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2. Regional First Secretaries in the Supreme Soviet Standing Commissions*

Shugo Minagawa

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the role played by the regional first secretaries in the federal Supreme Soviet Standing Commissions, and to identify the characteristics of their composition in these organs.

A number of scholars such as Grey Hodnett, Philip Stewart, Jerry Hough, Robert Blackwell, Peter Frank, and Joel Moses, who have studied their political role and behavior, seem to suggest that the regional first secretaries are the most important officials in the USSR after the supreme leadership. They look so powerful that, rightly or wrongly, Alexander Yanov called them "Little Stalins."[1] Perhaps more aptly, Jerry Hough, who has been a pioneer in identifying their political role, termed them the "Soviet prefects," suggesting a role as local agents of the central authorities comparable with that of the French departmental prefect.[2] Harry Rigby, on the other hand, says that their role is both less and more than that of the French prefect: less, because the existence of the obkom secretariat and bureau dilutes to some extent the power of the first secretary as a "line administrator"; and more, because of the global responsibilities of the party apparatus in Soviet society, such that there is scarcely an area of organized activity in his region on which the obkom secretary may not be called upon to make a decision, or a social institution or organization for whose performance he cannot be called to account.[3]

1. Membership of the Standing Commissions

Over the last fifteen years, large changes have occurred in the number, range, membership, and rules of procedure of the Standing Commissions. Table 2–1 shows that there was no increase in the number of Standing Commissions until the seventh convocation (1966), although in the same period there were some increases in their average membership. From the sixth to seventh convocations, however, the number of Commissions was sharply increased; a further substantial increase followed during the eighth convocation. As a result, 76 percent of the deputies (1,140) are now members of Standing Commissions.

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1 Alexander Yanov, *Détente after Brezhnev: The Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy*, (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies University of California, 1977).

2 Jerry F. Hough, *The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969).

3 T. H. Rigby, "The Soviet Regional Leadership: The Brezhnev Generation," *Slavic Review*, 37, No. 1 (March, 1978): 3-4.

Table 2-1 Standing Commissions of Federal Supreme Soviet

	4th		*5th*		*6th*		*7th*		*8th*		*9th*		*10th*	
Convocation years	(54-58)		(58-62)		(62-66)		(66-70)		(70-74)		(74-78)		(78-84)	
	U*	N**	U	N	U	N	U	N	U	N	U	N	U	N
1. Number	4	5	4	5	4	5	10	10	13	13	14	14	16	16
Average membership in each St. Com.	18	20	28	29	28	29	35	35	35	35	36	36	36	36
3. Percentage of deputies elected to the St. Com.	13.1%		18.8%		17.9%		46.1%		60.1%		65.9%		76.0%	
(Number of deputies elected to the Supreme Soviet)	1347		1378		1443		1517		1517		1517		1500	

* Soviet of the Union ** Soviet of Nationalities

Table 2-2 Organizations in Which Current Positions of the Members Are Located

(Federal Standing Commissions)

	5th convoc.	*6th convoc.*	*7th convoc.*	*8th convoc.*
	(N = 259)	(N = 259)	(N = 700)	(N = 912)
Party apparatus	37.5% (N = 97)	40.5% (N = 105)	30.4% (N = 213)	24.0% (N = 219)
Government apparatus	29.3% (N = 76)	25.9% (N = 67)	15.0% (N = 105)	10.5% (N = 96)
Agricultural enterprise	8.9% (N = 23)	6.6% (N = 17)	15.6% (N = 17)	20.4% (N = 186)
Industrial enterprise	8.9% (N = 23)	10.4% (N = 27)	18.4% (N = 129)	25.3% (N = 231)
Others	15.4% (N = 40)	16.6% (N = 43)	20.6% (N = 144)	19.7% (N = 180)

Table 2-3 Number of Local Party and Government Officials in Federal Standing Commissions

	5th convoc.	*6th convoc.*	*7th convoc.*	*8th convoc.*	*9th convoc.*	*10th convoc.*
A. Regional level (krai, oblast, aut. repub. okrug, etc.)						
Party						
First sec.	46	64	131	139	149	149
others	2	2	4	3	n. a.	n. a.
Government						
Chairman	18	19	42	41	n. a.	n. a.
others	2	2	—	—	n. a.	n. a.
B. City, raion and settlement level						
Party						
First sec.	9	8	30	35	n. a.	n. a.
others	—	—	1	1	n. a.	n. a.
Government						
Chairman	5	6	9	7	n. a.	n. a.
others	5	1	3	3	n. a.	n. a.

A careful study of the membership of the Standing Commissions for each convocation reveals certain trends in their composition suggestive of changes in the conception held by the Soviet leaders of the kind of personnel required by these bodies. Here, however, I shall describe only a few of the major changes which occurred in the membership of the federal Standing Commissions.

First, we can observe from Table 2−2 that there was a drastic reduction in the overall proportional participation of party and especially of government officials, even though in absolute numbers officials of the party apparatus had more than doubled their earlier participation. On the whole, government participation has therefore declined *vis-à-vis* party participation. The proportional and absolute increases in agricultural and industrial participation were much greater than those of either government or party, and the participation of other organizations also increased, although not to the same extent. At the same time, one should also note that in the eighth convocation (1970) of the federal Supreme Soviet, for instance, 219 out of 243 party officials and 96 out of 171 government officials who were elected as deputies to the Supreme Soviet served as members of the Standing Commissions, as compared to 231 out of 395 industrial members and only 186 out of 409 agricultural members. But it should also be noted that there have been considerable changes in the level and type of the party and government officials represented. One of the most significant changes is the consistent increase in party (and to a lesser extent government) officials drawn from regional and lower levels. Most of the officials of these levels are top-line executives (see Table 2−3). First secretaries of regional (krai and oblast)[4] party committees were the largest single occupational group in the membership up to the seventh convocation (1966) and at the eighth convocation (1970) were exceeded only by industrial workers. Furthermore, since the eighth convocation every regional first secretary elected to the Supreme Soviet has become a member either of the Presidium or of a Standing Commission,[5] whereas less than half of the industrial workers elected to the Supreme Soviet were chosen as members of the Standing Commissions.

In the tenth convocation, regional first secretaries occupied the chairmanship in only ten of the thirty-two Standing Commissions — a majority of them (6) in the Commissions of the Soviet of the Union. However, if one examines the "preparatory groups of deputies" (formed for preliminary examination of particular supervisory tasks) by their occupational positions, he will discover that, of the 43 preparatory groups examined, about half were chaired by regional first secretaries.

One might equally ask what categories of members of the Commissions have tended to retain their membership. Some interesting facts emerge from consideration of

4 Although the use of the term 'regional' is often limited to translation of the word 'oblast,' we use it to so translate both 'oblast' and 'krai.'

5 Of the 147 first secretaries of regional party committees elected to the Supreme Soviets in 1970, 3 were members of the federal Presidium, 139 of Standing Commissions, and 5 were members of RSFSR Standing Commissions. Since the ninth (1974) convocation, of the 153 first secretaries of regional party committees elected to the federal Supreme Soviets, 4 have been members of the federal Presium, and 149 of the federal Standing Commissions.

the federal Standing Commissions at the eighth convocation (1970). (A comparable study cannot be done for membership of the seventh convocation because of the vast expansion in total Standing Commission membership due to the creation of new Commissions.) There are 234 members who were members of the same Standing Commissions at the seventh (1966) and eighth (1970) convocations. Of these 234 "holdovers," 61 were first secretaries of regional party committees, which means that 44 percent of the first secretaries of regional party committees who were members of federal Standing Commissions at the eighth convocation (1970) were members of the *same* Standing Commissions at the seventh convocation (1966). The remaining 173 "holdovers" fall into 54 occupational groups. However, the "holdover" rate is far from being proportional to the number of seats which each of these positions represents in the Standing Commissions. Indeed, only 7 percent of 158 industrial operatives, by far the biggest group in the Standing Commissions, were members of the same Standing Commissions at the previous (seventh) convocation. The first secretaries of regional party committees will obviously remain the largest holdover group as long as the overwhelming majority of them continue to be selected as members of federal Standing Commissions. In other words, their holdover ratio in the Commissions is directly related to their occupational turnover ratio, although it could be reduced by transfers from one Commission to another. First secretaries of regional party committees held over from previous convocations are to be found in all of the Standing Commissions. They constitute the largest group of holdovers in *all* Standing Commissions except those for Foreign Affairs and for Transport and Communications. To put it in other words, the greater continuity of first secretaries in the Standing Commissions only reflects their overall increased tenure in offices at the regional level since 1965.[6] Nevertheless, a certain degree of stability in membership and in the kind of people re-elected ought not only to ensure the continuity of the particular work in each Commission beyond one individual's tenure of office but also to facilitate the accumulation of experience gained during successive convocations.

Having examined the actual representation of the regional first secretaries in the federal Standing Commissions, one might well doubt the claim that the Soviet concept of representation, i.e. that the representatives of the soviets are drawn from all sections of society, has much influence on the composition of the Supreme Soviet Standing Commissions.[7] True, this claim has been particularly noticeable only since the seventh convocation (1966) (see Table 2−2). However, as we have seen, certain categories of officials, and in particular the regional first secretaries, continue to enjoy far better proportional representation than do people drawn from other occupations. We may also note here in parentheses that the claim of equal

6 See Robert E. Blackwell, Jr., "Career Development in the Soviet Obkom Elite: A Conservative Trend," *Soviet Studies*, 24, No. 1, (1972): 24-25.

