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# Soviet Foreign Policy Toward Japan since the Conclusion of the Japan-China Peace Treaty

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On August 12, 1978, after long (six years), frequently interrupted negotiations, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship was finally concluded between Japan and the People's Republic of China (PRC)<sup>1)</sup>. The Soviet Union had been exerting great pressure on Japan not to conclude the Treaty with China. Moscow had opposed<sup>2)</sup> the Treaty, because it contains the so-called "antihgemony" clause, which in Beijing's parlance implies Soviet hegemonism<sup>3)</sup>. If this Treaty does not provide a significantly serious threat to Soviet security, it does at least constitute an obstacle to Soviet expansionist ambitions in the Northeast/Pacific region. Then, the question that interests us is: How in fact did the Soviet Union respond to the Treaty in general and particularly to Japan, which she had urged to desist from signing such a treaty and even warned of possible "retaliatory measures"?<sup>4)</sup> Would she actually retaliate against Japan? With these basic questions in mind, this essay will examine not solely the Soviet policy toward Japan since the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaty. In other words, the scope of this paper is somewhat broader than the examination of the impact of the Peace Treaty on the Kremlin<sup>5)</sup>. It will analyze general Soviet policy toward Japan, including the repercussions engendered by the Peace Treaty among Soviet leaders. The period which this paper will cover is approximately the year and a half between the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty (August 1978) and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979).

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1) Hong N. Kim, "The Fukuda Government and the Politics of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty," *Asian Survey* (vol. 19, No. 3, 1979), pp. 297-313.

2) Dagmar Ahrens-Thiele, "Moscow's Opposition to Chinese-Japanese Peace Talks," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* (No. 48178, March 1, 1978), pp. 1-10.

3) *Ibid.*

4) Avigdor Haselkorn, "Impact of Sino-Japanese Treaty on the Soviet Security Strategy," *Asian Survey* (vol. 19, No. 6, June, 1979), p. 558-573.

5) With regard to the impact of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty on the USSR and Soviet-Japanese Relations, see, respectively, Haselkorn *op. cit.* and Peggy L. Falkenheim, "The Impact of the Peace and Friendship Treaty on Soviet-Japanese Relations," *Asian Survey* (vol. 19, No. 12, December 1979), pp. 1209-1223.

## I. Prevention of Japanese Ties with Other Powers

It is debatable whether the Kremlin has any specific grand design or fixed policy with regard to Japan<sup>6)</sup>. Some Western observers are doubtful, arguing that Soviet Japan policies are simply a corollary of Soviet global or U. S./China policy. Basil Dmytryshyn, for example, holds that "the Soviets simply do not have a clear, distinct positive policy toward Japan. Offers which they have made have really been spin-offs of Soviet policy towards the United States and/or towards China."<sup>7)</sup> It can be posited that such interpretations may have been credible in the past; however, with the growing Soviet realization of the significant role which Japan occupies in Northeast Asia, the Kremlin leaders have recently been increasingly recognizing the need to formulate a specific policy for Japan. Be that as it may, a continued need exists to examine Soviet policies toward Japan also in the broader aspect, i. e., not solely in terms of Soviet-Japanese bilateral relations, but also in the light of Soviet global policies, or at least in terms of both its general policy in Northeast Asia and toward the U. S. and China.

From such a perspective, it would not be incorrect to regard the most basic strategy of the Kremlin in the Northeast Asia as the prevention of closer ties between Japan and other powers, specifically the USA and the PRC. In other words, the Soviets perceive that Japan itself as a single country, with a "low level of military strength" (D. V. Petrov)<sup>8)</sup>, does not necessarily present any meaningful threat to Soviet security. For instance, according to the assessment of D. Petrov, one of the leading Soviet experts on Japan, "Japan is hardly a match for the U. S. and European Community member countries in terms of numerical military strength, quality of military technology, size of defense expenses and similar indexes. Nor does Japan have her own nuclear weapon or the capability to make independent strategic decisions."<sup>9)</sup> On the other hand, it is also undeniable that Japan occupies the cornerstone position in Northeast Asia because of her geographical position, economic-technological capability, and hence represents militarily and politically significant potential. Thus, it becomes a completely different story for the Soviet Union when Japan attempts to increase her military potential by means of allying with other

6) See, for example, Malcolm Mackintosh, "Soviet Interests and Policies in the Asian-Pacific Region," *ORBIS* (vol. 19, No. 3, Fall 1975), pp. 763-765; Thomas W. Robinson, "Soviet Policy in Northeast Asia: Determinants, Options and Possible Changes," a paper read at the International Conference on Triangular Relations of Mainland China, the Soviet Union and North Korea (June 23-25, 1977), held at the Asiatic Research Center, Korea Univ., Seoul, pp. 1-4.

7) Basil Dmytryshyn, "Current Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy," a paper read at the Japan-U. S. Society in Sapporo, February 1979, p. 12.

8) D. V. Petrov, *Iaponiia v mirovoi politike* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1973), p. 42.

9) *Ibid.*, p. 41.

powers in Asia. It appears obvious that Japan has strengthened her strategic position by alliance with the US through the Japan-US Security Treaty. However, this is a kind of *fait accompli* which Moscow has, though very unwillingly, accepted for some 30 years. Actually, Japan's role and commitments are pursuant to this. The Treaty is not very far-reaching, the major factor being the leasing of military bases to the US on territories of Japan. What concerns Moscow is further development of the Japan-US military alliance to such an extent that Japan may play a more active role and intensify her future participation and obligations under that Treaty. Furthermore, the Kremlin's "worst possible scenario" is an anti-Soviet military alliance which is based on the US-Japan Security Treaty and embraces the Asian/Pacific basin, with the participation of the USA, Japan, South Korea, the PRC, Australia and New Zealand. Also, it is no less serious a nightmare for the Kremlin leadership to imagine the linkage of the almost one billion population of China with the advanced technology and industry of Japan. Just such a threat of Japan's alliance with other powers has appeared to the Soviets increasingly probable in these days when Tokyo has been, in the Soviet perception, drawn into an anti-Soviet front promoted by Washington and Beijing<sup>10)</sup>. The commentator Alexandrov, for instance, stated in a Japanese language Moscow Radio Broadcast on May 26, 1979, that "Japan is being drawn into U. S. strategic plans and the Chinese leaders' adventures."<sup>11)</sup> V. Vinogradov, in the June 3, 1969, issue of *Krasnaia zvezda* (*Red Star*), similarly perceives that "the fact that Japan is increasingly being drawn into the orbit of the Pentagon's strategy in Asia and its readiness to further build up its military potential and to cooperate with China's hegemonist circles clearly signifies a desire for qualitative change in the country's role in this part of the world."<sup>12)</sup>

#### A. Soviet Responses to the Conclusion of the Japan-China Treaty

Let us consider a second Soviet misgiving on the military alliance between Tokyo and Beijing. In order to obstruct such a possible alliance, it became imperative for Moscow to obstruct Tokyo's signing of the Peace and Friendship Treaty with Beijing, which might serve in the future as the basis for the development of a military alliance. In fact, in order to prevent Tokyo from concluding the Treaty with Beijing, Moscow tried to exert great pressure upon Japan by every possible means, including a warning, or strategy that Moscow would take some "retaliatory" actions in protection of its interests. Let us very briefly review these warnings chronologically. *Izvestiia* on July 18 and 19, 1976, bluntly stated that the Soviet

10) Petrov, *Iaponiia nashikh dnei* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo «Znanie», 1979), p. 50.

11) *Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (Soviet Union)* — hereafter cited as *FBIS (SOV)* — (May 29, 1979), p. C 1.

12) *Krasnaia zvezda*, June 3, 1979.

