



HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY

Title	SUTARIN SEIJI TAISEI NO SEIRITSU [THE FORMATION OF THE STALIN POLITICAL REGIME] , By Yuzuru Taniuchi, 4 vols., Tokyo : Iwanami Shoten, Vol. 1 (1970,780+7pp.); Vol. 2 (1972,638+7pp.); Vol. 3 (1980,513+12pp.); Vol. 4 (1986,894+15pp.)
Author(s)	Hirooka, Naoko; Okuda, Hiroshi; Uchida, Kenji
Citation	Acta Slavica Iaponica, 6, 100-108
Issue Date	1988
Doc URL	https://hdl.handle.net/2115/7981
Type	departmental bulletin paper
File Information	KJ00000034143.pdf



Review Article

SUTARIN SEIJI TAISEI NO SEIRITSU [THE FORMATION OF THE STALIN POLITICAL REGIME]. By *Yuzuru Taniuchi*. 4 vols., Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, Vol. 1 (1970, 780 + 7pp.); Vol. 2 (1972, 638 + 7pp.); Vol. 3 (1980, 513 + 12pp.); Vol. 4 (1986, 894 + 15pp.)

Naoko Hirooka
Hiroshi Okuda
Kenji Uchida

Professor Taniuchi has completed his monumental work on the peasants and the Stalin regime. To discuss his works is at the same time to discuss much of the development of Soviet studies in Japan. It may be safely said that Taniuchi laid a cornerstone in the foundation of Soviet studies in Japan. He has constantly played a leading role in scholarly accomplishments, while his methods and attitude toward research have been a model for younger students. Particularly, his critical examinations of primary sources greatly contributed to emancipating Japanese scholarship on the Soviet Union, once dominated by preconceived notions and ideological dogmas.

His first book, *A Political History of Soviet Russia*, published in 1962, was an outstanding work, in which the author under the influence of the late E.H. Carr tried to elucidate many of the aspects of the Russian governmental structures during the mid-1920s. His monograph, *The Village Gathering in Russia in the Mid-1920s* (Birmingham, 1968), which Dorothy Atkinson in her Ph.D. thesis called "the first non-Soviet work" on the Russian peasant commune, is a revised version of a part of *A Political History* dealing with the village *skhod*.

Essentially, *A Political History* became an introduction to the monumental work under review. It elucidated the fact, accepted now by almost all students, that a commune was de facto a political power in the countryside in the mid-1920s. As the subtitle, *Power and Peasantry*, suggests, it was a preempted criticism of Kukushkin's interpretation based on class struggles, although Kukushkin's book on village soviets basically relied on the same materials that Taniuchi had utilized six years before.¹ Taniuchi analyzed in detail the class structures in the countryside, and concluded that the communal relationships were predominant and independent of the political assumptions held by the party leadership. Later, Soviet historians, V.P. Danilov and E.P. Ivanov, defined this communal cohesion as "*neraschlenennost' obshchiny*."² In order to understand this structure, this book minutely and concretely analyzes social organizations such as the Committees for Peasants' Mutual Aids (*krestkomy*), and the All-Russian Agricultural and Forestry Workers' Trade Union (*Vserabotzemles*), as well as such social strata as peasant women, rural teachers, *batraki*, and shepherds. It was such a pioneering work that few Japanese specialists could properly evaluate it at that time. Only afterwards, under his influence, Soviet studies in Japan on the 1920s and 1930s substantially developed, and significant progress in many fields was made. We must admit, however, that in the studies of political process in the countryside during

the 1920s, Taniuchi's book has not been superceded.

A Political History's main subject is how the soviet power made political contacts with the peasantry, as it seriously wished under the slogan of "Face the countryside," proposed by Zinov'ev in 1924. So this book ends its description before the year of 1927. Ensuing years and events were to be dealt with in a new research. Now Taniuchi's concern was directed to clarifying the essential attributes of the Stalin regime through the analytical description of the political circumstances in the countryside, starting from the bottleneck in the grain collections, which soon reached the point of political crises at the beginning of 1928, and resulting in the historical breakthrough which took definite shape from the end of 1929 to the first half of 1930.

