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Title	Conceptualization of Informal Group Behavior under Gorbachev
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Citation	Acta Slavica Iaponica, 7, 63-76
Issue Date	1989
Doc URL	https://hdl.handle.net/2115/7988
Type	departmental bulletin paper
File Information	KJ00000034155.pdf



CONCEPTUALIZATION OF INFORMAL GROUP BEHAVIOR UNDER GORBACHEV

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INTRODUCTION

This paper is an attempt to conceptualize the effect of informal and semi-informal group behaviour either directly or indirectly on policy processes. I have observed elsewhere¹ the extensive (in terms of numbers) and cautious (in terms of contents) personnel changes in the first two and half years under Gorbachev. A few scholars² have so far studied Gorbachev's cadres policy in the context of his new initiatives and policies. It is certainly difficult to dissociate new people from new policies. However, this kind of study, in my view, cannot predict the likely success or failure of Gorbachev's authority building strategy. One of the mediating factors, namely informal group behaviour, I tentatively explore in this paper might not provide the immediate answer to this question, but equally one cannot avoid examining it if one is seeking to predict the likely outcome of the Gorbachev's strategy. The characteristic features³ of personnel changes do nevertheless have an influence on the formation of formal and informal groupings and on their behavioural patterns, changing their political interests, commitments, attitudes and alliances. The existence of informal and semi-informal groupings (mediating units) themselves, however, does not make them interact with one another unless they have common cause with one another. The domestic policy agendas that Gorbachev has introduced since he came into power on March 11, 1985 may act as a catalytic agent among these mediating units.

What I mean by an informal group here is a group that operates within the system, rather than an anti-government group. The formation of any political group has been regarded as running counter to ideological interests since the 10th Party Congress in 1921. Thus, any group that pursues its own interest can be said to be informal.

INFORMAL AND SEMI-INFORMAL GROUPS AND THEIR CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES

In recent years, a Soviet scholar, A. V. Obolonsky has warned of the underestimation of the informal aspects of state administration. He justifies his statements by viewing the state administration as an organic combination of formal and informal groups, principles, and modes of behaviour in various combinations and correlations. He then explains six factors underlying the formation of groups.⁴ These are 1) common background : graduated from the same school, worked similar official career, 2) similar job "philosophy", that is, a system of views regarding the objectives, tasks, content, and forms of work activity, work style, and methods (in terms of various structural levels and oneself personally), 3) the coincidence of individual with official interest (for example, people who have worked together in setting up a special information or other kind of service, people who are upgrading their qualifications together), 4) similarity of psychological type, of character, etc., 5) common off-the-job interests : shared preference for certain leisure pursuits, etc., 6) deviant goals and behaviour whose members abuse their official position for selfish ends. Although Obolonsky does not differentiate political informal groups from social informal groups, and he speaks only of informal groups within the state administration and he does not categorize as I do it here, he may be the first, in this

writer's view, Soviet scholar who drew attention overtly to this question.

I have divided these groups into three categories, namely, clientelist groups, sectional groups and specialist / opinion groups. Most, if not all students of Soviet politics who have carried out studies of some aspects of informal groups, have tended to use these three categories indiscriminately. True, these groups are categorized, at this stage, rather arbitrarily and are not exclusive of each other, but they are means of fostering a conceptual framework so that the effect of informal groups in policy processes can be observed. More sophisticated classifications of these groups is still to come after more extensive empirical findings are available.

Table 1. *Features of Informal Groups*

Classification	Setup		Behaviour		Policy		
	Structure	Distribution	Orientation	Viewpoint	Contents	Sight	Processes commitment
Clientelist Group	Leader/ Vertical	Multiple organi/fields	Power	Particularistic	Tactical	Short term	Direct
Sectional Group	Leader/ Vertical	Single organi.	Power/ Policy	Collective	Conservative	Overall	Direct
Specialist/ Opinion Group	Horizontal	Single field	Policy	Scientific	Rational	Long term	Indirec

Clientelist Group. A patron-client relationship is, according to Carl H. Landée's definition, a "vertical dyadic alliance", an alliance between two persons of unequal status, power or resources each of whom finds it useful to have as an ally someone superior or inferior to himself. Although it is difficult to pinpoint the exact reasons why two individuals form a patron-client relationship in the Soviet Union, it has been indicated by this writer and others elsewhere⁵, that participants in the chain of clientelist relationships appear to treat political clientage as one of several possible alternatives to further career prospects and to acquire political power.

Under the *nomenklatura* system, the party is not only used as an institution to mobilize competent persons but also as a centre of authority through which party leaders can exercise the right to appoint and dismiss their subordinate officials. Thus, party leaders at all levels make use of this privilege as a political means to reinforce their clientelist relations. Despite such informal activity persisting, Gorbachev appears to be making efforts to find hidden talent and revitalize the nation's policy implementation process and machinery by coopting these individuals. However, my studies⁶ reveals that as long as certain elements such as the length of service required for advancement at each level and the timing of retirement from office remain less formalized, the clientage networks may not be able to express their functions fully in the area of the policy processes. Such a state of political clientage in the Soviet Union may indeed become an element of destabilization in the power structure of leadership, by offsetting its positive functions.⁷