Union “would have to draw the necessary conclusions and amend its policy vis-à-vis Japan,”<sup>13)</sup> if Japan entered into a treaty with China embodying an antihegemony clause. A few days later, on July 21, 1976, *Krasnaia zvezda* also published the blunt statement that such a treaty between Japan and China “would have an adverse effect on Soviet-Japanese relations.”<sup>14)</sup> The word “retaliation” appeared for the first time on November 26, 1977, when *Pravda* stated :

“Japan, whether she wants it or not, will enter the path of complicating relations with third countries ... because the latter on their side would be entitled to take *retaliatory measures* (otvetnye mery) in the case that China and Japan would take action on the plan which Beijing has been trying to push ... Such action would turn out to be a negative influence upon Soviet-Japanese relations as a whole ... would take upon itself serious responsibility for the consequences of its inception.”<sup>15)</sup> (italics mine).

However, resorting to a menacing posture, without making any constructive and acceptable counterproposals, the Soviets, as is well known, have been unsuccessful in blocking the Treaty of Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship, which was signed on August 12, 1978. This current study deals with the Soviet policy toward Japan, starting from this point.

Once the Treaty was concluded, Soviet policy had to be based on the *fait accompli*. The rapid change, or about-face, that the Kremlin leadership has demonstrated on such occasions is not often duplicated by other regimes. This observation supports the argument that Soviet foreign policy is oriented not so much to a particular strategy as simply to the current opportunities or situational judgment<sup>16)</sup>. Sir William Hayter, a former British Ambassador to the USSR, pointed out “the Soviets tend to change their position drastically because of their lack of inhibition to inconsistency.”<sup>17)</sup> Be that as it may, the basic goals of the USSR vis-à-vis Japan, in the wake of the Sino-Japanese Treaty, can be summarized as follows: (1) to minimize as much as possible the negative impact of the Treaty on Soviet interests; (2) to obstruct the development of Sino-Japanese relations, as foreseen by the Treaty, into closer ties, especially a military alliance; (3) to promote more beneficial Soviet-Japanese relations by subverting the intent of the Sino-Japanese Treaty. These three aims constitute, in my view, the basic strategy of the Kremlin in regard to Japan in the wake of the Sino-Japanese Treaty. Let us elaborate on this thesis.

13) *Izvestiia*, July 18, 19, 1976.

14) *Krasnaia zvezda*, July 21, 1976.

15) *Pravda*, November 26, 1979.

16) Mackintosh, *op. cit.*, p. 765.

17) Sir William Hayter, *The Diplomacy of the Great Powers* (London: Harmish Hamilton Ltd., 1960), pp. 29-30.

(1) First, it seems evident that, following the conclusion of the Treaty between Tokyo and Beijing, Moscow has endeavored to downplay as much as possible the significance of the Treaty. In the words of A. Haselkorn, the Soviets have been attempting to “reduce the attractiveness of the Sino-Japanese ties to (both) signatories.”<sup>18)</sup>

Concretely speaking, Moscow has found it necessary to redefine or reinterpret the Treaty, for both domestic and international audiences, as actually less anti-Soviet in character. Having predicted such a diversionary approach, Professor Kuniko Miyauchi stated, even prior to the conclusion of the Treaty, that “while emphasizing the anti-Soviet nature of the Japan-China Peace Treaty prior to its conclusion, the Soviets will have to pretend that it is not very anti-Soviet. Is it a dilemma? Yes, they will yet be drawn into the position that the Treaty does not necessarily mean the formation of an anti-Soviet alliance”.<sup>19)</sup> You may easily imagine the Soviet difficulties in now interpreting the Treaty as less than a serious threat to the USSR — having hitherto maintained that just such a significant threat was inherent in the Treaty. However, if one recalls the startling vacillations of the Soviet adjustment to similar instances in the past, as illustrated by the reaction to the Treaty of Rapallo and to the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact<sup>20)</sup>, the harsh realities of the current Russian *volte face* come more easily into focus.

By the foregoing, I do not mean to imply that the Kremlin underwent this radical metamorphosis overnight. The gradual change in its assessment of efforts on the Japanese side to weaken or neutralize the anti-Soviet character of the Treaty seems to be best described in the following example. On the day following the signing of the Peace Treaty between Japan and the PRC in Beijing on August 13, 1978, a major news organ of the Soviet Government, *Izvestiia*, made the comment: “The Japanese Government is attempting to claim that the dangerous nature of the Treaty is neutralized by the insertion of Article 4 ... However the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs himself has made it clear that Sino-Japanese anti-hegemonism is the very core of the Treaty. Japan surrendered to the Chinese pressure to sign the Treaty on Chinese terms.”<sup>21)</sup> A few days later, on August 15, 1978, Yu. Bandura, an *Izvestiia* correspondent to Tokyo, similarly wrote:

“In attempting to weaken the criticism ... against the Treaty the Japanese Government sought to include in the treaty articles envisaging that “the treaty will not influence the position of either of the contracting parties in relations with

18) Haselkorn, *op. cit.*, pp. 564-565.

19) Kuniko Miyauchi *et al.*, “Shimurashon Nihon Gaiko,” *Shokun!* (April 1978), p. 47.

20) Frederick C. Barghoon, *The Soviet Image of the United States: A Study in Distortion* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950), pp. 13, 19.

21) *Izvestiia*, August 13, 1978.

third countries.” ... However, the importance of this reservation is to a considerable extent undermined by the unquestionable fact that, yielding to Beijing’s importunate demands regarding the inclusion of an article on countering hegemony in the Treaty, the Japanese ruling circles are providing an opportunity for the Chinese leadership to interfere in Japan’s policy in questions concerning its relations with other countries.”<sup>22)</sup>

G. Krasin in his article in *Novoe vremia*, dated three days later, noted that “the Japanese Government declares that the Treaty does not present a danger for neighboring countries insofar as it contains an article into the Treaty which allegedly neutralizes the provision on opposition ... However, these excuses are nothing more than putting a good face on the matter.”<sup>23)</sup>

However, some Soviet publications that appeared a year after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty quite clearly demonstrated that the Soviets had already shifted to a position of a more positive assessment of the Japan’s effort to neutralize the anti-Soviet character of the Treaty. This shift can be clearly detected in the works written and compiled by Dmitri Petrov, who tries skillfully to reverse the weight of two articles of the Treaty, i. e., Article 2 (“the anti-hegemony clause”) and Article 4 (“the third countries clause”). Firstly, whereas Petrov simply summarizes Article 2, he quotes the whole substance of Article 4, which stipulates: “The present treaty shall not affect the position of either contracting parties regarding its relations with third countries.”<sup>24)</sup> Secondly, and more importantly, Petrov interprets the wording of Article 2 on anti-hegemony as seriously retreating from Beijing’s original demands requesting closecooperation between China and Japan. Thirdly, Petrov emphasizes that “owing to the strong request from the Japanese side,”<sup>25)</sup> Article 4 for “the third countries clause” was added. In conclusion, Petrov argues, “Because of these amendments, the capability of Beijing, which has attempted to form a block with Japan predicated of anti-Sovietism, as reflected in the anti-hegemony clause, is restricted to a considerable degree.”<sup>26)</sup>

Concurrent with this effort to reinterpret the Sino-Japanese Treaty in light of its lessened anti-Soviet nature, the Soviets did not fail to stress, on the other hand, that there have still existed a number of serious differences between Japan and China, despite their treaty ties<sup>27)</sup>. Asserting that the “Sino-Japanese Treaty” was not

22) *Ibid.*, August 15, 1978.

23) G. Krasin, “V farbatere 《gegemonizm》,” *Novoe vremia* (No. 34, August 18, 1978), p. 8.

24) Petrov, *Iaponiia nashikh dnei*, p. 50.

25) Petrov (ed.) *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v aziatsko-tikhookeanskom regione* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 《Nayka》, 1979), p. 121.