This process is fully examined in the four volumes of his monumental work, *The Formation of the Stalin Political Regime*, to which the author devoted himself for more than a quarter of a century. The first volume entitled, *A Crisis in the Countryside*, mainly covers the year of 1928, the second volume, *A Great Turn*, from the second half of 1928 to the first half of 1929, and the third and fourth volumes, *The Revolution from Above*, from the summer of 1929 to the 16th Party Congress in June-July, 1930. It is impossible to discuss all of its important contents, since this work exceeding 2,800 pages contains so many valuable findings. Fortunately, the task of summarizing this four-volume work will be accomplished by the author himself in his forthcoming book. Therefore, we will confine ourselves to discuss only a part of his wide-ranging arguments.

The author's first subject is what is called "extraordinary measures" introduced in response to the crisis of grain collections. The 15th party congress, known as the Congress of Collectivization, decided to carry out collectivization of agriculture based upon peasants' spontaneity in accordance with the traditional Bolshevik idea. The tempo of collectivization was ambitious enough, but still gradual compared with one that the party later actually embarked on. In relation to industrialization, collectivization of agriculture was supposed to be the long-term target that should be pursued with the achievements of industrialization as its material foundations. Extraordinary measures applied in grain collection at the beginning of 1928, however, signaled the first stage of new history. The assumption that collectivization would bring quick relief to the grain problem began to prevail in the way of thinking of the party leadership. Contradictions which sharpened between the power and the peasantry in application of extraordinary measures further strengthened the dependence of the party upon collectivization.

Originally, the concept of "extraordinary measures" itself presupposed that they would be temporary so that NEP principles would be restored once the crisis was overcome. The vicious cycle that the crisis caused the extraordinary measures and vice versa, however, deprived the "extraordinary measures" of their temporary character, even though the 1928 July Plenum prohibited the party organizations from applying them. Meanwhile in Siberia and other provinces, the local party organizations "successfully" procured grains through making use of decisions at the village *skhod*. These initiatives were officially approved and this new form of collection, now called Ural-Siberian method (hereafter the USM),³ began to be applied throughout the country from the beginning of 1929 onwards. The USM was alleged to be a social (*obshchestvennyi*) method which forced grain holders to deliver grain by making use of communal sanctions from within. But these sanctions could not work without coercion applied towards peasants by the forces dispatched from cities, because antagonism between the regime and the peasantry as a whole was so tense. Therefore the essence of the

USM consisted, in fact, in nothing but legitimizing the coercion on the pretext of peasants' spontaneity by obtaining decisions at the village *skhod*. *Kontraktatsiia* was also the USM adapted for the future harvest of grain in response to the crisis.

Thus, the author attributes the historical origins of the breakthrough at the end of 1929, first, to the grain crisis and the party authorities' response to it, and second, to the USM, a developed form of "extraordinary measures." In clarifying these relations from all angles, the author described the process by fully elaborating on correlations of innumerable historical facts.

Taniuchi draws attention to the interesting, hitherto neglected points. In a letter dated February 13, 1928, sent to all the party organizations, Stalin quoted a directive of January 6, which has been kept secret until now. This directive was "quite exceptional both in the tone and the demand" and ended in "the threat" addressed to local party leaders in the case of failure to achieve a decisive breakthrough in grain collections in as short a period as possible.⁴ According to the author, this directive imposed on the party organs all the responsibilities of grain collections originally assumed by the state and cooperative agencies by putting those agencies which failed to collect grain "under the control of the party organizations." Consequently, it contributed to pulling the party organs up to the level of the highest state organs, and resulted in the introduction of heterogeneous elements essentially contradictory with the framework of NEP in the relationships between the party and the peasantry. Moreover, it was intended to take coercive measures against local party organizations through such measures as organizational shakeups, punishments, and dissolutions. It was an assault on the principle of autonomy of local organizations that had been established since the formation of the party.

Needless to say, these new features were also considered exceptional and temporary at the beginning of 1928. Later, however, the tendency toward a centralized and monolithic government with the party at its pinnacle became more deeply and irreversibly rooted. The development was inseparably intertwined with the application of the USM, which began as a method of grain collection, but soon became the procedure of wholesale collectivization, and a *modus operandi* of the liquidation of *kulachestvo* as a class. This USM was executed by "plenipotentiaries (*upolnomochennye*)," "troiki," "piaterki," and so on. In this process, *kulaks* appeared as the personification of the communal cohesion. The *Pravda* editorial of January 10, 1929, stated that *kulaks* won most of the peasantry to their side by "all-communal" slogans, and slogans of "communal egalitarianism" (II: 292).⁵ The confrontation between the peasantry and the power metamorphosed the concept of *kulak* into a politicized one, so the concept was inevitably and arbitrarily extended, as campaigns for collectivization became intensified. Therefore, "the liquidation of *kulachestvo* as a class" was the climax and the *denouement* of this confrontation.

