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Title	Eastern Europe in the 1970s
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Description	The countries of the Soviet-dominated bloc in Eastern Europe have experienced important changes in the 1970s, collectively and severally. Having failed to establish an organic bond with its client states, the Soviet Union strengthened its hold on the area through the promulgation of the 'doctrine of limited sovereignty' sanctioned by armed force and engaged in an intensive military build-up in the northern and central parts of the European theatre. Soviet military presence in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary serves the dual purpose of buttressing Moscow's approach to East-West detente and policing the area under its domination. The suppression of the Prague Spring brought to an end an era of comprehensive official reformism which in the 1960s represented an attempt to remove inefficiency, and to attain moral legitimation. Substitute manoeuvres in the economy have been and are being tried but special precautions are being taken to prevent a spillover of economic experimentation into political institutions and processes. The economic pressures of the latter half of the 1970s, which are likely to continue into the next decade, may yet lead to renewed approaches to in-system reformism. The communist parties in the area have by now completed their evolution towards system maintenance ; the era of political and economic innovation within the Moscow-set limits is over. The leaderships, after three replacements of first secretaries early in the period (Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany), have maintained an equilibrium between 'ideologues' and 'technocrats' in their compositions. Aging of the leaderships has been observed, but it does not constitute the same problem as in the USSR. Material standards of the population have improved to the point where the lower threshold of affluence is within reach for large sections of the public. Having fully endorsed the policy of consumerism, the regimes interpret it as a source of legitimacy and a vital ingredient in the 'social contract' whereby political passivity is traded for material security. In the first half of the 1970s, under the combined influence of several factors, the economic performance was sufficiently satisfactory to sustain such consumerist, non-political orientation. The trend began to weaken around the middle of the decade, especially under the impact of the energy crisis. The old ills of command economy have once again affected economic stability and old-new tensions between performance and expectation re-emerged. After two decades of indecision and blind alleying in the Comecon, the 1970s have seen the introduction of intra-bloc economic integrationism, motivated-or so it seems-as much by the desire for political cohesion and central control as by practical economic requirements. In the framework of long-term 'target programs' to be pursued multilaterally by the Comecon, the most immediate 'integrated' activity consists in joint investment projects, mainly to extract and convey fuels and raw materials in and from the Soviet Union. While of doubtless benefit to the East European countries, these joint ventures cost them a great deal and reduce their domestic investment options. Normalization of relations with West Germany and a substantial increase in East-West trading are the two most tangible manifestations of the so-called detente in Eastern Europe. Importation of Western technology (but also grain by some countries) and the incurrence of large debts in the West have marked the end of the erstwhile notion that the communist and 'capitalist' economies would develop independently. While it cannot be said that the East European countries have become inextricably dependent on an in-flow of Western machinery, they do not seem to have progressed very far in acquiring a technological creativity of their own. From the middle of the decade, after some initial braggadocio, Eastern Europe has been badly hit by the energy crisis which created an almost irreconcilabl
Citation	スラヴ研究, 25, 85-125
Issue Date	1980
Doc URL	https://hdl.handle.net/2115/5098
Type	departmental bulletin paper
File Information	KJ00000113078.pdf

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EASTERN EUROPE IN THE 1970 s*

Vladimir V. Kusin

The decade after the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia has seen a number of important developments in Eastern Europe, some of which represent continuity with, and culmination of, previous trends while others came to being as a corollary of the suppression of the Prague Spring and yet others originated as a response to new circumstances. In their sum total, these changes have affected most of the basic determinants of the political system and its social, economic and ideological correlatives, albeit to a varying degree. They have also made an important impact on the private lives and value orientations of East European citizens. Finally, they have not remained without effect in the world communist movement.

Some observers, while acknowledging broad systemic continuity of the East European past and present, have suggested that a re-examination of certain fundamental perceptions of the East European politico-economic continuum is called for as a result of recent changes.

It is the purpose of this paper to identify these changes, to adduce a certain amount of evidence, such as is available to this writer at the place and moment of writing, to cite some opinions by Western scholars, and to comment on the importance of the developments in question[1].

The following developments will be considered:

1. Recognizing the failure of its long-stading plan to weld the bloc together through 'international relations of a new type', the Soviet Union felt it necessary in the wake of the Prague Spring to promulgate publicly the doctrine of limited sovereignty for the area, sanctioned by armed force. This coincided with the beginning of an intensive military build-up in the northern and central part of the East European theater. We can call this process a *strengthening of the military element of Soviet suzerainty.*

2. Another failure occurred in the sphere of democratizing and market-oriented reforms which had been making headway in the 1960 s. All these attempts have now been laid to rest while in Hungary, where the economic phase of the reform is permitted to continue, special precautions have been taken to prevent its spillover into political institutions and processes. Substitute manoeuvres in the economy have

* I wish to put on record my thanks to the Japanese Ministry of Education and to the academic and administrative staff of the Slavic Research Center at the University of Hokkaido in Sapporo. They have all made my research and writing of this paper not only possible, but also pleasant.

1) Only events in, and experience of, the following six countries of the 'bloc' are discussed in this article: Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. They are considered as a collectivity, except where otherwise stated.

however been and are being tried. This development represents *the end of an era of comprehensive official reformism* as an attempt to remove grievance and inefficiency, and to attain moral legitimation. Whether the belief in reformism can return for a new bout of in-system change-seeking is a matter of argument.

3. By the same token, the communist parties in the area have now virtually completed their progress away from innovation towards system maintenance, with special emphasis on economic coordination. Their role is now practically the same as that of non-political middle-level administrators; there is no innovation, long-range design, vision. In deference to established usage, this process can be somewhat inaccurately called *political technocratization.* (Technicians do not rule in Eastern Europe, but the party's concern is largely technical in the broad sense of the word.)

4. On almost all counts, but not in quite all areas of permissible comparison, material standards of the population have improved. Combined with the removal of reformism as an experiment in participation and with tighter coercive controls over the mind of the population, economic betterment has led to the *emergence of communist consumerism* as the dominant life-style and as the core issue of a social contract between the population which wants it and the government which encourages it.

5. After two decades of indecision and impasse in the Comecon, the 1970 s have seen the practical *introduction of intra-bloc economic integrationism* in the shape of joint investment programs, mainly in the extraction and conveyance of energy sources and raw materials in and from the Soviet Union,

6. Overcoming certain reluctance in some quarters, the East European regimes have embraced the *Soviet-led concept of detente with the West,* mainly in its commercial aspects and in adjusting their postures to the Federal Republic of Germany. East European role in the Soviet scheme of detente politics has, however, remained supplementary and supportive; no independent trail-blazing has been allowed, except in Romania and, monothematically, in the Poland-Vatican relations. Trade with the West has been the main content of detente insofar as Eastern Europe is concerned. The notion of 'two world economies' finally expired as the flow of machinery, grain, fodder and money proceeded eastwards.

7. From about the middle of the decade Eastern Europe has been badly affected by the *energy crisis,* both directly in cut-downs of delivery growth rates and energy bill increases, and indirectly by a shift in Soviet favour within the intra-bloc economic configuration. The emergence of the energy problem in fact conveniently divides East European economic history of the 1970 s into two halves: the assisted boom in the first, and the mounting difficulties and slow-down of the second. In the final instance it is the energy-based economic problems which threaten the future of the entire economic-political strategy operated by the Soviet Union and its East European clients.

8. Throughout the area (and in the Soviet Union) there have come into the open groups of *dissidents, oppositionists and change-seeking activists,* setting up an alternative network of communication for both systemic and in-system criticism and

protest. They express views of disaffected constituencies and promote non-conventional attitudes on a wide spectrum, the common denominator of which has become the human rights within a social-democratic framework. This activity is now internationalized with regard to the West where it has interacted with many left-wing political tendencies hitherto immune to, or deliberately oblivious of, the failings of Soviet-type socialism. Inside Eastern Europe it has introduced a new element of strife into politics and influenced official decision making. Special mention needs to be made of escalated Romanian deviation from established and newly laid-down precepts of intra-bloc behaviour.

STRENGTHENING THE MILITARY ELEMENT OF SOVIET SUZERAINTY

The death of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 marked the end of the roll-back strategy according to which *some* American politicians and *some* East European anti-communists believed that Soviet domination could be pushed out of Eastern Europe more or less by force. There followed a period in which store has been set by the gradual erosion of Soviet precepts, especially in those East European countries which are thought particularly unsuited to them. From the Kremlin's point of view this is a theory and practice of 'falling dominoes', as Aspaturian observed:

> ... de-Stalinization leads to 'separate roads' which proliferate into various 'national deviations', which may in turn inspire 'modern revisionism', which is but a prelude to 'social democracy', that quickly degenerates into 'bourgeois democracy' and the 'restoration of capitalism'[2].

When the sum-total of Prague Spring reforms — those actually effected and those on the drawing board — threatened to culminate in the establishment of a Czechoslovak Reform-Communist Party at its extraordinary congress, scheduled to convene on 9 September, Moscow saw the writing on the wall. This was it. Where Dulles failed, the gradualists were about to succeed. The dominoes were beginning to fall. And so troops and tanks were sent in to prop them up.

> Brezhnev told the Czechs in the Kremlin on 26 August 1968:
> Your country lies in an area which was occupied in the Second War by Soviet soldiers. We paid a high price in human sacrifice, and we shall not leave that area.... The results of the Second War are untouchable and we shall protect them even at the cost of a new war[3].

The perceived danger to 'the results of the Second World War' *from within* the reform-seeking communities in Eastern Europe was real enough to merit elevation

2) Vernon V. Aspaturian, 'East European Relations with the USSR' in Peter A. Toma, ed., *The Changing Face of Communism in Eastern Europe* (Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 1970), p. 302.

3) Brezhnev's remarks are given here as paraphrased by Zdeněk Mlynář, who was present on the occasion, in *Mráz přichází z Kremlu* (Cologne, Index, 1978), p. 306.

of the threat of military intervention to the level of normal inter-state comportment. Before Czechoslovakia, the most authoritative statement on the deployment of Soviet military force in Eastern Europe was included in the declaration of the Soviet government issued after the first — but before the second — military intervention in Hungary in 1956. The Soviet Union was then willing to discuss withdrawal of its troops which anyway could only be stationed outside the USSR 'by agreement among all its [i. e. Warsaw Pact] members and only with the consent of the state on the territory of which and at the request of which these troops are stationed'[4]. This Declaration was also unique in that it expressly affirmed the applicability of the principles of peaceful coexistence to the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe, not just to relations between 'socialist' and 'non-socialist' states.

It was, of course, an opportunist declaration, honoured in its breach barely a few days after it had been promulgated. Nonetheless, it stayed on the statute book, never having been countermanded by direct or indirect edict. The formulation of the theory of 'international relations of a new type', allegedly prevailing in Eastern Europe, long a favourite of ideologists, soon began, however, to include a reference to the Soviet Union's special role in the continuum of the bloc, such as had been a part of it during Stalin's time[5]. And of course what has not been revoked was the escape clause, used to justify both interventions in Hungary in 1956, namely the alleged legality of Soviet intervention if undertaken on request.

By the middle of 1968 the determining ingredients of the 'relations of a new type' were supplemented with a reference to the defence of socialist attainments as a common duty of the Warsaw Pact as a whole. The Czech reformers were told: 'This is no longer your affair alone'[6]. And at the time of the invasion in August, the escape hatch of the 1956 declaration was reactivated by the 'appeal for assistance', purportedly sent to Moscow by Czechoslovak Marxists-Leninists-Internationalists, whose signatures turned out, however, to be non-existent.

The somewhat unconvincing justificatory patchwork called for codification which was first provided in a *Pravda* article. It pointed out that sovereignty was not one-sided, that joint class interests must not be ignored, that general communist principles must be observed, and that every communist party was responsible for the indivisibility of 'world socialism'[7]. The final seal of authority came from L. I. Brezhnev in November 1968. While still classifying 'military assistance to a fraternal country' as an extraordinary measure, 'dictated by necessity', he expressed the newly promulgated doctrine as follows:

And when external and internal forces hostile to socialism try to turn the

4) *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, 31 October 1956, p. 1, as translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. VIII, No. 40, p. 11.

5) See for example M. E. Airpetian and V. V. Sukhodeev, *Novyi tip mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii* (Moscow, 1964).

6) Warsaw Letter of the Five, *Pravda*, 18 July 1968, p. 1, as translated by *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XX, No. 2, p. 4.

7) Sergei Kovalev in *Pravda*, 26 September 1968, p. 4.

