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The Japanese-Soviet Economic Future*

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1 Introduction

Japanese-Soviet economic relations have not improved since Gorbachev took power in 1985. The stagnation in bilateral economic relations which began in the beginning of the 1980s has continued to the present. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the cause of the stagnation in order to consider the possibility of improvement in the future. We concentrate our attention on Japanese-Soviet trade relations in particular, because the trade relations have been, and will be, the dominant form of economic relations between the two countries.

First, we briefly look at the history of the stagnation in Japanese-Soviet economic relations. Second, the factors which caused the stagnation in Japan's imports from the USSR and in Japan's exports to the USSR are analyzed. Finally, we consider the possibility of changes in these factors in the near future.

Throughout this paper two sets of trade data are used. The first is from Japanese statistical sources, measured in dollar or yen value. The data in dollar value have been compiled and published by the Japan Association for Trade with Soviet Union & Central-Eastern Europe (SOTOBO) on the basis of the Foreign Trade Statistics released by the Japanese Ministry of Finance.¹ The data in yen value are published in Japanese official statistical handbooks.² The second set of data is from Soviet official foreign trade statistics, measured in ruble value.³ The data in dollar and ruble value will be used without references to specific publications by the sources mentioned above.

2 Stagnation in Japanese-Soviet Economic Relations

Based upon the trade data, we can say that the stagnation in Japan's imports from the USSR began in 1980 and that in Japan's exports—in 1983.

Since 1980 Japan's imports from the USSR remained approximately the same or even below 1979's level until 1986 (see Tables 1 and 2). The share of the USSR in Japan's total imports, which was more than 2.5% until the first half of the 1970s, lowered to mere 1% in the period from 1980 through 1985 (see Table 3). The share of Japan in the USSR's total exports also dropped from 3-4% level in the first half of the 1970s to nearly 1% in the beginning of the 1980s (see Table 2).

In 1983 Japan's exports to the USSR decreased by more than 25% compared with 1982 both in dollar and ruble values. They have not reached the pre-1983 level since then. The share of the USSR in Japan's total exports decreased from 2-3% in the period during the second half of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s to 1-1.5% in the mid 1980s (see Table 3). The share of Japan in the USSR's total imports fell from 4-5% to 3% in the same period (see Table 2).

There are two phenomena which symbolized the stagnation in Japanese

-Soviet economic relations. First, since 1979 Japan has been overpassed by three West European countries, Finland, Italy and France, in addition to the FRG, in terms of the amount of trade (the sum of exports and imports) with the USSR. Recall that in the beginning of the 1970s Japan was at the top of capitalist countries in terms of trade with the USSR and since 1972 Japan was in the second place after the FRG except for a few years.⁴

Second, in ruble value, 1983 was the first year in the post-war period when the amount of trade between Japan and the USSR recorded a decrease compared with the previous year (see Table 2). It was a consequence of the sharp reduction in Japan's exports to the USSR mentioned above.

3 Import Constraint Factors

There are two very important factors which have constrained Japan's imports from the USSR in recent years. The first is the fact that Japan has not imported a significant amount of oil and gas from the USSR. Actually, in the first half of the 1960s the imports of crude oil accounted for around 20% of Japan's imports from the USSR (in addition, there were imports of petroleum products which comprised about 10% of Japan's imports), but since 1968 its share has been below 3% of Japan's imports (see Table 4).⁵ There were attempts to increase these energy imports from the USSR, i. e., there have been three proposals of major joint projects between the USSR and Japan to develop oil and gas fields in the Siberian region. But only the Sakhalin Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Search Cooperation Project has been continued up to the present, although it still remains in the prospecting stage.⁶ It should be emphasized that it is largely due to purely economic considerations that Japan has been importing oil from countries other than the USSR.

While Japan was decreasing oil imports from the USSR, the West European countries, such as the FRG, Finland, Italy and France, have steadily increased imports during the 1960s and 1970s. Particularly during the years from 1979 through 1981 the value of oil imports from the USSR by these countries increased tremendously due to the doubling of price in the period of the second oil shock (1979-1980), and this brought about the considerable increase in their total imports from the USSR.⁷ This was why Japan was bested by Finland, Italy and France in 1979 in terms of trade with the USSR.⁸

In this way the basic difference between Japan and the West European countries in energy import policies became evident in the end of the 1970s. While the West European countries became increasingly dependent on Soviet energy sources, Japan has not imported much oil from the USSR. This difference is one of the underlying factors which determined the trade trend in the 1980s.

The second factor which contributed to the stagnant Japanese imports from the USSR is the reduction in Japanese demands for raw materials, such as timber and cotton, as a result of the structural changes which Japanese economy was forced to enact due to the rising prices on energy and raw materials since the mid 1970s. Comparing the import data in 1979 with that in 1985, we see that the decrease in imports by \$500 million was mainly due to the decrease in imports of timber by \$350 million and raw cotton by \$120 million (see Table 4).⁹ These

decreases were in concert with the decrease in Japan's total imports of these commodities. Japan's total imports of timber nearly halved in value during the period from 1979 through 1985.¹⁰ Accordingly, the share of timber in Japan's imports from the USSR decreased from about 40% in the 1970s to 20% in recent years. Cotton imports by Japan also nearly halved in value from the first to the second half of the 1980s.¹¹ Hence, its share in Japan's imports from the USSR decreased from more than 10% in the mid 1970s to less than 3% in recent years.