Viewing the present lineup of Politburo members from viewpoint of clientelist connections, not only the senior survivor (namely, Shcherbitsky) of the Brezhnev group but also the other full members do not strictly speaking belong to the Gorbachev group. However, Gorbachev has quickly established alliances with Ligachev and Ryzhkov who has their own followers. Then, he has placed his "new friends" such as Shevardnadze, Yokovlev, Slun'kov, Zaikov, Yazov and Medvedev in key positions. This cannot be done otherwise since Gor-

bachev, judging from his career and age at the time he assumed the General Secretaryship, did not have a strong and wide network of clientelist relations. Some scholar observes that patronage (sic.) has become less combative, pointing to the fact that considerable elements, first of collective patronage, and, second of patronage vested in the General Secretary, represent an institutionalization of personnel policy - with the intent of depoliticising it, of taking it out of the domain of personal competition for power.⁸ This appears to be true at the upper echelons of the political elite. Many of the Politburo members, however, were either there when Gorbachev was elected as General Secretary, or were coopted by collective leadership since Gorbachev came into power, and seem to have a similar pragmatic policy stance to Gorbachev. They are currently motivated "new friends" sympathizing with Gorbachev's political posture and extending cooperation to him. There is a possibility that this will grow into a more united group as the internal and external environment becomes severe. However, if a situation in which each can fulfill his own desire arises, the group may be divided due to pursuance of individual interests and the negative side of "Government by Committee" would be restored. In that case, it would be impossible to carry out personnel changes to the extent seen in the first and second year of the Gorbachev regime.

Over the last three and half years, however, Gorbachev has succeeded in promoting some of his clients and has also succeeded in widening the base of his support. It can be said that wider its members are dispersed, the better the clientelist group may work as a policy support system. Generally speaking, the longer a General Secretary is in power, the more his old friends and associates are appointed to positions in the leadership and the top echelons of the various bureaucracies.

Gorbachev's clients⁹ are as follows : (as of January 1989)

Party

G. P. Razumovsky	Sec. CC. ; Politburo Candidate Memb.
V. I. Nikonov	Sec. CC ; Politburo Full Memb.
A. I. Luk'yanov	1st Dep. Chm. ; Politburo Candidate Memb. Sup. Sov. Presidium.
Ye. Ye. Sokolov	1st. Sec. Belorussian CP.
N. Ye. Kruchina	Head, Dept. of Administration of Affairs, CC.
V. I. Boldin	Head, General Dept., CC.
V. G. Afonin	1st Sec. Kuibyshev Obkom.
G. Kh. Shakhnazarov	Aide to General Secretary
I. T. Frolov	Aide to General Secretary
V. I. Kalashnikov	1st. Sec. Volgograd Obkom
B. M. Volodin	1st. Sec. Rostov Obkom
A. A. Khomyakov	1st. Sec. Saratov Obkom

Government

A. K. Vedernikov	Section Head, Organizational Party Work Dept. CC.
V. S. Murakhovsky	1st. Dep. Chm. CM ; Gosagroprom, USSR
A. V. Vlasov	Chm., RSFSR CM ; Politburo Candidate Memb.
M. V. Gramov	Chm. State C'tee Sports and Physical Culture, USSR
V. A. Kaznachev	Chm. State C'tee Vocational & Technical Education, USSR
Vladimir Arkhipov	Dep. Minister of Defence, USSR
A. I. Iyevlev	1st. Dep. Chm. Gosagroprom, USSR
S. I. Manyakin	Chm. People's Control C'tee

Military

Valeriy Belikov
Aleksy Lizichev

Commander of Soviet Group of Forces in Germany
Head, the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet
Army and Navy

Media

L. N. Spiridonov

1st. Dep. Editor, "Pravda"

Research Institute

A. A. Nikonov

Pres., Lenin All-Union Acad. of Agri. Sc.

G. L. Smirnov

Dir., Institute of Marxism-Leninism

It is known that many of the clientelist bonds in the Soviet political system are largely formed during the patron's mid-career period, most likely around regional and republican secretaries. A regional first secretary may, for example, not only assume the role of patron but also under certain circumstances establish horizontal alliances among the regional secretaries themselves. Gorbachev's network may extend to Stavropol's contiguous regions in the RSFSR and in the Caucasus.¹⁰ As one could see in the above list, however, Gorbachev's patronage source is extremely thin. It should be remembered the fact that within the framework of routinized advancement, Brezhnev gradually succeeded in moving his proteges from Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhe, Moldavia and Kazakhstan into key political posts. Gorbachev's move to strengthen his patronage has thus been subject to constraint by his thin career background and common understanding with other leaders regarding personnel changes at regional level. In the first two years, in particular, top leaders appears to have aimed at regaining centralized power by breaking-up local fiefs.¹¹ The regular Party Conference that is to be convened in every two to three years may also be used as an instrument to purge cadres who obstruct change and to ensure an influx of reform-minded personnel, but not so much to strengthen individual clientelist groups. According to the press report, the new raikom first secretaries in the rural districts are "specialists", as opposed to their predecessors, who are frequently "generalists".¹² The top leaders must have by the 19th Party Conference (June 1988) realized the fact that the pool of able officials is really very narrow in the existing Soviet political system and that there is a limit to its capacity to relocate the right cadre to the right post.¹³ In effect, Gorbachev faced the dilemmas of the leader challenging the conventional Soviet system. A few students¹⁴ of Soviet politics, for instance, who have studied Soviet clientelism are inclined to link clientelism exclusively or predominantly to institutional, social and situational causation. If the latter system is to be reformed, it may impart an affective aspect to existing Soviet clientelist relations. However, if the reforms were deferred, newly recruited "specialists" or reform-minded junior officials, who have been socialized under previous regimes, would be bound to revert to old pattern of behaviour.¹⁵