> development of a given socialist country in the direction of restoration of the capitalist system, when a threat arises to the cause of socialism in that country — this is no longer merely a problem for that country's people, but a common problem, the concern of all socialist countries. ... Experience bears witness that in present conditions the triumph of the socialist system in a country can be regarded as final, but the restoration of capitalism can be considered ruled out only ... if the principle of socialist internationalism is held sacred and unity and fraternal solidarity with the other socialist countries are strengthened[8].

Sovereignty limited by consideration for guidelines laid down in Moscow has later been incorporated into preambles of some treaties concluded between the states of the bloc. It can now be regarded as a sufficiently established principle of intra-bloc 'relations of a new type' to be constantly available for use. This is not to say that the Soviet Union would not have perceived itself as possessing the right of intervention before the Brezhnev Doctrine was publicly formulated. The point is that it was seen necessary to crown the defeat of reformism with the anchoring of this Doctrine in the body of international socialist theory. What had been implicit before 1968 has become explicit, and no one should make any mistake of it.

Around the middle of the 1970 s the theory of 'a socialist commonwealth', displaying 'international relations of a new kind' and governed by special principles, such as the notion of limited sovereignty, has progressed still further by the development of the concept of 'real — or true — socialism'. (This sounds better in German: *Realsozialismus*.) The concept itself appears to be Moscow's reply to 'Eurocommunism' which has in fact been called 'the revisionism of the 1970 s'[9]. *Realsozialismus* embodies the 'lessons which have been corroborated by life, and which are therefore useful for the struggle of socialism under any historical condition'[10].

There have been obfuscation and tactical concessions, such as in 1976 when the notion of 'proletarian or socialist internationalism' became unacceptable to the Eurocommunists and was replaced in the document of the Berlin communist summit by 'international socialist solidarity', only to be vehemently advocated not much later, and ever since, in other Moscow-inspired international meetings and of course in materials *pro domo sua*. On the whole the delimitation of international communism has acquired by the end of the decade a certain duality or 'forked tongue syndrome'. Its tenets are formulated more guardedly in the presence of the Eurocommunists (and the Romanians and Yugoslavs), even when reference is made to the East European bloc, but with much greater abandon in materials destined for consumption in the countries of *Realsozialismus*. In the latter case, which no doubt represents the

8) Speech at 5 th Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party, *Pravda*, 13 November 1968; quoted from condensed translation in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XX, No. 46, p. 4.

9) *Rudé právo*, 15 December 1978, quoted in Radio Free Europe Background Report 20/79, p. 17.

10) Boris Ponomarev in *Pravda*, 13 December 1978, quoted in Radio Free Europe Background Report 20/79, p. 15.

laying down of law for the sphere of Soviet domination, there appear to be three quintessential features (of which any number of derivatives can be drawn):

— there exist certain characteristics of 'true socialism'[11],
— these characteristics are determined by, and cannot be altered without the consent of, the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party,
— where a transgression is deemed by Moscow to have occurred, a rectification by means of military force can be legitimately effected.

Since the rules of the game, changeable as they are, contain a strong ideological charge, we are now truly faced with the legalization of theoretical dispute as a *casus belli*. This potentiality makes international relations in Eastern Europe verily of a 'new type', except that their type is not so much new as old, pre-modern. Not only are they characterized by all the ills of non-socialist relations, such as 'economic disputes, military invasions, differences over foreign policies, charges of interference ..., seeking allies outside the nominal alliance, ruptures in relations and reconciliations'[12], but they can be even sharper because of their doctrinal substance, reminiscent of the Middle Ages when dogma ruled supreme[13].

Insofar as the means of delivering military retribution is concerned, there has never really been any doubt about the Soviet Union's possessing it. After 1968 this capability was further enhanced by the permanent stationing of five Soviet divisions on Czechoslovak territory, newly introduced into the area, and the strengthening of the order of battle of the other 26 Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe by some 20 per cent, a total increase in Soviet military manpower by some 130,000[14]. Over 9,000 of the 16,000 Warsaw Pact tanks in the area in 1976 were Soviet[15]. The 'northern tier' of the Warsaw Pact theater is now saturated with Soviet military might — personnel and firepower — more than ever before: some 400,000 men in East Germany, 30,000 in Poland, and 70,000 in Czechoslovakia. An additional 50,000 men are stationed in Hungary, counted as part of the 'southern tier'[16]. Reserves held ready in the Western military districts of the Soviet Union proper are also formidable, on the order of a further 31 divisions.

11) As recently postulated by Brezhnev in his speech on the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution, *Pravda*, 3 November 1978, pp. 2–3.
12) Zvi Gitelman, 'The Impact on the Soviet Union of the East European Experience in Modernization' in Charles Gati, ed., *The Politics of Modernization in Eastern Europe* (New York, Praeger, 1974), p. 269.
13) For an argument on this line see Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'Deviation Control: A Study in the Dynamics of Doctrinal Conflict', *American Political Science Review*, March 1962.
14) John Erickson, 'The European Military Balance' in Grayson Kirk and Nils H. Wessell, eds., *The Soviet Threat: Myth and Realities* (New York, The Academy of Political Science, 1978), p. 112.
15) John M. Collins and Anthony H. Cordesman, *Imbalance of Power* (San Rafael, Presidio Press, 1978), p. 229.
16) John Erickson, 'Soviet Theater-Warfare Capability' in L. L. Whetten, ed., *The Future of Soviet Military Power* (London, Macdonald and Jane's, 1976), pp. 126–8.

It is obvious that policing the East European *status quo* is not the only part these troops have been designed to play. The West has shown concern about the implication of the build-up of the 1970 s for the general state of East-West relations. To consider this dimension remains outside the scope of the present article. We must note, however, that the increase in the presence of Soviet troops, the higher frequency of military exercises, tightening of Warsaw Pact integration, and the emphasis placed in recent years on conventional military activity (as against and next to nuclear warfare)[17], have obviously improved Moscow's interventionist potential.

Experts have registered 'general Soviet confidence' in non-Soviet armed forces to whom the Soviet Union has provided 'an uninterrupted flow of highly modern war material'[18]. At the same time, specially trained non-Soviet units have been deployed alongside first-line Soviet troops, a move regarded by some observers — including the Romanians — as a step towards the creation of a mobile interventionist force that might be used within the Pact area, or even outside it[19].

Of the six countries of the bloc, Romania and Bulgaria have no Soviet troops stationed on their territory. It should be noted that, after a long planning history, a ferryboat connection on the Black Sea between the Bulgarian port of Varna and the Soviet port of Ilichevsk was set up between 1976 and 1978. The four ships currently in operation were built in Norway and Yugoslavia and have a payload of 12,900 tons each. It has been reported in the Western press that Romania was reluctant to permit the construction of a wide-gauge rail link through her territory, and so the ferry is of obvious significance. Each of the new ferry's flatcars can carry some 150 Soviet T-62 tanks. Manoeuvres in Bulgaria with Warsaw Pact participation can now be held; because of Romanian opposition the last such exercise took place in 1967[20].

END OF THE ERA OF OFFICIAL REFORMISM

What Wlodzimierz Brus calls 'second wave' economic reforms[21], were deliberate attempts by the party leaderships to eliminate grievance and inefficiency in a field which they recognized as having primary importance for the continued functioning of the system, through conceptual innovation rather than tinkering. Conceived around the middle of the 1960 s, the simplest common denominator of these efforts 'from above' lay in the idea of combining the plan and the market. Viewed from more specific angles, this basic notion turned out to be far from simple and easy when the designs were being worked out in detail and when the time came for them to

17) John Erickson, 'Soviet Military Posture and Policy in Europe' in Richard Pipes, ed., *Soviet Strategy in Europe* (New York, Crane, Russak & Comp., 1976), pp. 197–8.
18) *ibid.*, p. 202.
19) *ibid.*, p. 202.
20) See Radio Free Europe Bulgarian Situation Report, 4 December 1978, p. 3.
21) Wlodzimierz Brus, 'The East European Reforms: What Happened to Them?', *Soviet Studies*, April 1979, pp. 257–67.

descend from the drawing boards. Not only did the reformist orientation entail unforeseen difficulties and temporary adverse effects, but it also aroused a sense of political danger in the guardians of orthodoxy — always a suspicious breed. Will the economic changes not spill over into politics? Will the power of the party apparatuses not be eroded? Will the logical increase in commercial and technical contacts with the West not lead to the importation of perilous attitudes and practices?

The experience of the Prague Spring bolstered the case of the anti-reformist hawks as the Czechoslovak reformers were giving such answers to all the wary questions that could not but provide substance to the warnings. Yes, a comprehensive economic reform must entail certain political changes, mainly in the direction of less centralization of decision making. Yes, the party must give up a segment of its power for the sake of plurality in interest articulation, and the economic sphere must be taken away from everyday party control. Yes, modernization presupposes freer flow of innovative ideas from the advanced Western economies. The Prague Spring made the reforms — suspect in the eyes of the diehards even earlier — impracticable.

This is not to argue that Czechoslovak reformism was throttled because of its economic ingredient. In fact, it would have probably stayed alive, had it been confined to a moderate economic reform alone. Neither is it argued that a linear connection existed between the Czechoslovak counter-reformation and the other cases. (In the GDR, for example, the reform targets were de-scaled already in 1967.) Nevertheless, the baby went out with the bathwater. With one notable exception, that of Hungary, all the 'second wave' reforms were abandoned during the first half of the 1970 s.

A full return to an unadulterated command system has not, however, been staged. *Some* reformist measures have been retained and *some* devolution of economic decision making has been effected, notably to intermediate organizations rather than enterprises. What was sacrificed was the *totality* of reform sustained for an adequate period of time. What was preserved was a patchwork of measures and experiments thought to alleviate the ill-effects of rigid centralism. In addition, several new approaches have been introduced, none of them more important than the steep increase in the importation of Western technology on credit, with the evident purpose of modernizing manufacturing equipment. A Marxist move, although obviously pragmatic: a consistent and comprehensive market-oriented reform was ruled out of court because it was feared to undermine the 'socialist production relations', but a renovation of the more neutral 'means of production' — even with capitalist help — became authorized policy.

The post-reform economic mechanisms thus consist of an essentially command planning structure with some reformist features (incentives, profit, partial devolution, etc.) and with emphasis on technological re-equipment. The great surprise of the first half of the decade was that the recipe seemed to work. Table A shows official growth rates of Net Material Product (NMP) in annual average figures for the period 1970–76. Although somewhat smaller than for the previous five years, the progress was impressive enough and it must have strengthened the argument of those advocating

TABLE A AVERAGE ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH OF NMP 1970–71 TO 1975–76 (in per cent)

Country	1971–1975	1970–1976
Bulgaria	7.9	7.8*
Czechoslovakia	5.5	5.3
GDR	5.4	5.3
Hungary	6.2	6.0
Poland	9.7	9.3
Romania	11.3	11.2*
USSR	5.7	5.7

* 1970–1975

Source: For 1971–75 column, *SEV Statistichesky ezhegodnik 1976*, pp. 40–42
For 1970–76 column, *UN Statistical Yearbook 1977*, p. 740

abolition of comprehensive market-oriented reform designs.

All countries assigned priority growth targets to engineering and all but Bulgaria to chemical and rubber industries. All countries except Hungary continued to give preferential treatment to 'Group A' industries (means of production) over 'Group B' (consumer goods), even though the gap became somewhat narrower[22].

The economic success story of the first five years of the 1970 s received a rather rude jolt with the advent of the oil crisis. At first the East European leaders refused to recognize that they too might be affected, and some were distinctly cocky about the whole business. The Soviet Union, it was argued, had plentiful reserves and would go on buttressing the economies of its allies at low cost. The energy crisis was purely and simply a capitalist phenomenon. When this turned out not to be the case, the economic fortunes took a downward trend throughout the area. The growth rates are slowing down; the trade and payments balances present a problem; the energy balance is tight; the inflationary pressures are stronger.

One can only speculate whether a 'reformed' economy would have been able to withstand the tensions generated by the oil crisis better than an 'unreformed' one. The example of Hungary[23], the only country with a reformed economic mechanism, does not seem to point in that way unequivocally but, for one thing, it is early days yet and, for another, the Hungarian reform is young and to a large extent restricted by the unreformed milieu in which it is forced to operate. Be it as it may, there appears to be little doubt that the old, traditional defects of a command system are coming out to conspire with the new exigencies and that together they create once again a situation that calls for a more conceptual change. In a way, one is reminded of the early 1960 s, before the political oracles decreed that economic reform was

22) *SEV Statistichesky Ezhegodnik 1978*, p. 63.

