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Title	Constructions in Fusion and in Clash : The Case of And-Conditional Imperatives in English
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Citation	Journal of the Graduate School of Letters, 1, 69-85
Issue Date	2006-02
Doc URL	https://hdl.handle.net/2115/5764
Type	departmental bulletin paper
File Information	1-6_TAKAHASHI.pdf



Constructions in Fusion and in Clash: The Case of *And*-Conditional Imperatives in English

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Abstract: This paper discusses *and*-conditional imperatives, or sometimes called “pseudo-imperatives” — coordinate sentences in which the first conjunct is an imperative, the second conjunct a declarative, and the two are conjoined by *and*, as in *Bring alcohol to school and you’ll be suspended*. I argue that the *and*-conditional imperative sentence is not an isolated construction as is commonly assumed but is best analyzable in terms of higher-level **left-subordinating *and*** construction (cf. Culicover and Jackendoff 1997, 2005), occupied by an example of **non-prototypical imperative**, a variant of imperative lacking strong command force.

It is shown that the relevance-theoretic analysis of “pseudo-imperatives” by Clark (1993), who treats the imperative as an “ordinary imperative” and *and* as a truth-functional connective reducible to a logical symbol, falls short of providing a detailed characterization. In addition, this analysis does not yield a principled account of a variety of syntactic and semantic phenomena known to peculiar to *and*-conditional imperatives; included are the ability to refer to past situations, the semantic impact of emphatic attitudinal items, as well as the felicitous appearance of negative polarity items as well as stative predicates. In contrast, the construction-based approach of the present paper, it is argued, not only offers a fuller characterization of the *and*-conditional imperative construction but also neatly handles these seemingly disparate data in a unified manner, without relying heavily on pragmatic considerations.

1. Introduction

The sentence in (1), or sometimes both (1) and (2), have been labeled as “pseudo-imperatives”:

- (1) Bring alcohol to school *and* you’ll be suspended.
 <*and*-conditional imperative>
- (2) Be careful *or* you’ll lose your bag.
 <*or*-conditional imperative>

In each sequence, the left conjunct is an imperative clause, the right conjunct a declarative, conjoined by the connective *and* or *or*. For the sake of clarity and simplicity, let me call the conjunction of an imperative and a declarative clause (1) ***and*-conditional imperative**, and the

* This paper is an abridged and modified version of chapter 4 in my dissertation (Takahashi 2004).

disjunction of an imperative and a declarative (2) **or-conditional imperative**. This paper focuses on the *and*-conditional imperatives in (1), although this section and other sections (sections 2 and 3) briefly address *or*-conditional imperatives as well.

It has been observed by many researchers that these constructions obtain a conditional interpretation. For example, (1) is sometimes paraphrased as *If you bring alcohol to school you'll be suspended* and (2) as *If you are not careful you'll lose your bag*. As a matter of fact, it was once claimed that these “pseudo-imperatives” are (at least partly) derived from *if*-conditionals. Fraser (1969), for example, proposed that *Talk and I'll shoot Max* (= *and*-conditional imperative) and *Don't talk or I'll shoot Max* (*or*-conditional imperative), as well as *If you talk I'll shoot Max* are all derived from a common underlying structure containing *if*. However, Lawler (1975: 371) points out the inherent inadequacy of such derivational accounts of these “elliptical conditionals” as the following data reveal:

- (3) a. Open the window and I'll kill you/I'll kiss you.
 b. Open the window or I'll kill you/#I'll kiss you.

(3b) sounds odd with *I'll kiss you*; to make sense, it is necessary to revise our assumptions that kissing is desirable (Lawler 1975: 371).

Bolinger (1977) offered several important observations concerning such ‘apparent imperatives’ as *Spare the rod and spoil the child*, *Cut ourselves off from that source of income and we're ruined*, and *Break that vase and I'll break your neck*. First, while regarding conditions as the commonest non-command use of the imperative, he argued against distinguishing a pure set of imperatives that are commands and nothing else. Second, Bolinger suggests that the connective *and* may well be parasitic. By comparing a set of seemingly related constructions (*[If] you tell him anything, (and) he just looks at you blankly*), he remarks that “all barriers between *if*-conditions, coordinations, and imperatives may be flattened” (1977: 158). Third, this construction must involve the semantic relation of “intrinsic consequence,” which Bolinger regards as true condition. That is, *and*-conditional imperatives must express a semantic relation in which “consequences are the automatic result of the condition” (Bolinger 1977: 162). As a result, *and*-imperative conditionals are incapable of expressing what he terms “outlandish pseudo-conditions” such as *There's a man in the office, if you want to see him* (*ibid.*)

Next, Davies (1986) conducted a comprehensive descriptive analysis of imperatives including conditional imperatives. Terming the *and*-conditional imperative an Imperative-like Conditional (or ILC) and the *or*-conditional imperative an Imperative-like Ultimatum’ (or ILU), Davies handled the semantic asymmetry between the two constructions in pragmatic terms. On this account, the ILCs have imperative sentences which are not uttered in accordance with the conventions of utterance (Davies 1986: 206).

