



HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY

Title	Local Factor in Soviet "Northern Territories" Politicts: A Partial Survey of the Sovetskiy Sakhalin Daily Newspaper (October 1989-June 1990)
Author(s)	ZINBERG, Yakov
Citation	Acta Slavica Iaponica, 9, 176-188
Issue Date	1991
Doc URL	https://hdl.handle.net/2115/8030
Type	departmental bulletin paper
File Information	KJ00000034200.pdf



Local Factor in Soviet “Northern Territories” Politics :

A Partial Survey of the *Sovetskiy Sakhalin*
Daily Newspaper (October 1989–June 1990)

Yakov Zinberg

“It will certainly go against the grain for the people of Sakhalin, however pressed they may be economically, to have to trade their land.....”

Prof. Hiroshi Kimura, “Gorobachof-no Tainichi Seisaku”, *Sorenno Kiki to Nisso Kankei*, Tokyo, 1991, p. 282.

“The Sakhalin oblast is boiling up now. The *Sovetskiy Sakhalin* has published a large selection of letters in which people of various age and professions express their attitude to Guliy’s project....Almost all the appeals ring alarming: why is the fate of the islands being decided without considering opinions of the Kuril Islands residents ?”

V. Sukhnev, “Kurilskoye Ozherel’ye,” *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, 1990. 2. 16, No. 7, p. 16.

Popularly Elected Officials and Rising Concern about the “Northern Territories”

Faced with the upcoming visit to Japan of the President of the U. S. S. R (the as yet U. S. S. R.) Gorbachev and the growing concern found both in the Soviet Union and Japan about the need to resolve the die-hard “Northern territories” issue, one is left wondering what it is the residents of Sakhalin *oblast* at large and those inhabiting Southern Kuriles in particular think of the matter in question.¹ We become even more curious when pondering upon the particular ways in which the Sakhalin *oblast* public opinion might exert pressure upon the “Northern territories” decision-making process.² Neither should we underestimate the significance of the issue at stake in terms of the threatening Gorbachev—Yeltsin confrontation.³

Evaluating the scope of the Soviet public opinion has never been easy. Thus, “since actual data on the state of Soviet public opinion are limited, scholars have tended to depend on a historical interpretation of Soviet political culture or to argue that, given the character of Gorbachev’s reforms and their probable effect on various groups in the population, those groups “are likely” to react in predictable ways.”⁴

It is especially difficult for a foreign observer to come up with a reasonably valid estimate of the state of the Sakhalin *oblast* public opinion since its printed media is practically unavailable to one residing outside the Soviet Union. Considering this, I was lucky to secure access to a weighty selection of the *Sovetskiy Sakhalin* daily newspaper based in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. For the last 65 years,

since its first issue was put into print, it has been the major newspaper of Sakhalin *oblast* serving as a printing organ of both the Sakhalin Regional Committee of the Communist Party, and the Regional Soviet of People's Deputies. The subject of my interest being the "Northern territories" issue, I deliberately chose to screen the *Soviet Sakhalin* issues of the period extending from October 1989 through June 1990. Unfortunately, only slightly more than one half of all the newspaper issues published during that period were available, which inevitably imposes severe limitations upon the scale of our project.

It was in the autumn of 1989 that the initial impetus to a rise in popular concern by Soviet citizens at large towards the "Northern territories" issue took place. I would like to emphasize primarily the impact of the respective statements made successively during the autumn of 1989 by three popularly elected People's Deputies—Noble prize laureate Andrey Sakharov, rector of the Moscow State Historical Archive Institute Yuriy Afanas'yev, and the *Sovetskiy Sakhalin* correspondent Vitaliy Guliy.⁵ I find it necessary to separate these three prominent men from a considerable number of popular journalists, government and party officials, leading Japanologists, who during last two years or so have come up with a few "progressive" opinions regarding the Southern Kurils problem. These range from at long last admitting the very existence of the issue up to the challenging of the various legal aspects involved, a taboo in the not too distant past. And yet—meaningful as even the slightest differences in these opinions should in fact be—they do have far more in common than we expect. At least, this is the way it seems, perhaps, to the average Soviet citizen, which does matter in the times of *perestroika* and *glasnost*.⁶

As of the end of February of 1990, Vyacheslav Sukhnev, a special correspondent for the *Literaturnaya Rossiya* weekly newspaper, says in a popular series of articles entitled 'Kurilskoye Ozherel'ye' (The Kuril Necklace):

"As regards the subject of Russo-Japanese relations, I consider myself and Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin being dilettanti of the same level. History should be studied by specialists. If they had not kept silent in response to the statements made by V. Landsbergis and Yu. Afanas'yev regarding the return of the (Kuril) Soviet islands to Japan, public at large would have had a clearer understanding of the gist of the matter. But the specialists are silent. That is why dilettanti speak—the way they can."⁷