7 According to Soviet constitutional lawyers, each soviet constitues social and national units of the Soviet society. All these units represent not individually but *collectively* the masses in the soviets. See, e.g., V. I. Vasil'eva, ed., *Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo*, (Moscow: Politizdat, 1967), pp. 214-15.

representation of the sexes is hardly borne out by the female representation ratio of one in four in the federal Standing Commissions. Moreover, not a single woman currently enjoys the rank of obkom first secretary, and it is precisely this group that has been playing, in recent convocations, the leading role in the federal Standing Commissions.

2. Geographical Linkages

The Supreme Soviet organs have established connections with outside bodies through their operations and through their ordinary members. The latter I call "linkages" here. It is my opinion that linkages established through the membership are of considerable relevance to institutional development. One of the important geographical linkages established in the federal Standing Commissions is the linking of all of the regions in the USSR through the membership of almost all regional first secretaries in the Commissions. I have listed in Table 2－4 the regions whose party first secretaries are members of the various Commissions at the tenth convocation. One observation that can be made here is that certain of these regions are particularly concerned with certain activities of the Commissions. For instance, complex industrial regions such as Gor'kii, Kurgan, East-Kazakhstan, and Zaporozh'e are represented in the Budget and Planning Commissions. Comparatively rural regions such as Kokuchetav, Kustanai, Orel, Orenburg, Poltava, and Zhitomir are represented in the Commissions for Agriculture. Cheliabinsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Novosibirsk, Tiumen', and Volgograd, which are known as heavy industrial and mining regions, are all represented in the Commissions for Industry. Light or mixed industrial regions such as Checheno-Ingush and Kashkadar'ia are also represented in these Commissions. Irkutsk, Khar'kov, Krasnoiarsk, Kzyl-Orda and Lipetsk, where a variety of industrial building materials are produced, are all represented in the Commissions for Construction and Industrial Building Materials. Important water transportation regions such as Amur, Chuvash, and Pavlodar are represented in the Commissions for Transportation and Communications. Centers of land transportation such as Pskov, Smolensk, Sverdlovsk, and Tambov are also represented in these Commissions. Astrakhan and L'vov, which are both faced with the problems of industrial pollution, and Samarkand, which is concerned with the preservation of historical landmarks, are represented in the Conservation Commissions. The pattern of regional representation noted above is somewhat similar to those in the previous two convocations, although there are some variations between these convocations. In any event, the Commissions for Credentials, for Education and Culture, for Public Health and Social Security, for Housing-Communal Economy and Everyday Services, for Youth Affairs, and for Consumer Goods and Trade can be staffed by any regional first secretaries since all regions are concerned with these problems. And, if one looks at the actual number of regions whose first secretaries are at the same time full or candidate members of the CPSU Central Committee, it appears that the above-mentioned six Commissions have a relatively lower status in the hierarchy of Commissions than, for instance, the Legislative Proposals, Budget and Planning, and Industry Commis-

Table 2-4 Regional Representation in the Federal Standing Commissions: Names of Regions and Their First Secretaries (Tenth convocation only)

(1)	*Credentials* (4 regions)	
M +	Kaluga (CPSU)	Kandrenkov, A.A. (Rus.)
C	North Ossetia (CPSU)	Kabaloev, B.E. (Ossetin)
+	Sakhalin (CPSU)	Tret'iakov, P.I. (Rus.)
+	Syrdar'ia (Uzb.)	Khaidurov, V.A. (Rus.)
(2)	*Legislative Proposals* (11 obkoms and 1 kraikom)	
+	Adygei (A.O. CPSU)	Berzegov, N.A. (Adygei)
	Cherkassy (Ukr.)	Lutak, I.K. (Ukr.)
M +	Iakutsk (CPSU)	Chiriaev, G.I. (Iakut)
C +	Kabardino-Balkariia (CPSU)	Mal'bakhov, T.K. (Kabardin)
C +	Karakalpak (Uzb.)	Kamalov, K. (Rus.)
M +	*Krasnodar* (CPSU)	Medunov, S.F. (Rus.)
+	Nagorno-Karabakh (Azer.)	Kevorkov, B.S. (Arm.)
	Nakhichevan' (Azer.)	Ragimov, K.N. (Azer)
C	Novgorod (CPSU)	Antonov, N.A. (Rus.)
M +	Riazan' (CPSU)	Priezzhev, N.S. (Rus.)
M +	Tashkent (Uzb.)	Musakhanov, M.M. (Uzb.)
M +	Tula (CPSU)	Iunak, I. Kh. (Ukr.)
(3)	*Budget and Planning* (13 obkoms)	
	Abkhaz (Geor.)	Adleiba, B.V. (Abkhaz)
+	Adzhar (Geor.)	Papunidze, V.R. (Geor.)
	Bukhara (Uzb.)	Karimov, A.K. (Uzb.)
+	Chernigov (Ukr.)	Umanets, N.V. (Ukr.)
C +	East Kazakhstan (Kaz.)	Protozanov, A.K. (Rus.)
M +	Gor'kii (CPSU)	Khristoradnov, Iu.N. (Rus.)
+	Khorezm (Uzb.)	Khudaibergenov, M. (Uzb.)
M +	Kurgan (CPSU)	Kniazev, F.K. (Rus.)
+	Kurgan-Tiube (Tadzh.)	Pallaev, G. (Tadzh.)
M	Odessa (Ukr.)	Kirichenko, N.K. (Ukr.)
M +	Omsk (CPSU)	Maniakin, S.I. (Rus.)
M +	Udmurt (CPSU)	Marisov, V.K. (Rus.)
M +	Zaporozh'e (Ukr.)	Vsevolozhski, M.N. (Rus.)
(4)	*Foreign Affairs* (6 obkoms)	
M +	Arkhangel'sk (CPSU)	Popov, B.V. (Rus.)
+	Jewish (A.O. CPSU)	Shapiro, L.B. (Jew)
M +	Kaliningrad (CPSU)	Konovalov, N.S. (Rus.)
C	Minsk (Bel.)	Mikulich, V.A. (Bel.)

Note: The italicized regions are kraikoms. The mark M indicates those regions whose first secretaries are full members of the CC, CPSU and C indicate candidate members of the CC, CPSU. The mark + indicates the regions that were represented in the same Commissions at the ninth convocation. The names of the republics and CPSU in brackets after regional names indicate subordinate bodies of these regions. Nationalities in brackets after first secretaries' names indicate their ethnic origins.

M +	Vladimir (CPSU)	Ponomarev, M.A. (Rus.)
M +	Voroshilovgrad (Ukr.)	Goncharenko' B.T. (Ukr.)
(5)	*Agriculture* (12 obkoms)	
C +	Kirovograd (Ukr.)	Kobyl'chak, M.M. (Ukr.)
+	Kokchetav (Kaz.)	Kuanyshev, O.S. (Kaz.)
M +	Kustanai (Kaz.)	Borodin, A.M. (Rus.)
M +	Mordva (CPSU)	Berezin, A.I. (Rus.)
M +	Mari (CPSU)	Nikonov, V.P. (Rus.)
	Naryn (Kir.)	Savitakhunov, A. (Kir.)
M +	Orel (CPSU)	Meshkov, F.S. (Rus.)
M +	Orenburg (CPSU)	Kovalenko, A.V. (Ukr.)
M +	Poltava (Ukr.)	Morgun, F.T. (Ukr.)
M	Rostov (CPSU)	Bondarenko, I.A. (Ukr.)
M	Turgai (Kaz.)	Auel'bekov, E.N. (Kaz.)
M	Zhitomir (Ukr.)	Kavun, V.M. (Ukr.)
(6)	*Industry* (11 obkoms)	
C	Checheno-Ingush (CPSU)	Vlasov, A.V. (Rus.)
M	Cheliabinsk (CPSU)	Voropaev, M.G. (Rus.)
+	Dnepropetrovsk (Ukr.)	Kachalovskii, E.V. (Ukr.)
M	Karaganda (Kaz.)	Akulintsev, V.K. (Rus.)
M	Kareliia (CPSU)	Sen'kin, I.I. (Karel)
+	Kashkadar'ia (Uzb.)	Gaipov, R.G. (Uzb.)
+	Krasnovodsk (Turk.)	Mitrin, E.T. (Rus.)
C	Novosibirsk (CPSU)	Filatov, A.P. (Rus.)
M	Tiumen' (CPSU)	Bogomiakov, G.P. (Rus.)
C	Ural (Kaz.)	Iksanov, M.B. (Kaz.)
M +	Volgograd (CPSU)	Kulichenko, L.S. (Rus.)
(7)	*Construction and Industrial Building Materials* (7 obkoms and 2 kraikoms)	
+	Fergana (Uzb.)	Umarov, Kh. (Uzb.)
M +	Irkutsk (CPSU)	Bannikov, N.V. (Rus.)
M	Khar'kov (Ukr.)	Sakhniuk, I.I. (Rus.)
M +	*Krasnoiarsk* (CPSU)	Fedirko, P.S. (Rus.)
+	Kuliab (Tadzh.)	Khisamutdinov, A. (Uzb.)
	Kzyl-Orda (Kaz.)	Esetov, T. (Kaz.)
+	Leninabad (Tadzh.)	Khodzhiev, R. (Tadzh.)
M +	Lipetsk (CPSU)	Pavlov, G.P. (Rus.)
M +	*Primor'e* (CPSU)	Lomakin, V.P. (Rus.)
(8)	*Transportation and Communications* (11 obkoms)	
M +	Amur (CPSU)	Avramenko, S.S. (Ukr.)
M +	Chuvash (CPSU)	Prokop'ev, I.P. (Chubash)
	Dzhizak (Uzb.)	Baimirov, T. (Uzb.)
	Khmel'nitskii (Ukr.)	Lisovoi, T.G. (Ukr.)
	Pavlodar (Kaz.)	Isaev, B.V. (Rus.)
C +	Pskov (CPSU)	Rybakov, A.M. (Rus.)
+	Rovno (Ukr.)	Panasenko, T.I. (Ukr.)
M +	Smolensk (CPSU)	Klimenko, I.E. (Rus.)
	Sverdlovsk (CPSU)	El'tsin, B.N. (Rus.)