26) *Ibid.*

27) *Iaponiia nashikh dnei*, pp. 52-54.

successful in solving serious contradictions between these two countries,” Petrov enumerates in his *Japan of These Days* (1979) the following four problem areas: (i) unbalance in economic and trade relations between Japan and China — that is to say, an inevitable deficit on the part of China, which lacks sufficient capital, especially in foreign hard currency, to pay Japan for products, plants and other imports<sup>28)</sup>; (ii) political and strategic contradictions between Japan and China, both of which have been competing for the sphere of influence in Asia; (iii) the still unresolved “Senkaku Islands” (in Chinese “Tiao-yu-tai”) issue; (iv) the “Taiwan” problem<sup>29)</sup>. It is revealing to compare Petrov’s latest book (1979) with his earlier publication, i. e. *Japan in the World Politics* (1973), which also listed four contradictory factors between Tokyo and Beijing. Three of them mentioned in the 1973 book are identical with those in his 1979 book, i. e. (i), (ii) and (iv).<sup>30)</sup> However, the 1973 edition emphasized the conflicting attitudes of China and Japan respectively, with regard to the USSR. While Japan had been pursuing the so-called “equidistance” policy toward the USSR and the PRC, China was definitely opposed to such a line of policy. Yet, significantly enough, Petrov’s 1979 book completely omits this point, replacing it in paragraph (iii) by the “Senkaku Islands” issue.<sup>31)</sup>

(2) The second characteristic which can be singled out as a Soviet response to the signing of the Japan-China Peace Treaty is demonstrated in the Soviet strategy to regard the tie between these two states as fluid and to check and subvert it from serving, through the Treaty, as a basis on which Beijing and Tokyo can move into even closer relations directed against Soviet interests. Despite Soviet opposition, the Treaty was after all concluded, — a fact that even the Kremlin has to admit, like it or not. One can say, along with some observers in the West, that the conclusion of the Treaty was indeed as “drastic (a) blow” to Soviet foreign policy in Asia as the Soviet had recently encountered, or, to put it more simply, the USSR is “a net loser” vis-à-vis this Treaty.<sup>32)</sup> One thing that we have to keep in mind, however, is that, as N. Leites repeatedly warned in his massive work on Bolshevist psychology and strategy, *The Study of Bolshevism*, “The Soviets may retreat occasionally, but it does not mean that they yield.”<sup>33)</sup> There is no need to recall that the USSR is not a signatory nor a direct participant of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty. On the other hand, the Chinese side has never hidden the fact that the anti-hegemony clause in the Treaty is directed against nothing but the “Northpole bear”; and the Japanese side has a desire that the Soviets will not interpret this Treaty as do the Chinese.

28) *Ibid.*, p. 52.

29) *Ibid.*, p. 53.

30) Petrov, *Ianonia v mirovoi politike*, pp. 263-269.

31) Petrov, *Iaponia nashikh dnei*, p. 53.

32) *Christian Science Monitor*, September 15, 1978.

33) Nathan Leites, *The Study of Bolshevism* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1953), p. 498.

Exactly at this divergence of interests does Moscow, the third party, find the pretext to interfere and to maneuver for its own interests, employing a very thick-skinned and yet, admittedly, a very skillful policy.

To implement this policy, the Soviets use both "soft" and "hard" approaches. To begin with, since the conclusion of the Sino-Japan Peace Treaty, Moscow has increasingly shown a tendency to regard Tokyo as a sort of victim, tricked by the conspiratorial designs of Beijing. This view has been expressed particularly cogently by those Soviet officials who consider good relations between Japan and the USSR as vital. This group of people have articulated their view as follows: True, the Sino-Japanese Treaty became possible precisely because the basic interests of the ruling class of both the PRC and Japan are identical, and hence compromises between them became possible. But, at the same time, it must also be true that the Treaty would not have been concluded if Beijing had not exerted great "pressure"<sup>34)</sup> upon Tokyo. Thus, the Treaty, in this context, must have been the result of a calculated Chinese scheme to "lure"<sup>35)</sup> Tokyo into accepting the Chinese posture of anti-Sovietism and into final Japanese "capitulation"<sup>36)</sup> to this pressure. In other words, the Soviets consider Beijing to be the more offending partner and Tokyo to be the dupe, even meriting some sympathy from the Soviets.

The Soviet interpretation of a difference in the roles played by China and Japan in concluding the Treaty elicits another "soft" approach to Tokyo for its position, which lies short of immediate danger to the Soviet Union. D. Petrov, a typical soft-liner toward Japan, interprets the Treaty as a source of only *latent or potential danger* (opasnost') to the USSR.<sup>37)</sup> In other words, he never says that the Treaty in itself constitutes any actual danger to the Soviet Union. The similar interpretation of G. Krasin in his article in *Novoe Vremia* holds that: "The conclusion of the Treaty directed against the interests of peace and detente contains a *latent danger* not only for the peoples of Southeast Asia but also for Japan itself, which *might* (mozhet byt') be drawn into the Beijing leaders' adventurism."<sup>38)</sup>

Whether this potential danger will be realized or not, the Soviets continue to argue, is entirely up to Tokyo's future actions. M. Demchenko wrote, for example, in *Izvestiia* that "the future will show whether Japan will pursue her own independent foreign policy line or not."<sup>39)</sup> We can regard this pronouncement as a typical "wait and see"<sup>40)</sup> attitude of the Kremlin. At the same time, it can be considered as

34) Petrov, *Iaponiia nashikh dnei*, pp. 48-49.

35) *Izvestiia*, September 9, 1978.

36) *Izvestiia*, August 13, 1978.

37) Petrov, *Iaponiia nashikh dnei*, p. 50; Krasin, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

38) Krasin, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

39) *Izvestiia*, August 13, 1978.

40) "Moscow Attacks Teng Visit, Urges Closer Japan-USSR Ties," *FBIS: Trends in Communist Media* (November 1, 1978), p. 4.

a very skillful Kremlin bluff for the purpose of reserving its right to interfere in Japan's future conduct of its own foreign affairs. Thus, it becomes clear for us that it is not appropriate to worry over the "soft" and the "hard" approaches of the Kremlin toward Tokyo. Instead, it is more accurate to say that both approaches are inseparably interrelated and serve only one and the same Soviet objective. V. Melikhov, in an article in a book edited by Petrov, has threatened the Tokyo Government as follows: "Japan prefers to keep an equidistance from China and from the USSR, without allowing any overt measure, which could do damage to her relations with the USSR. The developments in Sino-Japanese relations have thus their own objective limits."<sup>41)</sup>

What Moscow is now most worried about — according to an article of *Trud*, the Soviet labor union's organ — is expressed in the following:

There is now no guarantee that, having made one concession to Beijing, Tokyo will not take other steps dictated by China... The fact that Japan has been drawn into the mainstream of China's great-power aspirations will undoubtedly create an atmosphere conducive to the activation of Japanese militarism.<sup>42)</sup>

It is a perfectly correct guess that what the Kremlin is most concerned about and wants to avoid is the development of the Japan-China relations into a military alliance. Therefore, each time Beijing tries to make an approach toward the Japanese Defense Agency and its high officials, the Soviets have never failed to conduct a massive campaign against such contact. In September 1978, when General Chang Tsai-Chien, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, visited Japan and met with K. Maruyama, then Deputy Chief of the Japanese Defense Agency, and T. Takashina, then Chairman of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces Joint Chief Staff, the Soviets fully mobilized all their communications media to represent such contact as a sign of potential formation of an anti-Soviet military alliance. Such denunciatory expressions as "dangerous contact,"<sup>43)</sup> "unprecedented military contact,"<sup>44)</sup> and other harsh words were found practically everyday in communications such as the *Pravda*, *Izvestiia*, *Krasnaia zvezda*, *Novoe vremia*, and others. This visit was interpreted by the Soviets as "a step toward fulfilment of the plan made by the U. S. and the PRC to combine Japan's advanced industrial and military potential with the huge Chinese population and strategic resource materials" (*Krasnaia zvezda*, Sep. 18, 1979).<sup>45)</sup> Exactly the same kind of campaign was repeated in May 1979 when

41) Petrov (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 142.

42) Quoted from *FBIS (SOV)* (September 13, 1978), p. M 5.

43) *Pravda, Izvestiia*, September 9, 1978.

44) *Ibid.*

45) *Krasnaia zvezda*, September 18, 1978.