In fact, the article in the *Ogonyok* magazine entitled 'Nesuschestvuyuschiy Vopros' (Non-existent Issue) as of May 12-19—perhaps, the most popular "Northern territories"—related printed material ever written by "the specialists"—appeared largely as an urgent effort to react to the challenging appeals of people like Afanas'yev, Guliy, and, to a certain degree, Sukhnev of the *Literaturnaya Rossiya*. Interestingly, the *Ogonyok* article also admits that "one the indeed is clear: at the moment the non-specialists mostly speak. While the specialists are mostly silent."⁸

Of course, not all the People's Deputies are "progressive" or brave enough to delve into various problematic issues, such as the "Northern territories," while not all the "specialists," or party officials, and the like are "conservative." In each particular case a thorough research is needed. But it is true, that *glasnost*' is putting an end to the "specialists power," and paving the way for fresh ideas and

activities energetically introduced by the popularly elected officials. In the context of *perestroika* this sort of phenomenon could lead to results of an extreme importance.⁹

Besides paying tribute to its possessing the undoubted authority of being the major newspaper of Sakhalin *oblast* to which the “Northern territories” in fact belong, why is surveying the *Sovetskiy Sakhalin* so important? First of all, we have to stress the high social prestige—and a great deal of influence as a result—journalism enjoys under conditions of *perestroika*. As far as Sakhalin *oblast* is concerned, as of March of 1990 as many as 16 professional journalists were elected as deputies of Regional, Municipal and District Soviets of People’s Deputies. An important feature of the elections was the fact that journalists were being nominated into the high offices not solely by respective editorial boards, as used to be the case, but by workers, teachers and other not necessarily engaged in professional journalism.¹⁰

Secondly, it is worthwhile stressing that the *Sovetskiy Sakhalin* in fact is the most popular newspaper of Sakhalin *oblast*.¹¹ According to a reliable local opinion poll, as of April of 1990 the *Sovetskiy Sakhalin* was the most popular newspaper of the oblast, *Molodaya Gvardiya* and *Germes* being the second and the third popular, and *Rybak Sakhalina* being the fourth.¹²

Finally, it is necessary to take into account the fact that People’s Deputy representing Sakhalin area Vitaliy Gulyi, one of the major contributors to the “Northern territories” discussion, is himself one of the most popular Sakhalin journalists and a correspondent for the *Sovetskiy Sakhalin* in fact, the Sakhalin 1989 Man of the Year, according to a local opinion poll.¹³

Gulyi vs. Tereshko: Unequal Rivals

Upon screening the available October ’89 through June ’90 issues of the *Sovetskiy Sakhalin*, I came to the conclusion that the period of time extending from December ’89 through February ’90 has the greatest concentration of material directly addressing the “Northern territories” issue. The material is almost exclusively represented by the publication of the conflicting views of Sakhalin *oblast* People’s Deputy V. Gulyi and First Secretary of the Southern Kurils Regional Committee of the CPSU M. Tereshko.¹⁴ A wide selection of letters from readers treating the subject of the dispute was put into print in three newspaper issues.¹⁵ It is worth noting here that the confrontation of Gulyi and Tereshko has apparently—and typically as well—never been discussed specifically in central press organs, to the detriment of Tereshko.¹⁶ First of all, may I draw your attention to Gulyi’s position as expressed in an article entitled “Tretiy put” (The Third Way).

Gulyi: Quite a Popular Way

“The third way” is, according to Gulyi, not the way of opposition, not the way of one-sided concessions but a search for mutually acceptable solutions within the atmosphere of mutual trust.”¹⁷ Gulyi admits borrowing the “third way” concept, as well as the term itself, from a Politburo member Alexander Yakovlev, an

interview with whom was published by the popular weekly magazine *Novoye Vremya* in the end of November '89.¹⁸ In this interview entitled "The third way—dialogue" Yakovlev discussed results of his visit to Japan. Typically, People's Deputy Guliy goes far beyond the scope of Yakovlev's cautious ideas.¹⁹ In brief, Guliy suggests the Southern Kuriles being a demilitarized zone. Further, a joint Soviet-Japanese administration is formed, with, possibly, the United Nations or the International Court in Hague participating. Based on mixed capital, a Soviet-Japanese company is formed in order to promote economic development of the area. A free economic zone covering the whole of the Southern Kurils is established. Both the Soviet and the Japanese residents are free to enter either of the two countries, visa requirements lifted. A Joint agreement regulating living conditions of the residents of the Southern Kurils is drawn. All of this will allow the Soviet Union to secure fruitful cooperation with Japan, which in turn will contribute enormously to the cause of rapid economic growth of the Soviet Far East. Guliy points out that as a Sakhalin resident he believes that the Soviet side is in need of Japanese technology and cooperation for the sake of developing the economy of the Far Eastern area. Demilitarization, says Guliy, will take considerable financial burden off the shoulders of the Soviet state, while at the same time leading to the eventual liquidation of yet another breeding ground for potential conflict. Guliy asserts that his ideas enjoy the support of majority of his electors.²⁰