	Tambov (CPSU)	Khomiakov, A.A.
+	Ternopol' (Ukr.)	Iarkovoi, I.M. (Ukr.)

(9) *Science and Technology* (6 obkoms and 1 kraikom)

	Kalmyk (CPSU)	Nikulin, V.I. (Rus.)
+	Mangyshlak (Kaz.)	Ashimbayev, T. (Kaz.)
	Mary (A.O.- Turk.)	Akgaev, A. (Turk.)
	Stavropol (CPSU)	Murakhovskii, V.S. (Ukr.)
C +	Taldy-Kurgan (Kaz.)	Kusainov, S. (Kaz.)
M	Tomsk (CPSU)	Ligachev, E.K. (Rus.)
M	Vologda (CPSU)	Drygin, A.S. (Rus.)

(10) *Consumer Goods and Trade* (12 obkoms and 1 kraikom)

	Altai (CPSU)	Aksenov, N.F. (Rus.)
+	Chernovtsy (Ukr.)	Dikusarov, V.G. (Ukr.)
M	Iaroslavl' (CPSU)	Loshchenkov, F.I. (Rus.)
	Issyk-Kul' (Kir.)	Masal'ev, A.M. (Kir.)
M +	Ivanovo (CPSU)	Kliuev, V.G. (Ukr.)
M	Kalinin (CPSU)	Leonov, P.A. (Rus.)
C +	Kamchatka (CPSU)	Kachin, D.I. (Rus.)
	Karachaevo-Cherkess (A.O.- CPSU)	Inzhievskii, A.A. (Rus.)
+	Khakas (A.O.- CPSU)	Krylov, A.I. (Rus.)
M +	Kostroma (CPSU)	Balandin, I u.N. (Rus.)
M +	Kuibyshev (CPSU)	Orlov, V.P. (Rus.)
+	Namangan (Uzb.)	Kamalov, M. (Uzb.)
M +	North-Kazakhstan (Kaz.)	Demidenko, V.P. (Ukr.)

(11) *Housing-Communal Economy and Everyday Services* (8 obkoms and 1 kraikom)

	Crimea (Ukr.)	Makarenko, V.S. (Ukr.)
	Gorno-Altai (A.O.- CPSU)	Znamenskii, Iu.S. (Rus.)
+	Grodno (Bel.)	Kletskov, L.G. (Bel.)
M +	*Khabarovsk* (CPSU)	Chernyi, A.K. (Ukr.)
M +	Perm' (CPSU)	Konoplev, B.V. (Rus.)
+	Transcarpathia (Ukr.)	Il'nitskii, Iu.V. (Ukr.)
	Tselinograd (Kaz.)	Morozov, N.E. (Rus.)
M +	Vinnitsa (Ukr.)	Taratuta, V.N. (Ukr.)
M	Voronezh (CPSU)	Ignatov, V.N. (Rus.)

(12) *Public Health and Social Security* (13 obkoms)

	Alma-Ata (Kaz.)	Aukhadiev, K.M. (Kaz.)
+	Aktiubinsk (Kaz.)	Liventsov, V.A. (Ukr.)
	Brest (Bel.)	Sokolov, . E.E. (Bel.)
M +	Buriat (CPSU)	Modogoev, A.U. (Buriat)
C +	Chita (CPSU)	Matafonov, M.I. (Rus.)
	Gorno-Badakhshan (Tadzh.)	Babaev, A. (Tadzh.)
+	Kherson (Ukr.)	Mozgovoi, I.A. (Ukr.)
M +	Kirov (CPSU)	Bespalov, I.P. (Rus.)
M +	Komi (CPSU)	Morozov, I.P. (Komi)
M +	Kursk (CPSU)	Gudkov, A.F. (Rus.)
C +	Nikolaev (Ukr.)	Vasliaev, V.A. (Ukr.)

	Surkhandar'ia (Uzb.)	Karimov, A. (Uzb.)
C +	Tuva (CPSU)	Shirshin, G.Ch. (Tuvin)
(13)	*Education and Culture* (5 obkoms)	
	Ashkhabad (Turk.)	Annaorazov, P. (Turk.)
	Briansk (CPSU)	Sizenko, E.I. (Rus.)
	Gomel' (Bel.)	Khusainov, Iu.M. (Rus.)
M +	Penza (CPSU)	Ermin, L.B. (Rus.)
+	Volyni' (Ukr.)	Korzh, N.A. (Ukr.)
(14)	*Problems of Women's Labor and Conditions, and Protection of Motherhood and Children.* (7 obkoms)	
	Chardzhou (Turk.)	Khudaiberdiev, R. (Turk.)
M	Donetsk (Ukr.)	Kachura, B.V. (Ukr.)
M	Dzhambul (Kaz.)	Bekturganov, Kh.Sh. (Kaz.)
M	Kemerovo (CPSU)	Gorshkov, L.A. (Rus.)
	Mogilev (Bel.)	Prishchepchik, V.V. (Bel.)
	Saratov (CPSU)	Gusev, V.K. (Rus.)
C	Sumy (Ukr.)	Grintsov, I.G. (Ukr.)
(15)	*Youth Affairs* (7 obkoms)	
M +	Belgorod (CPSU)	Trunov, M.P. (Rus.)
M	Chimkent (Kaz.)	Askarov, A. (Kaz.)
	Ivano-Franko (Ukr.)	Skiba, I.I. (Ukr.)
M +	Kiev (Ukr.)	Tsybul'ko, V.M. (Ukr.)
+	South Ossetia (Geor.)	Sanakoev, F.S. (Ossetin)
+	Ul'ianovsk (CPSU)	Kuznetsov, I.M. (Rus.)
+	Vitebsk (Bel.)	Shabashov, S.M. (Bel.)
(16)	*Conservation and Rational Use of Natural Resources.* (10 obkoms)	
M +	Astrakhan (CPSU)	Borodin, L.A. (Rus.)
M +	Dagestan (CPSU)	Umakhanov, M-S. I. (Dagestanets)
	Gur'ev (Kaz.)	Kushekov, U. (Kaz.)
M +	L'vov (Ukr.)	Dobrik, V.F. (Ukr.)
	Magadan (CPSU)	Mal'kov, N.I. (Rus.)
C +	Murmansk (CPSU)	Ptitysyn, V.N. (Rus.)
+	Osh (Kir.)	Koshoev, T.Kh. (Kir.)
C	Samarkand (Uzb.)	Rakhimov, B.R. (Uzb.)
	Semipalatinsk (Kaz.)	Ramazanov, A.G. (Kaz.)
+	Tashauz (Turk.)	Ataev, B. (Turk.)

sions. Conversely, the hierarchy of regions in the Soviet Union is reflected over time in the kinds of Standing Commissions to which regions have been assigned representation through their first secretaries.

Speaking of geographical linkages, it is thus worth noting that there exists a hierarchy among the regions. Although it would be a rather futile exercise to try to determine the exact ranking of obkoms and kraikoms, one can at least classify them into two main groups: a group of regional party committees coming directly under the control of the CPSU Central Committee (for convenience, we call it Group A), and another group which is not subordinate to the CPSU Central Committee (Group B). Group A consists of seventy-two party committees located in the RSFSR,

comprising six kraikoms, sixty-five obkoms (of which sixteen are located in ASSR's) and one gorkom (Moscow) that is not subordinate to the Moscow obkom. Group B consists of 82 obkoms, comprising 5 obkoms of autonomous oblasti in the RSFSR, which are subordinate to corresponding krai administrations, and 78 obkoms which are located in other union republics. In terms of their current roles and their prospects for advancement to top offices, Group A first secretaries have no real equivalent in the other union republics. Four of the union republics have oblast divisions, but with the exception of the Ukraine, their obkom first secretaries exercise responsibilities far inferior to those of the RSFSR, and their career prospects are effectively confined to their own republics. Almost three-fourths of 1roup A first secretaries are elected as full members of the present Central Com-m ittee, whereas only one-fifth of Group B first secretaries are elected as full members, although the latter's representation in the Central Committee has doubled in the last ten years (see Table 2-5).