23) It is difficult to say why the reform in Hungary has been allowed to survive, but its continued existence, even with wings clipped, is certainly a monument to the statesmanship of Hungarian leaders and a source of hope to others in the area.

acceptable.

There is at least one tremendous difference, which particularly the dissidents have been quick in pointing out. This time very little (if any) pressure for systemic reform on moral and political grounds is transpiring from inside the party. No more disenchanted insiders wishing to expiate their own sins committed when communism was being imposed on their societies. According to this line of reasoning, reformism is really and truly dead. I would question the validity of such judgment. The impossibility of a market-oriented *economic* reform does not follow from the absence of an ethically motivated constituency of revisionists inside the establishment. And it is surely better from the point of view of an alternative *political* arrangement to have an *economic* reform, albeit a 'technocratic' one, than to have none. Here the Hungarian case must be considered instructive: the country easily ranks as the most liberal of the bloc.

POLITICAL TECHNOCRATIZATION

A number of Western scholars observing the Soviet and East European political scene have noticed and some have even conceptualized the turning away of the ruling communist parties from the functions which they performed during the revolutionary introduction of communism and at the time when they were engaged in a radical transformation of the *ancien régime*. Now the system is established, no revolutions from above are needed. Instead, the system must be maintained and made to function. The economic reforms of the 1960s and possibly the endowment of communism with a human face were the last great transformatory schemes presented by the leaderships before their societies.

What the parties now propose to their populations 'is nothing but the indefinite continuation of the basic existing social relations and material progress'[24]. The ultimate role of the party 'may be a modified version of the familiar bargaining model with the party "brokering" between competing interests in the development process while reserving the right to intervene, when necessary, in the national interest'[25]. The party cadres have been likened to the established and self-satisfied middle classes of a bourgeois society, with whom they share 'a mistrust of all those who would question the established order, conventional morality, and the hallowed, traditional way of doing things'[26]. In short, in *Realsozialismus* the communist party has become an administrator and ceased being an innovator.

Except for the professional radicals, there is nothing particularly odious in this

24) Seweryn Bialer, 'The Soviet Political Elite and Internal Developments in the USSR' in William E. Griffith, ed., *The Soviet Empire: Expansion and Detente* (Lexington, D. C. Heath, 1976), p. 27.

25) Robert Sharlet, 'Introduction: Comparative Political Development in Eastern Europe', in Charles Gati, ed., *The Politics of Modernization in Eastern Europe*, pp. 44-5.

26) Joseph R. Fiszman, 'Poland: Continuity and Change' in Peter A. Toma, ed., *The Changing Face of Communism in Eastern Europe*, p. 81.

designation. The changing of roles is rooted in post-revolutionary logic. Once established, every system requires protection and maintenance. This the communist parties provide: they are preoccupied with economic matters[27], they have set up an elaborate system of reporting, filing and accountancy, their secretariats duplicate the ministerial structure and pre-decide all important governmental action, they have fortified their coercive legislation to regulate law and order, and so on. They look after themselves and after their creation — the system — as any 'capitalist company' does, only more forcefully.

The point at issue lies, however, elsewhere, namely in the tension between maintenance and performance, between stability and stagnation, between rigidity and creativity. Would the system work better if it was not fettered by the web of rules which its leaders have imposed in the name of stability? Brzezinski noted when writing about the Soviet Union:

> The political system, highly centralized but arrested in its development, is seen by some Soviet citizens as increasingly irrelevant to the needs of Soviet society, as frozen in an ideological posture that was a response to an altogether different age. ... Indeed, the ultimate irony is that the Soviet political system — having thrust Russia into the mid-industrial age — has now become the principal impediment to the country's further evolution[28].

To be even less charitable, one could perhaps suggest that all the processes of control and supervision whose maintenance is now vested into the communist parties could be just as easily assigned to the existing non-party bodies, such as governmental, social, economic and citizens' institutions and organizations. Even in the confines of the system, they would perform at least as well and probably better than the party does. They would most certainly provide greater satisfaction to the people who would make decisions and perhaps cause less suffering and injustice to those implementing them. There does not seem to be any need for 'a communist party of the new type' in Eastern Europe today. It should go away, having done its job, as Marx once suggested it would. Its absence would in fact be a financial bonus. But of course this is pure theory. One of the reasons why the communist party is 'of a new type', is its tenure of power in perpetuity.

All the communist parties in the area continued to grow numerically and to improve their social and age compositions, i. e. by recruiting industrial workers and young people. The growth appears to be measured, not unduly explosive, but still

27) Almost 90 per cent of central committee sessions are concerned with the economy, and the regular presentation of annual and five-year plans for scrutiny and approval by party bodies has become a ritual. Only Czechoslovakia in the first three post-invasion years, and to a lesser extent Poland in 1968 and then again in 1971, spent any length of time in the deliberations of top party organs on non-economic matters. The party seems to talk politics only when a crisis looms.

28) Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Between Two Ages. America's Role in the Technetronic Era* (New York, The Viking Press, 1970), pp. 138–9.

TABLE B COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP 1969–1976

Country	Year	CP membership	per cent of population	per cent growth base year–1976
Bulgaria	1971	699, 476	8.0	12.9
	1976	789, 793	9.0	
Czechoslovakia	1971	cca 1, 200, 000	8.4	15.2
	1976	1, 382, 860	9.3	
GDR	1971	1, 909, 859	11.0	7.0
	1976	2, 043, 697	12.1	
Hungary	1971	693, 000	6.4	10.5
	1976	765, 700	7.2	
Poland	1969	cca 2, 270, 000	7.0	10.1
	1976	cca 2, 500, 000	7.2	
Romania	1969	2, 089. 085	10.0	23.4
	1976	2, 577, 434	12.1	
USSR	1970	cca 14, 524, 000	6.0	8.1
	1976	15, 694, 187	6.1	

Source: Aspaturian, V. V., 'The Soviet Impact on Development and Modernization in Eastern Europe' in Gati, C., ed., *The Politics of Modernization in Eastern Europe* (New York, Praeger, 1974), p. 232; and Staar, R. F., ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1977* (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1977), various pages.

faster than the growth of the respective populations. The Romanian party has been accepting new members at the fastest rate, the East German at the slowest.

Data on the percentage of the various social groups among party memberships are notoriously difficult to assemble; in some countries such figures (as indeed other information pertaining to party members) are still treated as classified information and the criteria as to who belongs in what group differ. From what is available one can perhaps suggest that some 40 per cent of members are 'workers' (possibly somewhat more in the GDR and Hungary), though it is by no means clear whether 'currently practising' or 'by original occupation'. Another 40–45 per cent are 'white collar' employees (variously styled), except in Bulgaria, East Germany and Romania where their numbers are said to be smaller, from 25–30 per cent. It is of course this social group that includes the power-wielding *apparatchiki*. The rest are farmers (still a sizeable proportion in Bulgaria and Romania) and 'others'.

All parties are quite logically multi-layer organisms but the individual layers are impossible to measure. From experience and on the example of Czechoslovakia whose 'normalization' after the defeat of reformism has revealed more about some internal party-building processes than is usually the case, one can suggest that there exists an inner core, or 'hard' core, of members who are themselves employees of the party. In Czechoslovakia they would *probably* number about ten per cent of the total membership. This group of *apparatchiki* proper is naturally further diversified, reflecting the difference, say, between the district secretary and the night watchman in his office. Around this core group there would be a sizeable constituency of members who hold offices in other *apparats* (the state, the armed forces, the economy, the trade unions, the political organizations, etc.) numbering *perhaps* another 20–25

per cent of the total membership. These too are *apparatchiki*, albeit of other than the party hue. A further group, *possibly* some 30–35 per cent strong, would include members who hold non-*apparat* jobs (manual or otherwise) but at the same time 'perform a (political) function' which more or less directly derives from the existence of the *apparats*. These 'functions' are part-time, quasi-elected, and unpaid but they bind the holder over to a degree of disciplined and active behaviour. I doubt there are more than 40 per cent members in the ruling communist parties today, and probably fewer, whose commitment to the party policy stems from outside the field of duty generated by their job or by the 'function' they hold. In this outer circle of 'loose' party members, the differentiation criterion rests in career consideration. In other words: even if not statutorily required, does it serve my (my family's) career prospects if I am a member? There is no way to measure this phenomenon[29].

Insofar as the party leaderships are concerned, the last decade showed stability rubbing shoulders with turnover. One would note the achievement of a certain equilibrium between the 'revolutionaries' (or ideologues) and the political and economic 'technicians' in the highest party bodies. This again is a balance that cannot be adequately quantified, even though respectable attempts have been made[30]. I am a little wary of carving out catalogue slots for people whose roles in high-level decision making involve them in a great deal of quid-pro-quo politicking inside the bodies of which they are members. Education, experience and current position are of course helpful yardsticks but one suspects that a good many decisions are made outside the typecast pattern. Nevertheless, the nature of the 'red-expert' relation in East European party leaderships has been well summarized in the following quote:

> The results of this analysis [i. e. a painstaking comparison of various characteristics of East European leaderships] contradict the view that economic needs and constraints are the most direct and predominant causes of change in the elite structures of communist states. Actually, the top political leadership in each country is concerned with a far wider range of issues, and non-economic concerns have a more immediate impact on the make-up of the communist elites. ... Thus elite composition ... is not a unidirectional, linear pattern in conjunction with the modernization of communist societies. The causes of change are multiple, and include economic, political and social factors. ... [Change] is not a fixed sequence in favour of specialized elites to the detriment of political professionals. Rather changes in the political leadership systems are characterized by a zig-zag course, with frequent reversals and restarts brought about by the actions of the political leadership[31].

29) For results of the polling of Soviet Jewish emigres on this and related questions, see Aryeh L. Unger, 'Images of the CPSU', *Survey*, No. 4, 1977–78, pp. 23–34. My own calculations of the 'normalization' party build-up in Czechoslovakia are in Vladimir V. Kusin, *From Dubček to Charter 77* (Edinburgh, Q Press, 1978), pp. 179–89.

30) R. Barry Farrell, 'Top Political Leadership in Eastern Europe' in R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (Chicago, Aldine, 1970).

31) Jacob Bielasiak, *Political Change and Economic Development: A Study of Elite Composition in Eastern Europe* (Doctoral Dissertation, Cornell University, 1975), pp. 344–5.

The parties may be turning into organizations of 'prefects' but not all the prefects are primarily concerned with economic modernization. One could perhaps add that a symbiosis, albeit imperfect, between the 'revolutionaries' and the 'experts', remains a source of leadership stabillity and barring unforeseen circumstances will continue to do so in the future. Even the Czechoslovak 'normalizers' had to tread warily when creating the post-Dubček leadership, lest the country was brought to a standstill by an over-representation of the more primitive intransigents.

Turnover in party leaderships[32] has been, however, considerable. Continuity and replacement rates are given in Tables C and D.

TABLE C LEADERSHIPS: CONTINUITY RATE FROM 1969 TO 1978-9

A = Percentage of members holding a seat on any one of the leading bodies (politburo full members; politburo alternates; secretariat) in 1978-9 who already held a seat on any one of these bodies in 1969

B = Number of such continuing incumbents and total number of leadership members in 1978-9

C = Average age in 1978-9 of such continuing incumbents

Country	A	B	C
Bulgaria	37.5	9 of 24	65.6
Czechoslovakia	40	8 of 20	56.6
GDR	55.6	15 of 27	62.5
Hungary	40	8 of 20	62.2
Poland	29.2	7 of 24	59.1
Romania	46.5	20 of 43	57.9

TABLE D LEADERSHIPS: REPLACEMENT RATE FROM 1969 TO 1978-9

A = Percentage of members holding a seat on anyone of the leading bodies in 1969 who no longer held a seat on any one of these bodies in 1978-9

B = Number of replaced persons and total number of leadership members in 1969

C = Average age in 1969 of subsequently replaced persons

Country	A	B	C
Bulgaria	60.9	14 of 23	54.6
Czechoslovakia	50	8 of 16	51.6
GDR	31.8	7 of 22	58.1
Hungary	52.9	9 of 17	51.8
Poland	61.1	11 of 18	56.5
Romania	35.5	11 of 31	53*

* one person's age not known; N=10

32) 'Leadership' is here defined as the group of singly counted members of the politburo (full and alternate) and the central committee secretariat (both those styled 'secretaries' and 'members of secretariat'). In the case of Romania, the whole Political Executive Committee is counted (members and alternates) and the secretariat.