At the end of 1929, Stalin proclaimed for the first time a drastic policy shift to the "liquidation of *kulachestvo* as a class," which was in fact nothing but the confirmation of events taking place in the countryside since the summer of 1929. Accomplished facts were being accumulated and becoming indispensable elements of the regime, while extraordinary measures became persistent and "permanent." This process is described emphatically as one of the most important characteristics in the formation of the Stalin regime. Thus, the party was unleashed from all the restraints by this proclamation, and launched a shock campaign of dekulakization mainly through the forces dispatched to the countryside from outside. In collectivization campaigns, the wholesale collectivization and the liquidation of *kulachestvo* as a class inevitably became inseparable

and proceeded interrelatedly. This inner logic of collectivization is also regarded as the most important factor, which is fully examined by the author. Plenipotentiaries who were dispatched into the countryside found themselves surrounded by peasant hostilities. Peasants' consent, which could be obtained at the *skhod* by applying oppressive measures against apparently hostile elements, was immediately interpreted as peasants' spontaneous consensus and as the ground for legitimacy of the USM by the policy-makers. As a result, the concept of "kulaks" was politicized to an extreme extent, and accordingly that of "class struggle" bore a special meaning.

Since *kolkhozy* organized in this way lacked economic stability and were not politically reliable from the viewpoint of the party leadership, the fulfillment of the spring sowing campaign had to be guaranteed exclusively by strengthening the state's control over *kolkhozy*. The forthcoming spring sowing in 1930 was a test case of how *kolkhozy* could really function. The *kulak* problem became an urgent one to be solved in terms of functionalization of *kolkhozy*, and the party embarked on dekulakization on full scale in the spring sowing campaign. Once the party worked out a fiction that a commune which did not function as an arena where consensus could be obtained was not a genuine peasant commune but a *kulak* one, the same logic had to be applied to *kolkhozy*.

When the USM was applied in collectivization and liquidation of *kulachestvo*, such unofficial forces ruled by the party as "plenipotentiaries" were projected far into the collectivization front. This meant that the roles which were supposed to be played by agricultural cooperatives, village soviets and *bedniak-batrak* groups were transferred to party organs and partially to the OGPU. The author makes especially detailed analysis of activities of village soviets and *bedniak-batrak* groups, and concludes that neither *bedniak-batrak* groups attached to village soviets nor agricultural sections, which should have been organized in each village as the production meeting (*proizvodstvennoe soveshchanie*), could function effectively in collectivization. Even in the cases where they were reported to be successfully active, they functioned as the subsidiary wings of plenipotentiaries, *troiki* and so on. The author convincingly argues that as collectivization of agriculture was enforced, contradictions and struggles between the party and the commune as a whole became more sharpened.

"Excesses" and distortions of party lines which frequently took place under the wholesale collectivization and liquidation of *kulachestvo* as a class caused among peasantry deep dissatisfactions, which led to their taking direct action by February 1930. Under these circumstances, the party leadership issued directives to correct excesses after the second half of February. According to Taniuchi, these directives were designed to bring into order the collectivization campaigns, mainly in regions of non-wholesale collectivization, and therefore they should not be interpreted as a radical policy change. But the leadership's calculation went wrong, for local organizations including those of main grain-producing regions were totally confused by this move. Their disorientation threatened the whole *kolkhoz* system, which had been narrowly sustained by their oppressive power. Peasants in a great mass left *kolkhozy* and recaptured their former land and instruments. The political situations in the countryside were going from bad to worse, and they finally reached the point of crisis at the end of March. At this stage, the party leadership seriously attempted to bring about a radical change in the whole policy of collectivization in order both to calm down grievances of peasants and organize the immediate spring-sowing campaigns. But again, the local party organizations and even the plenipotentiaries were still panic-stricken. Their vacillations and disobedience to the central directives shook the party

leadership, which feared that the monolithic system of the party organs might collapse. It was this aspect that brought about the most serious anxiety among the highest echelon of the party. Therefore, "the March crisis" was, first of all, the "crisis of the party" (IV: 885). Thus correction of "excesses" during the collectivization drive was inevitably accompanied by the further centralization of the party organizations.