The ethnic composition of Groups A and B remains almost unchanged, but rather reinforced in its characteristics, i.e. the Russians dominate other ethnic groups

Table 2-5 Regional First Secretaries: CC, CPSU Membership

	A GROUP			B GROUP		
	1970	1975	1979	1970	1975	1979
Full Member	34 47.2%	42 58.3%	53 73.6%	8 11.4%	13 15.9%	17 20.5%
Candidate	31 43.1%	28 38.9%	10 13.9%	7 10.0%	12 14.6%	9 10.8%
Non-member	7 9.7%	2 2.8%	9 12.5%	55 78.6%	57 69.5%	56 68.7%
Total	72 100%	72 100%	72 100%	70 100%	82 100%	82 100%

Table 2-6 Regional First Secretaries: Nationalities

	A GROUP			B GROUP		
	1970	1975	1979	1970	1975	1979
Russian	51 70.8%	54 75.0%	54 75.0%	15 21.4%	17 20.7%	14 17.1%
Ukrainian	9 12.5%	8 11.1%	8 11.1%	25 35.7%	24 29.2%	25 30.5%
Belorussian	1 1.4%	— —	— —	4 5.7%	4 4.9%	5 6.1%
Kazakh	— —	— —	— —	7 10.0%	9 10.0%	11 13.4%
Uzbek	— —	— —	— —	9 12.9%	10 12.2%	10 12.2%
Tadzhik	— —	— —	— —	1 1.4%	2 2.4%	3 3.7%
Turkomen	— —	— —	— —	1 1.4%	3 3.6%	4 4.9%
Kirghiz	— —	— —	— —	1 1.4%	3 3.6%	3 3.6%
Azerbaidzhan	— —	— —	— —	1 1.4%	1 1.2%	1 1.2%
Armenian	— —	— —	— —	1 1.4%	1 1.2%	1 1.2%
Georgian	— —	— —	— —	1 1.4%	1 1.2%	1 1.2%
Minority Nationalities	11 15.3%	10 13.9%	10 13.9%	4 5.7%	7 9.8%	4 4.9%
Total	72 100%	72 100%	72 100%	70 100%	82 100%	82 100%

Table 2-7 Regional First Secretaries: Age

	A GROUP			B GROUP		
	1970	1975	1979	1970	1975	1979
Up to 45	12 16.7%	6 8.3%	1 1.4%	24 34.3%	14 17.1%	8 9.8%
46 - 50	10 13.9%	13 18.1%	16 22.2%	17 24.3%	25 30.4%	20 24.4%
51 - 55	16 22.2%	14 19.4%	16 22.2%	9 12.8%	20 24.4%	31 37.8%
Above 56	34 47.2%	39 54.2%	39 54.2%	20 28.6%	23 28.1%	23 28.0%
Total	72 100%	72 100%	72 100%	70 100%	82 100%	82 100%

Table 2-8 Regional First Secretaries: Date of Appointment

	A GROUP						B GROUP					
	1970		1975		1979		1970		1975		1979	
	S	T	S	T	S	T	S	T	S	T	S	T
1944	1											
1956	1	1	1		1							
1958	1		1		1							
1959	1	1	1	1				1		1		1
1960	2	3	2	2	1		1		1		1	
1961	7	9	6	6	8	1	2	1	1			
1962	1	1	1		1		5	1	1		1	
1963	2	2	3	1	4		5	1	3	1	1	
1964	1	3		2	1	1	3	2	1	1		
1965	3	3	3	1	4		2	11	2	8		1
1966	5	1	4		2		1	2	1		1	
1967	4	3	4	3	7		2	2	1	2		1
1968	1	5	1	1		1	4	7	3	6	4	
1969	3	1	2	1	3		2	4		2		1
1970	5	1	6		3	1	4	7	6	6	5	
1971			6	2	7				4	5	5	
1972			5		5				4	6	5	2
1973			4		3	1			2	9	6	1
1974			2		3				4	1	3	1
1975					2						4	2
1976					3						4	3
1977											6	4
1978					6	2					13	6
1979											1	
Total	38	34	52	20	65	7	31	39	34	48	59	23

Note: S = appointed first time
T = previously occupied obkom first secretaryship elsewhere

in Group A, whereas the Ukrainians have a good lead on other ethnic groups in Group B (see Table 2-6). If one were to investigate the ethnic origins of the regional first secretaries in the Commissions at the tenth convocation, relatively high non-Russian representation would be observed in the Commissions for Legislative Proposals, for Agriculture, for Science and Technology, for Public Health and Social Security, for Women's Labor, for Youth Affairs, and for Conservation, whereas, on the other hand, a strong Russian representation would be seen in the Commissions for Credentials, for Industry, for Education and Culture, and for Consumer Goods and Trade. Also, balanced representation exists in the rest of the Commissions, including the Commissions for Budget and Planning and for Housing-Communal Economy. Thus, the pattern of nationality representation may have some relevance to the particular activities of individual Commissions.

Table 2-7 shows that by 1975 more than half of Group A first secretaries were over the age of 56. Mainly for biological reasons, however, the proportion of this age group has not grown since then. Unlike Group A, two-thirds of Group B first secretaries were under 55. The average length of service as first secretary in Group A was 5.8 years in 1970 but this had risen to 11 years by 1979. Group B first secretaries had an average of 4.3 years in 1970, which had only risen to a term of 6 years by 1979. Stability of tenure for Group A first secretaries means reinforcement of their loyalty and commitment to the regime, but also means a slowdown in the replacement of first secretaries. It is said that under Khrushchev many first secretaries were appointed from outside the region, whereas under Brezhnev two-thirds of the first secretaries appointed between October 1965 and March 1971 in the RSFSR were selected from within the region, and five-sixths of those appointed between April 1971 and April 1976 were selected locally.[8] A policy of local recruitment may also have been carried out among the regional first secretaries in Group B, but the latter's mobility within the republic concerned appears to be greater than that of Group A (see Table 2-8). The mixed representation of Groups A and B in each Commission may have some effect on the operations of the Commissions. Overall stability of the secretaries' tenure, however, enabled them to be selected as members of the *same* Standing Commissions consecutively for more than one convocation (see Table 2-4). The holdover rate of regional first secretaries at the ninth convocation (those who were also members of the same Standing Commissions at the eighth convocation) was 46.9 percent. By the tenth convocation, the holdover rate had climbed to 61.9 percent. This means that they had an increased familiarity with the activities and operations of both their own regions and their respective Commissions.

3. Expertise

Table 2-4 shows the number of regional first secretaries whose education implies competence in some field of activity and whose careers include experience in major fields of activity. The most commonly encountered areas of experience are industrial

8 See Rigby, "The Soviet regional leadership: The Brezhnev generation," *Slavic Review*, 37, No. 1, (1978): 1-24.

and/or agricultural production and the Soviet or governmental apparatus. The only other major areas of experience represented were Komsomol jobs and teaching or school administration. The main change over the last fifteen years has been, in the case of Group A, a shift away from agriculture in favor of industry,[9] and in the case of Group B, orientation to the problems of agriculture rather than those of industry (see Table 2-9, 2-10).

The regional first secretaries share nevertheless certain characteristics. First, they have usually obtained experience as managers and/or specialists in one or more fields at some stage of their careers. Secondly, the regional first secretaries are well-established mid-career politicians who have acquired the ability to balance different and numerous pressures against one another, while maintaining a certain degree of confidence between the center and themselves and their respective regions. These common features should facilitate smooth communication between them in the Standing Commissions. Above all, their presence might also serve to offset any excessive tendency toward a purely technical attitude. Our interest here will be whether these well-qualified and technically proficient representatives of the Soviet political elite have relevant experience in the respective Commissions to which they have been assigned.

Tables 2-11 and 2-12 show that a certain degree of relevant expertise is (regarded as) one of the major prerequisites for regional first secretaries to become members of certain Standing Commissions. This is particularly apparent in the Commissions for Agriculture, for Industry, for Construction and Industrial Building Materials, and for Transportation and Communications, whose regional first secretaries are overwhelmingly persons who have completed higher education in agriculture or industry, or have previously engaged in agriculture or industry. In the remaining Commissions, regional first secretaries' educational backgrounds and career experience were far less frequently directly relevant. Here, one might surmise that as long as a substantial nucleus of directly relevant specialties is present (not only regional first secretaries but also other Commission members), the other specialties represented by their regional first secretary members may be "functional": they may help to secure a flow of information related to their various fields, and to supply checks from the standpoint of various kinds of technical and professional qualifications. A few further differences may be observed. First, a higher proportion of secretaries in the Commissions for Legislative Proposals, for Budget and Planning, for Transportation and Communications, for Public Health and Social Security, for Consumer Goods and Trade, and for Youth Affairs, has completed the Higher Party School. Second, those with administrative careers in the Soviet apparatus are more in evidence in the Commissions for Budget and Planning, and for Public Health and Social Security, and recently in the Commissions for Legislative Proposals, and for Agriculture, than in other Commissions. Finally, the Commissions for Youth Affairs, which are believed to have been created because of the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968, have a strong