Su Yu, Chinese Vice-Minister of National Defense, who was in Japan as a member of the so-called Chinese "Friendship Delegation," had talks with G. Yamashita, then Chief of the Japanese Defense Agency, A. Watari, Deputy Chief, and T. Takashina. Designating this meeting as "the first official meeting between the military leaders of Tokyo and Beijing, *Izvestiia* (May 21, 1979) warned that "it is nothing but a new step on the path of broadening Japanese-Chinese military contacts," permitting the Tokyo ruling circles to "involve themselves in the dangerous game of playing with fire."<sup>46)</sup>

(3) The third response of Soviet spokesmen to the conclusion of the Japan-China Peace Treaty can be found in their attempt to exploit its existence to promote their own designs for Japan. The Soviet penchant for turning everything to their advantage should be well noted at this juncture. Namely, the Kremlin has now urged Tokyo to make an effort to raise Soviet-Japanese relations to the same level as the Sino-Japanese relations. If the Tokyo Government says that it takes an "equidistant" policy vis-à-vis Beijing and Moscow, the Soviets argue that Tokyo must demonstrate its *bona fides* not simply in lip service, but in actions. The following passage from Yu. Afornin, a commentator of the Moscow Broadcasting Service in Japanese, provides us with a typical example of this kind of argument:

Then, how is Japan trying to straighten out the ramifications of its relations with the USSR? According to information made available so far, all that Japan is doing is explaining to the Soviet side that the Japan-China Treaty is not directed against the Soviet Union and that the Japanese Government is interested only in developing good-neighborly ties with the USSR. In other words, Japan is only making statements, not accompanied by deeds.<sup>47)</sup>

At least two concrete examples can be provided in order to show that Moscow has been following a flexible and dexterous approach to make full use of the Japan-China Treaty to Soviet advantage. Some observers in Japan go out of their way to suggest that the Kremlin welcomed rather than dreaded the conclusion of the Japan-China Treaty, precisely because the Treaty may give them an excellent excuse, otherwise lacking, to push two specific measures, to be described below, which are critical in Japan-Soviet relations. Whether or not such is the case, some observers consider that any actual damage caused by the Treaty to the USSR can be offset, or at least lessened, by some advantages or benefits which might be derived from the conclusion of the Treaty. In any event, it must be noted that the consummation of the China-Japan Treaty cannot be regarded as a net loss to Moscow. Then, what are the factors which have caused the Kremlin to pressure Tokyo more readily

46) *Izvestiia*, May 21, 1979.

47) *FBIS (SOV)* (August 28, 1978), p. M 1.

because of the Treaty than before its conclusion?

The first illustration concerns the Soviet position with regard to the "territorial" issue vis-à-vis Japan. As is well known, the Japan-China Peace Treaty in 1978 made no mention of the "Senkaku Islands," the ownership of which has long been disputed by Japan and China. In that sense it is not impossible to say that the territorial issue was then implicitly shelved on the part of the signatory states. Taking full advantage of the compromising attitude shown in that case, especially on the Japanese side, the Soviets have on occasion *implicitly* pushed Japan to maintain an equivalent approach vis-à-vis the U. S. S. R. as well, namely, to set aside the "Northern Territorial" questions. The reason why the author of this paper emphasizes the term "implicitly" is to stress the point that the Soviets are in no position to be explicit on this subject, since it is their official line that no unsolved territorial problem really exists between the USSR and Japan. At any rate, the "Northern Territorial" question between Japan and the USSR is not comparable to that of the "Senkaku Islands" issue between Japan and the PRC for many reasons. From the Japanese point of view, for instance, it was Japan that established *de facto* control of the "Senkaku Islands," but it was not Japan in the case of the "Northern Territories."

Deliberately ignoring this and other differences, Anatoryev, commentator of the Moscow Broadcasting Service, for example, in a Japanese language broadcast in October 1978 quoted China's Dong Xiaoping as stating that "since the present generation does not have the wisdom to settle the question of sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, it would be better to leave it to our future generations, shelving it for the time being."<sup>48)</sup> What Anatoryev implies is too obvious for elaboration. An analogous view on the part of the Kremlin has been suggested with regard to the Japan-Soviet territorial question, although with no indication of factual justification nor real intention. Reference is made to the view attributed to Vladimir L. Kudryavtsev, a political commentator for *Izvestiia* and also a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, concerning a meeting on June 21, 1979 in the Kremlin with a visiting mission of the youth department of the Japanese Liberal-Democratic Party led by Shinya Totsuka, a member of the House of Councillors. Mission members quoted Kudryavtsev as saying "Let us affix a *comma* to the territorial problem and not a *period*" (italics mine).<sup>49)</sup> Such punctuational metaphor underlines the Soviet preference for postponing the territorial question between Japan and the USSR for the future.

The second example of Soviet exploitation of the China-Japan Treaty in their own interests is clear and simple, i. e., Japan should also accede to the Soviet

48) *Ibid.*, (May 31, 1979), p. C 1.

49) *Ibid.* (June 22, 1979), pp. C 1-2.

request to conclude the "Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Cooperation" between the USSR and Japan. Japan has, of course, ignored this proposal, the one-sided content of which was published by the Soviets in the February 23, 1978 issue of the Soviet Government newspaper *Izvestiia*.

Four points render the treaty draft humiliating, and hence, unacceptable to Tokyo: (1) nowhere at all in the draft of 14 articles is mention made of the territorial question; (ii) The draft requires *de facto* abrogation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, a condition which is, of course, out of the question for Tokyo, and one which Beijing did not request when it concluded the Peace Treaty with Japan; (iii) an article on the so-called "security of consultation-in-emergency cases" gave rise to both indignation and fear on the part of the Japanese, who found a similar article to have been included in the treaties which the USSR had negotiated only with Soviet "allies" in Eastern Europe, or with "developing" countries like Afghanistan, Vietnam, India, Bangladesh, Iraq, and Ethiopia; (iv) there is no article referring to termination of the treaty such as those contained even in the Soviet-Vietnamese or the Soviet-Ethiopian Treaties. Above all, such a treaty proposal cannot be acceptable even as a simple negotiation draft for the Tokyo Government, whose position is that it is absolutely necessary to have a "Peace Treaty" first, which solves the territorial question and signifies the real end to World War II before discussing further cooperation between Japan and the USSR.

Despite their awareness of all the arguments described above on the Japanese side, the Soviets have nonetheless kept up the pressure on Japan to conclude first the "Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Cooperation" as a sort of intermediary step, given the fact that agreement over the "Peace Treaty" itself is currently so difficult for both states. Japan's conclusion of the "Peace Treaty" with the PRC provides the Soviets with a justification to push Tokyo further to conclude some kind of treaty with the USSR. Soviet reasoning can best be illustrated in the following passage of Yurii Afornin's commentary over the Moscow Broadcasting Service in Japanese on February 4, 1979: "Last January the Soviet Union officially submitted the draft treaty (of the Good Neighborliness and Cooperation) to Japan .... Tokyo often says that it wants to develop friendly ties with the Soviet Union .... Japan has signed a treaty with China. Accordingly, under the 'balance' principle no one can deny the necessity of readjusting Soviet-Japanese relations on the basis of a treaty. It is precisely this kind of readjustment that the Soviet Union has proposed. The next move is up to Japan."<sup>50</sup>

In sum, the Soviet strategy toward Japan in the wake of the conclusion of the Japan-China Peace Treaty can be summarized as follows: its minimum or negative

50) *Ibid.* (February 5, 1979). p. M 2.

objective is to block the formation of a Tokyo-Beijing military alliance, and its maximum goal is to conclude the Soviet-Japanese Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Cooperation.

### B. Some Developments Since the Conclusion of the Treaty

So far, this report has examined the *general* strategic policy of the Kremlin toward Tokyo. Now it is appropriate to consider a few *actual* developments in the overall picture since the conclusion of the Treaty, some of which tend to reassure the Kremlin leadership about the relations between Japan and the PRC. The Kremlin has realized that there do exist some significant restraints or limits beyond which Sino-Japanese relations cannot go. What, then, are these developments that have seemingly helped the Kremlin to reevaluate China-Japan relations in a somewhat new light?