What distinguishes Guliy's ideas from those of People's Deputies Sakharov and Afanas'yev is the lack of concern—a disrespect, rather—for the legal basis of the argument. Both Sakharov and Afanas'yev indicated that the Southern Kurils should be returned to Japan as in fact belonging to her.²¹ Legal issues apart, Guliy thinks that returning the "Northern territories" to Japan could seriously damage the prestige of the Soviet Union and, besides, create an internationally dangerous precedent.²²

Although neither ignoring or depreciating the legal side of the "Northern territories" problem nor looking forward towards gaining economic advantages by means of territorial concessions are new ideas, Guliy is to be praised highly for developing a bravely outlined project towards resolving the Southern Kurils issue and presenting it in a reasonably clear and quite understandable fashion. In fact, these two features are just as readily applicable to the ideas of People's Deputies Sakharov and Afanas'yev, which is certainly the reason for the Deputies having been able to attract attention of the public at large as opposed to the failure of the "specialists" to do so. One wonders if it is due to Guliy's journalistic connections or the very "presentability" of his project (desirability, perhaps?), or the combination of both, that he succeeded in presenting his ideas to the readership directly through the agency of the prestigious *Novoye Vremya* magazine and the Soviet Sakhalin newspaper. The "Northern territories" ideas of Sakharov and Afanas'yev were never made known directly through the popular press, having only been granted presentation through critical remarks here and there.²³

Another important dimension of Guliy's ideas deserves to be presented. Guliy is perhaps the first to come up with the idea of gaining political advantages by means of losing—or nearly losing—direct control over the Southern Kuriles. According to Guliy, he had first heard from Vladimir Tsvetov, a popular Central

Television political observer who worked in Japan for a number of years, that the “Japanese ruling classes need not the ‘Northern territories’ per se but the ‘problem’ of these territories.” Guliy says the idea might seem paradoxical, yet he believes Tsvetov to be right.²⁴ Guliy thinks the territorial issue is manipulated in Japan for the sake of discrediting the Soviet Union on a world-wide scale. Notice the clarity of his language :

“Inside the Japanese ruling class anti-Sovietism prevails. In the past it used to live on those negative phenomena which were present in our society, our politics. Now as a result of *perestroika* our country is no longer considered to be an ‘evil empire’. Many of the former trumps are no longer in the hands of the anti-Soviet forces. But the ‘Northern territories’ issue still remains in their hands as a trump card. . . . They will try to internationalize this problem, appeal to world public opinion.”²⁵

Just as it was in the case of borrowing the “third way” idea from Yakovlev, Guliy develops Tsvetov’s ideas to the extent of suggesting altering world public opinion in favour of the Soviet Union by means of actively offering to try to resolve the “Northern territories” problem on a mutually acceptable basis with the Japanese. The Japanese, Guliy thinks, will lose the battle for world-wide sympathy and support by refusing to cooperate. Guliy says :

“I believe we should take the initiative and insist upon trying to reach the settlement (with Japan) and not be passively waiting for our opponents to approach us.”²⁶

The Soviet possession of the Southern Kurils as a factor potentially generating world-wide irritation towards the Soviet Union is only a hypothesis of Guliy : yet he is certainly well continuously aware of the fact that a vast majority of the Japanese people are opposed to the Soviet “occupation” of Japan’s “Northern territories.”²⁷

It is perhaps a little known fact that on May 8th of 1990 Guliy, a People’s Deputy representing Sakhalin *oblast* and a popular journalist of the major Sakhalin newspaper, left the ranks of the CPSU on his own accord. He did so in order to rid himself of any sorts of political—both direct and indirect—pressures and thus be able to truly protect the rights of those who elected him.²⁸

Did it have any bearing upon the Southern Kurils issue ? Apparently, it did : the same *Germes* newspaper article mentions several meetings of protest which took place on the Southern Kurils. Protesters were demanding to recall Guliy from his Deputy’s seat. Says Guliy :

“Such a demand this time was put forward by the Shikotan Island residents. I see it as yet another provocation aimed at discrediting me among the electors I won’t be surprised to find out that KGB is also involved here. Anyhow, as we know now, previously it used to specialize in such activities. . . .”²⁹

Concluding the Guliy section, may I draw your attention to the popular Japanese magazine *Asahi Janaru* (*Asahi Journal*) which as of November 2nd, 1990 published results of a most interesting opinion poll.³⁰ This poll was conducted in the U. S., the Soviet Union and Japan through August—September, 1990. 3,109 Soviet citizens aged over 16 and residing in 12 different Soviet republics were asked to answer a variety of questions.