9 See Robert E. Blackell, Jr., "Elite Recruitment and Functional Change," *Journal of Politics*, 34 (1972): 141.

Table 2-9 Regional First Secretaries: Education

	A GROUP			B GROUP		
Complete Higher	1970	1975	1979	1970	1975	1979
Industry+	25 34.7%	27 37.5%	32 44.4%	18 25.7%	16 19.5%	17 20.7%
Agriculture++	24 33.3%	21 29.2%	20 27.8%	20 28.6%	31 37.8%	35 42.7%
Education	3 4.2%	6 8.3%	7 9.7%	10 13.3%	22 26.8%	9 11.0%
Economics/ Finance	1 1.4%	5 6.9%	4 5.6%	4 4 5.7%	5 6.1%	4 4.9%
Other/ Unspecified	13 18.0%	9 12.5%	3 4.1%	5 7.1%	5 6.1%	4 4.9%
Higher Party School	2 2.8%	1 1.4%	4 5.6%	13 18.6%	3 3.6%	13 15.8%
Incomplete Higher	1 1.4%	1 1.4%	1 1.4%	— —	— —	— —
Complete Secondary	3 4.2%	2 2.8%	1 1.4%	— —	— —	— —
Total	72 100%	72 100%	72 100%	70 100%	82 100%	82 100%
Complete also Higher Party Sch.	18 25.0%	9 12.5%	15 20.8%	11 15.7%	29 35.4%	9 11.0%
Kandidat/ Doctorate	n.a.	n.a.	13 18.0%	5 7.1%	6 7.3%	13 18.8%

\+ Industry includes also metallurgy, technology, aviation, mining, electrification, and mechanization of rural industry, shipbuilding industry, railway transportation, etc.

++ Agriculture includes veterinary medicine, zoology, fishery, forestry, etc.

Table 2-10 Regional First Secretaries: Primary Occupation Outside Party Apparatus

	A GROUP			B GROUP		
	1970	1975	1979	1970	1975	1979
Industrial Specialist	30 41.7%	38 52.8%	34 47.2%	18 25.7%	20 24.4%	20 24.4%
Agricultural Specialist	21 29.2%	19 26.4%	18 25.0%	14 20.0%	25 30.5%	25 30.5%
Teacher	7 9.7%	6 8.3%	7 9.7%	13 18.6%	12 14.7%	13 15.9%
Komsomol/Local Soviet Official	9 12.5%	4 5.5%	10 13.9%	17 24.3%	20 24.4%	23 28.0%
Military Officer	1 1.4%	1 1.4%	— —	— —	— —	— —
Journalist	— —	1 1.4%	1 1.4%	3 4.3%	2 2.4%	1 1.2%
Economist	2 2.7%	3 4.2%	2 2.8%	1 1.4%	2 2.4%	— —
Manual Worker	2 2.7%	— —	— —	4 5.7%	1 1.2%	— —
Total	72 100%	72 100%	72 100%	70 100%	82 100%	82 100%

Table 2-11 Education

Convocation Complete Higher:	Credentials			Legislative Proposals			Budget and Planning			Foreign Affairs			Agriculture			Industry			Construction Ind. Bld. Materials			Transportation and Communications		
	8th	9th	10th	8th	9th	10th	8th	9th	10th	8th	9th	10th	8th	9th	10th	8th	9th	10th	8th	9th	10th	8th	9th	10th
Industry	1	2	—	1	4	3	6	6	3	—	2	2	—	—	—	10	7	8	6	6	5	5	5	6
Agriculture	5	4	3	5	3	3	5	5	4	1	—	—	8	9	11	1	2	3	3	4	2	1	2	1
Education	2	—	1	3	2	3	3	3	3	—	—	—	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	1	—
Economics/Fin.	1	—	—	—	1	1	1	3	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	3
Other/Unspecified	2	2	—	2	4	2	2	—	2	—	2	1	1	1	—	—			1	—	—	1	1	—
Higher Party Sch.	1	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	2	3	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	1	1
Incomplete Higher	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
Complete Secondary	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Total	12	9	4	14	14	12	18	17	13	3	6	6	12	12	12	12	9	11	10	11	9	11	12	11
Complete also Higher Party School	3	2	1	4	4	2	4	5	3	—	—	—	2	2	1	3	1	2	2	3	1	2	3	3
Higher degree	—	—	1	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	2

Convocation Complete Higher:	Educ. Sc.&Cul. Sc.&Tech.			Educ. & Cul.	Pub.Health & Soc.Security			Trade Eve.Serv. Com.Econ.		H-C Econ. Eve.S.	Youth Affairs			Conservation Ra. Use Na. Re.			Consumer Goods & Trade		Women's Labor
	8th	9th	10th	10th	8th	9th	10th	8th	9th	10th	8th	9th	10th	8th	9th	10th	9th	10th	10th
Industry	—	1	3	—	3	3	2	3	1	3	3	1	1	1	3	3	4	7	2
Agriculture	2	2	1	4	3	3	7	4	2	2	2	3	2	3	3	3	4	5	3
Education	1	2	—	—	—	1	2	—	—	—	1	3	3	2	1	—	—	—	—
Economics/Fin.	1	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	1	—	1	—	1
Other/Unspecified	1	1	1	—	2	3	1	1	1	—	1	1	—	3	3	1	—	—	—
Higher Party Sch.	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	3	3	3	1	—	1	1	—	3	1	1	1
Incomplete Higher	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Complete Secondary	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
Total	6	8	7	5	9	12	13	11	8	9	8	9	7	11	12	10	10	13	7
Complete also H.P.S.	—	1	3	1	3	2	4	2	—	3	4	4	2	4	1	1	2	5	—
Higher degree	—	—	—	3	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	3	2

Table 2-12 Main Areas of Career Experience Outside Party Apparatus

	Credentials			Legislative Proposals			Budget and Planning			Foreign Affairs			Agriculture			Industry			Construction Ind.Bld.Mate.			Transpor. & Communica.		
Convocation Number or regions	8th (12)	9th (9)	10th (4)	8th (14)	9th (14)	10th (12)	8th (18)	9th (17)	10th (13)	8th (3)	9th (6)	10th (6)	8th (12)	9th (12)	10th (12)	8th (12)	9th (9)	10th (11)	8th (10)	9th (11)	10th (9)	8th (11)	9th (12)	10th (11)
Industry (Management or technical)	1	2	1	4	7	4	6	5	4	1	3	3	—	1	—	10	6	9	9	8	7	6	4	5
Agriculture (Management or technical)	5	4	2	2	1	2	6	6	3	1	1	1	8	8	8	1	1	2	—	2	—	2	6	3
Education (Teaching or research or adm.)	3	2	—	3	4	4	1	5	4	—	—	—	2	1	1	2	2	1	—	1	1	2	3	3
Komsomol Apparatus	—	1	2	3	3	1	2	1	3	1	1	2	3	3	2	—	1	2	—	3	—	1	2	1
Soviet (govt.) Appara.	2	2	2	1	3	6	4	4	6	1	1	1	2	3	8	1	2	1	1	2	3	—	2	2
Other Apparatus	2	1	—	2	1	1	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	3	1	1
Total	13	12	7	15	19	18	20	21	20	4	6	8	15	16	19	14	12	15	11	17	11	14	18	15

	Educ.Sc. & Cul.		Sc.& Tech.	Educ. & Cul.	Pub.Health & Soc.Security			Trade Eve.Serv. Com.Econ.		H Com. Econ. Eve.S.	Youth Affairs			Conservation Ra. Use Na. Re.			Consumer Goods & Trade		Women's Labor
Convocation Number of regions	8th (6)	9th (8)	10th (7)	10th (5)	8th (9)	9th (12)	10th (13)	8th (11)	9th (8)	10th (9)	8th (8)	9th (9)	10th (7)	8th (11)	9th (12)	10th (10)	9th (10)	10th (13)	10th (7)
Industry	1	2	2	1	4	3	1	4	3	5	3	1	1	2	3	1	5	7	4
Agriculture	2	2	1	2	3	3	5	4	1	2	1	2	1	2	3	4	4	4	2
Education/Research	3	3	—	1	1	3	4	—	2	—	—	1	1	4	3	2	1	2	—
Komsomol Apparatus	—	2	2	1	2	5	3	2	3	1	5	6	4	5	4	1	4	2	—
Sov.(govt.) Apparatus	—	4	4	2	4	5	5	6	4	3	—	2	2	3	5	5	3	3	3
Other Apparatus	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	6	13	9	8	14	20	19	17	13	11	9	12	9	16	18	13	17	18	9

representation of regional first secretaries who have had career experience in the Komsomol apparatus.

The data on the non-party organizational experience of the regional first secretaries do not suggest a single definitive explanation of the role of the regional first secretaries in the Commissions. Nevertheless, one may observe that there is a logical relationship, at least in some Commissions, between the background characteristics of regional first secretaries and the particular Commissions to which they have been assigned. One may also observe a relationship between the regions represented by their first secretaries and the responsibilities of the Commissions. These data strongly suggest that the Soviet leadership expects the secretaries to contribute their technical and administrative expertise to the Commissions' work, while at the same time allowing them some leeway to pursue regional concerns in the activities of the Supreme Soviet organs.

While there is at least *prima facie* evidence that the regional first secretaries are expected to perform both a technical and an administrative role through their activities in the Standing Commissions, more specific information on this is extremely difficult to come by, and there is little profit in attempting to examine this in greater detail. Instead we will turn to another aspect that is implicit in much of the foregoing, namely the political role played by the regional first secretaries in these Supreme Soviet bodies. Our discussion will necessarily be somewhat speculative, but the topic is an important one that should be tackled in this context.