It follows that — in these terms — the leadership of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands has been the most stable, and that the Polish United Workers' Party experienced the highest turnover[33]. As both East Germany and Poland witnessed ousters of their general secretaries (coincidentally two of the most veteran figures in these exalted positions), the lie seems to be given to the assumption that when the boss goes the heads roll. This was not the case of the Ulbricht-Honecker switch, but it might have been the one exception that confirms the rule. In Czechoslovakia the tables do not reflect the Dubček-Husák change (the third fall of a leader during the decade under scrutiny), but rather the stability or otherwise of the post-reformist leadership. If we were to compare the pre-invasion Czechoslovak leadership with the one in office today, we would find only 20 per cent of survivors (four of twenty).

Incidentally, talking about changes of 'supreme leaders', i. e. first or general secretaries, a somewhat simplified count which smoothes the edges of not quite clear cases and bothers with only years of the comings and goings, rather than months, reveals that there have been 19 cases of succession involving 26 leaders in the USSR and Eastern Europe since these countries became ruled by communist parties[34]. Of the 19 successions, 10 were occasioned by ouster, 8 by death, and only one by 'voluntary' resignation. (Ochab in 1956 : a borderline case between resignation and deposition.) Only one deposed leader was executed (Nagy), but two deaths are related to momentous events in the communist world (Gottwald and Bierut), and one or two may be suspect. Two countries experienced ousters only, but no deaths : Hungary three times and East Germany once. While the Soviet Union has had five leaders and the average length of tenure for each of them was 12.4 years (the sequence is taken to include Lenin-Stalin-Malenkov-Khrushchev-Brezhnev), the respective figures for the East European bloc countries are : Bulgaria 4 leaders (average tenure 8.5 years), Czechoslovakia 5 (6.8), GDR 2 (17), Hungary 4 (8.5), Poland 4 (8.5), and Romania 2 (17).

Although all East European leaderships have become somewhat older in the past ten years, age composition does not play the same role as in the Soviet Union and neither does it seem to be one of the root causes of the unwillingness to engage in new political and economic departures. Rather it is the Soviet leadership's geriatric problem which extends itself over to the East Europen parties, thoroughly dependent on Moscow for any major initiatives as they are.

Table E shows the age composition of the leaderships and Table F gives a more detailed breakdown into the three leading bodies.

33) The Bulgarian changes of July 1979 were made after all the calculations had been completed, and are not taken into account. If they were, the Bulgarian leadership would show a still higher rate of turnover than the computations given here already do. Three new full politburo members, two candidates and two new secretaries were appointed. Three of the seven are newcomers to the leadership while the four others were shifted upwards from one leading body to another. For a detailed description see Radio Free Europe Bulgarian Situation Report, 30 July 1979.

34) 1917 in the Soviet Union and 1945 in Eastern Europe, again a simplification.

TABLE E AGE COMPOSITION OF PARTY LEADERSHIPS IN 1969 AND 1978–9

Country	1969		1978–9	
	N	Average age	N	Average age
Bulgaria	25	55.3	24	57.1*
Czechoslovakia	16	49.6	20	53.9
GDR	22	55	27	58.2
Hungary	17	52.5	20	55.9
Poland	18	53.7	24	54.2
Romania	31	48	43	55.9**

* Age of one member unknown; calculated from N=23
** Age of four members unknown; calculated from N=39

TABLE F AGE COMPOSITION OF LEADING PARTY BODIES IN 1969 AND 1978–9

Country	Politburo Full Members				Politburo Alternate Members				Secretariat			
	1969		1978–9		1969		1978–9		1969		1978–9	
	N	Average age	N	Average age	N	Average age	N	Average age	N	Average age	N	Average age
Bulgaria	11	61.2	11	59.7	6	51.7	4	57.2	10	52.5	13	53.5*
Czechoslovakia	11	51.7	11	56.6	2	44	2	54.5	8	47.1	11	53.4
GDR	15	60.9	19	61.7	6	42.7	8	49.9	10	53.9	11	59.1
Hungary	11	53.9	15	57.7	4	51	0		6	48.8	8	53.5
Poland	12	55.9	14	57.5	4	51.2	3	49	9	52.8	12	51.3
Romania 'Permanent'**	8	51.6	11	56.2	11	43.9***	14	54.2+	7	45.6	9	55.7++
Romania 'PEC'+++	20	52.5	26	56.9*								

* Age of one member unknown; calculated from N=12
** 'Permanent Presidium' in 1969 and 'Permanent Bureau' in 1978. 'Alternates' are candidates of the Executive Committee, not the 'permanent' bodies
*** Age of one member unknown; calculated from N=10
\+ Age of one member unknown; calculated from N=13
++ Age of three members unknown; calculated from N=6
+++ 'Political Executive Committee'
* Age of one member unknown; calculated from N=25

For comparison, the top agencies of political power in the Soviet Union were ten or more years older in 1978 than their East European counterparts. According to Bialer's calculations the average ages in that year were: 68.1 for politburo full members, 64.7 for alternates, and 66 for secretaries[35].

The 'inner core' of the politburos, defined here as the group of full members who are at the same time secretaries of the committee (i. e. not just 'members of secretariat'), is of course older than the average member, except in Bulgaria (before

35) Seweryn Bialer, 'Succession and Turnover of Soviet Elites', *Journal of International Affairs*, Fall-Winter 1978, p. 189.

TABLE G AVERAGE AGE OF 'INNER CORE' MEMBERS OF POLITBUROS 1969 AND 1978–9

Country	1969		1978–9	
	N	Average age	N	Average age
Bulgaria	3	54	4	53.5
Czechoslovakia	4	48.5	3	61.3
GDR	7	57.7	8	61.9
Hungary	4	49.2	3	58.3
Poland	5	57	4	54.5
Romania	4	45.5	2	59.5

the recent changes) and Poland where it actually became younger during the 1970 s.

A further delving into the age statistics reveals that it is now the 55 and over, rather than the under 55 group, in which the reins of power are concentrated. There are, however, deviations from the trend. Full members of the politburos are generally older than alternates and secretaries. Persons newly coopted into the leaderships in the 1970 s are usually younger than the average age, but not unduly so. The 50–59 age group is the most favoured for cooptations, while the politically surviving incumbents have either already passed, or are shortly about to pass, into the 60–69 group.

An unweighted average age of all the six East European leaderships rose from 52.3 years in 1969 to 55.9 in 1978–9; these are almost exactly the average figures for Hungary.

EMERGENCE OF COMMUNIST CONSUMERISM

It was to be expected. Despite defects, shortages and waste, sustained economic mobilization and build-up have had to reach a point where material satisfaction of the population's needs begins to be regarded as the regime's achievement, rather than an issue on which its failings can be demonstrated. The 1970 s may yet to be remembered as the decade in which the East European societies have approached the lower threshold of what is somewhat vaguely called 'the affluent society'.

This development is of course accompanied by a number of question marks, especially when measured against the cost in sacrifice and suffering or when likened to material progress in comparable non-communist societies. Similarly, the balance between the positive aspects of a growth in the standard of living and the negative aspects of a political *diktat* remains precarious and open to argument. Many East Europeans are aware of the limitations:

> In spite of the radical transformation that has taken place, not enough has been achieved. The past is still too much in the present, as is evident, for instance, in the relatively low standard of living. Creating a modern and socialist society is still a task for the future connected not only with economic growth but with

positively correlating a rising standard of living and social reforms with economic efficiency[36].

The same author calls Eastern Europe 'a quasi-developed economy', but on the popular level some question marks have tended to disappear. Consumption of food is up, equipment of households with durables has improved, health and other social provisions are available, the rate of motorization has been on the rise, light entertainment and recreation are widespread, there is money to be earned and spent. Many people 'have never had it so good' and they care less about the moot question of whether they would have been still better off under different circumstances.

The attainments are, however, watched by the public jealously and so is the failure of governments to act quickly enough in order to effect improvements or to arrest a slide-back. The Polish workers brought one leader down in 1970 and almost toppled another in 1976 because the ratchet-type movement towards higher living standards threatened to stop. The Valea Jiului miners in Romania struck in 1977 to express dissatisfaction with a new pension law, the pay policy, the need to work overtime without adequate compensation, the poor food supplies in their area, and the obsolete equipment in the mines. Once achieved, consumer satisfaction must not be allowed to deteriorate; it is taken for granted and, as befits the communist pattern, the public makes the government responsible for maintaining it.

Neither is consumer satisfaction a simple result of improved performance and higher output in state-owned economies. The amount of moonlighting in Poland is proverbial and throughout the region 'corrupt' practices have mushroomed in recent years, e. g. black marketeering, bribery, nepotism, under-the-counter sales, misappropriation of property etc. This is true even about countries where such phenomena were not widespread in the past, for example Czechoslovakia. In a letter from Prague, dated 1977, a dissident wrote:

> Never has this 'second market' combined with corruption been so widespread as during the past eight years. Today even a member of the government will take a bribe, and so will a party official who holds power, and a university professor no less than the sales and purchasing managers, medical doctors and shop assistants. They will take money in order to be able to bribe others. They will take money because their superiors do the same. They will take money in order to be able to pass it on to their superiors in exchange for their favour[37].

Whatever its accompanying features, consumerism has arrived. Its emergence in the 1970 s has coincided with a recession in political reformism occasioned, among other things, by Moscow's fear that the Prague Spring might be repeated elsewhere. It is the combination of officially encouraged and popularly accepted consumer-orien-

36) György Ránki, 'Has Modernity Made a Difference?' in Charles Gati, ed., *The Politics of Modernization in Eastern Europe*, p. 326.

37) *Listy* (Rome), No. 3-4, 1977, p. 20.

tation with the sense of political frustration that gives a special flavour to East European attitudes today. Even Marx would presumably not be very happy about the 'new man' whose contours are emerging. He is as acquisitive as his counterpart who lives under 'capitalism'; he has to show more deviousness and less morality to achieve material wellbeing, but cannot assert himself freely in the sphere of ideas, be they political or cultural. Still, the blend of material satisfaction and political passivity is a new phenomenon in an area which hitherto saw the combination of both material and spiritual disaffection.

For the leaderships, this is a godsend. 'Effective consumerism, or the improvement of the citizen's lot, is one of the party's important counterweapons in maintaining political stability'[38]. In consumerism they have found a more than welcome basis of legitimation, and their propagandists have not ceased to press the point home with renewed vigour[39].

This may be the place to mention some demographic developments in Eastern Europe in the past decade. Briefly, the changes that have come to the fore concern first of all a further decline in birth rates in Bulgaria, the GDR and Romania, but their growth in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. In the long run, a projection to the year 2000 shows a decrease in the 0–14 age group for the entire area, a stagnation in the productive 15–59 age group, and an increase in the 60-plus group. The same tendencies apply to the Soviet Union[40]. The practical implication lies above all in the evident non-availability of new labour force inputs for extensive economic development. Neither is there enough manpower in the traditional target spheres of mobilization, viz. women (in which group the saturation employment levels have been reached) and farmers (who form the oldest age group of productive manpower and whose numbers have dwindled to the lowest necessary level, except perhaps in Bulgaria and Romania). Already growth rates of industrial employment have begun to fall off (except in Romania and East Germany).

More specifically, while demographic replacement at its relatively moderate level will in the long run be virtually the only determinant of the size and composition of the labour force, the transition period from an 'extensive' to an 'intensive' labour market is marked by attempts to regulate the discrepancy between labour supply and labour demand through increased mobility between and within enterprises. Labour turnover (frowned upon, but tolerated) is the highest among young people with low skills and short service, in auxiliary rather than basic activities, in developing rather than developed regions, and in sectors with relatively unfavourable working conditions

38) John P. Hardt, 'Soviet Economic Capabilities and Defense Resources' in Grayson Kirk and Nils H. Wessell, eds., *The Soviet Threat: Myths and Realities*, p. 131.

39) Christopher Cviic, 'Soviet-East European Relations' in Richard Pipes, ed., *Soviet Strategy in Europe*, pp. 118–9, calls it 'indirect legitimacy', consisting of the approval of the political *status quo* by the West and of material improvements.

40) All according to the 'most likely variant' in United Nations *Economic Survey of Europe in 1974*, Part II, (New York, UN, 1975), p. 178.

and remuneration[41].

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

The moves towards bloc cohesion through integrationist policies in the economic field which have been put into effect in the 1970 s are probably motivated by concern for non-recurrence of reformist deviation as much as by the belief that a unified economic system in the bloc can be established, under central command, to benefit all and each of the members. The Comecon tried integration in the past, without much success; now the real thing has started.

The Brezhnev Doctrine, the firmer Soviet grip on military integration of the Warsaw Pact, the intensification of ideological supervision and the economic integration are all parts of a structured desideratum to the pursuit of which the Soviet Union has devoted much attention and energy. One might add that the shortage of oil and gas which became an important factor in the middle of the decade, while creating problems and even engendering some tension in intra-bloc relationships, also acts in the general direction of greater dependence on the Soviet Union, thus enhancing the obedience coefficient in the integration design.