More recently, Dancygier (1998: 189–190) offered a most explicit answer to the question of why *and*-conditional imperatives imply a condition. She maintains that constructions such as (1) as well as (3a) above contain a set of conceptual features characteristic of prototypical predictive conditionals: namely, sequentiality, causality, and non-assertiveness (=potentiality). There is non-assertiveness (=potentiality), here introduced by the meaning of the imperative

rather than by *if*, there is a content-domain relation between the two conjuncts, and there is the iconicity of events involved.

Despite all these important findings and proposals, the literature on imperatives, regardless of theoretical orientation, does not satisfactorily answer many of the important questions pertaining to the two conditional imperatives. Let me give a few illustrative examples. First off, why do *or*-conditional imperatives disallow negative readings, as demonstrated in the infelicity of (3b) *Open the window or I'll kiss you*, although *and*-conditional imperatives do allow it, as evidenced in (3a)?

Second, only *and*-conditional imperatives (4a) may marginally refer to a situation in the past:

- (4) a. Jim was always hungry in those days. Give him a few dollars and he was happy.
- b. Jim was always hungry in those days. *Give him a few dollars or he went berserk.

Third, use of emphatic attitudinal items blocks the conditionality of *and*-conditional imperatives but is fully compatible with *or*-conditional imperatives:

- (5) a. *Do* come tomorrow, and you'll see our new house.
 (≠If you come tomorrow, you'll see our new house.)
- b. Step this way, *please*, and the doctor will see you.
 (≠If you step this way, the doctor will see you.)
- (6) a. *Do* come on time, or you'll miss the flight.
- b. *Do* shut up darling, or you'll only make everything worse.

Sentences (5) read more like a sequence of command and afterthought than a conditional (cf. Bolinger 1977).

Fourth, *and*-conditional imperatives allow use of negative polarity items (NPIs) such as indefinite *any* and *lift a finger*, whereas *or*-versions disallow it unless overtly negated:

- (7) a. Come any closer and I'll call the police.
- b. Lift a finger to help her and you'll be sorry.
- (8) a. ?Come any closer, or I can't hear you.
- b. ?Lift a finger to help her, or you'll be sorry.

Moreover, stative predicates, which are normally awkward in "true imperatives," become more acceptable in *and*-conditional imperatives (cf. Lakoff (1966: 3-5)):

- (9) a. Doubt that you will succeed, and you will not succeed.
- b. Know the answer and you will get an A.
- (10) a. ?Doubt that you will succeed.
- b. ?Know the answer.

In the next section, I examine Clark's (1993) relevance approach to this pair of imperative

constructions. Section 3 spells out problems with the relevance analysis of conditional imperatives. Section 4 proposes an alternative construction-based analysis resorting to the notions of left-subordinating *and* (Culicover & Jackendoff 1997) and non-prototypical imperative (Takahashi 1994, 2000, 2004). In section 5, I illustrate how the proposed approach of the present paper deals with the set of phenomena mentioned above.

I argue that the *and*-conditional imperative sentence is best analyzable in terms of **left-subordinating *and*** construction (cf. Culicover and Jackendoff 1997, 2005), occupied by an example of **non-prototypical imperative**, a variant of imperative lacking strong command force.

2. The Relevance Analysis

Closely following Wilson and Sperber's (1988) semantic analysis of imperatives, Clark (1993) conducts a detailed relevance-based analysis of the two conditional imperatives in (1) and (2). He treats the imperative and the declarative in "pseudo-imperatives" as an ordinary imperative and declarative, respectively, and deals with *and/or* as truth-functional connectives semantically reducible to logical symbols. First, Clark terms all the examples in (11) below as 'pseudo-imperatives,' whereas he regards the initial clause in each case as an 'ordinary imperative' and the second clause as an 'ordinary declarative':

- (11) a. Come closer and I'll give you five pounds.
 <positive reading preferred>
 b. Be off or I'll push you downstairs.
 <positive reading preferred>
 c. Come one step closer and I'll shoot.
 <negative reading preferred>
 d. Open *the Guardian* and you'll find three misprints on every page.
 <neutral reading preferred>
 [Clark 1993, exx. 1-4]

Clark's main arguments concerning these constructions can be summarized in the following four points. First, the connectives *and/or* in these sentences are truth-functional connectives (cf. Grice 1975), hence semantically equivalent to logical symbols '&' and 'v' (Inclusive *or*), respectively (Clark, 80).