Regarding the “Northern territories”, let us consider that 17% of Japanese

respondents and 18% of Soviet respondents stood for a joint administration of the islands. Without delving into a study of the character of this particular poll, one is impressed by the existence of an equally substantial number of Soviets and Japanese respondents preferring the “third way.”

Tereshko: A Very Practical Conservative

On the pages of the *Sovetskiy Sakhalin* Gulyi's ideas are most openly challenged and opposed by Michail Tereshko, First Secretary of the Southern Kurils CPSU Regional Committee.³¹ The most striking feature of Tereshko's criticism of Gulyi's project is the “down-to-earth” practiciness, as the “Out of touch with reality” title of his article in the *Sovetskiy Sakhalin* reveals clearly.³² Apparently, local “progressives” and “conservatives” have got to be primarily practical in order to succeed in any of their undertakings, while as we approach the outskirts of Moscow the “conservatives” get stiffer and “progressives” often turn into the “extremists.”

Yet another basic feature of Tereshko's case is that of his position being obviously suppressed and down-graded by the central Soviet authorities. This particular dimension is of an utmost importance in the context of the crucial Yeltsin—Gorbachev confrontation and deserves our special attention later.

Considering the “oppressed” reality of Tereshko's position, may I describe some of his basic ideas.

Tereshko's article in the *Sovetskiy Sakhalin* is apparently a reprint from the Southern Kurils daily newspaper *На Рубеже*. It was originally written in response to Gulyi's article published in a Kuril newspaper *Красный Маяк* on September 21, 1989 (obviously criticizing Afanas'yev) and Gulyi's broadcast talk on the “Pacific Ocean” Station.³³

Essentially, Tereshko is irritated by Gulyi's thoughtless approach to the “Northern territories” issue. According to Tereshko, Gulyi never cared to consult with the residents of the Southern Kurils. Moreover, Tereshko asserts that Gulyi's ideas run contrary to the way people of the Southern Kurils think. Further, Tereshko accuses Gulyi of having no knowledge of the economic growth of the Kurils and even of the geography of the area.

Tereshko stresses the enormous importance of the “Northern territories” for the Soviet fishing industry and hopes that the infrastructure will improve under conditions of *perestroika* fairly quickly. Tereshko is against the pro-Japanese orientation, saying:

“We sensed in practice that official Japan is not separating and is not intending to separate economics from politics.”³⁴

But Tereshko's practiciness reaches its height when he discusses Gulyi's project of sharing the islands with Japan. Tereshko calls it “hare-brained schemes” because Gulyi is, allegedly, incompetent in matters of practical politics and economics:

“The variant of joint sovereignty which Gulyi puts forward has no analogues in practice so far, perhaps. So who is going to develop economic and legal foundations, prepare specialists. etc.?”

Both Afanas'yev and Gulyi are accused of arrogance, and Tereshko says

specifically that “the electors of the Southern Kurils do not want the problems related to their future to be discussed without their participation.”³⁵

On December 23, 1989, an extensive article entitled “На сессии областного Совета народных депутатов” (At the session of the People’s Deputies Regional Soviet) appeared in the *Sovetskiy Sakhalin*.³⁶ It presents in detail the whole chain of official protests directed against Afanas’yev and Guliy at various local levels. Yet, what is certainly far more impressive is the fact that, as V. Sukhnev points out, “the events in Sakhalin *oblast* did not echo loudly on the pages of central press,” even though “resolution condemning positions of Afanas’yev and Guliy was adopted . . . by the plenum of the Sakhalin CPSU Regional Committee and sent to the *Pravda* newspaper.”³⁷

However, the deep sympathy shown by the nationalist *Literaturnaya Rossiya* toward the cause of Tereshko, a local figure, to the detriment of Guliy, a person of a clearly national standing, is fraught with the most serious consequences in the times of Yeltsin and Gorbachev.³⁸

“Oceanic Geothermal Station on Etorofu—is Realizable”...?

Having briefly presented the confrontation of Guliy and Tereshko in order to direct attention to both the enormous impact that popularly elected officials might exert upon the “Northern territories” decision-making process, with Guliy being the center of attention, and the dramatic potential of the central vs. local authority collision in the context of Yeltsin—Gorbachev rivalry, with Tereshko being in fact important primarily in this sense, may I proceed to presenting briefly a few other notable points of interest pertaining to the “Northern territories” subject.³⁹

Letters from readers published in three of the *Sovetskiy Sakhalin* issues throughout December ’89—February ’90 serve to prove how crucial the role of the popularly elected officials under *perestroika* is in generating an unprecedented popular concern about the “Northern territories.”⁴⁰ A variety of opinions is expressed in these letters. As we can fully imagine what the “conservatives” would have to say, let me introduce some “progressive” pieces:

“More than anything else, I feel pity for the children of the Kurils. Do they deserve such a fate?... Natural resources of the Kurils are not being used, in fact.... I think V. Guliy’s project is a serious one.... As far as I am concerned, I would vote for Guliy and against the program of Tereshko.” (V. Sinnikov)⁴³