4. Political Role

In an earlier study, I have attempted to chart the systemic relationship among the *actual* functions of the Supreme Soviet bodies and between these and their *formal* functions.[10] The former I have classified as communication, legitimation and identification, mobilization, and interest articulation functions, and the latter as organizational, pseudo-executive, legislative, and supervisory functions. I assumed that the Supreme Soviet organs are a sub-system linking the political and social systems. The performance of these actual functions by the Supreme Soviet organs appears to serve different interests, depending on the particular function involved. In some cases, it would appear to serve the interests of individual Soviet leaders; in some, central government, local executive and administrative leaders; and finally, in some, the public at large.

On the assumption that the regional first secretaries are to perform both a technical and an administrative role through their activity in the Standing Commissions, I have also elaborated elsewhere[11] the political role played by these officials in these bodies. The likely sources of politics may be listed as follows. Through the processes of the Supreme Soviet organs, groups or individuals: (a)

10 See Shugo Minagawa, "Presidia and Standing Commissions of the Federal and Republican Supreme Soviets in the USSR, 1958-1972," (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, The Australian National University, 1975).

11 See Minagawa, "Regional First Secretaries in Soviet Parliamentary Committees," *Soviet Union/ Union Sovietique*, 6, Part 1 (1979): 24-32.

compete for such available resources as status, power to influence the behavior and positions of others, planning decisions, and financial sources; (b) establish authority relations among themselves or define their roles in the operations of the Supreme Soviet organs; (c) compete to formalize functional values of the operations of the Standing Commissions; and (d) strengthen their own identities by establishing functional power relations with other organizations. The evidence, though rather fragmentary, suggests that this group is of key importance in Supreme Soviet activities. This political role also involves at times the administrative and participatory roles.

The administrative role is, I assume, derived from the nature of the Soviet system as one which seeks to link up organizationally the various sectors of society through the duplication and overlapping of functions and the multiplication and interweaving of offices — particularly the party, government, and economic apparatuses. The administrative role is performed in these bodies by fulfilling mobilization functions at two levels. The first is related to "public relations" in the broad sense in Soviet society. A communication system built into the Supreme Soviet organs and embracing both downward and upward communication could foster better public relations by making the government more responsive to the problems of citizens and sectional groups, while at the same time promoting wider positive awareness of official policies. The second level is that of administrative mobilization. The Supreme Soviet organs appear to contribute to the mobilization of the administration mainly through the medium of its Standing Commissions, and in two ways: first, by exercising *kontrol'* (supervision) over the performance of administrative bodies so as to help prevent them from straying from the approved channels; and secondly, by facilitating administrative coordination, cooperation, and conciliation in pursuit of official objectives. Indeed, a policy such as the annual economic plan or five-year plan requires synchronized action by many agencies whose actions the planners seek to anticipate. The fulfillment of the plan must be checked, reassessed and adjusted after consultation with the interested parties. In this connection, the regional first secretaries seem to play a crucial role in the processes of the Supreme Soviet organs. One must also note that administrative mobilization operates in both directions, e.g. I have observed how the regional first secretaries hear statements from higher officials, but also express to them the concerns of their particular regions. Thus, the Standing Commissions serve as one of the mechanisms for tapping the opinions of the regional first secretaries at a given time for a given issue (probably excluding defense, foreign affairs, and internal security). These operations also involve contending center-regional pressures. There is indeed some leeway for the regional first secretary to fight for modestly increased appropriations of materials and funds for his region (See Table 2-13). The increased representation and activities of the regional first secretaries in the Commissions will thus provide a bargaining channel through which secretaries can advocate their own particular local concerns to central organs and by which (within limits) they can better influence the mix of priorities and budgetary allocations from the central government ministries. As indicated earlier, however, the federal Standing Commissions are

Table 2-13 Amendment to the Draft Budget by the Standing Commissions

A. Federal Budget

Budget year	Draft budget (million roubles)	Proposed by the Standing Commissions	Percentage
1970	rev. 144,800 exp. 144,500	+ 130 (million)	0.09
1971	rev. 160,800 exp. 160,600	+ 154.5	0.10
1972	rev. 173,700 exp. 173,500	+ 120	0.07
1973	rev. 175,800 exp. 175,100	+ 120	0.07
1974	rev. 194,100 exp. 193,900	+ 121	0.07
1975	rev. 218,700 exp. 218,500	+ 125	0.05
1976	rev. 223,500 exp. 223,300	+ 130	0.05
1977	rev. 238,800 exp. 238,600	+ 130	0.05
1978	rev. 246,200 exp. 246,000	+ 135	0.05
1979	rev. 269,100 exp. 268,800	+ 138	0.05
1980	rev. 284,600 exp. 284,400	+ 140.4	0.05

B. Republic Budget (amendments are shown in percentages)

Budget year	RSFSR	Ukr.	Bel.	Kaz.	Uzb.	Est.	Lat.	Georg.	Arm.
1970	0.20	0.20	0.14	0.14	0.18	0.18	0.15	0.16	0.11
1971	0.21	0.22	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.15	0.10	0.15	0.20
1972	0.15	0.16	0.12	0.11	0.09	0.15	0.09	0.13	0.15
1973	0.14	0.15	0.11	0.10	0.08	0.15	0.08	0.06	0.09
1974	0.14	0.15	0.10	0.08	0.10	0.13	0.08	0.12	0.08
1975	0.14	0.15	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.08	0.12	0.08
1976	0.12	0.14	0.11	0.10	0.09	0.11	0.07	0.11	0.08
1977	0.12	0.13	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.10	0.08
1978	0.11	0.13	0.10	0.11	0.12	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.16
1979	0.10	0.12	0.07	0.10	0.12	0.07	0.11	0.05	0.15
1980	0.10	0.13	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.06	0.07	0.09	0.07

C. Republic Budget

	1970 (million roubles)		1980	
1	RSFSR	34,203	RSFSR	67,205
2	Ukr.	10,958	Ukr.	20,832
3	Kaz.	4,682	Kaz.	8,400
4	Uzb.	2,736	Bel.	5,227
5	Bel.	2,673	Uzb.	5,224
6	Azer.	1,302	Lith.	2,329
7	Georg.	1,229	Georg.	2,033
8	Lith.	1,186	Azer.	1,953
9	Arm.	879	Mold.	1,638
10	Lat.	822	Lat.	1,568
11	Kir.	741	Kir.	1,439
12	Mold.	722	Arm.	1,336
13	Tadzh.	691	Tadzh.	1,255
14	Turk.	629	Est.	1,027
15	Est.	547	Turk	981

D. Budget Increase, 1970-1980 (shown in percentage)

Mold.	227
RSFSR	196
Lith.	196
Bel.	195
Kir.	194
Uzb.	191
Georg.	191
Ukr.	190
Lat.	188
Est.	188
Tadzh.	181
Kaz.	179
Turk.	156
Arm.	152
Azer.	150

not of course the main instrument for these purposes, but may act as an additional agency available to alleviate some of the difficulties of these operations.

As for the participatory role, this process would appear to afford underchannels for wider public participation. A regional first secretary in seeking to advance regional interests would base himself partly on the information provided by the lower-level soviets and by other individuals and groups in his region. Indeed, one factor contributing to the increased activities of regional first secretaries in the federal Commissions may be the trend toward greater devolution of policy-making initiative and authority to the local soviets. The acceleration in the activities of the lower local soviets in accordance with recent laws (e.g. the laws relating to the rights and obligations of village and settlement soviets, and to the rights and obligations of district and city soviets, enacted on November 19, 1969, and March 19, 1971, respectively) called for supervision and coordination by not only the republican Supreme Soviet Presidia, but also by the regional party committees. The latter also found themselves under pressure from the lower local soviets which required additional funds to meet increased executive responsibilities, and it was incumbent on them to find ways of responding to these demands.

The enactment of laws and regulations, their implementation, amendment and eventual replacement by new legislation forms a continuous cyclical process in the Soviet Union as elsewhere. This is one context in which the informal participation of the regional first secretaries may be helping to shape the situation in which the "collective leadership" acts. Undoubtedly, the Soviet policy process continues to be a closely controlled and highly organized one, and the Supreme Soviet organs remain one of the less important arenas for policy-related activities. Moreover, their involvement in the policy-making process (and this applies also to the local soviet organs) is virtually confined to such areas of state activity as everyday services, public facilities, housing and school construction, public health, and education.

The main object of the federal Commissions' operations from the viewpoint of the Soviet leadership appears to be, by and large, not to improve the decision-*making* process, but to improve the decision-*implementing* process and also to moderate conflicts and protests on the issues concerned. There is of course another hypothetical possibility of indirect and limited public participation in the process of policymaking through the operations of the Standing Commissions. As Table 2-2 indicates, there are now numerous rank and file members of various organizations represented in the federal Commissions. If the operations of the Standing Commissions are to remain alive and meaningful in some form or another, the Commissions may have to digest and accommodate some of the demands of these groups. At this juncture, the regional first secretaries could act as an appropriate conduit. It is they, more than any other participants, who are able to let off steam by transmitting the views of the rank and file of the organizations.