Second, while being open to a variety of interpretations, "pseudo-imperatives," or imperatives in general, potentially involve at least three distinct readings, which he calls "positive," "negative" and "neutral" (Clark, 79). While *the* pseudo-imperative with *and* may involve all three readings, the one with *or* is restricted to a single, positive reading.

Third, negative and neutral readings count as "interpretive" (or "echoic") utterances (Clark, 104-114):

- (12) A: Have you read the manifesto?
 B: Yes. *Vote for them* and we'll all be rich and happy.

[Clark 1993, ex. 18]

In Clark's view, B's utterance in (12) can be "echoic" on the grounds that B does not accept the thought that the addressee should vote for them; rather, the speaker is attributing such a thought to the hearer in order to dissociate herself from it (Clark, 90).

Fourth, the reason why *or*-conditional imperatives lack negative and neutral readings is strictly a matter of pragmatics, not semantics:

(13) ?Leave now or I'll make you a nice dinner.

[Clark 1993, ex. 40]

According to Clark, this sentence is pragmatically (as opposed to semantically) ruled out because an alternative utterance like (14) below is readily available — a sentence which "would give rise to essentially the same interpretation and which are less complex" :

(14) Stay and I'll make you a nice dinner.

[Clark 1993, ex. 41]

Clark ascribed the infelicity of (13) above to the fact that the sentence puts the hearer to unjustifiable processing effort, hence risks misunderstanding (*ibid*, 107).

3. Problems with the Relevance Analysis

In this section, I first discuss a few weaknesses and inconsistencies in the theory Clark has offered. I will then critically examine its explanatory power concerning the semantic asymmetry between two conditional imperatives.

First, let us take issue with Clark's account of the *or*-conditional imperative's absence of negative and neutral readings in terms of "unjustifiable processing effort." While this may appear to be one plausible explanation, exactly the same argument can be made concerning *and*-conditional imperatives. Consider:

(15) Bring alcohol to school and you'll be suspended.

(16) Don't bring alcohol to school; you'll be suspended.

Note that sentence (15) is a perfectly felicitous use of *and*-conditional imperative, which normally involves a negative reading. In such a case, one might argue if one closely follows Clark's claim that this sentence should be ruled out because it commands the listeners to exert extra processing effort, since the idea can be better expressed by a sentence such as (16) with overt negation, a sentence which is both clear-cut and readily available. The problem is that the principle of "unjustifiable processing effort" in itself does not insure that it does NOT constrain the interpretation of *and*-conditional imperatives. That is, we would need an independent means to stipulate that this pragmatic constraint applies exclusively to *or*-conditional imperatives,

not *and*-conditional imperatives.

It will be argued in section 4 that we can attribute a wider range of interpretation of the *and*-conditional imperative directly to inherent features of the non-prototypical imperative as well as the left-subordinate *and* construction.

Clark's idea is undoubtedly useful in categorizing a large variety of imperative utterances. However, his system does not offer a principled explanation for the semantic asymmetry between *and* vs. *or* conditional imperatives. Under Clark's analysis, the form *Do that* in (17) below, for instance, simply has a "positive interpretation" regardless of whether it occurs in conditional imperatives with *and* as in (17a) or with *or* as in (17b):

- (17) a. Do that and you will feel better.
 b. Do that or I'll punish you.

In this way, Clark's system misses a subtle, but non-trivial, difference in the imperative's intensity of force exerted in each sequence; it leaves the "hyperbolic" nature (cf. Lawler 1975) of *or*-conditional imperatives unexplained. Quite analogously, his tripartite distinction does not seem to satisfactorily capture the difference in the imperative's strength of force between *Arrive on time!* (strong force reading) and *Arrive on time and you'll catch the flight* (mild force reading). Overall, Clark's relevance analysis of conditional imperatives falls short of providing the detailed characterization; it is too general if not incorrect.

Another problem is that this approach has little to say about how and why the conditional reading arises from *and*-conditional imperatives in the first place. Furthermore, Clark's relevance characterization does not seem to handle the variety of syntactic and semantic phenomena enumerated in (4) through (10) in section 1 in a unified manner, although he occasionally addresses some of them and makes insightful observations.

The next section introduces an alternative, construction-based analysis employing the conceptions of imperative prototypes as well as left-subordinating *and*.