“I was extremely irritated by the biased and even insulting for Afanas’yev and Guliy article by... Tereshko. His references to people, the grandiose plans of transforming the Kurils remind of the chill of Brezhnev days.” (A. Masterskiy)⁴²

“I stand for the proposal of People’s Deputy Guliy.” (A. Chaikin. The letter was signed by 156 people !)⁴³

“I don’t agree with those who often group Guliy and Afanas’yev together lately. Guliy does not stand for returning the islands. I am very glad to know that there are deputies like Afanas’yev who is not afraid as they are to express their opinions. I am glad to know that one may say what he thinks.... By the way, the statement made by the party secretary (Tereshko) on behalf of all the residents of the Kurils I consider unfounded.... Judging by the selection of letters

published, the elderly are mostly negative about Guli's project, while the young and those of middle age think differently, I think. (V. Gryshuk)⁴⁴

The following five review articles treating the issue of the Southern Kurils—either directly or indirectly—were found in the process of screening the available *Sovetskiy Sakhalin* issues: December 8, 1989—Урок живущим by A. Ivan'ko, January 7, 1990—Международное право и историческая реальность by Dr. Krushanov of the Academy of Sciences Far East Section, January 17, 1990—Время менять флаги by V. Plotnikov, March 17, 1990—an abridged reprint of V. Sukhnev's Курильское Ожерелье published by *Literaturnaya Rossiya* (see references), May 6, 1990—Курилы ... так чьи же они? by I. Titov of Moscow-based *Рабочая Газета*. Except for Titov's, all of the articles are very conservative and rigid in tone, yet let us note that while two of them—those by Titov and Sukhnev—vividly discuss the influential rhetoric of the People's Deputies engaged in the "Northern territories" debate, the first three articles hardly ever mentioned the "unpleasant" deputies but in fact appeared during December '89—January '90 period when the Guli vs. Tereshko battle was at its height.

The review articles provide us with yet another observation: the "Northern territories" issue being highly prestige-laden, applying such labels as "progressive" and "conservative" turns suddenly into quite a heavy burden. Thus, if we care to read one of his articles in the *Рыбак Сахалина*, the "ultra-conservative" patriot Anatoliy Ivan'ko, the RSFSR People's Deputy as of February '90, turns out being an amazingly "radical" progressive. And speaking of a very "progressive" *Рыбак Сахалина*, the tone could hardly ever be "rougher" when the newspaper addresses the issue of the Southern Kurils.⁴⁶

And finally, there is yet another surprise coming from the *Sovetskiy Sakhalin*. In a major interview given to the newspaper on January 9, 1990 First Secretary of the CPSU Regional Committee V. Zhigailo never mentions the Southern Kurils specifically while discussing in details various problems the Sakhalin *oblast* is facing upon entering the 1990's!⁴⁷ Apparently, he belongs to those 44% of the Soviet respondents who had nothing special to say about "some" "Northern territories" when asked to speak up by the *Asahi Journal*.⁴⁷ And I. Mihailov of the "Sakhalinergo" on May 22, 1990 presents us with a grandiose project of constructing an oceanic geothermal station on Etorofu thinking it is "real."⁴⁹

The Sakhalin Syndrome

Rapid formation of public opinion under the favourable conditions of *glasnost'* and *perestroika* has added as yet another powerful and dynamic element—the local, Sakhalin region, factor—to the complicated process of Soviet decision-making on the "Northern territories" issue. Moreover, the appearance and subsequent proliferation of the views of the popularly elected officials has contributed another dimension fraught with unpredictable consequences.

The screening of the available *Sovetskiy Sakhalin* newspaper issues reflected an unprecedented rise of popular concern about the "Northern territories" generated by the statements of a number of People's Deputies—Afanas'yev and Guli in particular. Widespread public attention appeared to focus upon the Guli vs. Tereshko confrontation, especially during the months of December 1989 through

February 1990. While Guliy seems to enjoy a great deal of support from the central—"All-Union"—authority, Tereshko's cause is just as strong, if not more so, primarily due to its nationalist flavour in the context of the on-going struggle for power between Yeltsin and Gorbachev.