First, it appears that the Soviets were quite impressed by the independent posture and policies which Tokyo adopted during the China-Vietnamese War in the spring of 1979. At that time *Pravda* carried favorable reports on Tokyo's neutral position in that war. For instance, when Dong Xiaoping visited Tokyo on his way back to Beijing from Washington to inform of Beijing's intention to "teach a lesson" to the Vietnamese, in a February 9, 1979 issue of *Pravda* I. Latyshev described the Japanese position as follows: "Premier Ohira did not yield to Chinese pressure and dissociated himself from Beijing's bellicose policy."<sup>51)</sup> Latyshev further quotes most Japanese observers as agreeing (1) that in these talks "significant differences between the two sides" were highlighted in assessing the situation in Asia, and (2) that Japan must continue "to preserve its independence in determining its foreign policy."<sup>52)</sup> When the Chinese "punishment" materialized, V. Tsvetov, commentator of a Moscow Radio Broadcast, on February 18, 1979 approvingly announced: "Japan received reports of Beijing's invasion of Socialist Vietnam with great displeasure."<sup>53)</sup> Tsvetov even went a step further on April 8, 1979 observing: "The Chinese invasion of Socialist Vietnam met with a strong protest in Japan. Even those conservative politicians who had worked for closer Sino-Japan ties have criticized Beijing's behavior,"<sup>54)</sup> and in conclusion he quoted lines from the *Sankei Shimbun* that "the invasion shattered the illusion of a 'peaceful China' held by some Japanese people."<sup>55)</sup>

Second, Moscow was highly gratified by the freezing, or even abrogation, of some Japan-China joint economic projects and large economic contracts as announced at the end of February 1979. In early March an increasing number of items

51) *Pravda*, February 9, 1979.

52) *Ibid.*

53) *FBIS (SOV)* (February 22, 1979), p. M 1.

54) *Ibid.*, (April 11, 1979), p. C 1.

55) *Ibid.*

appeared in the Soviet mass media stressing that Japan-China relations were not going well. Moscow Radio on March 1, 1979, for instance, reported the "PRC deferment of contracts with Japan to be a heavy blow," observing that "trade and industrial circles in Japan are extremely unhappy over the PRC decision to defer the fulfillment of contracts for imports of industrial plants from Japan," and that "sober-minded representatives of business circles in Japan express serious concern about a possibility of trade with China," with their new view that "China is unable to pay for plants" or that "the Chinese market is by no means a dreamland."<sup>56)</sup> As for reaction on the part of the Chinese, Moscow Radio happily reported on April 4, 1979 that "the hegemonists in Beijing have been irritated by Japan's refusal to conduct trade with China on unequal and disadvantageous terms."<sup>57)</sup> It was reported that Liao Chengzhi, President of the Sino-Japanese Friendship Society, in addressing a mission from Japan to the PRC, made a charge of decreased interest in Sino-Japanese relations on the Japanese side," and urged that "Japan show more zeal in promoting Sino-Japanese relations."<sup>58)</sup>

From these various developments between Japan and China, Moscow, at least officially, drew the conclusion that "euphoria about China" had disappeared from Japan by April 1979. Yu. Bandura and V. Kassis, Tokyo correspondents of *Izvestiia*, for instance, sent an article to Soviet readers, in which they reported on the "waning of the tempestuous but short-lived 'China fever'."<sup>59)</sup> I. Latyshev, Tokyo correspondent of *Pravda*, made a similar observation in the April 13, 1979 issue, that "all this taken together has meant that the 'China fever' in Japanese business circles has not only abated, but is being replaced by pessimistic sentiments."<sup>60)</sup>

### C. Prevention of Anti-Soviet Military Alliance

Diplomatic normalization between the US and the PRC followed the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty by less than six months. Faced with this development, the USSR found it even more imperative to prevent by all means the following countries, the US, Japan, the PRC, and even South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, from forming a military alliance against the Soviet Union. Thus it became the high-priority aim of the Kremlin to avert Japan's increasing involvement in such an anti-Soviet alliance. Let us very briefly elaborate on this.

Between May and October 1979 frequent contacts among top political and military leaders of Japan, the US, and South Korea took place, for example, US President

56) *Ibid.*, (March 6, 1989), p. M 1.

57) *Ibid.*, (April 6, 1979), p. C 1.

58) *FBIS (SOV)* (April 6, 1979), p. C 1.

59) *Izvestiia*, April 8, 1979.

60) *Pravda*, April 13, 1979.

Carter's and Defense Secretary Brown's visits to Japan and South Korea ; G. Yamashita's visit to South Korea — the first one ever made by the Director General of the Japanese Defense Agency — to the US and to Western Europe. Although these personal meetings were necessitated, at least partially, by the sizeable, recent build-up of Soviet military forces, the Soviet Government invariably mobilized Soviet mass media such as the *Pravda*, *Isvestiia*, *Krasnaia zvezda*, Tass, and Moscow Radio to label such personal exchanges of high officials as aggressive moves.

The main features of these propaganda campaigns were as follows : first, the U. S. Pentagon acted as the ringleader and organizer of such an anti-Soviet alliance. Second, the military cooperation between the US and Japan was the core of this alliance, with South Korea as its third member. TASS news analyst V. Kharkov, for instance, declared on October 18, 1979 : "The broad participation of the United States in implementing the program for a re-equipment of the Korean Army is a new step in promoting Seoul to the status of a full-fledged party to the US-Japan-South Korea tripartite alliance being knocked together now."<sup>61)</sup> Third, notwithstanding these assertions, Soviet propaganda phraseology did not yet consider the triangular regional alliance as consummated, as illustrated by terms such as "a new scheme to form a US-Japan-ROK military alliance"<sup>62)</sup> ; "What new steps should be taken to establish a militarist alliance between the United States, Japan and the South Korean regime ?"<sup>63)</sup> ; "Both Japanese and U. S. military authorities intend to form a virtual — if not formal — alliance of aggression through the complete support of the Seoul Government."<sup>64)</sup> Fourth, Beijing entered as the fourth member of that alliance : thus, Moscow Radio's "Domestic Service" in English on October 17, 1979 cited the *Akahata*, the organ of the Japanese Communist Party as stating that "the aim of the forthcoming talks (of Brown in Seoul and Tokyo) is to include Beijing as a fourth participant in the Washington-Tokyo-Seoul alliance."<sup>65)</sup> Korolev, commentator of Moscow Radio, repeated exactly the same allegation in a Japanese broadcast on October 18, 1979.<sup>66)</sup>

## II. Specific Strategy and Tactics Toward Japan

So far I have examined the Soviet foreign policy toward Japan within the framework of its general global or Asian policy scheme. Now I will turn to considering the Kremlin's policy and strategy toward Japan *per se*.

61) *FBIS (SOV)* (October 19, 1979), p. C 1.

62) *Ibid.*

63) *Ibid.*, (October 18, 1979), p. C 1 ; (October 19, 1979), p. C 1.

64) *Ibid.*, (October 22, 1979), p. C. 2.

65) *Ibid.*, (October 18, 1979), p. C. 1.

66) *Ibid.*, (October 19, 1979). p. C. 2.