4. A Construction-Based Analysis

Here I put forward a view that the *and*-conditional imperative is not an isolated construction but rather an instance of the higher-level **left-subordinating *and*** (cf. Culicover & Jackendoff 1997) construction occupied by an exemplar of **non-prototypical imperative** (Takahashi 1994, 2000, 2004).

4.1 Left-subordinating *And*

It has long been recognized that there is both a coordinate and a subordinate *and*. This point was made clear more than three decades ago by Culicover (1970; 1972) in his discussions of "OM-sentences"; (18) is an illustration:

- (18) One more can of beer and I'm leaving.

This sentence has an interpretation in which the left constituent functions semantically as if it were a subordinate clause. Numerous others have also observed that *and* can be used asymmetrically, in the sense that the order of conjuncts cannot be reversed without causing a significant change in interpretation (cf. Ross 1967, Schmerling 1975, Lakoff 1986, and Deane 1992, among others). To my knowledge, Culicover & Jackendoff (1997) were the first to clearly define a conditional *and* as a fully established use, which they term as “left-subordinating *and*” as a clearly distinct use in both semantic and syntactic properties from ordinary, non-conditional, use.

Culicover and Jackendoff illustrate a class of such left-subordinating *and* sentences (19) below as a case of apparently coordinate construction which is conceptually subordinate. They classify it as a case of “semantic subordination despite syntactic coordination” (Culicover and Jackendoff, 1995):

- (19) a. You drink another can of beer and I’m leaving.
 b. Big Louie sees you with the loot and he puts out a contract on you.
 [Culicover and Jackendoff 1997, ex. 3]

According to Culicover and Jackendoff, left-subordinating *and* such as sentences (19) is restricted in distribution with respect to tense and aspect. The conditional reading is generally lost if the perfect tense occurs (20a and 20b), although it may appear in the left conjunct (probably not in the right) in some contexts (21) (Culicover and Jackendoff, 1998, fn. 5):

- (20) a. You’ve drunk another can of beer and I’ve left.
 b. Big Louie has seen you with the loot and he’s put out a contract on you.
 [Culicover and Jackendoff 1997, ex. 4]
- (21) [context: I’m about to open the door to find out whether or not you’ve broken anything]
 You’ve broken another vase and I’m leaving.
 [*ibid*, 198f]

Next, left-subordinating *and* paraphrases only a subset of *if*-conditionals; it is incapable of paraphrasing irrealis conditionals (22a) or *conditionals* with abstract stative clauses (22b):

- (22) a. If Bill hadn’t come, we would have been sad.
 (*Bill didn’t come, LS-and we were sad.)
 b. If x is less than y , the derivative of $f(x)$ is positive.
 (* x is less than y , LS-and the derivative of $f(x)$ is positive.)
 [Culicover and Jackendoff 1997, ex. 10]

Of crucial importance here is the fact that the left-subordinating *and* allows a wide range of syntactic constructs to appear; the imperative is just one instantiation. It permits a declarative (19b) and even a quantified noun phrase (18) to occur as the left conjunct; it even allows for a non-declarative clause as the right conjunct as in *Show initiative, and will he thank you?* (Declerck and Reed 2001, ex. 844).

Given all these analyses, *and*-conditional imperatives might be reasonably treated as just one instance of the superordinate **left-subordinating *and*** construction. At this point we need to identify a common denominator of all the instances of left-subordinating *and*. At least four (partly interrelated) features distinguish left-subordinating *and* from ordinary coordinate *and*. First, the two conjuncts follow the order of temporal iconicity (cf. Dancygier 1998: 192); *S2* occurs after *S1*, in the ‘*S1* LS-and *S2*’ sequence.

Second, being semantically a conditional, they are mutually dependent upon each other in interpretation; one clause cannot be adequately interpreted without the conception of the other (cf. Dancygier 1993, 1998).

Third, (and related to second), the two conjuncts are generally symmetric in epistemic attitude (cf. Akatsuka 1997, Clancy, Akatsuka and Strauss 1998). That is, if the left conjunct is considered desirable, the right is also considered desirable (*Sleep until noon and you’ll feel better*); if the former is considered undesirable, the latter is also considered undesirable (*Sleep until noon and you’ll miss lunch*); and if the left conjunct is neutral in attitude, the right is also neutral.¹

Fourth, the two conjuncts lack commitment to the truth of the proposition. *You drink another can of beer and I’m leaving* (19a) is an example of left-subordinating *and* as opposed to coordinate, on the grounds that the speaker is not asserting the truth of each conjunct (i.e., non-assertive; cf. Dancygier 1998). Conversely, *You’ve drunk another can of beer and I’ve left* (20a) exemplifies use of coordinate *and*, in that the truth of each conjunct is being asserted; the proposition involves the speaker’s commitment.