These two factors, the negligible imports of oil and gas from the USSR and shrinking demands for Soviet raw materials, largely explain the passive attitude of the Japanese side toward the Siberian and Far East development projects, which have been the driving force for expanding Japanese-Soviet economic relations in the past. So far, there have been nine large projects for Siberian development. It is important to note that almost all of them were proposed by the mid 1970s: there have been no new proposals since then on which a general agreement was concluded by both sides. From the beginning of the 1980s to the present, there is only one project—the South Yakut Coal Development Project—which has significantly contributed to promote Japan's imports from the USSR.

In addition to the two basic factors mentioned above, there are other factors which hindered the promotion of Siberian development projects. First, there were the Soviet Union's domestic problems, particularly the country's deteriorating economic situation which necessitated a focus upon the West Siberian oil and gas development. In this climate, insufficient supports have been obtained from Moscow for the development of the East Siberia and Far East since the end of the 1970s. Second, the restoration of diplomatic relations with China in 1978 shifted the interests of Japanese business circles from the Soviet Far East toward China. If we compare China with the Soviet Far East, the latter's disadvantage is obvious. Among others, there is a shortage of labor. The secrecy of the region, particularly of the Vladivostok area, is another obstacle for commercial activities.¹² Finally, we have to take into account the suspension of the Japanese Government's official credit extension to the USSR which was a measure of the economic sanctions enacted following the Soviet invasion in Afganistan.

4 Export Constraint Factors

There are several factors which brought about the stagnation in Japan's exports since 1983. First, the inactive situation in the Siberian development projects, which was discussed above, detrimentally effected the promotion of the exports. It is said that one third of the machinery exports to the USSR in the latter half of the 1970s and in the beginning of the 1980s consisted of equipment related to the Siberian development projects.¹³ For example, in 1981 and in 1982 Japan's exports of construction & mining machinery and loading & unloading machinery increased by \$140 and by \$300 million respectively, mainly due to the Third Far East Forest Resource Development Project.¹⁴ This was one of the major causes of the considerable increase in Japan's exports to the USSR by \$480 and by \$640 million respectively in these two years (see Table 5). In turn, the decrease in exports of these machinery by \$240 million in 1983 as a consequence of the delivery completion for this Project became one of the major factors which

brought about a \$1 billion reduction in Japan's exports.¹⁵

The second factor was the huge Japanese trade surplus in 1982 vis-a-vis the USSR. It reached \$2.2 billion in 1982, having increased by almost \$1 billion from the previous year's level (see Table 1). In ruble value the surplus was 2.2 billion rubles in 1982. This was the largest deficit recorded in Soviet trade with capitalist countries until that time.¹⁶

If we look at Japanese-Soviet trade history in retrospect, until 1974 trade deficits were recorded on Japanese side and they stimulated the further increase in Japan's exports. In the latter half of the 1970s, however, as Japan's imports became stagnant, a considerable amount of trade surplus began to be formed on Japanese side. Especially, in the beginning of the 1980s, in spite of the inactive imports, Japan's exports to the USSR increased very rapidly due to the increase in steel pipe and the above-mentioned machinery exports.¹⁷ While from 1976 through 1980 Japan's exports to the USSR in ruble value showed annual growth rates of less than 10%, in 1981 and in 1982 they jumped up to 24.8% and 32.2% respectively (see Table 2). The tremendous value of the trade surplus in 1982 was a consequence of these developments.

Thus, there emerged a very vivid contrast between Japan and the West European countries in the period from 1979 through 1982. On the one hand, in spite of the stagnant imports, Japan's exports to the USSR increased continuously, leaving a large trade deficit on Soviet side. On the other hand, the imports of the West European countries began to increase, leaving a trade surplus on Soviet side. Under these circumstances the Soviets preferred to import machines and other industrial goods not from Japan, but from the West European countries.¹⁸ In addition, West European governments and firms made enormous efforts to promote their exports to the USSR, in order to reduce growing trade deficits with the USSR. As a result of reduction in Japan's exports, Japan's trade surplus with the USSR decreased to \$1.4 billion in 1983.

The third factor is related to the Japanese Government's policy, i. e., its policy of credit extension to the USSR. In the latter half of the 1970s the extension of the large long-term government credits in the form of funds from the Japan Export-Import Bank, played a significant role in expanding exports to the USSR. In 1974, when for the first time these credits were given to finance Siberian projects, it was regarded that they would be extended in the future only for resource development projects. Since 1975, however, they were given for large-scale plant exports, and since 1976 they were also given for the exports of large diameter pipes. The total amount of these credits for the exports of large-scale plants from 1975 through 1977 reached nearly \$1.3 billion.¹⁹ From 1976 through 1981 more than 3 million tons of large diameter pipes were exported to the USSR by means of these credits.²⁰ But already by 1978 this credit extension for large-scale plants not related to Siberian projects became rare. Since 1980 when the Japanese Government suspended the credit extension as a measure of the economic sanctions in response to the Soviet invasion in Afganistan, the negotiations concerning payments were made more complicated and more politicized.

The fourth factor is an institutional factor, but might be called a policy factor in the sense that it could be used by the Japanese Government. It is related to the fact that nearly 95% of Japanese-Soviet trade is carried out by nine biggest

trading companies of Japan.²¹ For these companies Japanese-US trade relations are more important than trade with the USSR. Therefore, they are very cautious in developing trade with the USSR, as they are always looking at the US market. The Toshiba affair was a good example.