In the last week of September 1979, two significant events created astonishment among Japanese observers as to Soviet objectives and behaviors toward Japan. In the eighth joint session of the Soviet-Japan and the Japan-Soviet Business Cooperation Committee held in Moscow on September 24-27, the Soviet side surprised the Japanese delegation by their unprecedented enthusiasm and flexibility. This session took place after a long interval and was the first to be held after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty between Japan and China. The Soviets agreed to insert a paragraph in the joint communiqué stipulating that “both sides will continue to discuss the possibility of a mutually acceptable production-sharing formula with a cooperation based on reciprocity.” This was a remarkable softening of the previous Soviet position which had insisted on the “production-sharing formula”, according to which the Soviets would repay Japan in goods produced from plants to be constructed with Japanese help and credits. It was also in the course of this Conference that the Japanese participants learned via a Washington release that the Soviets had built a military base also on Shikotan Island. The build-up of Soviet military forces on other parts of the so-called “Northern Islands” which Japan has claimed as her territories, i. e. the Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands, had already been disclosed in February. Nevertheless, the Soviet bases on Shikotan Island came as a particular shock to the Japanese, who consider the Islands as a part of Hokkaido. Reacting to these two obviously contradictory Soviet signals, Mrs. Sadoko Ogata, former Minister to the Japanese Representative to the United Nations and the first Japanese lady ever to hold such a high diplomatic position, commented in an article in the *Asahi Shimbun* (Oct. 10, 1979) that “the Soviet move is mysterious”<sup>67)</sup> — a characterization remindful of Churchill’s famous quotation “the Soviet Union and its foreign policy is riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” In the following section of this paper I will attempt to explain why the Soviet move should appear so mysterious to Mrs. Ogata and others who hold a similar view on Soviet conduct of foreign affairs.

(1) In general the Soviet conduct of foreign affairs (diplomacy, negotiations, strategy, tactics, etc.) has both similarities and dissimilarities compared with that developed and adopted in the West.

First, it may not be correct to consider Soviet diplomacy as totally different from the Western one. Sir Harold Nicolson, author of a classic text on diplomacy, goes out of his way to conclude that Soviet diplomacy is “not diplomacy but something else.”<sup>68)</sup> Gordon Craig, another analyst of Soviet external behavior, holds a similar view: “Soviet negotiators have always had a fundamentally different approach toward diplomacy from that of Western colleagues. To them diplomacy is more than an

67) *Asahi Shimbun*, October 10, 1979.

68) Harold Nicolson, *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method* (London: Constable & Co. Ltd., 1954), p. 90.

instrument for protecting and advancing national interest: it is a weapon in the unremitting war against capitalist society.”<sup>69)</sup> Are then Soviet diplomacy and negotiation techniques so totally distinct from Western ones? If the answer is “yes”, we should realize that some aspects of Soviet behavior cannot be explained sufficiently. Some observers would argue that in the face of a threat of mutual nuclear annihilation, Soviet foreign conduct has increasingly become less distinct from that of Western countries, as evidenced by Soviet negotiating behavior during the SALT talks. This is one of the few important conclusions of Dr. Joseph G. Whelan’s penetrating study *Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior: Emerging New Context For U. S. Diplomacy* (1979).<sup>70)</sup> “Whatever the designation, Dr. Whelan argues, “Soviet diplomacy is no doubt diplomacy at least in the formal sense of using internationally recognized instrumentalities to achieve Soviet national interests, to moderate differences with other states, and to seek solutions through negotiations.”<sup>71)</sup> In other parts of his study, Dr. Whelan tends to take a middle position, characterizing Soviet diplomacy as a blend of “diplomacy, both with a difference”<sup>72)</sup>, an assessment with which the author of the present paper concurs.

The next question relating to the above is whether the Soviets actually follow clearly defined negotiating tactics in their diplomacy. Here again the answer is “yes and no.” One is easily tempted to imagine that the Kremlin authorities have been resorting to unique Soviet methods and techniques, quite different from Western ones, in their effort to achieve their diplomatic objectives. However, according to Western observers who are familiar with overt Soviet behavior in shared research or experiences, such is not necessarily the true picture.<sup>73)</sup> On the contrary, they note that they generally do not detect any specifically Soviet tactics. This observation made by Western experts is more readily acceptable if one views the Soviet conduct of foreign affairs in general as a mere characteristic of big powers than of the “Socialist” countries. The Soviets like adhering to very traditional, 19th century, and even out-dated techniques. This may be seen as a natural practice, since, regardless of the differences in political and economic systems, human nature does not differ

69) Gordon A. Craig, “Totalitarian Approaches to Diplomatic Negotiation,” in A. O. Sarkissian, ed., *Studies in Diplomatic History in Honor of G. P. Gooch* (London: Langmans, 1961), p. 119; See also Stephen D. Kertesz, “American and Soviet Negotiating Behavior” in Kertesz and M. A. Fitzsimons, eds., *Diplomacy in a Changing World* (Notre Dame Press, 1959), pp. 144 ff.

70) See, for example, The Senior Specialists Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, *Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior: Emerging New Context For U. S. Diplomacy* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 534, 540-541.

71) *Ibid.*, p. 541.

72) *Ibid.*, p. 540.

73) *Ibid.*, p. 528.

much, and it is really hard to think of fantastic ideas or tactics. Be that as it may, the means by which the Kremlin has often acted are on such tactics, which are also used by Western diplomats, as "divide and rule," "stick and carrot," "salami tactics," "bazaar tactics," "shock tactics," "the time limit," "waiting game," "departure time decision," "bluff," "linkage," "repetition," and so forth.<sup>74)</sup>

On the other hand, however, it is not correct either to conclude that there are no peculiarities or features whatever in Soviet methods. In my opinion, the distinct feature of Soviet diplomatic tactics can be found not in its particular kind of tactics, but in its special way of using them. It can be said that "the Soviets employ more methodically and regularly the similar or same tactics used unsystematically and infrequently by Westerners."<sup>75)</sup> It may be enough to say simply this. We should say that the Kremlin has tended never to hesitate to resort to any means which they believe will serve their objectives. Dr. Michael Blaker, who has been engaged in study on the negotiation style of Japan and the USSR at Columbia University, argues that "what seems to be characteristic behavior of Soviet diplomats lies not in the use of special techniques but in their attempt to resort to a combination of all kinds of conducts to win over adversaries."<sup>76)</sup> For them, to put it simply, the goal justifies the means. Stephen D. Kertesz, a former Hungarian diplomat, confirms this by stating that "all means which promote Communist objectives are regarded as good and legitimate. Everything, with the exception of the final goal, is reduced to expediency. Hence Communist representatives are uninhibited in their tactics and procedures."<sup>77)</sup>

(2) I would like to single out for discussion one of the Soviets' favorite tactics, namely, "linkage," because in my opinion, it not only reflects Soviet (arbitrary) logic most clearly, but it offers a potential practical benefit if taken into account in Japanese policy-making toward the USSR. Not a few influential business leaders, and even some intellectuals in Japan, argue that the policy attitude taken by the Soviet Union, i. e., of separating politics from economy, should also be taken by Japan. Let us consider two Japanese responses to this view. At the joint Conference of the Japan-Soviet and Soviet-Japan Economic Committee held in Moscow in September 1979, the *Asahi Shimbun* reported that "a change in the policy of the USSR in

74) *Ibid.*, p. 229-239; Bryant Wedge and Cyril Muromcew, "Psychological Factors in Soviet Disarmament Negotiation," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* (vol. 9, No. 1, March 1965), p. 35; Louis J. Samelson, *Soviet and Chinese Negotiating Behavior: The Western View* (Beverly Hills, California: SAGE Publications, 1976), p. 8 ff; Cyril Muromcew, "Soviet Negotiating Behavior," pp. 5-14.

75) Samelson, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

76) Michael Blaker, *Japanese International Negotiating Style* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), translated by Makoto Ikei, *Nemawashi, Kakimawashi, Atomawashi*, (Tokyo: The Simal Press, 1976), p. 265.

77) Kertesz, *op.cit.*, p. 145.

her effort to improve economic relations separately from politics can be observed.”<sup>78)</sup> Mr. Shigeo Nagano, President of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Chairman of the Japan-Soviet Economic Committee, was reported to have responded with the question as to what kind of “displeasure” or “retaliation” must be expressed against the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan that “business circles at this stage consider the separation of economy from diplomacy necessary, since Japan needs Soviet timber and coal.”<sup>79)</sup> I do not intend to discuss here the policy question of whether Japan should separate economics from politics and diplomacy. What I want to do is to simply provide the material facts on which to base an independent judgment, rather than a judgement based on the wrong perception of Soviet policy, a policy which seems to me to be selective, arbitrary, and an opportunistic juxtaposition of any or all issues at hand to “ride on the coattails” of the immediate and specific Soviet goal. These tactics the Soviets themselves do not make any attempt to conceal.