Sectional Group. Sectionalism in the Soviet Union can be found in any vertically structured bodies such as the party machine, army, police and government organs. This group is therefore in a way a formal body of organization. However, if it pursues its own sectional interests through its organizational operations, its behaviour run counter to its ideological principles. For example, an illustration can be made from the Cuban crisis in 1962. Although this case was occurred during Khrushchev period, similar cases are not uncommon at present day. The final decision to put missiles in Cuba must have been made in the then Presidium (now Politburo). However, the path from the general decision to the actual appearance of operational missiles in Cuba involved a number of Soviet organizations. As we know, the U. S. government easily spotted the construction sites of Soviet missiles in Cuba using one of its U-2 reconnaissance planes. It was the GPU (Soviet military intelligence) that shipped, unloaded and transported missiles to construction sites. The KGB was also responsible for the exclusion of all Cubans from the ports and missiles sites. Secrecy is their standard operating proc-

edure. Once the weapons and equipment were delivered to the construction sites, Air Defense Command and the Strategic Rocket Forces were responsible for installing the various kinds of missiles. Missile sites under construction were not camouflaged in Cuba as there was no such practice in the Soviet Union. For a Soviet missile construction crew, that would have been a hindrance to that organization's objective : rapid completion of sites according to schedule.¹⁶ Each of the major ministries tends to control its own housing, research institutes, training institutions, construction departments, supply organ and so forth. These self-contained and compartmentalised government agencies proved also resistant to central direction.¹⁷

The lengthy service of the federal Council of Ministers members¹⁸ will nurture loyalty and identity with their respective Ministries unless they are not rotated among the Ministries. For the last three and half years, one could observe a certain amount of rotation of government officials, but by and large this has occurred within similar groups of government bodies.¹⁹ Nonetheless, the creation of "superministry" like *Gosagroprom* may force the officials concerned to shift their political loyalty, attitudes and commitments slightly. One also notices the lengthy service of the regional first secretaries at regional level.²⁰ However, one would not expect them to pursue sectional interest. Using organizational terms and interpreting Soviet political system as a single bureaucratic body, we would call these party officials "line", whereas the members, if not all, of the Council of Ministers "staff". Thus, the upward and intra-organizational mobility of regional officials is higher. For example, it is noted clearly that the Central Committee secretaries have had career experience in other than party bodies whereas Presidium members of the Council of Ministers have not.²¹ As we have stated above that many of the clientelist bonds in the Soviet political system are largely formed during the patron's mid-career period. There are of course party career specialists working in the bodies like the Central Committee departments. They might behave like those of the members of the Council of Ministers.

Specialist / Opinion Group. This is a group of specialists engaged in research or study, and so able to express their opinion covertly or overtly. Thus, I do not mean here just specialists such as medical doctors, engineers, agronomists, etc. who are working in a number of subordinate organizations. As the social and economic structure become diversified, and as technological evaluation continues to proceed, specialization is an inevitable process. In this paper, the focus is on the following specialists : 1) specialists attached to research institutes ; 2) specialists attached to executive and administrative bodies as consultants ; 3) specialists attached to the individual Politburo members as advisers.

The research institutes proliferated during the Khrushchev years, and under the Brezhnev leadership most institutes, if not all, conducted studies relevant to policy-making.²² In the Soviet Union, there exists a variety of research institutes. Among them, the research institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences are counted as the most influential in the policy processes.²³ Selected academics in these institutes are given some measure of access to foreign literature and possibly diplomatic reports.²⁴ Because of the intricate relationships existing among high-powered bureaucrats in Moscow, an urgent study may on occasion be carried out at the request of a high official in the party or government who happens to be on close terms with an institute director or deputy director. *Ad hoc* committees to develop specific policy positions are convened increasingly by the General Secretary's Secretariat.²⁵ These committees include representatives of the relevant ministries and leading experts (usually directors or deputy directors) from the appropriate institutes of the Academy of Sciences, with the department concerned providing coordination and supervision of the deliberations. Although there exist research programmes of the individual institutes that are

approved by the appropriate divisions and sections and ultimately by the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences, individual institutes may originate such studies entirely on their own and then circulate them among the officials concerned in an attempt to advance a new approach to a critical problem or influence policy.²⁶ These are a few examples of the way specialists influence the policy processes. Difficulties in aggregating and articulating their interests include the fact that not all specialists in each field have identical opinions on the related questions. Their opinions may differ depending on their educational and career backgrounds and generations. Even in the same field, the analytical method and research orientation of individuals research institutes are said to be different.²⁷