The author concludes his description of the formation of the Stalin regime with an analysis of the abolition of *okrugs* in July, 1930. This decision was claimed to be designed to bring the apparatus of the party, soviets, and others closer to districts and villages. But as the author explains, this decision had nothing to do with attempts to reform administrative districts (*raionirovanie*) during the 1920s. Reinforcement of districts, announced as the goal of the decision, was not intended to make effective the democratic control over the apparatus from below, but to counterattack and oppress grievances which had spread among the local party organizations since the March crisis. The abolition of *okrugs* was itself a "trifle," claimed Sheboldaev. "The essence of the matter consists in reorganization of our apparatus as a whole." He also revealed Stalin's statement at a commission of the Politburo. According to Stalin, practice so far has been a "Menshevik" one in the sense that decisions of the upper party organs were obligatory to the lower organs only through the latter's confirmation, and that all the party cells and members should carry out without demur (*besprekoslovno*) every decision of the upper party organs, irrespective of whether it was confirmed by the intermediate organs.⁶ Thus, Stalin overrode a Bolshevik organizational principle that was prescribed in the 1925 party rule: "All the party organizations are autonomous in deciding their local problems." In other words, Stalin elevated to one of the organizational principles of the party a military and extremely centralized practice of the plenipotentiaries system which fully developed during the "revolution from above" and trampled down the autonomy and discretion of the local party organizations.

One of the most serious issues examined by Taniuchi in this work is the problem of how to interpret the Stalin regime. The author characterizes it in terms of two correlated aspects: its methods and its organizational principles of government. As to the former, he concludes that extraordinary measures applied at the grain crisis in early 1928 were perpetuated and had become an indispensable element in implementation of policies. Government through coercion and administration by mere injunction from above replaced a sort of consensus politics in the countryside. This development could not have occurred without accompanying and/or being accompanied by any change in the latter sphere. Thus, Taniuchi singles out the two main attributes of the Stalin regime; 1) "complete transference of real power within the party organizations into the hands of the party bureaucracy," or monolithization of the party, and 2) "adhesion between the party and the state, complete subordination of the state to the party, and, as a result of this, etatization of the party" (I: 8).

Let us examine first the author's interpretation of the Stalin regime in terms of its organizational aspect. Taniuchi is, of course, not the first to characterize the Stalin regime as monolithization and etatization of the party; in fact, these factors can be certainly recognized as important features already for the 1920s, at least, so far as the higher levels of the party were concerned. It may be, therefore, difficult to discern qualitative differences between political regimes in the 1920s and in the 1930s, if we concentrate our attention on the top levels. The uniqueness of Taniuchi's interpretation lies in his focus on the bottom of the political hierarchy, that is, in the countryside.

In his first book, *A Political History*, he analyzed how the policy of revitalization of rural soviets had been implemented in the middle of the 1920s. Since rural party organizations were too weak to perform governmental functions, the peasantry became incorporated into the political system through the soviets, only in so far as the Soviet leadership allowed extensive autonomy of village communes, while maintaining a balance of power between the soviets and communes.⁷ In contrast with these situations, in the 1930s local party organizations and plenipotentiaries played a decisive role in governing the peasantry by setting aside both the soviets and communes. Local party organizations virtually took upon themselves those tasks previously assumed by the state organs. The party became "etatized" from the bottom to the top of its hierarchy. The author argues that precisely because resistance and hesitations still existed within the party, etatization of the party was accomplished only through its further centralization, as was symbolically shown by the secret directive of January 6, 1928. By thus analyzing the bottom of the political order, Taniuchi succeeds in answering the complicated problems of continuity and change between the 1920s and 1930s and between Leninism and Stalinism.

The author considers etatization of the party most essential to the Stalin regime. This seems to stem from his understanding of the nature of the Bolshevik party. At the theoretical level he presupposes the state-society dichotomy and places the party on the level of society. In so doing, he believes that much of the original idea of Bolshevism was still kept alive in the 1920s, but it was suppressed through the "revolution from above" and overwhelmed by the Stalinist value system. Taniuchi argues in the concluding chapter:

A volte-face in the value system, which took clear shape in the 1930s, was a fundamental change that can be characterized...as a shift in emphasis from society to state. The idea that held the state to be evil and only a fictitious figure to be soon resolved into and absorbed by society...and that had functioned as a normative principle of Bolshevism until the end of the 1920s was replaced by a new Bolshevik creed that held the state to be good...and a monopolist of all the socialist virtues. And the very institutional core that embodied authoritarianization of the state in this sense was nothing but the party, or to be more accurate, the hierarchy of the party organs (IV: 886).

These conclusions are derived from critical analyses of an enormous amount of primary sources, but at the same time they give us a clue to Taniuchi's views on history.