This is very different from the situation in the Western Europe. In the FRG, for example, there are more than 1,500 firms involved in trade with the USSR, not a few of which specialize in trade with the USSR.²² Therefore, if the Government takes a policy of restricting trade with the USSR, it will inevitably deteriorate the performance of such firms and in the worst cases cause a bankruptcy. This consideration prevents West European governments to take restrictive measures against the USSR.

On the contrary, Japanese big trading companies can dispense with trade with the USSR. Moreover, they are always ready to sacrifice trade relations with the USSR, if it is required in order to maintain good relations with the US.²³ If we take into consideration the close relationship of big business firms and the Japanese Government, the fact that Japanese-Soviet trade is carried out in most part by big trading companies gives the Japanese Government the ability to control the trade relations as it wishes.²⁴ This institutional or policy factor played a negative role in Japanese-Soviet economic relations in the beginning of the 1980s.

5 Conclusion

Let us consider the possibility of change in those factors which have restricted Japanese-Soviet trade in recent years. In the preceding sections we discussed four economic and two policy factors. Among the four economic factors, the negligible imports of oil and gas from the USSR and the shrinking demands for Soviet raw materials are the fundamental factors which brought about the other two, i. e., the stagnation in the Siberian development projects and the continuous Japanese trade surplus with the USSR. As far as these two fundamental factors are concerned, most experts, Japanese and Soviet, may agree that these will remain unchanged in the foreseeable future.²⁵ Thus, since the mid 1980s both Japan and the USSR have begun to seek a new sphere of cooperation, such as processing of marine products, which does not need large amount of capital investments and in which it is relatively easy for the Soviets to ascertain demand for such products in Japanese markets. Of course, however, we cannot expect too much from these "mini projects" simply due to their insignificant size and the time it takes to develop a large number of such projects.

Some might argue that the problem of the continuous Japanese trade surplus already disappeared, pointing out that Japan's surplus decreased from \$1.2 billion in 1986 to mere \$80 million in 1989 (see Table 1).²⁶ This was due to the leveling off in Japan's exports since 1983, discussed in the previous section, and to the increase in its imports since 1986.²⁷ Japan's imports increased from \$1.4 billion in 1985 to \$3 billion in 1989 and the share of the USSR in Japan's total imports increased from 1.1% in 1985 to 1.5-1.6% level in the period from 1986 through 1988 (see Table 3). The main factors which contributed to this increase seemed to be the imports of gold and non-ferrous metal and the appreciation of yen. The

imports of gold increased by \$230 million in 1986 and those of non-ferrous metal increased by \$570 million from 1986 through 1989 (see Table 4).²⁸ The influence of the appreciation of yen is obvious from Table 3, which shows only a little increase in Japan's imports from the USSR in yen value in recent years. The fact that Soviet share in Japan's imports remained the same level since 1986 indicates that the increase in Japan's imports from the USSR is in concert with the increase in Japan's imports from all over the world as a consequence of the rapid appreciation of yen. The appreciation of yen and the large increase in gold imports, however, seems to have already stopped. We are not convinced that the increase in Japan's imports from the USSR based on the increase in non-ferrous metal imports will continue in the near future.²⁹

Two other factors, i. e., the extension of official credits and the dominant role of big trading companies in Japanese-Soviet trade, are policy factors. It is probable that the Japanese Government will change its attitude toward the economic relations with the USSR as a consequence of, or a precondition for, some improvement in the bilateral political relations. If the Government is willing to issue official credits and urge big business to increase trade with the USSR, we might expect that Japanese-Soviet economic relations will be improved, at least temporarily, as happened when the Prime Minister Tanaka visited Moscow in 1973, and as happened in relations with China when diplomatic relations were restored in 1978.³⁰

There are, however, some necessary conditions for such an improvement to be realized. First of all, the most crucial and difficult condition is the completion of the reorganization in Soviet economic system. Under the present situation of chaos in the Soviet economy, Japanese companies will refrain from being involved too much in trade with the USSR.³¹ Second, the credit extension has a limit, simply because it depends on the ability of the USSR to repay the loan. After all, it depends on the Soviet ability to earn hard currency. No one believes that within a couple of years the Soviets will be able to expand its exports of industrial products to the developed industrial countries, except for its exports of fuel and mineral resources. If we take into account the diminishing interests for these resources in Japanese business circles, it is difficult to find out the commodity by which the Soviets can increase their exports to Japan substantially.³² It seems that these two conditions have become additional trade constraint factors between Japan and the USSR. Therefore, we have to say that there will be little prospect for "Soviet trade boom" in the near future, even if there will be any improvement in the bilateral political relations.

In passing, let us point out that in the end it is the US Government that determines the attitude of Japanese companies toward Soviet markets. Because the Japanese Government has been always in a weak position vis-a-vis the US Government in trade issues, the former is ready to follow US recommendations when little resistance from pressure groups in Japan is foreseen. The economic relationship with the USSR is one such sphere at present, since Japanese business circles place it in low priority due to the two economic factors discussed above. Hence, throughout the 1980s Japanese firms were very obedient to US policy toward the USSR.³³

Thus, we believe that economic factors have been, and will continue to be,

dominant over policy factors, so long as Government policy reflects the interests of business circles and not the other way around. The present situation is far different from that which persisted until the mid 1970s when the business circles were anxious to develop new sources of energy and material resources by all means. Therefore, we foresee that the present stagnant Japanese-Soviet economic relations will probably continue at least to the end of this century.³⁴