5. Conclusion

The presence and activities of the regional first secretaries in the federal

Commissions are probably among the key contributing factors, in Huntington's terms,[12] to its institutional adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. Their present importance from the viewpoint of institutional development will, however, be tempered by various factors such as the lack of institutional identity, the motivations of the Soviet leadership, changes in the existing "rules of the game"[13] and the motivations of the regional first secretaries themselves.

One could also assume that certain individuals and groups may change the behavior that other groups and individuals expect of them. One reason why this may be likely to occur is the lack of identification and autonomy of the Supreme Soviet organs. The identity of each Commission member, for instance, would appear normally to be intrinsically in his original occupation since his duties as deputy take up a relatively small proportion of his total time and attention. That is to say that each member potentially assumes his own presence in the Standing Commissions to be as extrinsic and casual. The regional first secretaries may feel they are being exploited by being asked to shoulder more responsibility for little extra reward. On the other hand, those first secretaries who have served as members of a particular Commissions for several convocations consecutively might develop some degree of identity with their respective Commissions. In that event, one could conceive of the possibility of some role conflict between identification with the Standing Commission and with regional interests, though this would seem unlikely unless the overall political significance of the Supreme Soviet bodies grew enough to make them important in the career perspectives of the regional first secretaries. But this will largely depend on the policy concerning the operations of the Standing Commissions set by the top political leadership, and on the ability of the leadership to adjust the policy as circumstances dictate.

The newly-appointed Chairman of the Presidium, Iurii Andropov, who is known to have expressed his distaste for the Brezhnev style of ostentatious leadership, may give the Supreme Soviet some political weight to help break the bureaucratic inertia he inherited from Brezhnev, most strikingly in the field of economic management. Andropov's speeches at the November (1982) and June (1983) plenums of the Central Committee on this subject are rather unexciting. This can be interpreted as indicating that Andropov is personally content with the extent to which the federal Commissions have been neutralized by placing key party officials, namely,

12 See Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 12. In an attempt to conceptualize institutionalization of any particular organization or procedure institutionalization can be measured by its adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence.

13 "Rules of the game" means here the authority relations among the participants. I have divided the participants into four groups and attributed to each a particular communication role in the meetings. Taking into account the hierarchical structure of the Soviet political system, I have defined the role of each group according to the extent to which the group projects its relative power in the communication process. See details in Minagawa, "The Functions of the Supreme Soviet Organs, and Problems of their Institutional Development", *Soviet Studies*, 27, No. 1 (1975): 62-64.

the regional first secretaries, in them, or that the collective leadership as a whole has attained its main objective with regard to the functional value of the Supreme Soviet organs,or thirdly, that some disagreement has developed among the leaders as to further reactivation of these state organs and as to the direction these organs should follow. Indeed, the present power balance within the top leadership in no way appears to leave the new Chairman's hands free.

Comment

Jerry Hough

Just like my study of regional newspaper coverage of Poland, Japan, and China in my paper for this conference, Minagawa is looking at a narrow slice of political reality in the Soviet Union. Just as my little study would not claim to illuminate the central essence of the Soviet foreign policy process, so Minagawa obviously does not claim that he has described the essence of the Soviet political system.

But it seems to me that this is the essence of science — the essence of scholarship. Every physicist does not try to summarize the existing sum of knowledge about physics. Every physicist does not try to have his own theory of relativity to replace Einstein's. In physics and in other sciences, scholars look at a small slice of reality. They try to make new discoveries, to make a contribution to the general knowledge, and they believe that if many people make small contributions, that will eventually lead to major increases in knowledge and understanding. This interest in discovery seems to me the spirit of science, the spirit of scholarship.

And in itself, I think that Minagawa's paper does lead to an increase in understanding. Many say for example that the party has all power, and that the government, and the Supreme Soviet in particular, is totally unimportant. Certainly it is true that the party organs have more power. Minagawa's paper reminds us of the complexity of the Soviet Union.

First, of course, the party is not a unified single institution. The ministers, who are members of the Central Committee, and in this sense party leaders, have very different interests from the regional party secretaries, and the regional secretaries often speak angrily of the ministers. The regional party secretaries have different interests from each other. Money for Siberia means that there is less money for the Nonblack Earth Area, and there is competition for this money.

Second, this paper reminds us that party officials can and must use many channels if they want to influence policy. They deal with their superiors in the Central Committee apparatus, they petition the ministries, and they write articles in the press. They also, as this paper demonstrates, play an active role in standing commissions.

Obviously, not every secretary takes his work seriously, but some do. After all, this is a way to make an impression on higher officials. If you sit in the Ukraine, you are a long way from Moscow. But if you sit in Moscow and you are a chairman of a subcommittee with other people around, then they can see: are you a good man? an energetic leader? or are you not? If an obkom secretary does well in these commissions it may increase his chances of being promoted. A number of the first secretaries in Table 2-4 have been promoted. Perhaps their working in committees was not important. But in any case the fact that this is the chance that they have to be noticed at the center must mean that many take their work seri-

ously.

But if the obkom first secretary uses the preparatory committees at the standing commissions for his own purposes, this means that these preparatory committees at the standing commissions have become a part of the political process. Certainly they are not the most important part. But they are a part, and we cannot understand the whole until we understand all the parts.

As Minagawa prepares this thorough paper for the publication of the proceedings of this conference, I would have a very few suggestions for his work — perhaps three small suggestions.

First, it would be useful if he at some time distinguished between the Council of Unions and the Council of Nationalities. The preparatory committees are usually joint committees. But, for example, in Table 2-4, it would not be difficult to communicate which of the regions were in the Council of Unions and which in the Council of Nationalities.

Second, it seems to me that many readers do not know very much about the preparatory subcommittees. It would perhaps be useful if he described their role — a paragraph or so would suffice. It might even be possible to interview on these questions. Mr. Pavlov, the ambassador to Japan, served as a party secretary. He must have been on some committee. Perhaps in the interest of mutual Soviet-Japanese understanding he might be willing to give an interview on this subject since it is so far in the past.

Third, it seems that it might be useful if the published paper included a list of the names of the chairmen of the subcommittees — that is, a table like Table 2-4. I say this because this might be useful to other scholars trying to answer other questions.

Since I have few criticisms of the paper, let me use the few minutes I have left to say just a few words about future work in this area.

There has actually been much work on obkom first secretaries and republic secretaries in recent years. One type has been biographical work. A second type has been the study of differences in budgets and allotment. I have looked, for example, at distribution of hospital beds and housing in the Russian Republic. Others have looked at budgets. A third type of study has been the examination of speeches of obkom first secretaries. Not very much of this has been done, but Breslauer, for example, has done a little. Hassner has looked at the foreign policy sections of speeches at party congresses. A fourth kind of study, in which Minagawa has also been engaged, has been of clientele relations. And, of course, more could be done. We have not really looked at the question of which leaders are nominated over the years for which Supreme Soviet elections. A fifth type of study, which has not been published, has been information on regional party institutions.

I have data for years on the percentage of women speaking in obkom soviets, on the membership of bureaus going back to the mid-60s, and on the age distribution of soviets going back into the 50s. It seems to me that as we have begun to do the parts of this work here, we should be thinking more about combining them. For

example, are the first secretaries who served as chairmen of subcommittees more likely to be promoted, or less? As for the RSFSR commissions, the active people there are the second secretary and chairman. Does participation there seem to be a factor in promotion to obkom first secretary? This kind of combination work needs to be done in the future. Is there a relationship between members, membership on a commission, and outcome? Gor'kii and Omsk have long been represented on the budget commissions. Do their budgets grow more rapidly than others? Chita and Kursk have been on the health committee. Do they get more hospital beds? Do articles of the obkom first secretaries sometimes seem to reflect their membership on standing commissions? These are questions upon which work can be done in the future. Meanwhile, if he has tables on who headed what committees, perhaps someone who is doing combination work can use his material.

But this is work for the future that I hope Minagawa and other Japanese scholars will participate in. I began by saying Minagawa is doing the kind of detailed scholarship that is the essence of physics and other natural sciences. There is one unfortunate difference between physics and Soviet studies. Thousands of physicists around the world are trying to push back the frontier of knowledge. Thousands of people are working on one subject. We do not have thousands of specialists on the Soviet Union in the capitalist world. Indeed, many who are specialists on the Soviet Union cannot do detailed research but are generalizers, or in some cases even ideological workers.

Few are doing this kind of detailed scientific work in the United States, and the situation here is not much better. It seems to me that we should be actively engaged in sharing information and projects. If anyone in Japan, for example, is interested in studying something — even if he wants to take a limited number of obkom secretaries in the Far East or eastern Siberia, via combination work, I would be glad to send information that I have, for instance, on the membership of the bureaus. I would be glad to hear from Japanese scholars working on these questions.

I welcome the fact that there is a new journal in English so it will be easier for us to read the work of Japanese scholars.

To repeat, this paper seems to me to be an interesting contribution to our ongoing science, and I look forward to a continued exchange of ideas and information on this and other subjects.