Dichotomous concepts play an important part in the author's arguments. In addition to the state-society dichotomy mentioned above, a dichotomy between idea and reality provides a key notion. As it is well known, E.H.Carr and Isaac Deutscher once had a debate on the role played by a revolutionary utopia or idea in history. Reviewing Carr's *History of Soviet Russia*, Deutscher criticized him, saying that Carr is "inclined to view the State as the maker of society rather than society as the maker of the State." Taniuchi recalls this debate in an article in memory of E.H.Carr, and favorably quotes Deutscher's criticism as it is not off the point so far as the earlier volumes of Carr's *History* are concerned. According to Taniuchi, Carr later accepted this criticism and learned from Deutscher that an idea should play an important role as a living force in history.⁸ Taniuchi, too, takes the view that a role of "an idea as one of the driving forces of history" should be duly taken into consideration. He, thus, at-

taches great importance to the Leninist idea, held by the Bolshevik party in the 1920s, that took for granted that the party should belong to society in the state-society dichotomy. It is precisely because of this view that he considers a characteristic of etatization of the party so essential to the Stalin regime.

The author never assumes, however, that an idea automatically becomes reality. On the contrary, his analyses of concrete phases in history are governed by an attitude to draw a sharp distinction between policies and practices. We can find throughout the volumes instances of his methodological premise that "qualitative changes in the governmental structure can be only perceived by turning our attention to actual changes that were going on behind the seemingly same institutional appearance" (IV: 582). Starting from this premise, the author vividly describes how various policies based on theoretical assumptions of Bolshevism had been rejected by realities in the countryside, and had not at all produced such results as the leadership had expected. This analytical framework of the idea-reality dichotomy is clearly shown in his treatment of the so-called "party's mass work." In his opinion, in theory if the party had actually succeeded in organizing poor peasants, capturing the support of the middle peasants, and thus isolating the minority *kulaks*, it could have accomplished its various policy goals under the support and agreement from the overwhelming majority of peasants. But every effort made by the party to organize the mass work was in vain, since peasants were so closely united with one another in a commune to face the state that the party could exert control over them only by authoritarian means. This was diametrically opposed to the theoretical idea mentioned above. This dichotomy between the idea of peasants' spontaneity and the reality of coercion toward them can be seen most conspicuously in the USM, which was the mechanism of government based on the fictitious legitimacy of "the consent of the entire peasantry." It might be no exaggeration to say that the essence of this study lies precisely in its detailed analysis of the USM and in the special significance the author attaches to it.

This analytical framework has led the author to challenge the widely held view that village soviets, reinforced by the introduction of the agrominimum and the agropenipotentiary system in the late 1920s, had succeeded in controlling peasant communes during the wholesale collectivization. Although the "abolition" of communes definitely widened the role of the Soviet state in controlling the countryside, Taniuchi argues that this reinforcement of the state's role should not be identified with the enhanced authorities of village soviets; on the contrary, he maintains, it should be characterized as a decisive decline of their supposed role. At the crucial stage of collectivization, village soviets were reduced to a powerless status or in many places even destroyed by the strong hands of plenipotentiaries and of the forces sent from cities and industries. The theory of "abolition of village soviets" were fiercely criticized at that time, but this theory coincided with the formation of the system of government ruled by the party in the countryside, replacing village soviets. Thus Taniuchi sees in this theory of "abolition of village soviets" a reflection of reality.

The same methodology is applied to the question of the "abolition" of peasant communes. As is well known, their abolition began to be strongly called for, as the wholesale collectivization was launched, eventually resulting in the famous legislation of the Russian Sovnarkom and the VTsIK dated July 30, 1930.⁹ Taniuchi argues that this policy was grounded on the poor assumption that the Russian peasant commune, deeply rooted in rural life, could be wiped out at one blow from above, though he admits the actual blow was in a fact a terrible one. If the wholesale collectivization and the abolition of the communes had been a movement really based on the consent of the

peasants' majority, the *kolkhoz* could have been claimed to be an institution designed to introduce a new form of self-government, a genuine successor to the abolished communal self-government. As it was, the USM worked upon the process in the completely opposite direction. In the absence of the conditions of spontaneous transformation of communes into *kolkhozy*, the attempt to abolish them "from above" resulted in maintenance in the countryside of the backward attributes of the former communal peasantry.