NOTES

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- 1 Most of SOTOBO's data are derived from the February issues of its monthly bulletins. See references.
- 2 For example, the publications by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the Statistical Bureau. See references.
- 3 Most of them are derived from the annual statistical handbooks of foreign trade published by the Ministry of Foreign Trade (since 1989 the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations). As for 1989 the data are derived from *Ekonomika i Zhizni*, No. 15, 1990.
- 4 In 1973 and in 1976 the US was in the second place because of its huge grain exports to the USSR.
- 5 During the period from 1979 through 1985 the imports of petroleum products again increased to reach around 10% of Japan's imports from the USSR.
- 6 The other two are the Tyumen Oil Development and Yakut Natural Gas Search Cooperation Projects. The former was shelved in 1974 because of the difficulty of transportation, and only the first part (the prospecting stage) of the latter was completed in 1979. Discussing the Tyumen's case, Curtis concluded that "its mounting concern over the increasing financial cost of the Tyumen project, the difficulty of securing adequate guarantees of supply, the military implications of a trans-Siberian pipeline and the second trans-Siberian railroad, and the impact of the project on Japan's relations with the People's Republic of China had led, by the spring of 1974, to a virtual standstill in the Tyumen project negotiations." Curtis, 1977, p. 158.
- 7 During these three years the imports from the USSR by the FRG, Finland, Italy and France increased by 2.5, 2.3, 2.2 and 3 times respectively. And 95.5% of the increase in FRG's imports consisted of the increase in oil and gas imports. As for other three countries this ratio was 82.6%, 93.9% and 92.8% (Finland's ratio was calculated in terms of oil imports only, because its gas

- imports were very small).
- 8 In 1980 and in 1981 Finland's exports to the USSR showed tremendous increase mostly due to the increase in machinery exports facilitated by the bilateral clearing account arrangement between the two countries.
 - 9 During this period imports of non-ferrous metals also decreased by \$100 million, while imports of gold increased by \$110 million.
 - 10 Statistical Bureau, 1988, p. 64.
 - 11 Ibid., Statistical Bureau, 1989, p. 347.
 - 12 Ogawa, 1988, pp. 31-33. In Japan's imports from China oil had been the largest item until recently. Its share fluctuated from one third to nearly one half of Japan's imports from China during the second half of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. As we already pointed out, it is largely due to purely economic considerations that Japan has been imported oil from China rather than from the USSR. Curtis, 1977, pp. 169-170.
 - 13 SOTOBO, 1983, pp. 229.
 - 14 op. cit., pp. 229-231.
 - 15 In terms of ruble value, in 1981 and in 1982 Japan's exports of road-building machines increased by 130 and by 280 million rubles respectively, causing the considerable increase in Japan's exports to the USSR by 440 and by 710 million rubles respectively in these two years (see Table 2). The decrease in exports of this machinery by 260 million rubles in 1983 brought about a 750 million ruble reduction in Japan's exports.
 - 16 There were only five times in Soviet history when a trade deficit more than 2 billion rubles was recorded with capitalist countries. All other cases were in relation with the US due to the grain imports: a 2.5 billion ruble deficit in 1984, a 2.3 billion ruble deficit in 1989 and 2.1 billion ruble deficits in 1979 and 1985.
 - 17 The increase in exports of steel pipes, especially for large diameter pipes, was due to the laying of gas pipeline from the Western Siberia to the Eastern and Western Europe. The reduction in their exports in 1983 by more than half billion dollars (370 million rubles) was one of the major reasons of sharp decrease in Japan's exports in that year by \$1 billion (750 million rubles).
 - 18 Ogawa, 1987, p. 166, Smith, 1987, pp. 119-120, Dienes, 1985, pp. 520-521.
 - 19 SOTOBO, 1983, p. 228.
 - 20 op. cit., pp. 233-235.
 - 21 Ogawa, 1988, pp. 9-10. See also Dienes, 1985, p. 514.
 - 22 Ogawa, 1988, pp. 9-10, Dienes, 1985, pp. 515-516.
 - 23 It is interesting to remember that "during the 1950s and 1960s Japanese trade with the USSR was conducted primarily by small and medium-sized firms. Large Japanese trading corporations, which relied heavily on trade with the United States, created dummy firms for handling their trade relations with the USSR, rather than trading directly." Smith, 1987, p. 111.
 - 24 Japanese business-government relations during the Tyumen project negotiations are described in Curtis, 1977, pp. 158-161.
 - 25 Kinbara, 1986, p. 76.
 - 26 In terms of ruble value the reduction in Japan's surplus has not been so vivid. Japan's surplus has remained in the range of 600-800 million rubles during the

period from 1987 through 1989 (see Table 2).

