open access

https://hdl.handle.net/2115/55886

Demonstrating that monitoring and penalties increase non-cooperative behavior in a social dilemma game

日本語

illegal dumping of industrial waste

2014

日本心理学会

心理学研究

85(1)

9-19

This research demonstrated the negative influence of monitoring and punishing during a social dilemma game, taking the illegal dumping of industrial waste as an example. The first study manipulated three conditions: a producing-industries monitoring condition (PIM), an administrative monitoring condition (ADM), and a control condition (no monitoring). The results showed that noncooperative behavior was more frequent in the PIM condition than in the control condition. The second study had three conditions: a punishing condition (PC), a monitoring condition (MC), and a control condition (no monitoring, no punishing). The results indicated that non-cooperative behavior was observed the most in the PC, and the least in the control condition. Furthermore, information regarding other players ’ costs and benefits was shared the most in the control conditions in both studies. The results suggest that sanctions prevent people from sharing information, which decreases expectations of mutual cooperation.

学術雑誌論文

Version of Record

0021-5236

AN00123620