The author thus detects the paradoxical, but inevitable fact that the USM forced the Soviet state not only to adapt itself to the remaining communal relationships but also to make use of them (II: 149; IV: 621). Taniuchi apparently shares the view with Isaac Deutscher, who, paying attention to the historical relationships between "ends" and "means" in the emergence of Stalinism in Soviet Russia, concluded that "Stalin undertook...to drive barbarism out of Russia by barbarous means. Because of the nature of the means he employed, much of the barbarism thrown out of Russian life has crept back into it."¹⁰

The author asserts that the "abolition" of communes determined the course of "absorption by the Soviet state of the entirety of social spheres (*obshchestvennost'*)" (IV: 621). The state ruled by the party thus emerged as the exclusive subject endowed with all the values. In this the author has much in common with Danilov, who sees the history of communes in the context that the socio-political institutions and functions formerly inherent to communes were gradually subsumed by the organizations above, and finally by the state itself. According to Danilov, as a general rule the completion of this process coincided with the period of the abolition of communes.¹¹ Taniuchi argues, however, that in the case of the Russian communes, which were abruptly destroyed from above *without* sufficient conditions from below the "absorption of the social spheres" was inevitably accompanied by the process in which the Soviet state became assimilated to the Russian backwardness. Although the precise meaning of the concept of "Russian backwardness" remains unclear, we can see here the author's sound intuition toward history that the relationship between collectivization and the abolition of communes should not be understood merely through official decisions.

If we can speculate beyond the terminal date of the volumes, the concept of the Stalin regime presented by the author as the perpetuation and irreversible institutionalization of extraordinary measures would not exclude the possibility that the recovery of normalcy could appear after the extraordinary situations ceased to exist. It might be asserted that the middle of the 1930s, as termed by Alec Nove as "a period of relaxation," was the period in which the party exerted an effort to get out of the state of emergency symbolized by the grain crisis and the famine of 1932-33, and by the authoritarian government over the peasantry through the *politotdely* of the MTS. If so, the political circumstances after the middle of the 1930s might be characterized as being imbued with the dynamism in which the inertia of extraordinary measures stressed by the author was entangled with the tendencies to recover normalcy.

Our discussions only touch upon the surface of the conclusions drawn by the author, and do not do justice to the rich texture of Taniuchi's descriptions of the formation of the Stalin regime, which are based on empirical analyses of an incredible array of massive primary sources. No history has been written on the relationship between the peasants and the power during this period that would equal Taniuchi's volumes in richness, meticulous attention to historical details, and analytical insight. Taniuchi's work towers not only as the pinnacle of accomplishments by Japanese scholarship on

the Soviet Union, but, indeed, unrivalled throughout the world.

Notes

- 1 Iu.S.Kukushkin, *Sel'skie sovety i klassovaia bor'ba v derevne* (Moscow, 1968).
- 2 *XXVI s"ezd KPSS i problemy agrarnoi istorii SSSR* (Ufa, 1984): 115-23.
- 3 For the author's preliminary survey on the USM available in English, see, "A Note on the Ural-Siberian Method," *Soviet Studies*, 33, No.4 (19): 518-47.
- 4 I.V.Stalin, *Sochineniia*, 11: 10-19; also see Taniuchi, I : 363; N: 767-68, 883-84.
- 5 It should not be overlooked that in relation to these circumstances the author pays special attention to peasants' political request for organizing "peasants' leagues (*krest'ianskie soiuzy*)" as late as the end of the 1920s, not in 1905. See Taniuchi, I : 224, 620; II: 306-7.
- 6 B.Sheboldaev, *Ob ocherednykh zadachakh raboty v derevne* (Moscow, 1930): 32-36; also see Taniuchi, N: 766-69.
- 7 The relations of village soviets with communes in the mid-1920s are also briefly discussed in Taniuchi, *The Village Gathering*: 27-39.
- 8 Explanatory notes written by Yuzuru Taniuchi for the Japanese translation of E.H.Carr, *The Russian Revolution* (London: Macmillan, 1979). For Deutscher's criticism of Carr, see Isaac Deutscher, *Heretics and Renegades, and Other Essays* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1955): 95.
- 9 For the author's analysis on the demand for the abolition of communes and the pioneering role in it of the Ukraine, see Taniuchi, N: 587-91. The Ukrainian Land Code ruled throughout the 1920s that no individual *dvors* should exist outside land societies (*zemel'nye obshchestva*). This suggests the necessity of studying further the peculiarities of the Ukrainian republic.
- 10 Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin* (London: Penguin, 1966): 553.
- 11 *Ezhegodnik po agrarnoi istorii*, vyp.6 (Vologda, 1976): 128.