If advantageous to them, the Soviets take the position that all fields of human activities, including, politics and economy, are closely linked with each other. This stand is in accord with the concept of “total diplomacy.”<sup>80)</sup> For instance, the Soviet repudiation of the Japanese protest against their build-up of military bases on the Shikotan Islands in the Autumn of 1979 provides a good example of this kind of linkage. On October 6, 1979 the *Izvestiia* carried an article by Yu. Bandura warning Tokyo to stop the protest campaign, threatening that such a campaign would inevitably damage Soviet-Japanese relations in trade, fishing, and other fields. It continues as follows: “the first casualties of a policy hostile to the Soviet Union could be damaging to cultural, scientific, and technical ties, mutual relations in regard to fishing, trade, and economic cooperation.”<sup>81)</sup> Clearly, the Soviets here try to link spheres which are not necessarily related to one another. It is also obvious that they intend to drive a wedge between specific Japanese fishing, trade, and other interests and the Japanese public in general, who feel the need to protest against the military build-up on a territory that really belongs to Japan. It is well to recall in this context that in the heated and protracted negotiations between Japan and the USSR in the spring of 1977 concerning fishing rights — in the wake of the Soviet declaration of the 200 miles fishing zone — the Soviets insisted that they had never linked the “fishing” problem with the “territorial” one, an argument which some Japanese took at its face value.

On the other hand, when the Soviets consider it undesirable to link different issues, they do not hesitate to separate them from other spheres of human activities. Thus, an article in the *Izvetiia* (July 3, 1979), after stating that “the Soviet Union has

78) *Asahi Shimbun*, October 10, 1979.

79) *Sankei Shimbun*, January 8, 1980.

80) Whelan, *op. cit.*, p. 523.

81) *Izvestiia*, October 6, 1979.

consistently advocated and continues to advocate the all-round (vsestoronnee) mutually advantageous development of commercial, economic, cultural and other relations with Japan.”<sup>82)</sup> It continues as follows: “the anti-Soviet campaigns surrounding the imaginary ‘territorial problem’ are interfering with the development of such bilateral relations.”<sup>83)</sup> In other words, they switch arguments as it suits their purpose.

Lastly, a word about the Soviet attitude concerning the relation between economy and politics. As pointed out before, politics and economy are, in the Soviet tactics, linked or not linked, depending upon the situation at a particular moment. Consequently, it is not to assume *a priori*, as some Japanese do, that the Soviet Union always tends to separate economics from political issues. On the contrary, it frequently combines them, using economic factors as a welcome instrument for advancing their political aims. For example, in an article in *Za rubezhom* (October 4, 1979) economic cooperation is declared to be “an important means of cementing relations between states with different and political systems.”<sup>84)</sup> The Soviet side has never made it a secret that joint economic projects between the USSR and Japan also aim at being a useful vehicle for improving relations between the countries. N. Nikolaev, in his article on *Problemy dal'nego vostoka* (No. 2, 1975), suggests that several Soviet-Japanese projects for economic cooperation have “a *political* as well as economic character.”<sup>85)</sup> (italics mine.) P. D. Dolgorukov, Deputy Secretary of the Japan Economic Research Institute of the USSR Ministry of Trade, also comments: “With the increase in the volume of joint (Soviet-Japanese) projects, not only their economic, but also their *political* significance has been growing.”<sup>86)</sup> (italics mine.) The long-term Soviet-Japanese Economic Cooperation Agreement, which the USSR has been tenaciously urging Japan to conclude, will, according to Dolgorukov, engender the same kind of political consequence. In a paper submitted to a symposium of Soviet and Japanese scholars, held in Osaka in early November 1979, he states that a “Long-term Agreement (between the USSR and Japan) on principles of (economic) Cooperation will lead to very important *political* results, besides quite obvious economic advantages.”<sup>87)</sup> (italics mine.) Yet, the Soviets do not hesitate to condemn this link between economy and politics if it is unfavorable to them, criticizing Tokyo for consolidating its political ties with the PRC and other developing countries by

82) *Ibid.*, July 3, 1979.

83) *Ibid.*

84) Quoted from *FBIS (SOV)* (October 12, 1979), p. C 1.

85) N. N. Nikolaev, “K 50-letiiu ustanovleniia diplomaticheskikh otnoshenii SSSR s Iaponiei, *Problemy dal'nego vostoka*, (No. 2, 1977), p. 58.

86) P. P. Dolgorukov, “Torgovo-ekonomicheskie otnosheniia SSSR s Iaponiia,” *SSSR-Iaponiia: K 50-letiiu ustanovleniia sovsotsko-iaponskikh diplomaticheskikh otnoshenii 1925-1975* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka 1978), p. 120.

87) Dolgorukov, “Torgovo-ekonomicheskie otnosheniia SSSR s Iaponiei,” p. 14.

means of economic aid. In the 1972 version of the *Yearbook of Japan*, D. Petrov writes as follows :

The Japanese Government has been pursuing a series of *political* as well as economic objectives, by encouraging investment abroad with all available means. Improved conditions of 'aid' to developing countries are expected to strengthen the position of Japan and create a *political* climate favorable to Japan.<sup>88)</sup>

The Japanese Government has been claiming that she is in favor of development of trade relations on the basis of «separation of economy from politics», ... (but) channels of trade have been used for *political* contact and, despite the lack of diplomatic relations, made it possible to preserve *de facto* relations at the highest level. (italics mine.)<sup>89)</sup>

(3) Which specific varieties and forms of policy conduct has, then, the Soviet Union applied to Japan following the conclusion of the Japan-China Treaty? The answer is the “carrot and stick” depending on concrete issues and circumstances.

First, the “carrot” (soft) approach : Notwithstanding threats of retaliatory measures in the event of the conclusion of a treaty with China, the U. S. S. R. has actually reacted rather moderately, much to Japan's surprise. A similar trend can be noticed not only in regard to trade and economic cooperation, but also in the exchanges of cultural and other representatives. This was in marked contrast to the “MIG-25 Incident” (September, 1976), when Moscow expressed its displeasure by postponing the already-scheduled Seventh Joint Conference of the Soviet-Japan and Japan-Soviet Business Cooperation Committee, suspending the issuance of visas to the Japanese team of *Go* (a Japanese Chess game) players, and staging a rather discourteous reception by the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko of his Japanese counterpart, Mr. Kosaka, on the occasion of the United Nations General Assembly in New York in September 1976. Yet, when Mr. Gromyko met with Mr. Sonoda, then Foreign Minister of Japan, in New York in September 1979 — one month after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaty —, their talks were conducted in an unusually cordial and cooperative atmosphere,<sup>90)</sup> and Mr. Gromyko even intimated that a visit to Japan was a clear possibility.<sup>91)</sup>

In the economic sphere, Moscow has been much more flexible. Less than a month after the Japan-China Peace Treaty, Mr. Kusnetsov, Director General of the

88) D. V. Petrov, “Vneshnaia politika,” *Iaponia 1972 Ezhegodnik* (Moscow : Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1973), p. 80.

89) *Ibid.*, pp. 88, 91.

90) Nagao Hyodo, *Saikin no niso-kankei to hoppo-ryodo mondai. (The Recent Japan-Soviet Relations and the Territorial Question)*, (Tokyo : Minshu-gaiko Kyokai, 1979), p. 11.

91) *Asahi Shimbun (evening edition)*, September 25, 1979.

USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade, visited Tokyo as the Soviet representative at the Third Japan-Soviet Off-Shore Trade Conference.<sup>92)</sup> In October 1978, the regular annual conference on Japan-Soviet Trade was held in Tokyo as scheduled.<sup>93)</sup> A few months later, in February 1979, the Eighth Joint Conference of the Japan-Soviet and Soviet-Japanese Economic Committee convened in Tokyo with Mr. Ivan F. Semichastnov, First Deputy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade and Chairman of the Soviet-Japan Economic Committee, representing the Soviet Union. Unexpectedly, this conference achieved much and opened up concrete prospects for increased Soviet-Japanese cooperation on the government level, especially in the field of joint ventures in Siberia (*Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, September 1979).<sup>94)</sup>

In other domains too, the Soviet desire to improve Soviet-Japanese bilateral relations became evident, following Japan's peace treaty with the PRC. Toward the end of August, 1978, the Soviets received, as scheduled, a delegation of the Japanese Socialist Party, headed by Seiichi Kawamura, and in early September, another delegation of the two Chambers of the Japanese Diet, headed by Nikichi Shirahama of the L. D. P., who met with Premier Kosygin in the Kremlin for a 70-minute talk.<sup>95)</sup>

Five members of the CPSU, including Mr. I. Kovalenko, Chief of the International Section of the CPSU,<sup>96)</sup> came to Tokyo in October 1978, and held *pourparlers* with almost all the leaders of Japan's political parties, extending invitations to visit Moscow at the earliest convenience. Soon after, on November 21-25, Yohei Kono, representative of the New Liberal Club, visited Moscow. Kazuo Asukata, Chairman of the J. S. P., and Shogo Tada, Vice-Chairman of the Komei Party, followed suit, in December 1978, and in January 1979, respectively. Perhaps the most important in this series of visits was that of Kenji Miyamoto, Chairman of the Japanese Communist Party in December 1979, a few days earlier than the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan. The patching up of the C. P. S. U. and J. C. P. was at last made at the great price the Soviet side paid to the J. C. P. — *de facto* humiliating admission that their policy toward J. C. P. in the past had had some errors.

Soon thereafter, important Soviet officials paid return visits to Japan. One official was Mr. Nikolai P. Firyubin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, who, during his stay in May 1979, declared in a conference on the Deputy Foreign Minister level that an "actual possibility has been created for moving Soviet-Japanese relations on to a new phase."<sup>97)</sup> Mr. Firyubin also told Japanese Premier Ohira that "we regard

92) *Ibid.*, September 9, 1978.

93) *Ibid.*, October 14, 1978.

94) *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, February 28, 1979.

95) *Asahi Shimbun*, September 7, 1978.

96) *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 6, 1978.

97) *Asahi Shimbun*, May 15, 1979.

the development of Soviet-Japanese relations as very important, despite the negative influence on the part of a third country.”<sup>98)</sup> Mr. V. Afanashev, Chief Editor of *Pravda* and a member of the Supreme Soviet, reportedly stated at a Press Club meeting in Tokyo on May 23, 1979 that the “Peace and Friendship Treaty between Japan and China does not necessarily constitute a decisive obstacle to the development of good-neighborly and friendly relations between the USSR and Japan. I consider that difficulties produced by the Japan-China Treaty can be overcome.”<sup>99)</sup> Subsequently, in his long reportage on Japan in his own newspaper *Pravda* (June 25, 1979)<sup>100)</sup> Afanashev commented quite favorably on Japan, praising the labor ethic and management capabilities of the Japanese people.<sup>100)</sup>

(4) Regrettably, the Kremlin has not adhered solely to the “soft” line of policy, but has chosen to express both hot and cold attitudes toward Japan. These unconciliatory attitudes can be illustrated by two recent examples: the Soviets’ uncompromising attitude regarding the “Northern Territories,” and the recent build-up of military bases on these territories. Since the former is widely known, we will turn to a brief discussion of the latter.

In February 1979, the Japanese public learned that the Soviets had installed military forces on Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands. About half a year later, in late September 1979, it was disclosed through American sources that Soviet military bases had been established on Shikotan Island as well. Why did the Soviets decide to reinforce the military forces on these islands, from which they had withdrawn their troops in 1961? No definite answer to this question has been given thus far. Some observers in Japan and in the West interpret this move in terms of retaliation against Japan’s decision to conclude the peace treaty with China. Various Soviet official statements appear to confirm the validity of this view. The *Izvestiia* of February 9, 1979, for instance, argues that the build-up of the Soviet military bases on Kunashiri and Shikotan Islands was an “obligation” stemming from the fact that Japan has been drawn increasingly deeply into a course of anti-Soviet policy in connection with *Japanese-Chinese* and *American-Chinese* rapprochement.”<sup>101)</sup> (italics mine.). This justification becomes somewhat questionable when one scrutinizes the chronology and sequence of events. According to some reports, it was not in February 1979, but in May 1978, that the Fukuda Government learned of the build-up of Soviet military forces on Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands. It would then be probably a fair guess that the decision by the Soviet leadership to build these bases had been reached at least half a year earlier, i. e. around December 1977. There is no

98) *Ibid.*, May 20, 1979.

99) Hyodo, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

100) *Pravda*, June 25, 1979.

101) *Izvestiia*, February 9, 1979.

evidence, however, that in December 1977 the Kremlin leaders were in a position to anticipate the possible future conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty with the PRC. If this assumption is correct, one could say that the Soviet military reinforcement on the Northern Islands can be at best interpreted as a Soviet anticipatory move, but hardly as a *direct* retaliatory response to an action of the Fukuda Government, which had not yet been taken.

Personally, I am tempted to side with the view that there are *multiple* objectives behind the Soviet military build-up on the Northern Territories: (i) it was a part of the Soviet global strategy primarily aimed against the U. S. A.; (ii) a move that must have taken into serious account the then prevailing, generally constructive ties between Japan and China; (iii) a strategy of psychological intimidation directed against Japan. Quite a few Soviet official statements refuting Japan's protests against the militarization of the Islands seem to confirm my opinion. For example, after accusing Japan of "inconsistency between words and action" and paying "mere lip service" to the Soviet Union, V. Tvetov, a commentator of the Moscow Broadcasting Service, claimed on October 3, 1979, that Japan (i) "actually concluded a treaty with China which was directed against the Soviet Union;" (ii) "also show sreadiness to join in the formation of an extensive, multilateral, anti-Soviet military alliance;" and (iii) "is reinforcing its military forces in Hokkaido and conducting a series of exercises with the Soviet Union as its imaginary enemy."<sup>102)</sup> Similarly, a TASS reporter in *Pravda* (September 28, 1979), criticizing a "provocative ballyhoo" in Japan over USSR presence on Shikotan, asserted that U. S. and Japanese ruling circles needed this kind of public indignation to justify (i) "the build-up of the might of the Japanese armed forces;" (ii) "the strengthening of the Japanese-U. S. military alliance," and, to a certain extent, (iii) "the trend of knocking together a tripartite Washington-Tokyo-Beijing alliance."<sup>103)</sup> A few days later, in the October 13, 1979, editor of *Pravda*, Mr. Kitsenko, accused Japan of a revival of militarism, which he saw reflected in the fact that "in 1977, Japanese journals had published six articles about the 'Soviet military threat,' whereas in 1978 the number amounted to 47 articles."<sup>104)</sup>

These examples will suffice to demonstrate how imaginative official Soviet press statements have been in putting forth multiple pseudo-justifications for their military activities in the "Northern Islands" in veiling their real motivations, which I have attempted to identify in an earlier passage.

In conclusion, I should like to explain, following Hans J. Morgenthau's propositions in his *Politics among Nations*, why the Soviet Union feels the need for ap-

102) *FBIS (SOV)* (October 4, 1979), p. C 1.

103) *Pravda*, September 28, 1979.

104) *Ibid.*, October 13, 1979.

plying military pressure and threats. Morgenthau suggests that nations have three choices in order to maintain their relative power positions<sup>105)</sup>: (1) they can withhold the power of other nations from the adversary; (2) they can add their own power to the power of other nations; or (3) they can increase their own power<sup>105)</sup>. It would seem that the Soviet Union has been rather adept at making use of the first method, but it has not found it easy to pursue the second one, i. e., of forming alliances based on real equality and the voluntary decisions of the partner. Not having been entirely successful in either the first or second possibilities, they have resorted to the third choice, i.e., increasing their own power, as evidenced in the very recent past, by their military action in the Northern Islands and in Afghanistan.

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105) Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (third edition) (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 181.

106) *Ibid.*