NOTES

- 1 As of the beginning of 1990 the population of Sakhalin oblast amounted to over 714,000 people. О Социально-экономическом развитии области в 1989 году (On Socio-Economic Development of Oblast in 1989), *Sovetskiy Sakhalin* (here after cited as SS), (1990. 2. 13), p. 1. According to the latest census, 119 nationalities are represented (160 inhabit the Soviet Union): Russians—580,000, Ukrainians—46,000, Byelorussians—11,500, Kazakhs—1,000. "Skolko nas? Kakiye my?" SS, (1990. 3. 20), p. 3. K. Sarkisov of the Institute of Oriental Studies in Moscow mentions that young people prevail among those in favour of returning the Southern Kurils to Japan. "Perestroika-de Sorenjin-no Ishiki wa Koko-made Kawatta," *Asahi Journal* (1990. 11. 2), p. 22. The average age of a Sakhalinian as of 1989 was 30.3. Senior citizens was comprised 9% of the over-all population of the oblast. "Skolko nas? Kakiye my?" SS. (1990. 3. 20), p. 3.
- 2 According to Mr. Nobuo Arai, Senior researcher for Hokkaido Institute of Regional Studies, who served as an interpreter during Hokkaido Socialist Governor Yokomichi trip to the Soviet Union in June 1990, at a meeting held in Moscow on June 13 A. Yakovlev of the Presidential Council mentioned that the fate of the Southern Kurils may not be decided without taking into account Sakhalin oblast public opinion. This has been widely reported in the Japanese press media.
- 3 According to V. Sukhnev of the *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, as of early December of 1989 an extraordinary session of the Southern Kurils Regional Soviet of People's Deputies issued an angry telegram addressed to the Second Congress of the U. S. S. R. People's Deputies, saying that "The issues related to the further economic development of the Southern Kurils should be decided upon only on the basis of Article 10 entitled 'On Regional Soviets of the RSFSR People's Deputies' of the Law of RSFSR". V. Sukhnev, "Kurilskoye Ozherel'ye", *Literaturnaya Rossiya* No. 8, (1990. 2. 23), p. 18. See also Hiroshi Kimura, Gorubachofu-no Tainichi Seisaku—Henka to Mondai (Gorbachev's Japan Policy—Changes and Challenges), *Ronbunshu, International Symposium '90*, p. 103 ("The Yeltsin Factor").
- 4 R. Grey, L. Jennisch, A. Tyler, "Soviet Public Opinion and Gorbachev Reforms," *Slavic Review*, (Summer 1990), Vol. 49, No. 2, p. 262.
- 5 For a detailed discussion see H. Kimura, "Japan-Soviet Relations: A Political View," a discussion paper prepared for a workshop on "Changing Soviet Policies in the Asia-Pacific: A Strategic Approach for the West" held at Kauai on April 12-14, 1990. The very first U. S. S. R. People's Deputy to address the "Northern territories" issue and come up with a clear-cut proposal was Vitautus Lamdsbergis, Chairman of the Sajudis—a representative agency of the People's Front of Latvia. In an interview for the Japanese newspaper

- Sekai Nippō* he said: “We share a common goal and hope with those social organizations which have been requesting the return of “Northern territories” The U. S. S. R. should be aware that there is an opinion within the Soviet Union demanding that it must cease its occupation of the four islands and return them to Japan”. See “Странное Желание,” *Известия*, 1989. 9. 6. Dr. Sakharov, while in Japan in late October of 1989, mentioned that the Southern Kurils belong to Japan. People’s Deputy Afanas’yev on November 5, 1989, proposed a three-stage formula for the returning of the Southern Kurils to Japan. The *Известия* criticism notwithstanding, during his visit to Japan in November 1989 Afanas’yev insisted upon his original ideas. Amongst later contributors People’s Deputy V. Gulyi, the *Sovetskiy Sakhalin* correspondent, stands out. His ideas were introduced to the Soviet public directly through a “friendly” agency, the prestigious *Novoye Vremya* magazine. See V. Gulyi, “Северные территории”, *Новое Время*, No. 49, (December 1, 1989). The U. S. S. R. People’s Deputy Yeltsin also has had a share in the “Northern territories” debate. Of particular importance is his speech at the Teikoku Hotel in Tokyo on January 17, 1990. Compared to Afanas’yev, Sakharov and Gulyi, Yeltsin was a late-comer. Yeltsin’s role in the issue deserves special attention primarily because of his present position of power. See H. Kimura, “Gorubachofu-no Tainichi Seisaku,” p.103 (“The Yeltsin Factor”). V. Sukhnev of the *Literaturnaya Rossiya*—a weekly newspaper of a clearly nationalist direction—goes as far as detecting a high-level conspiracy as seen through the sequence of statements addressing the “Northern territories” problem, and made by the U. S. S. R. People’s Deputies. V. Sukhnev, “Kurilskoye Ozherel’ye”, *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, No. 8 (1990. 2. 23), p. 18.
- 6 For an excellent critical review see H. Kimura, “Gorubachofu-no Tainichi Seisaku”, pp. 98-100 (“Sogo-ni Ukeire kano-na dakyo”) (“A Mutually Acceptable Compromise”). To mention just a few, К. Саркисов, “Владивостокские инициативы: два года спустя”, *Международная Жизнь*, июль 1988, А. Богатуров, М. Носов, “Треугольник без углов”, *Новое Время*, № 18, 1989. 4. 28, И. Рогачев, “Претензии, лишённые оснований”, *Известия*, 1989. 4. 24, В. Овчинников, “Уступить ли “Северные территории”, *Правда*, 1990. 4. 24, Г. Кунадзэ, К. Саркисов, “Размышления о советско-японских отношениях”, *Мировая экономика и международные отношения*, № 5, май 1989, В. Лукин, Г. Кунадзэ, К. Саркисов, И. Тыщецкий, “Несуществующий вопрос”, *Огонек* № 20, май 12-18, 1990. Professor Hiroshi Kimura of the Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, praises Yu. Afanas’yev, A. Sakharov and V. Landsbergis as those who had something definite to say on the “Northern territories.” Yet, says professor Kimura, “no leading Japonologist nor anyone else of influence . . . has stated anything definite concerning the revision of Kunashiri and Etorofu. Instead, they are nearly unanimous in stressing the need to identify what they call a “mutually acceptable” (взаимоприемлемый) compromise as a catch phrase for resolution of the territorial issue.” H. Kimura, “Gorubachofu-no Tainichi Seisaku”, pp. 99-100.
- 7 V. Sukhnev, “Kurilskoye Ozherel’ye,” *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, No. 8 (1990. 2. 23), p. 18.
- 8 K. Sarkisov, et al, “Nesuschestvuyuschiy Vopros”, *Ogonyok*, No. 20, (May 12-19), p. 16.