Western observers have been quick to point out that the interdependence of the 1970 s has some new features against the previous periods:

> ... in the economic sense at least, Eastern Europe needs the Soviet Union more than the Soviet Union needs it, especially now [after the oil price rises] that Russia is better able to pay for its own imports of technology and know-how from the West. Indeed, in the new pattern of economic relations that is emerging in the mid-1970 s, an important new instrument of political control has been put into the Russians' hands[42].

And the argument has been taken even further:

> It could be argued ... that by the end of the 1960 s Eastern Europe had been transformed from an economic asset into an economic liability for the Soviet Union[43].

Generally one tends to divest oneself of liabilities, not to establish a still closer interaction with them. Why then does Moscow insist on integration bordering on absorption? Zvi Gitelman says:

> But even if the cost of association with Eastern Europe along present lines becomes very high in economic and political terms, the cost of dissociation might

41) See for example László Köszegi, 'Labour Turnover and Employment Structure in European Socialist Countries', *International Labour Review*, No. 3, 1978, pp. 305-18.

42) Cviic, *op, cit.*, p. 113.

43) Andrzej Korbonski, 'Eastern Europe and the Soviet Threat' in Grayson Kirk and Nils H. Wessell, eds., *The Soviet Threat: Myths and Realities*, p. 71. See also Korbonski in *Perceptions: Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union* (Washington, U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1979), p. 161, and Melvin Croan in *ibid.*, p. 137.

well be higher. The Soviets would stand to lose not only clients and reliable allies but prestige, ideological self-confidence, and standing in the world communist movement. As Alexander Dallin said fifteen years ago: 'Moscow must hold on to the satellite sphere even if it hurts'[44].

Asset or liability, the policy line of the present Soviet leadership clearly and unequivocally follows the one overriding objective which their spokesmen have expressed on many previous occasions:

> ... the calculations of those who want to break off even one single link from the socialist commonwealth are shortsighted and futile. The socialist commonwealth will not permit this to happen. The commonwealth of socialist states is an indissoluble entity. ... For the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government, for the Soviet people, there is no more sacred cause in the field of foreign policy than strengthening the commonwealth of socialist countries. Defence of the gains and solidarity of the socialist states is our sacred duty, to which our country will be loyal through any ordeals ...[45]

On the part of the Soviet Union, hanging on to Eastern Europe in spite of purported economic disadvantage is not, however, a blind exercise in self-destruction. Everything seems to be done to minimize the economic cost.

Integration within Comecon, long an elusive goal foundering on ill-conceived aspirations as well as on nationalist opposition, began in earnest with the 1971 Comprehensive Program. It proceeds essentially on three lines: through joint planning of certain production activities, through long-term 'target programs' pursued in coordinated fashion, and through joint investment projects, especially in the fuel extraction in the USSR and its transportation westwards. (These projects are a specific function of the 'target programs'.)

All European member countries of Comecon are now including in their five-year plans special sections to set out ways and means for joint activities. 'Target programs' are now in train in five areas: fuel, energy and raw materials; agriculture and food; engineering; consumer durables; and transport. The most extensively pursued area of collaboration consists, however, of joint investment activity from which the Soviet Union derives the greatest and most immediate benefit. Twenty-eight such projects were scheduled for the 1976–80 planning period at the cost of over 9,500 million transferable rubles (about US $ 14.5 billion), half of the cost to be covered by the East Europeans and the other half by the Soviets[46]. For the ensuing ten years the present estimate of the cost of joint investment projects stands at up to 86,000 million transferable rubles (about US $ 130 billion)[47].

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44) Zvi Giteman, *op. cit.*, p. 271.

45) A. A. Gromyko's address to the Supreme Soviet, *Pravda*, 28 June 1968, as translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol, XX, No. 28, p. 14.

46) N. Faddeev in *Izvestiya*, 4 January 1979.

47) Yu. S. Shiraev, director of the Comecon Institute for Economic Problems, as quoted by

Whereas the commitment of funds by individual East European countries depends on the direct share of the output which each country is to receive from the respective projects, the overall credit extended to the Soviet Union by the East European governments in this way is formidable in size: US $ 1,500 million p. a. until 1980, and US $ 6,500 million p. a. from 1980–1990. To this must be added what amounts to an interest subsidy, i. e. the difference between the Comecon rate of interest of two per cent and the prevailing Euromarket rates (about 11 per cent at the moment) which Moscow would have to pay if it looked for funds outside Eastern Europe. Were this the case, the cost of the projects, before they would start paying off, would be some 70 per cent higher.

Finally one would have to add the losses in investment credit values due to inflation: investments are valued at the time the credits are committed, whereas barter repayment is valued at the much later moment when the new undertakings begin production[48].

> An astute analyst has summed up the situation as follows:
> Economically less developed member states and those that are implementing extensive modernization programs or are facing extensive restructuring of their economies are discovering that the burden imposed by joint investments is restricting their domestic options. This is already a serious problem for several East European countries and has become more acute because of the deteriorating economic situation in Eastern Europe. This deterioration could have a dual effect. It could, on the one hand, further increase East European economic dependence on the Soviet Union, thereby making resistance to Soviet demands more difficult. On the other hand, it could undermine the East European countries' ability to contribute their full share (as seen by the Soviets) to the joint economic effort. Once again, therefore, the great Soviet dilemma in Eastern Europe shows itself: the inability to combine control with viability. When one is present, the other is threatened. The two have so far proved incompatible[49].

Economic integration of the Comecon states in Eastern Europe is thus a three-fold process: an important factor of political control over the area, a vehicle to obtain East European subsidy for Soviet investment activity, and a would-be answer to everybody's problems in the energy field. *Qui vivra verra.*

Two quotations to end this section. Charles Gati appears to believe in the principle of long-term reciprocal beneficiality of closer economic ties between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union:

Harry G. Trend, 'Dramatic Increases in Comecon Joint Investments Planned', Radio Free Europe Background Report 59/79, p. 2.

48) Harry G. Trend, *ibid.*, p. 3.

49) James F. Brown, 'Thirty Years of Comecon', Radio Free Europe Background Report 8/79, p. 6. For a summary look at East European economic problems see also H. G. Trend, 'Comecon at the Beginning of 1977', Radio Free Europe Background Report 65/77.

> If there was a time when Moscow, overlooking local needs, could impose its will and exploit these countries for short-term gain, such a Soviet approach now would only exacerbate economic problems and ignite political explosions. Today the Soviet Union has a genuine, vested interest in the viability and prosperity of the East European economies — because its trade with Eastern Europe is essential to the Soviet economy, because Moscow needs increased East European military contributions to the modernization and general upgrading of the Warsaw Pact, and because serious East European economic problems create political tension...[50]

Nish Jamgotch has no great faith in the beneficence of integration:

> ... the presence of a disparately large member, i. e. the Soviet Union, in practice hampers success. ... Programs for integrating several fragile East European economies and the Soviet Union's self-sufficient economy cold only mean extreme dependency at best and absorption at worst[51].

In my view the crucial question of the 1970 s is the one singled out by James F. Brown in the long quotation above, namely the aggravation of the dilemma between tight control and viability. The Soviet Union obviously has opted for a ride on both horns. One might add that Moscow is not benignly footing the whole bill. The East Europeans are subsidizing both control over themselves, which is a certain thing, and their own viability, which is far more precarious.

DETENTE

The conclusion of agreements between West and East Germany and between the Great Powers about Germany ushered in the era of detente for Eastern Europe at the beginning of the decade. Insofar as detente's cornerstone lies in the establishment or maintenance of a strategic nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United States, Eastern Europe has remained largely a passive onlooker and a theater in which some aspects of the nuclear scenarios get a dry run[52]. As regards the sub-strategic military ingredient of detente, Eastern Europe's part is a more active one, especially in three areas: 1. The region has been chosen to sustain a large conventional military build-up by the Soviet Union and has thus enhanced its standing as the prime potential theater of war. 2. The Vienna talks on mutual troops reduction have been largely kept in a state of suspended animation, with the two participating sides alternating in showing interest and disinterest in the achievement of practical results. 3. Czechoslovakia and Poland remained on the list of important exporters

50) Charles Gati in *Perceptions: Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union*, p. 148.

51) Nish Jamgotch, Jr., 'Soviet Foreign Policy Perspectives' in James A. Kuhlman, ed., *The Foreign Policies of Eastern Europe: Domestic and International Determinants* (Leyden, Sijthoff, 1978), p. 52.

52) Viz., the deployment of semi-strategic SS-20 s, mobile and MIRVed, and the gothic propaganda campaign about the 'neutron bomb'.

of arms to the Third World. Czechoslovakia ranked tenth in the list of suppliers for 1970–76, the total value of her arms exports in this period being US $ 87 million at constant 1975 prices, or. 0.3 per cent of the world total. Poland is the only other bloc country, other than the USSR, to make the list, ranking 14th, with US $ 30 million or 0.1 per cent of the world total, to her credit[53]. East Germany began to use her training facilities and instructors in support of Soviet military ventures in the various trouble spots. At present she is said to have 9,000 skilled cadres (soldiers and advisers) in Africa and the Middle East[54]. It is estimated that Eastern Europe, not including the Soviet Union, supplied arms to the less developed countries worth US $ 1,445 million from 1968 to 1977 as against US $ 685 million during the preceding 14 years, from 1954 to 1967[55]. In fact, 48 per cent of all East European arms exports for the past 23 years, since they began, were effected from 1973 to 1977.

The establishment of diplomatic relations between the East European countries and the Federal Republic of Germany proceeded smoothly, with the exception of Czechoslovakia which, immersed as she has been throughout this period in the re-instatement of dogmatism in all walks of life, made her favours dependent on a legal disentanglement of some problems arising from the Munich *Diktat* of 1938. In retrospect, this was a mere hiccup in what otherwise amounted to a long overdue exercise. Without question, the main practical outcome has been the stepping up and regularization of trade. West Germany has become the major non-socialist trading partner of all the East European countries by a solid and sustained margin. Of the total West European imports from the European Comecon area, valued at US $ 18,890 million in 1975, West Germany's share amounted to 4,568 million dollars, or two-and-a-half times as the next Western partner's (Italy). In exports West German lead was still more pronounced: 8,051 million dollars of the total of 23,396 million, or more than three times as much as France, the next ranking exporter. In both exports and imports West German totals were far above those for the United States, Canada and Japan as well[56]. A good deal of economic benefit also derives from tourist traffic and other exchanges. A livelier cultural exchange scheme is being operated than previously, but one has the feeling that neither side has been pushing this activity too hard. (Romania is an exception, but only in certain respects. For example, the number of West German students at Romanian universities has increased sharply from 1969 to 1974.)

Of a less tangible character is the attendant disappearance of the danger of West German 'militarism and revanchism', until 1971 the main alleged external peril, especially in Poland, Czechoslovakia and of course the GDR, around which the ideo-

53) *SIPRI Yearbook 1978* (London, Taylor & Francis, 1978), p. 226.
54) William F. Robinson, 'Eastern Europe's Presence in Black Africa', Radio Free Europe Background Report 142/79, p. 9.
55) *CIA Handbook of Economic Statistics 1978*, p. 73.
56) United Nations *Economic Survey of Europe in 1976*, Part I, (New York, UN, 1977), p. 126.

logical mobilization of orthodox vigilance had pivoted. Suffice to remember that as late as 1969 the West German bugbear was unashamedly paraded before the public eye as one of the instrumental reasons for military intervention in Czechoslovakia. Moscow of course presents the German *Ostpolitik* as a victory of its own *Westpolitik*[57] and, by implication, as the taming of the predator, but the fact remains that operating an ideological scarecrow in the field of foreign policy has now become a more selective exercise insofar as the league table of villains is concerned. A distinction is now being made, albeit often hazy, between detente-inclined and detente-opposed 'circles' in the West. 'American imperialism' has been similarly parcelled out before it is handled by the propagandists. China, Israel and, for several years after the downfall of Allende, Chile, have become the undivided objects of pillory, together with Soviet and East European émigrés. This may have made Soviet foreign policy and propaganda more flexible and pragmatic, especially with regard to the Western world, but it has also obfuscated certain ideological tenets which served well in a black-and-white form for many previous years.