One of the important factors that influence policy processes is the degree of personal connection the specialists have with high party and government officials. For instance, academic administrators who began their careers in the Central Committee apparat or in the editorial offices of *Pravda* or *Izvestia* appear to have an advantage over their rivals.²⁸ Public relations talents and ability to attract more prominent scholars and give good jobs to relatives of party and government officials also determine their relative standing. Specialists who live full-time in Moscow have naturally better chances of establishing ties with high officials.²⁹ A connection of sorts between institutes and ministries is further maintained by the practice of having certain officials of scholarly background and disposition serve on the institutes' scientific councils, in which capacity they frequently take part in discussions and conferences. Another link is provided by a widespread urge among officials to work for advanced academic degrees, to attend scholarly conferences, and to write scholarly books and articles, which may become part of the scholarly debate. The practice of appointing scholars to high party and government positions creates additional ties between the academic world and the policy establishment. Powerful men may for complex personal and political reasons protect scholars with whom they disagree significantly; sometimes the officials may be relying on scholars for information, speech-writing, or even ideas; sometimes the officials and scholars are simply friends who talk over events and ideas together and could not sort out the constant shifting impact of their thinking upon each other.³⁰ The impact of different specialists, therefore, depends on their skills and personal authority in this intimate setting.

There are number of specialists attached to the party and government bodies. In the case of the Central Committee department, they are called "a group of consultants".³¹ They are employed as either full-time or part time staff, drawn from the scholarly community. Although they have less opportunity to express their opinion in scholarly journals, they are said to be more influential than specialists attached to the research institutes.³² They participate in the formulation of major doctrinal statements and the writing of major speeches.³³ Unlike the basic staff of the Central Committee departments, who have enough to do keeping up with the day-to-day developments in their areas, these consultants conduct in-depth research and carry out long-range studies.³⁴

In the Brezhnev period, the status of the General Secretary's formal and informal personal assistants (*pomoshchniki*) appears to have been upgraded. Brezhnev's two major foreign policy assistants, A. M. Aleksandrov-Agentov and A. I. Blatov, worked for years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before becoming his assistants. Thus, in their case, their experience enabled them to concentrate on governmental relations.³⁵ They served not only Brezhnev, but also the latter's successors, Andropov and Chernenko. It is, however, difficult to determine the exact nature of their work. It is indeed difficult to identify which of the Gorbachev's aides advising on policy as opposed to providing technical assistance. Furthermore, Gorbachev has changed his formal aides more frequently than the previous General Secretaries. This may be something to do with a shift of priorities on policy issues and the consolidation of

his political power. Any Politburo member who seeks to form opinions of his own feels free to call upon anybody for advice. Some of the Politburo members who occasionally supplement the knowledge they obtain through the official channels by informal personal advisers are probably viewed with suspicion by the experts in the Central Committee and the Ministries. Besides his official aides, Gorbachev has gathered around him a team of specialists - mainly scholars and prominent public figures - who work directly under him and have no roots in the Party bureaucracy.³⁶ In theory, each member of this body can raise any issue he wants - bypassing the Council of Ministers and / or Secretariat and having it discussed by the Politburo.³⁷

CONCLUSION

The characteristic features of these three types of informal and semi-informal groups are tentatively expressed in the form of a table (see Table 1).

In the Table, these features have been clarified under three headings, namely, institutional setup, group behaviour, and policy. Both clientelist and sectional groups have a hierarchical structure with a group leader at its top. A clientelist group extends its membership across bureaucratic boundaries, whereas a sectional group consists of members of the same or functionally related organization. An opinion group is not necessarily formed in the same organization. The members sharing the same research field continue to associate with one another to pursue their interests as long as their research orientation is identical. It is, however, difficult to identify their group leader. As for the behavioural pattern, a clientelist group tends to behave particularistically in order to gain further power. A sectional group, while its members associate themselves with the substance of policy formulation and policy implementation, acts rather narrow for the benefit of its organization. An opinion group with any specialty points out particular policy questions from a long-term standpoint, but within a doctrinal framework. Their arguments are by and large rational and logical. A clientelist group attempts to link policy questions with power and create a situation advantageous to themselves as far as possible. A sectional group tends to be passive towards administrative reforms, for they have vested interests in bureaucracy. Not all members of a clientelist group are directly involved in policy process but at least the group's leader and his close associates are involved in policy processes indirectly, although some specialists are involved at times directly. The degree of influence over the policy process by these three groups varies with the attributes of the policy concerned such as urgency, importance, dogmatic nature and whether it is domestic or foreign. The degree of influence may also vary, depending on the stages of policy formulation and implementation. One should also take into account the time factor. It takes time to change the attitudes, perceptions, belief, and expectations of the policymakers. For instance, recent changes in the personnel and style of the Soviet foreign affairs establishment alone appear to have brought already considerable payoffs. Rebert Legvold's study, however, indicates that an image of change in Soviet foreign policy originates in the considerable reconceptualization of many aspects of international affairs under way within the Soviet foreign policy establishment over the last decade and half. Soviet academic analysts and, in less abstract forms, middle-level policymakers have been thinking fresh ideas since the early 1970s.³⁸ Another side effect of the realization of the domestic agendas is that there might occur certain modifications in the characteristic features of the informal groups. For instance, "revitalization and democratization" of the party through multiple candidacies and secret ballots at the local and republican levels of the apparatus, together with the introduction of a limit of two five-year terms of service for elected Party officials,³⁹ not only help ensure a

constant influx of fresh personnel into the middle and the upper echelons of the party,⁴⁰ but also may make clientelist networks express their functions in the area of the policy processes, in particular, in policy-making process.