- 9 “Successful democratization of the system can lead to the election of officials opposed to other aspects of reform. If perestroika continues to lead to higher unemployment, increased costs for food, popularly elected officials may find it difficult to resist pressures to moderate the drive to restructuring. Elected officials in the non-Russian republics will probably continue to reflect the nationalistic fervor of their constituents”. R. Grey, et al, “Soviet Public Opinion and Gorbachev Reform,” *Slavic Review*, Summer 1990.
- 10 “16 журналистов избраны депутатами”, *Гермес*, 17-31 марта 1990г., р. 1. *Germes* is a popular weekly newspaper published by the Sakhalin Regional Organization of the U. S. S. R. Journalists’ Union.
- 11 As so many other local Soviet newspapers today, the *Sovetskiy Sakhalin* is fairly advanced as compared to central newspapers, the latter hardly being conservative nowadays. See, for example, an article entitled “При внезапных обстоятельствах” by M. Shtein, candidate of economic sciences, SS, (1990. 1. 4), р. 3. A reprint from the *Гудок*, it is a controversial article about the circumstances surrounding the death of N. Krupskaya. A monopoly-holder of the Sakhalin oblast major newspaper status for the 65 years, the SS is facing hard times. With the proliferation of press and the role of the Communist Party rapidly changing, the past hardships are inevitable. On the future of the SS newspaper see E. Беловицкий, “Я б в редакторы пошел,” *Germes*, (May 23-31, 1990), pp. 1, 6.
- 12 С. Воронов, “Рейтинг гласности,” *Germes*, (April 16-30, 1990), р. 1.
- 13 “Кто он, человек года? Первые имена,” *Germes*, (December 21-31, 1989), р. 1.
- 14 В. Гулий, “Третий путь”, SS, (1989. 12. 5,) pp. 1, 3, М. Терешко, “В отрыве от реальности”, *Ibid*, (1989. 12. 17), р. 3.
- 15 “Сахалинцы о будущем Курил,” SS, (1989. 12. 29, 1990. 1. 10, 1990. 2. 2).
- 16 It is important to bear in mind that on December 1, 1989, just a few days before his “Третий путь” appeared in SS, Guliy presented his ideas regarding the “Northern territories” in the prestigious *Новое Время* magazine issue in the form of a short article. See Guliy, “Северные территории. Что с ними делать?,” *Новое Время*, No. 49, (1989. 12. 1), pp. 18-19. Tereshko, apparently, never appeared in central press organs.
- 17 Guliy, “Третий путь”, SS, р. 3.
- 18 А. Yakovlev, “Третий путь—диалог,” *Новое Время*, No. 48, (1989. 11. 24), pp. 10-11.
- 19 According to Guliy, he met Yakovlev on November 5, 1989, slightly prior to Yakovlev’s trip to Japan. Guliy mentions “a most interesting friendly talk.” See Guliy, “Третий путь,” р. 3.
- 20 According to Sukhnev of the *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, the deputies of the Southern Kurils Regional Soviet of People’s Deputies stated that Guliy groundlessly referred in *Новое Время* to the majority of electors as supporters of his ideas. V. Sukhnev, “Курильское Ожерелье,” *Литературная Россия*, No. 8 (1990. 2. 23), р. 18.
- 21 It seems that Guliy and Afanas’yev, the most commonly known People’s Deputies to have addressed the “Northern territories” issue, are often grouped together as the “bad guys.” See, for instance, С. Оскольский, “Сколько стоят Курилы?” *Рыбак Сахалина*, (1990. 3. 31), р. 1. *Rybak Sakhalina* is a weekly