Comment

Tomoyoshi Hirai

First, Minagawa analyzed how the regional first secretaries are represented in the Supreme Soviet and assigned to standing commissions. I agree completely with his analysis and with his manipulation of data. On the one hand, recently, the absolute number of secretaries from the agricultural and industrial sections of the

Supreme Soviet has been growing, and will soon surpass (if it has not already done so) the number of party and governmental officials in the commissions. On the other hand, it is a governmental official who is nominated as chairman of each standing commission. However, these facts are of little significance as long as the real role of the Supreme Soviet in the Soviet political process is not understood. The nature of this role is, I think, the main question left unanswered by his paper. But since he already wrote a Ph. D. dissertation on this point, his additional remarks on this point would be greatly appreciated.

In other words, by filling the positions in the standing commissions, how do the first secretaries exert their influence on the various functions of the Supreme Soviet? He mentioned many functions of the Supreme Soviet: formal, organizational, executive, legislative, and budget functions. In which of these functions is the influence of the role of first secretaries most apparent? These questions may relate not only to the degree of real influence of the first secretaries in the Supreme Soviet, but also to their influence in the Soviet political process as a whole. Consider, for example, the section of Minagawa's paper regarding representation of the first secretaries in the Foreign, Transport and Communications Commissions. The question arises: how can such exceptions be explained with reference to the political significance of the party secretaries? This may be evidence of real powers offered by the Supreme Soviet in the whole system of Soviet politics.

Next, I would like to make some remarks about linkage. Group A and Group B can be distinguished by analyzing the mode of representation of the first secretaries in the standing commissions in terms of the geographical and ethnic characteristics of each region. He indicated that the length of tenure of a first secretary of Group B is generally shorter than that of Group A. How could he explain the difference between the two groups? He also mentioned a policy of recruiting most regional first secretaries locally which is practiced not only in Group A, but perhaps also in Group B. My memory may be mistaken, but I remember that Andropov recently proposed a change in this practice. He said that the recruiting policies should be more full, that the recruiting process and the secretaries' organization should reach across regions and not be confined to single localities.

My last question is concerned with politics and organizations. Minagawa seems to treat them as separate and opposite concepts. But I think that politics are always developed through organizations, and that organizations emerge through politics. Therefore overemphasizing their remoteness from each other may misguide the reader. With regard to the problem of participation in the politics of the standing commissions, he lists as participants in politics the following: the Soviet leadership, the Supreme Soviet leadership, civil officials, special groups, functional groups, and social groups. On the other hand, he also mentions four participating groups: party and government officials, the second echelon of the party and government hierarchy, executive members of the lower party and government apparatus and other organizations, and the rank and file of various organizations. It seems to me that there is a disparity between these two statements.

Discussion

Minagawa began by responding to the remarks of the two discussants. Hough had asked why he had not distinguished between the Council of Union and the Council of Nationalities in Table 2-4. He replied that of course there are two councils with different members. In 1966, he said, the councils had convened their sessions independently, but gradually joint meetings had come to be held, so that at present no one can think of holding the sessions separately. They convene meetings jointly for both houses. Thus in his presentation he had analyzed the composition of the standing commissions as if there were only one council in order to simplify the explanation, though he had had separate tables at hand. According to his tables quite a few standing commissions and regional first secretaries of Group B are in the Nationalities; however, Group A regional first secretaries are in the Council of Union. This may show that the Council of Union stands higher than the Council of Nationalities and enjoys a higher status.

As for the preparatory committees, called subcommittees, he said that there are a number of committees which were not classified in his paper. These committees are formed at the joint meetings and there is no point to separating them into two groups; they are composed of a mixture of both councils. While he did not list the members of the preparatory committees, he mentioned that he had done this in his Ph.D. thesis.

Minagawa suggested that he might be in the minority in Japan, studying the current operations of standing commissions of the Federal Supreme Soviet while Taniuchi of the University of Tokyo is working on the government bodies of the 1920s and 30s. Therefore, until this symposium he had not received any constructive or sharp criticism on his paper, and he very much appreciated Hough's comments, which would help his further study. For example, client relationships between top central leaders and obkom secretaries would be analyzed in detail. And also it might not be very difficult for him to analyze the promotion of the chairmen of the preparatory committees, since he has a list of the members fifteen years ago.

Minagawa went on to mention the preparatory commissions. There are a number of preparatory bodies. The preparatory commissions and working groups of deputies are set up for drafting registration. And the supervisory work done by the commissions is also set up by preparatory groups. As for the preparatory groups set up for drafting registration, the membership depends on the kind of registration. Some preparatory committees have fifteen to twenty members and others have thirty-five to forty. While some of the members of the subcommissions are members of standing commissions, some are specialists; but the second committee, called the working group of deputies, consists only of members of the standing commissions. And perhaps these deputies rank higher than those of the subcommittee. As for the preparatory group established by the standing commissions for the supervisory work, the number of members is rather small: from five to ten usually. Some of these groups operate for many months, but two to three months is the norm. The preparatory

groups of deputies are formed before the budget session. Every year about 300 members of the standing commissions are engaged in preparatory groups for checking the annual economic plan.

Finally, he said that it would be too difficult to answer either the question about how the first secretaries exert their influence in the various functions of the Supreme Soviet or the one about the real role of the Supreme Soviet in the Soviet political process. He said that this was because he had not brought his Ph.D. thesis, which was written ten years ago, and because there was too little time. Nevertheless, he has been gathering materials, and is constantly watching these processes.

Focusing on the fictional content of the political activities of the standing commissions, Besançon argued that part of the function of Soviet institutions is to make believe that socialism actually exists. For instance, as for plans, they are not plans, but mere ghosts. And standing commissions contribute not to plans, but to the implementation of the creed that there is such a thing as a plan. This may be applied to the whole political life including the so-called "democratic elections." Minagawa agreed with the point that there is an enormous gap between the ostensible functions of the Supreme Soviet and its actual operations. That is why he had excluded totally the activities of the Chambers. As a matter of fact, he said, the Chambers are merely the agreement organs (yes men) for the decrees and laws adopted by higher authorities. At the same time, he asserted that for the standing commissions the situation is different. They had started at the level of the local soviet in the 1950s. Since 1966 the number of standing commissions of the Federal Supreme Soviet has been increased enormously. The Presidium has been active particularly at the Federal level since 1964, too. The standing commissions have been supporting the operation of the Presidium in many ways. Although the standing commissions are not bodies attached to the Presidium, they are really controlled by the Presidium since the Chambers do almost nothing. Hough also supported Minagawa in the sense that although there is no pure plan and everything is assembled in an ideal way, there is a political process that decides whether money will be invested in Tiumen' oil or in Ukrainian coal.

Friedberg argued about favoritism within the Soviet system that might or might not be shown by party secretaries to deputies of the Supreme Soviet. It is said that there are many mafia with regard to construction materials, medical supplies, and education. Yet, it is not certain whether the Ukraine was treated better than the other republics as a result of Khrushchev's having been former first secretary of the Ukrainian party. And going back further to the Stalin period, Friedberg wondered whether any favoritism had been shown the Georgian Republic at the time when Stalin was the autocrat over Russia and Beria was his chief henchman. This had not prevented the decimation of the perfectly innocent literary establishment in Georgia and the execution of a great many writers. In other words, leaders seemed to have severed their links, at least on that level, with the places of their origin.

In reply, Hough pointed out that Georgia had received a steel mill that was economically irrational. Certain kinds of agricultural products in Georgia had

been priced higher, so the standard of living had indeed been higher than in central Russia where the peasants had lived extremely badly. But he was not sure whether this had been because of Stalin. Many of these questions, he said, had not been studied. As is shown by Table 2-15-D, there were great differences between the republics' budgetary increases from 1970 to 1980. What does this mean? Is the fact that Brezhnev and Chernenko came from Moldavia responsible for the difference? Maybe it has occurred because Moldavia is one of the more rural republics, or perhaps relative advantages have been given Moldavia in order to try to put a damper on separatist movements, which became a real problem in Romania. And why does Georgia have more doctors per capita? The answers to these questions are unknown because they have not been studied.

Pointing out the alteration of the functions of political organizations in the historical process and the importance of their agent function, Kimura asked which of the four political functions of the standing commissions Minagawa felt to be the most important. Minagawa answered that the mobilization function for economy measures is most important, and he supposed that the Soviet leaders also expect to strengthen that function. He also added that there are an enormous number of grading mobilization functions, not only in the Supreme Soviet Commissions, but also in the other bodies in the Soviet Union.

According to Ito, the crucial point is whether local secretaries are now acting as agents of the central government in local politics or whether they are acting as agents of their local interests. Minagawa and Hough had emphasized the aspect of local secretaries acting as agents of local interests in national politics. But Ito said that, with regard to the role of the Polish Seim during the Solidarity period from September 1980 to December 1981, this body had engaged in remarkable activities and had taken the initiative in that situation. It had not been local secretaries who had played the important role in subcommissions of the Polish Seim, but noncommunist intellectuals. And this function, wherein the subcommissions of the Polish Seim had acted as agents of local interests in national politics, had remained even after the military took over, because the Polish Communist Party had almost disappeared. The Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party is not playing the same role as it had played before the military took over. In addition, Ito stressed the importance of the departments of the Central Committee of the Communist party where the local secretaries can act as agents of local interests in national politics. However, Hough and Minagawa regarded this argument not as an antithesis but as an expression of the same thing in sharper focus.