Look at Clark’s three types of *and*-conditional imperatives again:

(23)(=(15a, c, d))

- a. Come closer and I’ll give you five pounds.
 <positive reading preferred>
- c. Come one step closer and I’ll shoot.
 <negative reading preferred>
- d. Open *the Guardian* and you’ll find three misprints on every page.
 <neutral reading preferred>

It is evident that the *and*-conditional imperative shares all the four properties of left-subordinate *and* constructions. To begin with, all these sentences follow the order of temporal iconicity, where *S2* occurs after *S1*. To take an instance of (23a), the event of the right conjunct “I’ll give you five pounds” is construed as occurring after the event of the left conjunct “Come closer.”

Second, it is also evident that two conjuncts are dependent on each other in interpretation. In each sentence in (23), neither clause can be fully interpreted without the conception of the other, which is apparent if we compare the following three sentences-instances of paratactic *and*

¹ Compare contrastive *and* (a variant of coordinate *and*), which is “asymmetric” in epistemic stance: [*It just doesn’t make sense!*] *You won a gold medal and the coach was still unhappy.*

coordination, which lack temporal and causal (or ‘intrinsic’) sequence:

- (24) a. Get on with your homework, and I haven’t heard you practice the piano today.
 b. You wash the dishes, and I take out the garbage.
 c. Have a lovely day and I expect to hear from you.

The two clauses here are mutually independent in interpretation, hence non-conditional.

Third, the two clauses are symmetric in speaker attitude. In (23a), DESIRABLE (your coming closer) leads to DESIRABLE (my giving you five pounds); in (23c), UNDESIRABLE (your coming one step closer) leads to UNDESIRABLE (my shooting); and in (23d), NEUTRAL (your opening *the Guardian*) leads to NEUTRAL (your finding three misprints on every page).

Finally, the speaker is not committed to the truth of the proposition of each conjunct. In neither clause is the speaker engaged in the speech act of assertion; he or she presents a supposed situation instead.

One may conclude then that the *and*-conditional imperative obtains a conditional sense precisely because the sentence inherits features of its “parent” construction, left-subordinating *and*, which is intrinsically cause-consequential conditional in interpretation.

4.2 Non-prototypical Imperatives

Next, I argue that only a class of imperatives defined as non-prototypical is allowed to occur as the left conjunct of left-subordinate *and*. This amounts to saying that the left conjunct of the *and*-conditional imperative is not an “ordinary imperative” (cf. Clark 1993) but rather a non-prototypical use of the imperative.

Let me explain first what it means for an imperative utterance to be prototypical or non-prototypical. As I have argued in several occasions (Takahashi 1994, 2000, 2004), imperatives can be best analyzed as forming a category with “better” or “worse” exemplars, which center around the degree of *force exertion*. Against this proposed scale, a given imperative utterance can be ranked as more or less prototypical. Let me present the set of imperative utterances in (25):

- (25) a. [parent to child]
 Clean up this mess right now./Just hold your tongue.
 b. [host to guest]
 Please sit down.
 c. [between two strangers]
 A: Excuse me. Do you know where Starbucks is?
 B: *Go straight ahead three blocks.*
 d. [between coworkers in casual conversation]
 Regional accents can be a problem. *Put a proper Bostonian on the phone with a Texas oilman* and here comes miscommunication.
 e. [teacher to student]
Bring alcohol to school and you’ll be suspended.

- f. [between two persons in a strong argument]
Say that again! (I'll punch you in the nose.)

While every imperative sentence is potentially ambiguous regarding the degree (and nature) of force exertion, each imperative utterance in (25) in its preferred reading can be postulated to occur at different points on the continuum of force exertion. It is arguable that they stand in the decreasing order of force exertion in their primary readings if we disregard subtle differences in the nature of force. Specifically, imperative utterances (25a) and (25b) count as prototypical with strong force but all the rest more or less non-prototypical cases—with mild/weak force in (25c), with little or no force at all in (25d), with mild minus force in (25e), and with strong minus force in (25f).

The following figure (Figure 3-4 in chapter 3 in Takahashi 2004) illustrates the proposed analysis.