- 27 In 1987 Japan's exports decreased by 19% (nearly \$600 million) and the share of the USSR in Japan's total exports reduced to 1.1%, the lowest since the 1960s (see Tables 1 and 3). This decrease was brought about by a \$470 million reduction in machinery exports. It might be regarded as a consequence of the Toshiba affair (See Toda, 1990, pp.148-149). We, however, have to bear in mind that the Soviets began to take more seriously the bilateral trade balance with each capitalist country in the overall deterioration in the terms of trade since 1985. As we have already discussed, the Soviets preferred to import machinery from the country in relation with which a positive trade balance is maintained for the USSR. The appreciation of yen was not a major factor for the decrease in Japan's exports to the USSR, because it cannot explain the reason of the reduction in Soviet share in Japan's exports.
- 28 Among non-ferrous metals the imports of platinum increased by \$180 million, those of nickel and its alloys—by \$160 million, those of aluminum and its alloys—by \$100 million and those of palladium—by \$60 million from 1986 through 1989.
- The imports of timber and coal also increased substantially in recent years. The timber imports increased by \$270 million from 1986 through 1989. This increase seems to have been brought about by the appreciation of yen; in value terms they increased by nearly 80%, while in quantity they decreased by 3.6% during this period. The coal imports increased by \$250 million, 2.3 times, in the same period. To the contrary to most of the other import items, in quantity they increased by almost the same rate, 2.2 times. This was a result of the South Yakut Coal Development Project.
- 29 Ogawa suggested that the recent increase in rare metals imports, such as platinum and palladium imports, has been in part a result of the restriction of these imports from the South Africa in response to its apartheid policy. See Ogawa, 1988, p. 11. See also Smith, 1987, p. 115.
- 30 When the Prime Minister Kaifu visited Poland and Hungary on January, 1990, he promised \$1 billion aid for Poland and \$900 million aid for Hungary, including \$500 million credits from the Japan Export-Import Bank to each country. Such a kind of economic aid will be expected for the USSR in 1991, when the President Gorbachev will come to Japan.
- 31 *Nippon Keizai Shinbun*, September 29, 1989. Japan's exports to the USSR have also been discouraged by the shift in economic policy priorities since 1985. The Gorbachev regime placed more emphasis on the restructuring of existing plants than on the new big constructions. Accordingly, the demands for large equipment and steel pipe for the large pipeline construction have diminished. Recall that traditionally steel and large-scale equipment exports have been dominant in Japan's exports to the USSR, while in the exports from the West European countries to the USSR machinery exports not linked to large projects have been rather significant. See Smith, 1987, p. 116.
- 32 We have also to take into account the delay of payments from Soviet side since the end of 1989, although it is not entirely a result of a shortage of hard currency in the USSR.

- 33 Kinbara, 1983, p. 111-112, Kinbara, 1986, p. 75. Timber imports are an interesting example. The pressure from the US Administration toward Japan to expand timber imports from the US has constrained the imports from the USSR recently. See Smith, 1987, p. 114.
- 34 Similar conclusions were drawn by several authors. See Dienes, 1985, pp. 521-522, Smith, 1987, p. 113 and Kinbara, 1986, p. 76.

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Table 1. Japan's Trade with the USSR in Dollar Value (Million Dollars)

	Total		Export		Import		Balance
	Mil. \$	%	Mil. \$	%	Mil. \$	%	Mil. \$
1960	147.0		60.0		87.0		-27.0
1961	210.8	43.4	65.4	9.0	145.4	67.1	-80.0
1962	296.7	40.8	149.4	128.5	147.3	1.3	2.1
1963	320.1	7.9	158.1	5.9	161.9	9.9	-3.8
1964	408.5	27.6	181.8	15.0	226.7	40.0	-44.9
1965	408.6	0.0	168.4	-7.4	240.2	5.9	-71.8
1966	514.4	25.9	214.0	27.1	300.4	25.0	-86.3
1967	611.6	18.9	157.7	-26.3	453.9	51.1	-296.2
1968	642.5	5.1	179.0	13.5	463.5	2.1	-284.5
1969	729.8	13.6	268.2	49.8	461.6	-0.4	-193.3
1970	822.0	12.6	340.9	27.1	481.0	4.2	-140.1
1971	873.1	6.2	377.3	10.7	495.9	3.1	-118.6
1972	1098.1	25.8	504.2	33.6	593.9	19.8	-89.7
1973	1561.9	42.2	484.2	-4.0	1077.7	81.5	-593.5
1974	2513.8	60.9	1095.6	126.3	1418.1	31.6	-322.5
1975	2795.8	11.2	1626.2	48.4	1169.6	-17.5	456.6
1976	3419.3	22.3	2251.9	38.5	1167.4	-0.2	1084.5
1977	3355.8	-1.9	1933.9	-14.1	1421.9	21.8	512.0
1978	3943.9	17.5	2502.2	29.4	1441.7	1.4	1060.5
1979	4372.1	10.9	2461.5	-1.6	1910.7	32.5	550.8
1980	4638.1	6.1	2778.2	12.9	1859.9	-2.7	918.4
1981	5280.1	13.8	3259.4	17.3	2020.7	8.6	1238.7
1982	5580.9	5.7	3898.8	19.6	1682.0	-16.8	2216.8
1983	4277.3	-23.4	2821.2	-27.6	1456.0	-13.4	1365.2
1984	3912.3	-8.5	2518.3	-10.7	1394.0	-4.3	1124.3
1985	4179.8	6.8	2750.6	9.2	1429.3	2.5	1321.3
1986	5121.6	22.5	3149.5	14.5	1972.0	38.0	1177.5
1987	4915.1	-4.0	2563.3	-18.6	2351.9	19.3	211.4
1988	5895.7	19.9	3129.9	22.1	2765.8	17.6	364.1
1989	6086.2	3.2	3081.7	-1.5	3004.5	8.6	77.1

Note: Columns "%" show annual increase rates, calculated by the author.

Source: Japan Association for Trade with Soviet Union & Central-Eastern Europe (SOTOBO).