My reading of the effect of the Helsinki Declaration and the acceptance of the United Nations covenants on human rights by the bloc sees a miscalculation on the part of the Soviet Union and its East European clients. Blinded by the prospect of having an *inter-state* document giving endorsement to the continued division of the spheres of influence in Europe, they probably did not expect that the reference to *relations between man and his state* in the Final Act would carry more than a short-lived nuisance value. Similarly, the highlighting of the *rights of nations and states* in the covenants had probably been considered an important enough instrument in the endeavour to rally Third World support in the United Nations when these documents were being worked out in the 1960 s, to lower defences when it came to legalizing those sections which dealt with *individual rights and liberties*. The tightening of their whiphand grip on Eastern Europe in the wake of the invasion into Czechoslovakia and the commencement of an integrationist bearhug in the economy, may have given the Soviet leaders the impression that the situation was sufficiently well under control and that they could now afford to accept the human rights provisions as a part of the overall detente package. It must have looked not too high a price for the other, chiefly economic, benefits deriving from detente. Certainly when the Belgrade follow-up conference convened two years after Helsinki, the Soviet position rigidified considerably in this respect.

On balance, Principle VII of the Helsinki Final Act and its 'third basket', together with the United Nations covenants on civil and political rights, and on economic, social and cultural rights, have provided the dissidents in Eastern Europe and, indeed, the world at large, with a checklist against which the behaviour of Soviet-type regimes towards their own citizens and towards international cooperation can be measured. They have of course given the same opportunity to Western

57) William E. Griffith, 'The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: An Overview' in William E. Griffith, ed., *The Soviet Empire: Expansion and Detente*, pp. 12-3.

governments. Even if implemented in their breach, these documents have influenced East European politics. To say the least, they have made life more difficult for the foreign political manipulators who see detente as no more than a backdrop against which trade is conducted and behind which Soviet influence is extended into new areas.

Charles Gati is right when remarking that 'contrary to conventional wisdom in the West, United States-Soviet detente is not necessarily conducive to liberalization in Eastern Europe'[58]. And it is equally apparent, as Zygmunt J. Friedemann observed, that 'cooperation with the West has not accelerated sufficient centrifugal forces within the Soviet empire to create unmanageable difficulties for its leadership'[59]. But it seems that these are early days yet. The two writers anyway hedge their bets by talking about *necessary* liberalization and *unmanageable* difficulties. The truth of the matter is that as a result of an intersection of causes and circumstances, of which the human rights aspect of detente has been one, Eastern Europe now has an active constituency of people who dissentiate from official policies, criticise them, protest against them and take their cause to the public, both in the bloc and outside it.

But of course, as already stated, the size and intensity of East-West trading and financial dealing have been the most tangible outcome of the detente policy in Eastern Europe so far. We can call this phenomenon a *capitalist-assisted modernization effort* in a field where internal communist means have proved inadequate. Looking back at the checkered and zig-zaggy economic history of communism, industrialization at the expense of agriculture and with the help of forced labour stands out as the main means of economic expansion. (Even in this respect, one can argue, 'capitalism' was being imitated and its natural processes simply compressed into a shorter time space.). Once completed, or nearing completion, the crude industrialization matrix has lost its validity as a problem-solving and progress-bearing recipe. By the 1960 s, in spite of all the talk about the 'scientific-technical revolution' for which communism was allegedly the most propitious environment, it became clear that command planning had failed to provide a milieu conducive to a transition to the post-industrial phase of modernization. Science, technology and economy simply did not connect in the mono-organizational context of *Realsozialismus.* Virtually all progressive technology was being generated by the free economies which, in spite of recessions and a multitude of other defects, have shown to be succeeding precisely where command economies have not. Thus the idea was born to graft Western technology on to state-owned industries, and to do so in the inviting atmosphere of detente. It was a shrewd decision which took advantage of one of the inherent properties of free enterprise, namely its irresistible urge to do business[60].

58) Charles Gati in *Perceptions: Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union*, p. 151.

59) Zygmunt J. Friedemann in *Perceptions: Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union*, p. 144.

60) For two recent articles pointing out the disadvantages and dangers of East-West trade from the Western point of view, see Marshall I. Goldman, 'Will the Soviet Union be an

TABLE H FOREIGN TRADE TURNOVER PER CAPITA 1966–1980
(In US dollars, end of year average)

Country	1966–1970	1971–1975	Plan 1976–1980
Bulgaria	224	591	922
Czechoslovakia	257	605	807
GDR	275	618	862
Hungary	233	638	925
Poland	111	336	486
Romania	94	250	466
Eastern Europe*	199	506	745
Soviet Union	51	131	168
European Comecon*	178	453	531

* unweighted average
Source: *United Nations Economic Survey of Europe in 1976*, Part II, p. 120.

TABLE I EXPORTS AND IMPORTS PER CAPITA 1970–1976
(in US dollars)

Country	1970		1976		per cent increase	
	imports	exports	imports	exports	imports	exports
Bulgaria	216	236	642	614	197.2	160.2
Czechoslovakia	258	265	651	606	152.3	128.7
GDR	284	269	786	677	176.8	151.7
Hungary	242	224	681	578*	181.4	158.0
Poland	111	109	404	321	264.0	194.5
Romania	97	91	251	251*	158.8	175.8
Soviet Union	48	53	150	145	212.5	173.6

* 1975
Source: *United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1977*, pp. 431–7; and *Statistická ročenka ČSSR 1977*, p. 646

As Tables H and I show, the jump in foreign trade activity has been substantial, and the increase in imports has been greater than of exports.

Several observations are called for. Firstly, the East European bloc countries have managed to step up trading between themselves and with the developing countries simultaneously with an increase in commerce with Western advanced nations. The general predominance of intra-bloc trade thus remained assured, with the exception of Romania which now exchanges more goods with the non-socialist than with the socialist world (52 against 48 per cent). The increase in trade with the advanced West is particularly apparent with regard to the bloc's previous record in this field, not within the present trade structure by region.

Secondly, the rise in commerce with the West has not been of the same magni-

Autarky in 1984?', *International Security*, Spring 1979, pp. 18–36; and Raymond Vernon, 'The Fragile Foundations of East-West Trade', *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1979, pp. 1035–51.

tude in all the bloc countries. Generally speaking, Poland, the USSR, Romania and Hungary have been the 'bold' traders, i. e. mainly importers, whereas Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Bulgaria proceeded more cautiously. This caution seems certain to have different reasons; the GDR has generally operated a high-level turnover with the West in the form of 'intra-German' trade, while being, alongside Czechoslovakia, the most industrialized country of the bloc and therefore in need of relatively less engineering imports than the other members of Comecon.

Thirdly, imports from the West include fairly high levels of grain and feed, next to machinery, but very little consumer goods. Data for 1971–75 reveal that only Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania had a surplus in the grains trade balance (bread and feed).

Fourthly, without exception, the bloc countries developed a negative trade balance towards the West and overall. The deterioration has been fairly rapid and large, and only Romania noted an improvement, although still remaining 'in the red'. Whereas the combined trade balance of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1970 was positive (US $ 714 million), in 1976 it stood at minus US $ 7,653 million[61].

Fifthly, all the East European countries have fallen in debt vis-à-vis the capitalist West. By the end of 1977, according to one report, the net indebtedness was as follows:

TABLE J NET DEBT AS OF THE END OF 1977

Country	Thousand million US $	US $ per capita
Bulgaria	3.0	340
Czechoslovakia	1.9	130
GDR	5.4	320
Hungary	3.0	280
Poland	12.7	370
Romania	2.5	130
Soviet Union	14.6	60
Total	43.1	118

Source: *Dia Zeit*, 29 December 1978, quoted by H. G. Trend, 'Stiffer Euro-Credit Terms Facing Comecon Countries?', Radio Free Europe Background Report No. 70, 26 March 1979

The crucial question in this context is to what extent have the imports and the borrowings been productive, i. e. how much are they providing a long-term technological boost to domestic East European manufacturing capacities[62]. Although answers

61) United Nations *Statistical Yearbook 1977*, pp. 431–7.

62) There now exists a sizeable volume of literature on East-West technological transfer, ranging in consideration from such questions as the theory of import-led growth to tracing the effects of imported technology on the production of mineral fertilizers. These books and articles are almost exclusively concerned with the Soviet Union, not Eastern Europe. Perhaps one should take note of A. C. Sutton, *Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development*, 3 vols. (Stanford, Hoover Institution, 1968–73), which relates the story from

differ and are anyway difficult to formulate and aggregate because of the near inability to measure technological inputs in the given situation, the general impression towards the end of the decade is one of mild scepticism. Trade with the West has certainly brought a number of blessings and has helped to overcome threatening pitfalls *in some countries*, e. g. Poland, as well as add to the modernization efforts of strong economies, e. g. in East Germany, but on the whole it does not appear to have improved either efficiency or long-term effectiveness. Phil Hanson's conclusions *about the Soviet Union* are as follows:

> First, these imports are a comparatively small input into a large economy. Second, the failure of the USSR to increase substantially its share of Western markets for manufactures seriously hinders the growth of Soviet machinery imports for balance-of-payments reasons. Finally, Soviet lead-times in utilizing and diffusing the imported technology seem to be relatively long. ... Thus the predominant constraints on Soviet utilization of technology transfer to spur growth would appear to lie in the realm of the Soviet economic and systemic factors ...[63]

In fact, the effects of the recession in the West connected with the energy crisis and the heavy annual debt servicing burden have made the planners' life more unpleasant. For a definite assessment of the East European, rather than Soviet, benefit from technology transfers one would, however, have to wait for an expert analysis of specific conditions in the individual countries of the area.

TABLE K SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN SHARE OF WORLD TRADE 1970–1976 (in per cent)
(Aggregate table for both the USSR and Eastern Europe, excluding Yugoslavia but including Albania)

Item	Exports			Imports		
	1970	1975	1976	1970	1975	1976
Food	7.6	6.1	5.6	8.9	10.7	10.6
Raw materials	9.2	10.2	9.2	9.8	9.8	8.6
Fuel	10.2	8.2	8.3	5.7	4.4	4.3
Chemicals	6.6	6.7	6.0	7.9	9.0	8.0
Machinery	10.7	10.0	9.6	10.5	11.5	10.6
Other manufactures	8.6	7.8	7.3	8.6	10.1	9.2
TOTAL	9.8	8.9	8.5	9.2	9.4	8.8

Source: *United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1976*, Vol. I, p. 101; and *United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1977*, p. 511.

1917; Ron Amann et al., eds., *The Technological Level of Soviet Industry* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977); and a recent overview article by Phil Hanson, 'Western Technology in the Soviet Economy', *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1978, pp. 20–30. Other Hanson's writings on this subject are well worth following, as are of course studies by other scholars.

63) Phil Hanson, 'Western Technology in the Soviet Economy', *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1978, p. 30.

Finally, United Nations statistics reveal that the upsurge in Comecon foreign trading in the 1970 s has not been particularly spectacular in the international context. Everyone is engaging in more trade than before, notably the developing countries, and of course price rises account for many an outstanding performance. What is interesting is the composition of East European trade as a share of world trade, as given in Table K.

Soviet and East European shares of world exports are falling in food, fuel, chemicals and 'other manufactures' as well as overall. Only in the level of exported raw materials (other than fuel) has the European Comecon area kept pace with the rest of the world. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have been increasing faster than the rest of the world the importation of food and 'other manufactures', while keeping level in chemicals and machinery, and slowing down in raw materials, fuels and overall.

The novelty of East-West trading in the 1970 s would thus seem to be in reference to the area's own past and to its erstwhile ideology. Otherwise it is yet another exercise in catching-up, with some risks involved.

THE ENERGY CRISIS

It has already been said that of all the East European economic highlights of the 1970 s, the increase in prices paid for imported energy is the most important. In this respect there is little difference between the bloc and the free economies. In a way, the European Comecon can be seen as a *pars pro toto* representation of the world at large: there is one big producer and supplier of oil (the USSR), one almost but not quite self-sufficient producer (Romania), one owner of substantial solid fuel deposits which can still be expanded, though not enough to cover all demand (Poland), two producers of smaller and declining amounts of solid fuels (East Germany and Czechoslovakia), and two countries with neither coal nor oil to speak about (Hungary and Bulgaria). What is happening within this constellation is not so very much unlike what goes on between OPEC and OECD, except of course that the two poles in Eastern Europe — the producers and the consumers — are ideologically bound to regulate the price spiral in a more orderly, though not necessarily less painful, fashion.

Two articles of faith (advocated as late as 1973) collapsed in the energy turmoil of the past five years: that the 'capitalist' predicament did not apply in Eastern Europe, or could be avoided by conscientious action, and that the Soviet Union will go on ignoring world prices when supplying its clients.