Figure 1: English Imperatives (25) on the Scale of Force Exertion

FORCE:	MINUS MAXIMUM	ZERO	MILD	PLUS MAXIMUM
	<-10	+1>
Examples:	(f)	(e) (d)	(c)	(b)(a)
	NON-PROTOTYPICAL			PROTOTYPICAL

Support for the present claim that the *and*-conditional imperative classifies as a non-prototypical use of imperative comes from the impact of emphatic attitudinal markers illustrated in examples (5) and (6) in section 1. In general, the conditional sense is lost when forms like *will you*, *please*, and *do* appear:

- (26) a. Hand me that hammer, *will you*, and I'll nail this down.
(≠If you hand me that hammer,...)
b. Step this way, *please*, and the doctor will see you.
(≠If you step this way,...)
c. *Do* come tomorrow, and you'll see our new house.
(≠If you come tomorrow,...)

Bolinger (1977: 164) judges sentences (26a) and (26b) with the attitudinal *will you* or *please* as commands rather than conditions. Similarly, concerning (26c) he points out that “the union of the two clauses is forced; the second is an afterthought, and much less like the result clause of a conditional sentence than the one in *Come tomorrow and you'll see our new house*, whose first clause may be a command as well as a condition.” (Bolinger, 191). Since these attitudinal expressions are transparent indicators of (more or less) strong positive force when they occur with imperatives, the impact of them in (26) suggests the conceptual incompatibility of prototypical imperatives (i.e., imperatives with strong force) with *and*-conditional imperatives — or more generally, the left-subordinating *and* construction. In constructional terms, one may say that the imperative in its prototypical conception CLASHES with left-subordinating *and*, but FUSES with

it in its non-prototypical conception. Sentences such as those in (26) above are only interpretable in terms of coordinate *and*, which is essentially non-conditional.²

Why must the imperative be non-prototypical when it felicitously appears with the left-subordinating *and*? One may speculate that the exertion of strong force, a feature most characteristic of prototype imperatives, tends to make an imperative clause stand conceptually more independent of the right clause. As a result, the two conjuncts fail to form a composite gestalt — a conception essential to the semantic structure of subordination (cf. Croft 2002).

In summary, the *and*-conditional imperative can be viewed as a non-prototypical use of imperative occupying the left-subordinating *and* construction. We can attribute the conditionality of the *and*-conditional imperative directly to features of this higher-level construction.³

5. Phenomena Pertaining to *And*-Conditional Imperatives

Having analyzed *and*-conditional imperatives in terms of left-subordinating *and* and non-prototypical imperative, we can now proceed to showing how the analysis works in explaining some of the relevant phenomena including those pointed out in section 1.

5. 1 Conditionality

Let us discuss how the conditional interpretation arises from *and*-conditional imperatives without an explicit *if*. As Dancygier (1998) clearly put forward, the conditional interpretation of *and*-conditional imperatives crucially relies upon features of predictive, or content-domain (cf. Sweetser 1990), conditional, which is the most standard conditional — non-assertiveness (or potentiality), iconic sequence, and causality between two conjuncts.

Let us look at the conceptual basis for the paraphrase relation between *and*-conditional imperatives and corresponding *if*-conditional sentences. Observe:

- (27) a. Go by air and you'll save time.
 b. Bring alcohol to school and you'll be suspended.
- (28) a. If you go by air, (then) you'll save time.
 b. If you bring alcohol, (then) you'll be suspended.

Sentences (27) and (28) above are sometimes judged as complete synonyms by speakers of

² I am not arguing that to be read with strong force, an imperative utterance needs the assist of emphatic attitudinal items. In fact, imperative utterances do involve strong force without overt attitudinal markers. Rather, the point I am making here is that these items serve to disambiguate the degree and kind of force exertion, which is otherwise only implicit in imperative utterances.

³ It is argued in Takahashi (2004, chap. 4) that *or*-conditional imperatives are best analyzable in terms of asymmetric *or* (cf. Lakoff 1971), occupied by an instance of prototypical imperative. Consequentially, I claimed that the *and*-conditional imperative and the *or*-conditional imperative stand in complementary distribution within the category of imperative. That is, non-prototypical imperatives (i.e. imperative lacking strong force) are welcome in *and*-conditional imperatives, but unwelcome in *or*-conditional imperatives (Takahashi 2004: 162).

English.⁴ Here one can do no better than follow the mental space analysis (cf. Fauconnier 1985/1994), according to which *and*-conditional imperatives and corresponding *if*-conditionals can be treated as sharing a common conceptual structure. Specifically, the imperative (P1) in sentences like (27) can be analyzed as a space builder exactly like the subordinator *if*, which sets up a (hypothetical) space C, distinct from the reality R. In the next step, the declarative (P2) will be taken as holding in an extension of C, not in the reality space R, with a set of entities corresponding across the two spaces. To take an instance of (27a), P1 (*you go by air*) sets up a hypothetical mental space, distinct from the reality, and then P2 (*you'll save time*) will be taken as holding within this hypothetical space, as opposed to the reality space. The imperative in this construction (P1) shifts the viewpoint to the space it establishes. The clause thus invokes a special viewing arrangement in which the content of the *and*-clause is apprehended from a fictive vantage point, rather than the actual point.