Table 2. Japan's Trade with the USSR in Ruble Value (Million Rubles)

	Total			Export			Import			Balance
	Mil. R	%	Share	Mil. R	%	Share	Mil. R	%	Share	Mil. R
1960	123.9		1.2	55.4		1.1	68.5		1.4	-13.1
1961	161.6	30.4	1.5	59.9	8.1	1.1	101.7	48.5	1.9	-41.8
1962	232.9	44.1	1.9	131.2	119.0	2.3	101.7	0.0	1.6	29.5
1963	260.4	11.8	2.0	148.9	13.5	2.3	111.5	9.6	1.7	37.4
1964	322.1	23.7	2.3	173.9	16.8	2.5	148.2	32.9	2.1	25.7
1965	326.1	1.2	2.2	159.6	-8.2	2.2	166.5	12.3	2.3	-6.9
1966	416.6	27.8	2.8	201.8	26.4	2.8	214.8	29.0	2.7	-13.0
1967	466.8	12.0	2.9	149.1	-26.1	1.9	317.7	47.9	3.7	-168.6
1968	518.6	11.1	2.9	166.5	11.7	2.0	352.1	10.8	3.7	-185.6
1969	558.7	7.7	2.8	237.4	42.6	2.6	321.3	-8.7	3.1	-83.9
1970	652.3	16.8	3.0	310.9	31.0	2.9	341.4	6.3	3.0	-30.5
1971	733.6	12.5	3.1	356.2	14.6	3.2	377.4	10.5	3.0	-21.2
1972	815.6	11.2	3.1	433.9	21.8	3.3	381.7	1.1	3.0	52.2
1973	994.4	21.9	3.2	372.4	-14.2	2.4	622.0	63.0	3.9	-249.6
1974	1679.8	68.9	4.2	774.1	107.9	4.1	905.7	45.6	4.4	-131.6
1975	1922.4	14.4	3.8	1253.5	61.9	4.7	668.9	-26.1	2.8	584.6
1976	2120.5	10.3	3.7	1372.1	9.5	4.8	748.4	11.9	2.7	623.7
1977	2297.8	8.4	3.6	1444.4	5.3	4.8	853.4	14.0	2.6	591.0
1978	2319.8	1.0	3.3	1583.7	9.6	4.6	736.1	-13.7	2.1	847.6
1979	2597.9	12.0	3.2	1653.5	4.4	4.4	944.4	28.3	2.2	709.1
1980	2722.8	4.8	2.9	1772.6	7.2	4.0	950.2	0.6	1.9	822.4
1981	3029.5	11.3	2.8	2212.7	24.8	4.2	816.8	-14.0	1.4	1395.9
1982	3682.4	21.6	3.1	2925.8	32.2	5.2	756.6	-7.4	1.2	2169.2
1983	3004.0	-18.4	2.4	2175.5	-25.6	3.7	828.5	9.5	1.2	1347.0
1984	2894.3	-3.7	2.1	2054.3	-5.6	3.1	840.0	1.4	1.1	1214.3
1985	3216.0	11.1	2.3	2287.1	11.3	3.3	928.9	10.6	1.3	1358.2
1986	3185.3	-1.0	2.4	2205.4	-3.6	3.5	979.9	5.5	1.4	1225.5
1987	2600.7	-18.4	2.0	1628.2	-26.2	2.7	972.5	-0.8	1.4	655.7
1988	3135.1	20.5	2.4	1950.9	19.8	3.0	1184.2	21.8	1.8	766.7
1989	3481.0	11.0	2.5	2138.0	9.6	3.0	1343.0	13.4	2.0	795.0

Note:

Columns "%" show annual increase rates, calculated by the author.

Columns "Share" show Japan's share in the total foreign trade, imports and exports, of the USSR respectively (%), calculated by the author.

Source:

Soviet official foreign trade statistics.

Table 3. Japan's Trade with the USSR in Yen Value (Million Yens)

	Export			Import		
	Mil. ¥	Share	F.E.R.	Mil. ¥	Share	F.E.R.
1960	21,387	1.5	356.6	30,690	1.9	352.7
1961	23,216	1.5	355.1	51,659	2.5	355.3
1962	53,780	3.0	360.0	53,031	2.6	360.0
1963	56,929	2.9	360.0	58,298	2.4	360.0
1964	65,452	2.7	360.0	81,622	2.9	360.0
1965	60,609	2.0	360.0	86,471	2.9	360.0
1966	77,048	2.2	360.0	108,130	3.2	360.0
1967	56,768	1.5	360.0	163,410	3.9	360.0
1968	64,446	1.4	360.0	166,864	3.6	360.0
1969	96,569	1.7	360.0	166,163	3.1	360.0
1970	122,736	1.8	360.0	173,174	2.5	360.0
1971	131,994	1.6	349.9	173,848	2.5	350.6
1972	155,287	1.8	308.0	182,923	2.5	308.0
1973	131,625	1.3	271.8	292,260	2.8	271.2
1974	321,514	2.0	293.4	413,056	2.3	291.3
1975	482,284	2.9	296.6	346,761	2.0	296.5
1976	667,522	3.3	296.4	346,287	1.8	296.6
1977	526,135	2.4	272.1	384,909	2.0	270.7
1978	525,613	2.6	210.1	304,712	1.8	211.4
1979	535,286	2.4	217.5	419,129	1.7	219.4
1980	628,748	2.1	226.3	423,635	1.3	227.8
1981	713,719	2.1	219.0	443,745	1.4	219.6
1982	967,852	2.8	248.2	412,264	1.3	245.1
1983	669,505	1.9	237.3	345,661	1.2	237.4
1984	596,073	1.5	236.7	329,492	1.0	236.4
1985	661,267	1.6	240.4	339,513	1.1	237.5
1986	537,602	1.5	170.7	336,223	1.6	270.5
1987	371,952	1.1	145.1	340,768	1.6	144.9
1988	401,470	1.2	128.3	355,247	1.5	128.4
1989	422,970	1.1	137.3	413,275	1.4	137.6

Note :

Columns "Share" show Soviet share in Japan's exports and imports respectively (%), calculated by the author.