The above summary of characteristic features indicates that each group has its own resources to pursue its interest: clientelist group has a political resource such as *nomenklatura*; sectional group has an organizational skill and information; and opinion group has an expertise. The above summary also indicates that the three informal / semi-informal groups are bound up one with another in the policy processes. In another words, their relations are symbiotic. Particularly, the symbiotic relationship between a clientelist group and a sectional group and that between a sectional group and an opinion group are noticeable. It is, however, a clientelist group that can make the most use of these tripartite symbiotic relations.

The question is whether dominant clientelist groups like Gorbachev's have the will and the abilities to make the best use of the symbiotic relationship. It is generally believed that Brezhnev had established a strong and wide network of clientelist relations. Under his reign, a large number of specialists became associated with policy questions; and a few powerful government agencies pursued their sectional interests. Yet, Brezhnev's performance in both domestic and foreign policy areas was said to be poor. He failed to make them interact to attain effective mobilization. Gorbachev, on the other hand, made his will clear in the policy agendas. These agendas are introduced with a view to affecting political, economic and social structures, procedures and policies. As these policy agendas appear to be, by recent Soviet standards, quite extensive, though contradictory, if some of these are to be realized for the realization of larger goals, then the active symbiotic relationships will necessarily be called into play. Indeed, in drafting these policy agendas, Gorbachev must have already had assistance from some members of specialist / opinion groups, such as Fedor Burlatsky, Anatorii Butenko, Tatyana Zaslavskaya and Abel Aganbegyan.⁴¹

Recently, Aganbegyan stated that Gorbachev quite often gathers economists, including academics, to discuss a number of economic questions, and that everyone said what they thought and Gorbachev integrated their ideas.⁴² The question is whether Gorbachev has the abilities to synthesize the advice of those into a coherent and consistent plan of action. Aganbegyan also expressed his opinion on the state of shaping reforms that, despite the platform has been given to articulate radical reform proposals, his ideas are far from accepted and real limits exist on his influence.⁴³ As we know, for the last three and half years Gorbachev has introduced his reforms step by step but rather fragmentally. One could well argue if Gorbachev has developed his reform programmes incrementally or he has envisaged a precise and far-reaching programmes rather than the most general terms at the outset. Another problem is that while now most members of the Politburo are in one way or another indebted to Gorbachev, few can be seen as faithful clients, and the same applies to the newcomers at the second level of party and government leadership. He cannot simply impose policy but has to argue for it, mobilize support, and secure the best compromises going. His strategy is, therefore, to articulate the interests of these groups, to unfold his programmes incrementally and to consolidate his coalition with his "allies", "new friends" and reform-minded middle and lower ranking officials.

One should also aware of the fact that there exist equally important mediating factors other than informal group behaviour. These are, namely 1) common understanding, 2) coalition-building process, and 3) mobilization of the social and political forces.

The current member of the Politburo may have common understanding and perception as to the problems the Soviet Union currently faces and their possible solutions. They are better educated and more sophisticated in their ambitions for a society that has yet to demons-

trate that it is a superpower in more than merely military terms. Nevertheless, they appear to be disciplinarians who do not want to reform Marxism-Leninism, but simply make it more adaptable in the interest of economic and administrative efficiency. A more adaptable ideology, they believe, will promote a positive attitude towards the Soviet Union from its own people and foreigners alike. While Gorbachev pressed for democratization, he has also given much attention to improving party procedures in the areas of controlling public communications and personnel selection for all official organizations. Even in the workforce, it was sometimes given the right to vote on two or more party-approved candidates. This shifted power over managerial appointments from the government ministries to the party apparatus. It is said that a massive expansion of party training and indoctrination is under way. This envisages a threefold expansion in the teaching staff of the party's political colleges in the next 10-15 years, and increasingly limiting promotion in official organizations to those who have had the equivalent of two years full-time party training on top of their professional education.⁴⁴ The operating procedures have, therefore, been streamlined and integrated into party system for effectiveness and efficiency. To this end, the top leaders seemed to have reached a consensus. Within the context of such a common denominator, one tends to identify the leaders with either conservative or progressive wings. It should also be noted that at the 19th Party Conference there was a marked shift of economic management responsibilities from the Party to the government, and from the centre to the localities. The redistribution of power was accompanied by strengthening Party role of "guiding" instead of "directing" Soviet society and economy while undergoing an inner-Party democratization.⁴⁵ It seems at highest level a learning process has been underway ever since Gorbachev came into power. The top leaders must have by the 19th Party Conference realized the fact that in the absence of political reform, economic and social reforms are bound to fail. However, they took care of the introduction of political reform so as not to run the risk of reducing the authority of the Party.

Appointments based on clientelist links both reflect and reinforce the mounting power of the General Secretary. However, in the early stages of his tenure they are not the main informal source of his power. No incoming General Secretary has had more than one or two old associates with him in the Politburo in the first year of his incumbency. It is important for him to get his own men into key personnel management posts, and Gorbachev achieved this when he appointed Razumovsky and Luk'yanov to these positions. It is also important to have his trusted "allies" in charge of particularly important policy interest - for example Shevardnadze and Murakhovsky. But the power and authority of the General Secretary at this stage will depend primarily on a coalition with other members of the Politburo, the understandings he reaches with them regarding the way power is to be exercised and on the broad lines of policy, and his effectiveness in developing a leadership style within the Politburo itself. The combination of the General Secretary's formal powers and the informal power flowing from his personal leadership style may produce a bandwagon effect. If the condition favours rapid turnover, as it does under Gorbachev but did not under Brezhnev, the bandwagon will roll even faster. In the process of coalition building, the General Secretary's committed old friends are joined by more and more committed new friends. Under all previous General Secretaries, the new friends have been as essential a part of the General Secretary's informal power base as the old friends.