This is the conceptual structure shared by both *and*-conditional imperatives and corresponding (predictive) *if*-conditionals, which directly accounts for the paraphrase relationship. This type of mental transfer to a fictive (temporal) vantage point is a well-attested phenomenon, pervasive in numerous subordinate constructions with *when*, *until*, *before*, *after*, *while*, among others.

5.2 Negative Polarity Items

As introduced in (7) and (8) in section 1, a certain class of negative polarity items such as *lift a finger*, (indefinite) *any*, or *a (single) soul* are licensed in *and*-conditional imperatives (and *if*-conditionals) without overt negation:

- (29) a. *Lift a finger* to help her and you'll be sorry.
 b. Come *any* closer and I'll call the police.
 c. Mention that to *a single soul* and I'll never forgive you.

However, the same polarity items are disallowed in ordinary imperatives unless overtly negated:

- (30) a. *Lift a finger to help her.

⁴ The two constructions are not totally synonymous in that they show a sharp contrast in acceptability when they are embedded in adverbial (*because*) clauses, where the *and*-conditional imperative is generally far less acceptable than its corresponding explicit *if*-conditional. Compare (i) and (ii) below:

<*and*-conditional imperatives>

- (i) a. ?You should include Nancy, because invite her and she will be pleased.
 b. ?You'd better hurry, because go now and you'll be in time for the bus.

<*if*-conditionals>

- (ii) a. You should include Nancy, because if you invite her, she will be pleased.
 b. You'd better hurry, because if you go now, you'll be in time for the bus.

See Takahashi (2005: pp.65–66) for more data and discussions.

- b. Don't lift a finger to help her.
- (31) a. *Come any closer.
b. Don't come any closer.
- (32) a. *Mention that to a single soul.
b. Don't mention that to a single soul.

It is important to note, however, that not all types of *and*-conditional imperatives license negative polarity items but only those with negative interpretations (cf. Davies 1986, Clark 1993):

- (33) a. **Lift a finger* to help her and she'll be happy.
b. *Come *any* closer and I'll give you a candy.
c. *Mention that to *a living soul* and I'll appreciate it.

Unlike (29), sentences (33) are unacceptable because they are interpreted positively; the proposition of each conjunct is considered desirable.

I limit my discussions here to show that the present analysis of *and*-conditional imperatives is essentially compatible with the predictions of two recent theories of NPI licensing in two very different traditions: the analysis of “nonveridicality” supplemented by negative implicature as an ancillary mechanism for indirect licensing (cf. Giannakidou 1998, 1999), and the approach of scalar reasoning as a general cognitive-pragmatic mechanism for NPI licensing (cf. Israel (1995; 1996; 2001), based on Fauconnier (1975a; 1975b)).

Within the framework of Giannakidou's indirect licensing, imperatives are among a set of nonveridical operators which are simultaneously sensitive to the notion of negative implicature. This sensitivity explains the acceptability of NPIs in *and*-conditional imperatives with negative (as opposed to positive) force, although Giannakidou's theory in itself does not address the question of why NPI licensors are nonveridical in the first place. From the perspective of the present analysis, one may say something like the following. To allow negative polarity items, *and*-conditional imperatives must involve negative implicature, which can be attributed to one variant of non-prototypical imperatives — those postulated to occur around $[-1] \sim [0]$ points on the continuum of force exertion outlined in figure 1 in section 4.

Next, Israel (1995; 1996; 2001) claims, following Fauconnier (1975a; 1975b), that an NPI is a form which must properly express its emphatic and informative value via “scalar reversal”; otherwise, its appearance results in infelicity. Israel (1995) offers a most explicit account of why NPIs favor overt negative, as opposed to affirmative, sentences. Consider:

- (34) a. Marianne didn't sleep a wink that night.
b. *Marianne slept a wink that night.

Sentence (34a) contains an implicit proposition, which he terms as “text proposition,” such as *Marianne didn't sleep a minimal amount*. This proposition entails that *Marianne didn't sleep a normal amount* (such as eight hours), where inferences are running from low to high

quantity value, so the NPI may properly express its emphatic and informative value. In contrast, the same NPI *a wink* is not allowed in the affirmative *b*-sentence, because *Marianne slept a minimal amount* does not entail *M slept a normal amount*. As a result, the NPI cannot express its emphatic value, so infelicity results (Israel 1995: 216).