Columns "F.E.R." show implicit foreign exchange rates, calculated by using exports and imports data shown in this Table and Table 1 (yen per dollar).

Source :

Statistical Bureau, *Japan Statistical Yearbook* and *Historical Statistics of Japan*. MITI, *Tsuso Hokusyo*.

Table 4. Japan's Imports from the USSR by Commodity (Million Dollars)

	①	②	③	④	⑤	⑥	⑦	⑧	⑨
1960	87.0	6.5	15.6	7.7	15.2	4.4
1961	145.4	4.6	23.6	13.3	33.0	13.4
1962	147.3	0.9	37.8	17.0	31.2	16.6
1963	161.9	0.8	33.9	14.9	30.5	19.3
1964	226.7	2.8	1.9	50.6	16.5	35.6	22.6	21.5
1965	240.2	2.6	7.1	58.3	17.9	32.0	28.4	25.7
1966	300.4	3.7	13.0	76.5	22.9	40.2	27.4	31.7
1967	453.9	5.3	36.7	119.6	34.1	31.6	30.6	63.4
1968	463.5	3.5	49.8	164.0	39.6	11.9	30.5	66.6
1969	461.6	4.8	45.8	170.2	46.2	7.9	13.4	76.4
1970	481.0	5.4	24.3	197.7	43.7	7.6	25.0	76.3
1971	495.9	3.8	34.1	197.0	45.5	8.4	23.9	79.9
1972	593.9	4.4	75.7	225.9	49.0	7.7	17.7	121.3
1973	1077.7	14.7	103.7	424.1	57.0	30.6	26.2	264.6
1974	1418.1	25.8	189.6	520.6	110.1	20.9	81.6	272.0
1975	1169.6	13.9	171.1	418.0	164.0	5.1	59.5	161.8	0.0
1976	1167.4	16.1	127.9	416.0	175.2	6.6	81.9	153.0	1.2
1977	1421.9	16.7	190.9	538.3	165.6	6.3	70.4	188.5	5.6
1978	1441.7	27.7	149.7	527.7	133.3	5.0	68.7	268.1	32.8
1979	1910.7	42.3	151.8	732.1	124.1	7.5	153.6	323.4	41.6
1980	1859.9	34.8	108.0	705.9	120.7	21.0	150.2	328.3	47.5
1981	2020.7	47.0	173.0	458.5	91.1	21.2	204.1	235.6	535.5
1982	1682.0	50.4	159.8	396.9	94.4	7.3	159.9	219.2	367.8
1983	1456.0	49.0	79.2	408.1	110.0	15.9	145.1	260.0	107.7
1984	1394.0	74.7	76.8	356.1	118.7	16.3	140.8	283.3	64.0
1985	1429.3	67.9	28.3	350.4	197.5	23.9	129.8	229.8	154.2
1986	1972.0	122.9	56.7	445.8	270.6	8.7	84.0	304.2	387.4
1987	2351.9	167.8	51.2	404.8	297.0	6.4	132.2	538.1	429.8
1988	2765.8	269.3	34.2	603.9	388.6	6.4	104.1	642.0	335.5
1989	3004.5	238.7	62.3	623.0	449.4	0.0	128.1	794.9	228.6

(Share: %)									
1960	100.0	7.5	17.9	8.8	17.5	5.0
1961	100.0	3.2	16.2	9.1	22.7	9.2
1962	100.0	0.6	25.6	11.6	21.2	11.3
1963	100.0	0.5	21.0	9.2	18.8	11.9
1964	100.0	1.2	0.8	22.3	7.3	15.7	10.0	9.5
1965	100.0	1.1	3.0	24.3	7.4	13.3	11.8	10.7
1966	100.0	1.2	4.3	25.5	7.6	13.4	9.1	10.6
1967	100.0	1.2	8.1	26.3	7.5	7.0	6.8	14.0
1968	100.0	0.8	10.7	35.4	8.5	2.6	6.6	14.4
1969	100.0	1.0	9.9	36.9	10.0	1.7	2.9	16.6
1970	100.0	1.1	5.1	41.1	9.1	1.6	5.2	15.9
1971	100.0	0.8	6.9	39.7	9.2	1.7	4.8	16.1
1972	100.0	0.7	12.7	38.0	8.3	1.3	3.0	20.4
1973	100.0	1.4	9.6	39.4	5.3	2.8	2.4	24.5
1974	100.0	1.8	13.4	36.7	7.8	1.5	5.8	19.2
1975	100.0	1.2	14.6	35.7	14.0	0.4	5.1	13.8	0.0
1976	100.0	1.4	11.0	35.6	15.0	0.6	7.0	13.1	0.1
1977	100.0	1.2	13.4	37.9	11.6	0.4	4.9	13.3	0.4
1978	100.0	1.9	10.4	36.6	9.2	0.3	4.8	18.6	2.3
1979	100.0	2.2	7.9	38.3	6.5	0.4	8.0	16.9	2.2
1980	100.0	1.9	5.8	38.0	6.5	1.1	8.1	17.7	2.6
1981	100.0	2.3	8.6	22.7	4.5	1.0	10.1	11.7	26.5
1982	100.0	3.0	9.5	23.6	5.6	0.4	9.5	13.0	21.9
1983	100.0	3.4	5.4	28.0	7.6	1.1	10.0	17.9	7.4
1984	100.0	5.4	5.5	25.5	8.5	1.2	10.1	20.3	4.6
1985	100.0	4.8	2.0	24.5	13.8	1.7	9.1	16.1	10.8
1986	100.0	6.2	2.9	22.6	13.7	0.4	4.3	15.4	19.6
1987	100.0	7.1	2.2	17.2	12.6	0.3	5.6	22.9	18.3
1988	100.0	9.7	1.2	21.8	14.0	0.2	3.8	23.2	12.1
1989	100.0	7.9	2.1	20.7	15.0	0.0	4.3	26.5	7.6