Gorbachev has introduced a number of domestic policy changes.⁴⁶ Some may call his policy programmes Gorbachev's authority building strategy.⁴⁷ The question is what his domestic political goal is. Succeeding leaders since Lenin have all attempted and failed to eradicate the system's requirements of effectiveness and efficiency.⁴⁸ Gorbachev was well aware of the fact that he has to introduce a reformist element into his policy agendas. Does

this mean that Gorbachev has broken with the centralizing mobilization approach? Despite the political reform, by and large he maintained one-party rule, the primacy of central planning, socialist ownership, and the Leninist principle of democratic centralism.⁴⁹ The leaders agreed to introduce a certain degree of democratization, not just for the sake of democratization but for realizing social and economic reforms. The reconstruction of Soviet society meant, therefore, to strengthen socialism, not to abolish it.⁵⁰ It is clear from the domestic agendas (see footnote no. 46) that these tasks are contradictory in themselves. My assumption is, therefore, that Gorbachev has adopted a mobilization approach like his predecessors, but one which is less centralized, less coercive, less orthodox and less dogmatic. In the process of achieving the highest possible mobilization of the system, he aims his domestic policy agendas eclectically at the political elite and the public at large as he sees fit. Thus, he does not concern himself very much with the contradictions in the domestic policy agendas.⁵¹ But he does concern himself with its timely and effective application of these policy agendas. Gorbachev formed right from the beginning an alliance with Soviet intelligentsia in order to appeal his reforms as well as his leadership style to the broader social and political elite and the country as a whole. At the 19th Party Conference Gorbachev actively sought an alliance with the grass-roots Party membership in order to put pressure on the middle-ranking functionaries. In return, he offered them a greater say in decision-making, and enhanced career openings.

The active interaction of informal groups' symbiotic relations and the likely course of the interaction depend, therefore, on the power structure of Soviet leadership, support of broader social and political forces and richness of the individual domestic agendas as well as its timely and effective realization.

Notes

This is an abridged and updated version of my earlier papers: "Informal Groups in Soviet Policy Processes", *Kokusaiseiji*, The Japan Association of International Relations, Vol. 81, March 1986; "Mediating Factors for Personnel Changes", *Nanzan Hogaku*, Vol. 11, No. 4, March 1988; "Treatment of Mediating Factors under Gorbachev", *Japan-US Joint Study in the Soviet Union*, Conference IV, July 1988, the Research Institute for Peace and Security. The invaluable guidance and criticism of Kimura Hiroshi and Takayuki Ito of the Slavic Research Center and T. H. Rigby of the Australian National University are gratefully acknowledged, as is the support of the Research Institute for Peace and Security and the financial assistance of the Nanzan University Pache Research Fund.

- 1 See Shugo Minagawa, "The Personal Changes Under Gorbachev", *Japan-US Joint Study on the Soviet Union*, Conference 1, February 6-8, 1987, Occasional Paper No. 2, Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo.
- 2 See for instance, Gustafson and Mann, "Gorbachev's First Year: Building Power and Authority" and "Gorbachev's Next Gamble", *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1986, pp. 1-20 and July-August 1987, pp. 1-20 respectively; Jerry F. Hough, "Gorbachev's Strategy", *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1985, p. 35-55 and "Gorbachev Consolidating Power", *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1987, pp. 21-43; and Ronald J. Hill and Peter Frank, "Gorbachev's Cabinet-Building", *The Journal of Communist Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 168-181.
- 3 These characteristics are 1) rejuvenation of leaders, 2) preference of able technocrats, and 3) reinforcement of (central) party control.
- 4 See A. V. Obolonsky, "Formal'nye i nefomal'nye grupy v apparate gosudarstvennogo up-