Applied to *and*-conditional imperatives involving negative interpretations, Israel's scalar model account neatly explains why NPIs are licensed. Since the NPI *lift a finger* expresses a minimal amount of action, sentence (29a), for instance, would entail that *Help her (a normal amount) and you'll be sorry*, where inferences are running from low to high quantity, so the NPI properly expresses its emphatic and informative value. However, when it comes to *and*-conditional imperatives with positive interpretations such as (33), this Scalar Model alone does not seem to make correct predictions; rather, it incorrectly predicts the NPI to be acceptable. To take an instance of the *a*-sentence, it entails something to the effect that *Help her (a normal amount) and she'll be happy*, where inferences are running from low to high quantity value, so the sentence should be acceptable, although it is unacceptable. It seems clear then that to license certain NPIs, "weak licensers" such as *and*-conditional imperatives (or more generally, left-subordinating *and*) need some negative implicature as well as scalar reasoning.

In summary, *and*-conditional imperatives fit in with Giannakidou's proposed mechanism for indirect licensing of NPIs, in that they involve both the semantic feature of nonveridicality, as well as a negative implicature when force is negatively exerted. Israel's theory of scalar reasoning offers a succinct account of why some *and*-conditional imperatives are able to license NPIs without overt negation, although this proposal must integrate the requirement of negative implicature.

5.3 Reference to Past Situations and Stative Predicates

Reference to past situations (4a) as well as the appearance of stative predicates in *and*-conditional imperative sentences (9) and (10) can be best accounted for in terms of aspects of non-prototypical, or more accurately, peripheral, imperative:

(35)(=(4))

- a. Jim was always hungry in those days. Give him a few dollars and he was happy.
- b. Jim was always hungry in those days. *Give him a few dollars or he went berserk.

(36) a. Doubt that you will succeed, and you will not succeed. (= (9a))

b. Know the answer and you will get an A. (= (9b))

c. Be intelligent and you'll get into M. I. T.

(37) a. ?Doubt that you will succeed. (= (10a))

b. ?Know the answer. (= (10b))

c. ?Be intelligent.

My claim is that when an imperative appears with left-subordinating *and*, the clause may completely lack feature of agency and dynamicity, involving no force. In such a case, it hardly functions like the command imperative but blends in with the infinitive (cf. Bolinger 1977) and behaves more like an *if*-clause. This is exactly what happens in example (35a), where the

immediately preceding context allows conceptualizers to shift their vantage point to some time in the past (“those days”) and interpret the imperative in terms of the infinitive. This mental operation is unavailable in (35b) with the *or*-conditional imperative, in which the imperative is prototypical, so infelicity results.

Next, it should be noted that all the examples in (36) above are interpreted as genuinely hypothetical than mild command. The felicity of stative predicates such as *doubt*, *know* and *be intelligent* can therefore be directly attributed to features of peripheral imperatives.⁵ The imperative lacks the conception of force as well as agency and dynamicity. As a result, these stative predicates can be readily accommodated.

Conclusion

In this paper, I presented a construction-based account of *and*-conditional imperatives. I first examined Clark’s (1993) relevance analysis, which treated the connective *and* in this construction in purely semantic terms as reducible to a logical symbol, analyzed the imperative as an “ordinary imperative,” and distinguished three separate interpretations of the imperative utterance. We have found that his system does not capture the subtle contrast in the imperative’s strength of force in a wide range of different constructions; nor does it offer a unitary account of related phenomena.

As an alternative approach, I analyzed the *and*-conditional imperative in terms of left-subordinating *and* plus non-prototypical imperative. I hypothesized that the imperative in its prototypical conception CLASHES with left-subordinating *and*, but FUSES with it in its non-prototypical conception. Within this framework, we can attribute features of the *and*-conditional imperative directly to those of the left-subordinating *and* construction, which is iconic in clause order, lacks commitment (hence, non-assertiveness), and involves mutual dependence and symmetry between two conjuncts.

It was argued that the approach adopted in this chapter not only offers a fuller characterization of *and*-conditional imperatives but it also better accounts for a set of seemingly disparate phenomena problematic in previous approaches.

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⁵ Features of prototypical imperative explain the impossibility of past reference in *or*-conditional imperatives. As for the appearance of stative predicates in *or*-conditional imperatives, however, the notion of imperative prototypicality alone does not account for the phenomenon. In Takahashi (2004: 176–177), I treated it as a case of metonymic operation in the sense defined in Panther and Thornburg (2000).

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