Demand for energy inputs had been high in Eastern Europe even before the Arab price hike of 1974, not the least because of wastage in utilization and of course because intensive industrialization called for it. The impact of the oil shortage and high cost has then become more pronounced because it more or less coincided with the transition of East European economies from 'basic' (solid) fuels to 'refined' forms

of energy (oil and gas). In 1969 the whole of Eastern Europe (excluding the USSR) consumed 400 million metric tons of energy (hard coal equivalent or, more precisely, 'standard fuel' of 7,000 calories per kilogram) against an output of 380 million tons. The deficit was relatively easy to make up by imports from the Soviet Union. In 1976 consumption rose to 570 million tons against an output of 480 million tons, and the demand in 1980 is expected to be 780 million tons and over 1,000 million tons in 1990, while output will decline in relative terms to some 50 per cent of consumption[64]. The first conclusion thus is that the disparity between indigenous production and consumption is growing wider.

The second problem, also long-term, concerns the falling share of solid fuels in the composition of energy sources: from some 80 per cent for Comecon as a whole in 1950 to less than 37 per cent in 1980. The attendant trend is of course towards an increase in the consumption of crude oil and natural gas: oil from 14.5 per cent of the total energy demand in 1950 to over 35 per cent in 1980, and gas from 3.3 per cent in 1970 to over 23 per cent in 1980[65]. As oil and natural gas are not available in non-Soviet Eastern Europe (except in Romania where production has probably peaked already, and minute quantities in Hungary and Czechoslovakia), the importation of these commodities must continue at an increased pace.

The Soviet Union has been and remains the major logical supplier of fuel to Eastern Europe since the early 1960 s. (Prior to that Eastern Europe had been a net exporter of fuel to the USSR, thanks to Polish coal, although situation varied in the individual countries.) In 1968 it supplied the European Comecon countries with 96

TABLE L SOVIET DELIVERIES OF CRUDE OIL TO COMECON 1956–1985

Five-year period	Million tons	Per cent increase over previous five-year period
1956–1960	21.7	—
1961–1965	59.0	172
1966–1970	138.7	135
1971–1975	243.0	75
1976–1980	364.0	50
1981–1985*	440	20

* This is an estimate based on Kosygin's recent promise to increase Soviet supplies by 20 per cent from 1981–85

Source: H. G. Trend, 'Energy — the Key to East European Economic Development', Radio Free Europe Background Report No. 93, 12 May 1978, p. 6, quoting a Polish and a Soviet source.

64) United Nations *Statistical Yearbook 1970*, p. 359; *ditto 1977*, p. 387; and a Bulgarian source quoted by Harry G. Trend, 'Energy — the Key to East European Economic Development', Radio Free Europe Background Report 93/78. Dr. Trend has been producing informative and well argued coverage of the East European economic situation in general and the energy problem in particular. His reports, as indeed most of the others, in the Radio Free Europe series can only be ignored by students of the area at their own peril.

65) All figures from H. G. Trend, *ibid.*

per cent of their demand for cude oil; this proportion is due to fall to 75 per cent by 1980[66]. Table L gives Soviet deliveries of crude oil over a long span, showing the slowdown.

Soviet supplies are divided into two categories: within the goods exchange protocol and above-protocol. The latter have to to be paid for either in hard currency or in commodities sellable on Western markets. As the additionally negotiated deliveries do not cover the difference between protocol supplies and demand, the East European countries are becoming increasingly — but so far not very significantly — involved in purchasess of oil on free markets governed by OPEC prices. In 1970 they imported 5.1 million tons and in 1975 almost 13.3 million tons in this way[67].

Following the OPEC shock of 1974, the Soviet Union first increased its price of oil supplied to Eastern Europe by a substantial margin in 1975. From 1976 the principle of increasing prices every year on the basis of five-year moving averages of world prices ('the Bucharest principle') has been applied both to Soviet oil and to manufactures bartered for it by the East Europeans. This is in fact a simple mechanism to link world prices with the artificial creations of the communist world, and it can be seen as a compromise solution: the East Europeans enjoy greater regularity and less surprise in accepting the oil price spiral, while the Soviet Union gets from its partners — in real terms — almost what OPEC is charging.

The Bucharest principle determines crude oil price for the current year as the average world price for the previous five years. Thus, e. g. in 1978 the Soviet oil price still included consideration of the world price in 1973, the last low-price year, plus an element of prices in 1974, 1975, 1976 and 1977. The most recent substantial rise in OPEC prices — of July 1979 — will only find reflection in Comecon prices in 1980. In practical terms, the East Europeans pay about 18 per cent more in 1979 than they paid in 1978, and will pay another 9 per cent more in 1980, assuming that OPEC does not hike the price level further before the end of 1979.

Things are, however, not that simple. To this *nominal* price are added 'phantom freight' charges, i. e. half the cost the East Europeans would have to pay, had their oil come from the Middle East. Furthermore, the principle of five-year moving averages also applies to the commodities delivered by the East European countries to the Soviet Union in payment for the crude. Their prices have been and are rising less rapidly than oil prices. Finally, additional — above-protocol — imports of oil from the Soviet Union have to be paid in foreign currency and any further deliveries require East European investments into the development of the Soviet raw material base at concessionary interest rates. It has been suggested that additional deliveries of Soviet oil cost the East Europeans almost double the nominal price[68].

All this being said, and in the absence of official East European figures for either

66) H. G. Trend, *ibid.*, quoting a Hungarian source.

67) William F. Robinson, comp., *Selected Demographic and Economic Data on Eastern Europe* (Munich, Radio Free Europe, 1977), pp. 30–34.

68) Harry G. Trend, 'OPEC's 1979 Price and Soviet Price for Oil Deliveries to Comecon', Radio Free Europe Background Report 273/78, p. 3.

'nominal' or 'real' prices, it is practically impossible to say how much do the East Europeans pay for Soviet oil. Estimates drawn from chance remarks in various East European sources (many of which are suspect) would point to the very inaccurate conclusion that in 1979 the 'nominal' price for protocol deliveries was still 40 per cent, and the 'real' price possibly 20 per cent, below the world price prevailing in that year. In a different context I made use of official Czechoslovak statistics to establish that the price per ton of crude paid by Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union rose from Kčs 122.32 in 1970 to Kčs 259.99 in 1976, i. e. that it more than doubled[69].

In the end, what matters is not so much the difference between a Comecon and a world price, but much rather the jump of price levels *within* Comecon during a short span of time. It is this unprecedented high and rapid increase in the foreign trade bill which the East European governments have to contend with, not the arithmetic exercise of subtracting Soviet from OPEC prices. As stated earlier in this article, one way of coping is to engage in investment activity inside the Soviet Union. This is a kind of subsidy extended by Eastern Europe to the Soviet economy in exchange for assured deliveries and for less-than-OPEC prices.

A variety of measures have been taken to alleviate the burden and to plan for the future. Without going into detail, one should mention the increase of domestic retail prices of all kinds of fuels (the latest spate of which occurred in July 1979), the conservation measures (which should yield a good result if rigorously applied, with the excessive wastage), the intensive coal-digging programs, and the concentration on nuclear power generation. On the latter score, the recent earmarking of large sums to mass manufacture of reactors in the Soviet Union, with East European participation (*Atommash*), is impressive. An evaluation will, however, have to wait until the scheme begins to work and produce results. In perspective, atomic energy resources will account for only a small share for a long time yet. They are expected to grow from an overall 2 per cent of energy consumption throughout the bloc in 1980 to possibly 8–10 per cent in the year 2000.

There is no real development of alternative 'unorthodox' energy sources, although the technology of synthetic fuels in its ecologically crudest form had been available in the area already during the Second World War.

Perhaps the most effective development countering the adverse influence of the energy crisis can be seen in the slow-down of economic growth rates. It obviously makes a difference to the energy bill if the economy expands at 3 per cent p. a. rather than at 6 per cent. The decelerating growth rate is thus not only the result of a host of deficiencies but also, as the proverbial cloud with a silver lining, a beneficial factor. If the energy pinch in the West prompted the slogan 'the days of cheap petrol are over', the East Europeans have more to mourn. For them the forced extensive expansion based on the spreading of heavy industry, no matter what the cost and thank God for the results, is a policy of the past. The energy crisis has contributed to their need to look for other, more complex, avenues of modernization.

69) Vladimir V. Kusin, *From Dubček to Charter 77*, p. 239.

One wonders whether heavy investment into Soviet oil extraction and other primary activities represents such an avenue.

DISSENT AND DEVIATION

Few serious students of Soviet-type communism would doubt that its entire history can be interpreted — should we choose to do so — in terms of a dichotomy between assent and dissent. Such an approach was in fact favoured by Stalinist historiography which teleologically described the party's progress through time as an uninterrupted string of collisions between those who were 'right', and happened to become victors in the various contestations, and those who were 'wrong', and ended consigned to the proverbial 'rubbish heap of history'. One of the least changeful correlations of the party's (regime's) existence is the existence of opponents. They range from passive ill-wishers to organized subverters. Some are real, some are invented.

In this broad sweep the situation of the 1970 s does not differ much from any previous decade. And yet, so much has been happening in the area in recent years and so much attention has the world focussed on the phenomenon that an investigation of a new meaning of dissent and opposition in the communist bloc is obviously justified. Such an investigation has by now become an important compartment of the broad discipline of Soviet and East European studies.

Take for example the year 1976 which has been called 'the year of the East European dissident'[70]. The region saw the establishment of unofficial groups for the monitoring of the observance of the Helsinki Final Act. The Eurocommunist parties, as well as Yugoslavia and Romania, dissentiated from the Soviet proclamation of communist goals at the European communist summit meeting in East Berlin to the point where a watered down version had to be adopted. Following criticism of the new draft of the Polish Constitution and the price riots, Polish dissidents formed a Committee for the Defence of Workers which later evolved into a 'social self-defence' organization of human rights activists, and was joined by other dissident groups. The Catholic Church in Poland has gradually aligned itself with dissent based on human rights advocacy. Intellectuals in East Germany launched an unprecedented protest against the enforced emigration of a ballad singer and later strengthened their stand against other anti-cultural practices of the regime. Finally, on 1 January 1977, the Charter 77 manifesto was issued in Czechoslovakia, making the human rights into a basic platform subsequently adopted by oppositionists in other East European countries, including Romania and Bulgaria[71].

What then, at least according to this writer, are the features which distinguish East European dissent of the 1970s ?

70) J. L. Kerr, 'Dissent in Eastern Europe', Radio Free Europe Background report 218/78, p. 4.

71) Literature on dissent is too numerous for even a brief enumeration of the main items. From our point of view, basic analysis of the various countries and an overview of the area is provided perhaps best in Rudolf L. Tökés, ed., *Dissent in Eastern Europe* (London. Macmillan, 1979 — forthcoming at the time of writing).

It is essentially *social-democratic* in its mainstream. It is the result of a confluence between the communist reformism of the 1960 s and liberal democratic thought, surpassing the former in the direction of democracy and the latter in the direction of socialism. For the first time since the suppression of the Social Democratic parties in the late 1940 s, an alternative *socialist* arrangement to the incumbent *communist* one has emerged as a political force in Eastern Europe, even though of uneven strength and less than adequate impact as yet.

This dissent is on the whole *realistic* in that it recognizes that the power-political configuration in the world at large and in Europe in particular imposes constraints on both the depth and the timing of social-democratic changes in the area. The dissidents are strongly aware of the danger of Soviet military intervention, which they do not wish to happen, and they are prepared to accept that Moscow will not relinquish its hold over the region. Their aim lies in the direction of a kind of *socialist Finlandization* of Eastern Europe, rather than its complete emancipation from Soviet tutelage.

By the same token, East European dissent is *peaceful*, non-violent, relying above all on pressure through stimulated public awareness, both at home and abroad. The dissidents have succeeded in bringing into life a *parallel unofficial communication system*, such as never existed before in communist-ruled countries. They realize that confrontations between governments and large segments of disaffected populations are at once dangerous to the point of counter-productivity and difficult to bring about because of the political frustration, fear and increasing material affluence among the public.

Dissent is now less connected with — or entirely separated from — reformist tendencies inside the establishments, unlike in the 1960 s when in-system reformers formed an important element in the change-seeking process. (This was so certainly in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, but also in East Germany, Poland and even Romania, albeit each in a different way and for different reasons.) As there is no longer a recognizable community of reformers inside the establishments, dissent is 'purer' than before. It engages more in developing 'parallel social activities' rather than permeating the official ones. It is exogenous and extra-curricular. Nonetheless, it seems to me that it has to rebuild the bridges which were burned by the destruction of in-system reformism in Czechoslovakia, and even create anew its allies inside the establishments where they were either banished or intimidated by the counter-reformatory clampdown. (This relation between dissent and establishment has a special character in Hungary where official reformism has not been destroyed.)