- ravleniya", *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo I Pravo*, No. 5, 1983, p. 29.
- 5 See B. Harasymiw and T. H. Rigby eds., *Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1983 ; Joel C. Moses, "Regional Cohorts and Political Mobility in the USSR : The Case of Dnepropetrovsk", *Soviet Union*, Vol. 3, pt. 1, 1976 ; John P. Willerton, "Clientelism in the Soviet Union", *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Vol. 12, Nos. 2 and 3, 1979 ; Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union is Governed*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1979 ; and John H. Miller, "Putting Clients in Place : The Role of Patronage in Cooperation into the Soviet Leadership", Archie Brown, ed., *Political Leadership in the Soviet Union*, Macmillan, London, 1988 (forthcoming).
 - 6 See Shugo Minagawa, "Political Clientelism in the USSR and Japan", Harasymiw and Rigby eds., *loc. cit.*, pp. 200-229.
 - 7 Uri Ra'anán argues that Soviet factions display little long-term commitment to issues. They are inclined to advocate certain policies only as long as they are competing with rival groups that propagate a different approach. Once such competitors are defeated finally and unmistakably, manipulation of the issue in question loses political significance. See his article "Soviet Decision-Making and International Relations", *Problems of Communism*, Nov. -Dec., 1980, pp. 41-47.
 - 8 See John H. Miller, "Putting Clients in Place", *loc. cit.*, p. 44.
 - 9 This list is compiled based on the findings of John H. Miller, Gustafson and Mann, and Jerry F. Hough, and my own findings. See John H. Miller, "How much of a New Elite ?", T. H. Rigby *et al.*, *27th Prty Congress*, the Australian National University Press, 1988 (forthcoming) ; Hough, *Problems of Communism. loc. cit.*, 1987 ; and Gustafson and Mann, *Problems of Communism. loc. cit.*, 1986 and 1987.
 - 10 Jerry Hough states that Gorbachev selected a disproportionate number of people from three groups : 1) those who had worked in Stavropol' and contiguous regions in the RSFSR (especially Kransnodar) and in the Caucasus (Georgia and the Chechen-Ingush autonomous republic) ; 2) individuals who graduated from Moscow University in the mid-1950's (Gorbachev graduated in 1955), and 3) persons who worked in the Young Communist League apparatus in the late 1950s and early 1960's when Gorbachev himself was engaged in such work. See his article "Gorbachev consolidating Power", *loc. cit.*, p. 30.
 - 11 See John Loewenhardt, "Political Reform under Gorbachev : Towards the Defeudalization of Soviet Politics ?", *Acta Politica*, Vol. XXIII, January 1988, p. 18.
 - 12 See Yu. Makhryn, "Obnovlenia", *Pravda*, January 14, 1987.
 - 13 Boris Yel'tsin who had lost the first secretaryship of Moscow gorkom in December 1987 is believed to have stated that despite frequent personnel changes Yel'tsin was unable to find people capable of carrying out reforms efficiently and intelligently. See Alexander Rahr, "The Ouster of Boris Yel'tsin - The Kremlin's 'Avant-Gardist'", *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 506/87, December 18, 1987, p. 4.
 - 14 See Philip D. Stewart, *et al.*, "Political Mobility and the Soviet Political Process : A partial test of two models", *American Political Science Review*, V.l. 66, 1972, p. 1270 ; John P. Willerton, Jr., "Clientelism in the Soviet Union", *loc. cit.*, pp. 161-162 ; and Zygmunt Bauman, "Eastern Europe", *ibid.*, pp. 184-189.
 - 15 See Seweryn Bialer, "Report on Panel 1 : Domestic Social-Political Aspects", Research Institute of Peace and Security, 1987, p. 16.
 - 16 See Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision*, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1971, pp. 110-111.
 - 17 See Mary McAuley, *Politics and the Soviet Union*, Harmondsworth, Penguin 1977, pp.

- 142–177.
- 18 The average length of service at federal level for the members of federal Council of Ministers was about seventeen years in 1984. See Minagawa, “The Personnel Changes under Gorbachev”, *loc. cit.*, 1986, Table 12.
 - 19 *Ibid.*, Table 9.
 - 20 *Ibid.*, Table 12.
 - 21 *Ibid.*, Table 7.
 - 22 R. W. Kitrinov, “International Department of the CPSU”, *Problems of Communism*, Sept.-Oct., 1984, p. 64 ; Speaking of criminal policymaking, Peter H. Solomon, Jr. states that the regular participation of scholars in this field gained support in the late 1960s and early 1970s from a further source. Just as the Khrushchevian emphasis upon “democratization” had helped the expansion of criminal law scholars’ participation in the late 1950s, so in the middle and late 1960s a new political theme - that of “rationalization”-reinforced the institutionalization of their role. See his article, “Specialist in Policymaking : Criminal Policy, 1938–1970”, Karl W. Ryavec, ed., *Soviet and the Communist Party*, University of Massachusetts Press, 1978, p. 169.
 - 23 See Vladimir Petrov, “Formation of Soviet Foreign Policy”, *Orbis*, Vol. 17, No. 3–4, p. 841 ; Kitrinov, speaking of the International Department of the Central Committee, also states that in an effort to cope with the ever-increasing glut of information it drew more and more upon the research institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences. See Kitrinov, *loc. cit.*, p. 6 ; Jerry F. Hough also states that some institutes were created in substantial part to provide expertise to policymakers in the Central Committee. See his article, “Soviet Policymaking Toward Foreign Communists”, *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Vol XV, No. 3, 1982, p. 177.
 - 24 But they seem to have no access to secret information and data obtained by intelligence agencies, and only on rare occasions is an important expert requested to take part in an in-house project in a ministry or a committee where secret projects were carried out. See Petrov, *loc. cit.*, p. 843.
 - 25 *Ibid.*, p. 826 and 843.
 - 26 *Ibid.*, p. 842.
 - 27 These problems are well illustrated in Richard W. Judy’s article. See his article, “The Economist”, H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*, Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 209–253.
 - 28 Petrov, *loc. cit.*, p. 844.
 - 29 Hough, “Soviet Policymaking”, *loc. cit.*, p. 187.
 - 30 *Ibid.*, p. 180.
 - 31 *Ibid.* ; p. 175 ; Petrov, *loc. cit.*, p. 830.
 - 32 See Donald D. Barry, “The Specialist in Soviet Policymaking ; The Adoption of Law”, *Soviet Studies*, Vol. XVI, No. 2, pp. 161–162.
 - 33 Hough, “Soviet Policymaking”, *loc. cit.*, p. 175.
 - 34 *Ibid.*, p. 181 ; Petrov, *loc. cit.*, p. 841.
 - 35 Hough, “Soviet Policymaking”, *loc. cit.*, p. 176.
 - 36 See Alexander Rahr, “Gorbachev’s Personal Staff”, *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 216/88, May 30, 1988, p. 1.
 - 37 Petrov, *loc. cit.*, p. 829.
 - 38 See Robert Legvold, “The New Political Thinking and Gorbachev’s Foreign Policy”, *Japan-US Joint Study on the Soviet Union*, Conference II, May 23–24, 1987, Occasional Paper No. 3, pp. 17–18, Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo.