- newspaper published by the Sakhalin oblast Regional Committee of the CPSU for those engaged in the fishing industry.
- 22 Guliy was heavily criticized by the conservatives. See, for example, "Подвергнут резкой критике", *Germes*, (December 21-31, 1989), p. 1. Also see И. Савченко, "Горький опыт озлобления", *Germes*, (February 1-15, 1990), p. 1.
 - 23 See, for example, V. Sukhnev, "Курильское Ожерелье", No. 7, 1990, p. 16.
 - 24 Tsvetov's article in the *Ogonyok* entitled Пока теленайп молчал utopian future portrays a utopian future for the Southern Kurils. In actual fact, the rosy future Tsvetov portrays is much like the Guliy's project. See В. Цветов, "Пока телетайп молчал," *Огонек*, No. 44, (October 1989), pp. 24-25. Guliy says that he and Tsvetov came to the same conclusions simultaneously, without being acquainted. See Guliy, "Третий путь," p. 3.
 - 25 Guliy, Третий путь, p. 3.
 - 26 *Ibid.*
 - 27 Guliy could have exploited advantageously the not so well known fact of the Japanese Communist Party demanding return of all the Kurils to Japan, a policy enacted in 1959. See, for example, "Chishima Mondai-no Shinjitsu," *Riron Seisaku*, No. 158, March 1981, *Chishima Mondai to Nihon Kyosanto*, Tokyo, 1977. In English see Peter Burton, "The Japanese Communist Party's View of Gorbachev's Perestroika," *Acta Slavica Iaponica*, vol. 7, 1989, pp. 122-123. For a detailed treatment of Japanese perceptions of the "Northern territories" issue see Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, "Japanese Perceptions of the Soviet Union," *Acta Slavica Iaponica*, vol. 5, 1987, pp. 53-57.
 - 28 "Вышел из партии народный депутат Гулий", *Germes*, (May 5-22, 1990), pp. 1, 5. "Expelled from the party" is the right way to put it, as there is no way as yet of "leaving" the party upon making such a request.
 - 29 "Вышел из партии," *Germes*, p. 5.
 - 30 "Perestroika-de sorenjin-no ishiki wa koko-made kawatta", *Asahi Journal*, (1990. 11. 2), pp. 14-23.
 - 31 M. Tereshko, "В отрыве от реальности" (Out of touch with reality), *SS*, (1989. 12. 17), p. 3.
 - 32 Typical as it is, of all the "bad" deputies, Afanas'yev and Guliy exclusively are criticized.
 - 33 V. Sukhnev, "Курильское Ожерелье", *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, No. 7 (1990. 2. 16), p. 17.
 - 34 Tereshko, "В отрыве от реальности," p. 3.
 - 35 *Ibid.*
 - 36 На сессии областного Совета Народных депутатов, *SS*, (1989. 12. 23), p. 3.
 - 37 V. Sukhnev, "Курильское ожелье", *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, (1990. 2. 23), No. 8, p. 18.
 - 38 It is reported that during his 3-day-long visit to Sakhalin in August of 1990 Yeltsin expressed his full support of the Sakhalin Regional Executive Committee demands of territorial independence, and made a statement when visiting the Kunashiri island saying that "that land should not be returned." М. Бугаев, "Три дня с Ельциным," *Свободный Сахалин*, August 30, 1990.
 - 39 The weekly newspaper *Germes* provides a great deal of information and comments on the "Northern territories", and supplies good articles about the problems of the military personnel. On the background of the troops

stationed on the Southern Kurils see H. Kimura, "The Conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty (1978): Soviet Coercive Strategy and Its Limit," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, summer/autumn 1985.

- 40 "Сахалинцы о будущем Курил," SS, (1989. 12. 17, 1990. 1. 10, 1990. 2. 2).
- 41 "Сахалинцы о будущем," SS, (1989. 12. 29), p. 3.
- 42 *Ibid.*
- 43 *Ibid.*
- 44 *Ibid.*
- 45 А. Иванько, "Гласность у нас теперь хорошая, только вот слышимость", *Рыбак Сахалина*, (February 24, 1990), p. 2.
- 46 А. Лопачев, "Правда об островах", *Рыбак Сахалина*, (January 20, 1990), pp. 3, 5.
- 47 В. Жигайло, "Вступая в 90-е годы", SS, (1990. 1. 9), pp. 1-2. Compare to: "The development of relations with Japan is blocked deadly by the territorial issue." Л. Млечин, "Четыре острова и суверенитет России" *Новое Время*, (No. 27, 1990. 6), p. 12.
- 48 "Perestroika-de sorenjin-no ishiki wa koko-made kawatta," *Asahi Journal*, (1990. 11. 2), p. 21.
- 49 И. Михайлов, "Океанская ГеоТЭС на Итурупе—Это Реально", SS, (1990. 5. 22), p. 2.