East European dissent has found the lowest common denominator between its various shades of political belief in *human rights activism*. This takes on a variety of forms, most frequently expressed in the advocacy of legality within systemic bounds, in the direction of a communist *Rechtsstaat*.

There has been a certain rapprochement between the different ideological strands of dissent — political (liberalism and socialism), religious and nationalist — but a joint

or even only a coordinated action program has not been created yet.

While comprising people from all social and age groups, East European dissent is still largely *led by the intelligentsia*, the only social class which can express concern with general ideas in an articulate fashion. The beginning of an alliance between workers and intellectuals has been observed in Poland, in the wake of the price riots in June 1976, and in Czechoslovakia, where a number of the Charter 77 signatories are workers. Nevertheless, the workers are still largely concerned with responses to immediate grievance and the intellectuals do not seem to have developed more than the most general framework for interaction with them.

Persecution has differed in intensity in the various countries, just as dissent has, although there is no linear relation between the numerical strength of the dissident community and the vehemence of suppressive practices. What seems new is the fact that *articulation of dissent has become irrepressible* and so has the will of the dissidents to align themselves in loose associations. Dissidents have even expressed solidarity with each other's aims and postures across the national boundaries and the year 1978 witnessed the first attempt at international coordination by the Polish and Czechoslovak human rights activists.

Some Western observers view the persistence of publicly expressed dissent as the result of toleration on the part of the East European establishments. It has been said that, if the regimes so desired, they could squash the opposition tomorrow. There is no doubt an element of reluctance to use the traditional weapons of Stalinist cruelty at the time when considerations of detente contribute to the shaping of communist policies, and there may even be some calculated risk-taking. To allow a certain measure of non-conventional activity scores well on the checklist of international relaxation, provided that it is kept within limits that the respective national authorities — and Moscow — consider not dangerous. But one has the feeling that the survival of dissent and opposition depends no longer, at least not fully, on the goodwill, weakness or cunning of communist officialdom. We might be nearer an explanation in arguing that in the post-industrial stage of modernization, communism, having lost its ideological attractiveness long ago, has now also emerged stripped of its alleged uniqueness in social management. It is neither more moral nor more equality-minded than 'capitalism', and certainly not as efficient or as free. Unlike 'capitalism', which has evolved its political, economic and social parameters from reproachable beginnings to a high level of popular acceptability, communism has moved backwards on the same track. And of course there is the dedication and self-sacrifice of the dissenters themselves, a factor without which the persistence of protest, criticism and opposition would be unthinkable.

Finally, as a special case of national deviation, Romania has escalated its assertion of foreign-political independence in the 1970 s beyond the essentially economic self-defence of the previous decade. This has been particularly apparent in the foreign political activity she conducts outside the bloc, of which her middle-of-the-road behaviour towards China, Vietnam and Israel is the prime example. But she has also opted

for a highly selective approach to the integrationist programs within Comecon and has even shown defiance in the Warsaw Pact in matters like increased defence spending, resistance to the idea of a mobile force and non-participation in any but map-reading military exercises. At the same time there has been no end to rigid, counterreformist and suppressive practices at home.

CONCLUSION

Whither Eastern Europe in the 1980s ? The clouds are gathering and an economic storm may be in the making, but the regimes, with Moscow in the van, have identified courses of action which they believe will help the area to weather the adversities and still leave the systems intact. It is a variation of the age-old story : change is at once required and resisted. What is stronger, the requirement of change or the resistance to it ?

In the last instance, the contending tendencies in the emancipation of economic and technological innovation from the dead hand of the command system and the desire for political relaxation on the one side, and the integration of East European politics and economics into the mono-organizational embrace of Soviet centralism on the other. The decade after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has seen more progress in the integrative than in the emancipatory tendency, not only through the military build-up and the joint investments, but also in the increased assertion of supportive developments, such as frustration from failure and the advent of acquisitive consumerism. Nevertheless, the competition is still alive.

In the 1960 s the optimum measure of desired change crystallized around the concept of a market-oriented economy guided by a framework plan and supporting a politically relaxed system in which plurality of non-antagonistic social and even political interests would be afforded expression under the benign guidance of a communist party with a human face, all of this within the confines of 'special partnership' with a tolerant Soviet Union. This target image has been ruled out of court by the intervention in Czechoslovakia and subsequent counter-reformatory policies of the Soviet leadership, at least for the time being. In the 1970 s the level of the optimum has been lowered or, to put it differently, the optimal goal of change-seeking has been pushed farther beyond the horizon of the future, What seemed feasible in the second half of the 1960 s, is hardly possible now. The Prague Spring was asking too much, even though not nearly enough.

Archie Brown has put his finger on the same problem when he wrote :

> Though the memory of the military intervention which ended the Czech experiment will in time become a less vivid deterrent to Eastern Europeans bent on change, Communist reformers within the next two decades are likely to be more inclined to concede a Soviet interest in their political arrangements than were the Czechs. The more cautious among them regard the 'Kadar model' as the optimal one within the present geopolitical environment ; and, since the USSR

> has tolerated the Hungarian precedent, the odds are against its being able to prevent the spread ... of at least that degree of internal relaxation in other East European societies[72].

Less is asked of reformed East European communism today than twelve years ago: suffice for it to perform reasonably well in the economic field in order to guarantee a steady standard of living and to treat its citizens with the minimum amount of coercion and the maximum amount of intellectual respect. It is in finding the balance that the desideratum lies today, not in grand reformist designs. Even so, the present order is tall.

Time is not playing into the hands of those who desire change either, at least not entirely. Andrzej Korbonski perceptively identified a long-term tendency which he calls 'the Soviet sociocultural threat'. This

> ... can be viewed as a gradual yet clearly visible erosion of the traditional political cultures in Eastern Europe. As a result, the national political cultures are gradually being replaced by what may be called ... the progressive 'russification' ... containing certain features of traditional Russian culture together with new values and modes of behaviour imposed from above by the Communist rulers. ... [The East European societies are undergoing] slow transformation in the direction of the Soviet sociocultural model, which represents the lowest common denominator ...[73]

Two external influences on the future systemic developments in Eastern Europe must be mentioned in addition to pressures arising inside the area itself. First, there is Western Europe[74] with its growing awareness of the complexities which determine the role of the East European part of the continent in the general scheme of East-West relations, and with the technological and economic potential needed to carry the 'technetronic' revolution further. A perceptive, democratic, socially conscious and economically strong Western Europe can be of assistance to the achievement of a moderately reformist state of affairs in Eastern Europe by the sheer virtue of its existence. A selfish, bureaucratic and depression-stricken Western Europe will strengthen the conservative elements in the East by the same token.

Second, there is the succession riddle in the Soviet Union itself, and, closely connected with it, the general state of dependence of the East European regimes on Moscow. If the post-Brezhnev leadership decides that departures from the conservative practices of today have to be initiated in the Soviet Union itself, then the 'Kadarization' of Eastern Europe may become the order of the day. And of course conversely, if Brezhnev goes but diehard conservativism continues and is sufficient to carry the Soviet Union through the difficult times ahead, there is little prospect for the client

72) Archie Brown, 'Eastern Europe: 1968, 1978, 1998', *Daedalus*, Winter 1979, pp. 170–1.
73) Andrzej Korbonski, 'Eastern Europe and the Soviet Threat' in Grayson Kirk and Nils H. Wessell, eds., *The Soviet Threat: Myths and Realities*, pp. 74–5.
74) Archie Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

states. By the end of the century they may found themselves absorbed completely not only in Soviet organizational confines, but also in the Soviet way of life and thought.

The future is thus — is it not always so? — a question of several ifs. To this writer the alternative of moderate reformism still appears somewhat more likely than continued Sovietization, but the scales are finely balanced.

Finally, there is the possibility of both Moscow and its East European agents doggedly practising political and economic dogmatism to the point where reality will rebel against it. If the breaking point were thus to be reached, the centrifugal tendencies in Eastern Europe would not be slow in coming into the open.

SUMMARY

Vladimir V. Kusin

EASTERN EUROPE IN THE 1970 s

The countries of the Soviet-dominated bloc in Eastern Europe have experienced important changes in the 1970 s, collectively and severally.

Having failed to establish an organic bond with its client states, the Soviet Union strengthened its hold on the area through the promulgation of the 'doctrine of limited sovereignty' sanctioned by armed force and engaged in an intensive military build-up in the northern and central parts of the European theatre. Soviet military presence in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary serves the dual purpose of buttressing Moscow's approach to East-West detente and policing the area under its domination.

The suppression of the Prague Spring brought to an end an era of comprehensive official reformism which in the 1960 s represented an attempt to remove inefficiency, and to attain moral legitimation. Substitute manoeuvres in the economy have been and are being tried but special precautions are being taken to prevent a spillover of economic experimentation into political institutions and processes. The economic pressures of the latter half of the 1970 s, which are likely to continue into the next decade, may yet lead to renewed approaches to in-system reformism.

The communist parties in the area have by now completed their evolution towards system maintenance; the era of political and economic innovation within the Moscow-set limits is over. The leaderships, after three replacements of first secretaries early in the period (Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany), have maintained an equilibrium between 'ideologues' and 'technocrats' in their compositions. Aging of the leaderships has been observed, but it does not constitute the same problem as in the USSR.

Material standards of the population have improved to the point where the lower threshold of affluence is within reach for large sections of the public. Having fully endorsed the policy of consumerism, the regimes interpret it as a source of legitimacy and a vital ingredient in the 'social contract' whereby political passivity is traded for material security. In the first half of the 1970 s, under the combined influence of several factors, the economic performance was sufficiently satisfactory to sustain such consumerist, non-political orientation. The trend began to weaken around the middle of the decade, especially under the impact of the energy crisis. The old ills of command economy have once again affected economic stability and old-new tensions between performance and expectation re-emerged.

After two decades of indecision and blind alleying in the Comecon, the 1970 s have seen the introduction of intra-bloc economic integrationism, motivated — or so it seems — as much by the desire for political cohesion and central control as by practical economic requirements. In the framework of long-term 'target programs' to be pursued multilaterally by the Comecon, the most immediate 'integrated' activity consists in joint investment projects, mainly to extract and convey fuels and raw materials in and from the Soviet Union. While of doubtless benefit to the East European countries, these joint ventures cost them a great deal and reduce their domestic investment options.

Normalization of relations with West Germany and a substantial increase in East-West trading are the two most tangible manifestations of the so-called detente in Eastern Europe. Importation of Western technology (but also grain by some countries) and the incurrence of large debts in the West have marked the end of the erstwhile notion that the communist and 'capitalist' economies would develop independently. While it cannot be said that the East European countries have become inextricably dependent on an in-flow of Western machinery, they do not seem to have progressed very far in acquiring a technological creativity of their own.

From the middle of the decade, after some initial braggadocio, Eastern Europe has been badly hit by the energy crisis which created an almost irreconcilable tension between supply and demand and sent sharply upwards the energy import bills, barely coverable as they now are by stepped-up exports. Economic dependence on the Soviet Union has been strengthened as a result.

Throughout the area there have multiplied and come into the open groups of dissidents, oppositionists and change-seeking activists; they have established an alternative communication network, both inside their own countries and towards the West. Expressing views along a wide spectrum of critical thinking, they are generally united in protesting against the encroachment of human rights by their respective governments. They have made use of the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the United Nation covenants, ratified by the East European governments, to expose coercive practices, thus introducing a new element of strife into communist politics and influencing official decision making. Special mention must be made of escalated Romanian deviation from the precepts of intra-bloc behaviour as laid down

in Moscow.

Whither Eastern Europe in the 1980s? In the 1960s the desired change aimed at a reformist package deal in which a market-oriented economy under the umbrella of conceptual planning would support a politically relaxed system. Plurality of interests would have been afforded expression under the benign guidance of a communist party with a human face and within the confines of a 'special partnership' with a tolerant Soviet Union. Such target image has been ruled out of court in the 1970s, following the intervention in Czechoslovakia. Less is asked of reformed East European communism today: suffice that it perform reasonably well in the economic field in order to guarantee a steady standard of living, and that it treat its citizens with the maximum amount of intellectual respect and the minimum amount of coercion. It may not seem so, but with the many variables at play even such an order is tall. Much will depend on how determined will the pressure be from Moscow towards continued Sovietization of Eastern Europe under the post-Brezhnev leadership. The alternative of moderate reformism has not been irretrievably lost yet, but the scales are finely balanced.

Sapporo, September 1979.