- 39 See Resolutions of the 19th Party Conference, *Pravda*, July 5, 1988.
- 40 This is the proposal Gorbachev made at the January 1987 CC plenum. A resolution dealing with personnel policy adopted at the plenum, however, watered down Gorbachev's proposal and calls merely for "improving the mechanism for the formation of elective party organs at all levels with the aim of its further democratizations."
- 41 Fedor Burlatsky is a close aide to Gorbachev and political commentator on *Literaturnaya Gazeta*. Before Gorbachev's speech at the January 1987 CC plenum were known, Burlatsky advocated multiple candidacies and secret balloting. See Fedor Burlatsky "The Gorbachev Revolution", *Marxism Today*, February 1987, pp. 14–19.

Anatorii Butenko's view represents perhaps an extreme wing of the reform-oriented Soviet intelligentsia. He notes that the reason why so many people work badly and dishonestly is that, under the present system, it is in their interest to do so. It is not, however, in the general interest of society. See further Elizabeth Teague, "Charges of Resistance to 'Restructuring' Intensify", *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 37/87, January 26, 1987, p. 4. While the views of Butenko may not represent the mainstream of Party opinion, it is clear that his argument is related to Gorbachev's domestic agendas, such as the anti-corruption campaign.

The sequence of economic development Gorbachev reported at the 27th Party Congress, i. e. discipline first, reorganization and its fruits later, was outlined earlier by a reform-minded economist, Abel Aganbegyan, who is now acting as a Gorbachev's personal assistant on economic matters, in an article that was worded as though it represented official policy. See his article, "Strategiya uskoreniya sotsial'no ekonomicheskogo razvitiya", *Problemy Miri I Sotsializma*, No 9, 1985, pp. 13–19.

While the changes presently envisaged by Gorbachev regime may meet with approval of reform-minded scholars such as Zaslavskaya and Val'tukh of Novosibirsk (the Institute of the Economics and Organization of Industrial Production of the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences, which director was until recently Abel Aganbegyan), some of their proposals have been put into effect as we have noted earlier on the creation of "superministries". See T. I. Zaslavskaya, "The Novosibirsk Report", *Survey*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1984, pp. 88–109 ; *Ekonomika skvoz'prismu sotsiologii*, *EKO*, No. 7, 1985, pp. 3–23. Also her articles in *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, January 7, 1986 and *Izvestia*, June 1, 1985 ; K. K. Val'tukh, "Intensifikatsiya i sovershenstvovanie upravleniya", *EKO*, No. 2, 1977, pp. 4–26.

- 42 According to Aganbegyan, it was under Andropov that Gorbachev began to work with the more general economic problems connected with economic development in the country as a whole. The meetings with economists were said to be very informal. See Stuart Parrot, "Aganbegyan's Press Conference in London", *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 468/87, p. 2.
- 43 See Bialer, *loc. cit.*, p. 14.
- 44 See T. H. Rigby, "A New Soviet Revolution ?", *Working Papers in Political Science*, RSSH, The Australian National University Canberra, November 1987, p. 7.
- 45 See Resolutions of the 19th Party Conference, *loc. cit.*
- 46 George Breslauer lists the following main domestic agenda items as being most indicative of Gorbachev's strategy for realizing his presumed goals. These are as follows : 1) The anti-alcoholism campaign ; 2) The anti-corruption campaign ; 3) New incentives and rewards for the productive ; 4) Heavy investment in the machine-building sector ; 5) Moderate reform of economic structure ; 6) 'Glasnost' campaign ; 7) Foreign relations-arms control and economic interdependence ; 8) Political democratization. See his paper, "Gorbachev's Domestic Agenda", *Japan-US Joint Study on the Soviet Union*, Conference 1,

February 6–8, 1987, Occasional Paper No. 1, Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo.

- 47 See Thane Gustafson and Dawn Mann, "Gorbachev's First Year : Building Power and Authority", *loc.cit.*, May-June 1986, p. 11.
- 48 *Ibid.*
- 49 See *Pravda*, January 28, 1987. See also Elizabeth Teague, "Gorbachev Discusses Personnel Policy", *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 38/87, January 28, 1987, p. 3.
- 50 See John Loewenhardt, *loc. cit.*, p. 3.
- 51 Robert Miller states that the continuing party-centred connotation of 'human factor' concept in agricultural administration is in some contradiction to other major aspects of the new policies, with their emphasis on 'economic mechanisms'. Gorbachev seems not to be particularly concerned with such evident contradictions. See further Robert F. Miller, "Recent Changes in the Management of Soviet Agriculture : Will They Make a Difference ?", *Working Papers in Political Science*, RISS, The Australian National University, Canberra, August 1986, p. 13.