Note :

- ① : Total Imports.
- ② : Fish.
- ③ : Cotton.
- ④ : Timber.
- ⑤ : Coal.
- ⑥ : Crude Oil.
- ⑦ : Petroleum Products.
- ⑧ : Non Ferrous Metals.
- ⑨ : Gold.

Source :

Japan Association for Trade with Soviet Union &
Central-Eastern Europe (SOTOBO).

Table 5. Japan's Exports to the USSR by Commodity (Million dollars)

	①	②	③	④	⑤	⑥	⑦	⑧	⑨
1960	60.0	9.2	1.3	23.1	11.8	18.2	4.9	1.3	11.2
1961	65.4	12.2	0.7	14.9	10.8	27.1	20.7	0.1	4.8
1962	149.4	24.0	2.6	32.7	6.3	81.6	39.5	2.9	37.8
1963	158.1	23.7	4.6	40.8	9.6	76.9	35.4	6.2	34.1
1964	181.8	22.1	11.5	14.3	4.7	117.0	47.0	5.8	62.6
1965	168.4	26.6	23.6	33.3	26.5	63.1	21.8	4.1	34.0
1966	214.0	48.0	24.1	30.7	28.1	92.5	29.6	7.8	50.9
1967	157.7	46.5	21.3	18.2	16.6	53.1	40.6	8.4	0.1
1968	179.0	58.2	20.7	27.0	16.9	50.3	36.1	9.7	0.7
1969	268.2	85.4	36.7	38.6	26.3	74.0	50.4	13.0	6.6
1970	340.9	103.8	40.8	45.3	22.1	108.7	69.4	14.2	20.0
1971	377.3	93.1	55.5	68.0	25.8	122.1	71.4	18.8	27.8
1972	504.2	113.8	49.0	86.6	42.5	203.5	138.0	22.0	36.8
1973	484.2	70.7	42.7	137.2	54.5	176.8	126.9	19.0	23.0
1974	1095.6	150.4	109.6	481.6	99.8	239.4	149.5	30.9	49.8
1975	1626.2	168.3	176.2	549.4	297.2	574.3	323.0	85.1	150.2
1976	2251.9	142.0	149.9	1062.2	688.8	697.8	473.5	71.2	138.3
1977	1933.9	201.3	153.7	550.5	348.8	789.6	554.4	89.5	126.3
1978	2502.2	129.4	188.3	726.2	533.8	1197.0	836.6	191.4	142.1
1979	2461.5	148.5	200.4	1028.0	752.9	808.4	497.5	157.5	120.1
1980	1778.2	244.4	335.4	966.3	543.8	872.0	509.3	130.8	207.0
1981	3259.4	263.4	262.8	1315.4	963.0	1048.0	637.3	125.3	258.4
1982	3898.8	219.1	272.5	1605.1	1272.6	1465.7	1040.3	123.6	273.7
1983	2821.2	239.7	244.1	1026.5	728.4	947.7	629.4	118.1	169.5
1984	2518.3	195.3	232.3	953.3	715.7	770.2	459.4	133.5	139.4
1985	2750.6	167.1	257.9	863.2	653.3	1050.0	627.8	191.2	199.2
1986	3149.5	119.8	229.1	1142.6	989.9	1316.7	834.5	192.2	257.3
1987	2563.3	110.8	334.2	999.1	795.5	844.8	541.0	214.9	63.7
1988	3129.9	108.5	359.5	1259.7	841.8	1096.2	637.9	289.9	136.3
1989	3081.7	138.0	365.4	784.4	395.8	1386.2	790.3	383.1	152.7

	(Share : %)								
1960	100.0	15.3	2.2	38.6	19.7	30.3	8.1	2.2	18.7
1961	100.0	18.7	1.1	22.8	16.4	41.4	31.6	0.2	7.3
1962	100.0	16.0	1.7	21.9	4.2	54.6	26.4	1.9	25.3
1963	100.0	15.0	2.9	25.8	6.0	48.6	22.4	3.9	21.6
1964	100.0	12.2	6.3	7.9	2.6	64.4	25.9	3.2	34.5
1965	100.0	15.8	14.0	19.8	15.7	37.5	12.9	2.5	20.2
1966	100.0	22.4	11.2	14.3	13.1	43.2	13.8	3.6	23.8
1967	100.0	29.5	13.5	11.5	10.5	33.6	25.7	5.4	0.1
1968	100.0	32.5	11.6	15.1	9.4	28.1	20.1	5.4	0.4
1969	100.0	31.8	13.7	14.4	9.8	27.6	18.8	4.9	2.4
1970	100.0	30.4	12.0	13.3	6.5	31.9	20.3	4.2	5.9
1971	100.0	24.7	14.7	18.0	6.9	32.4	18.9	5.0	7.4
1972	100.0	22.6	9.7	17.2	8.4	40.4	27.4	4.4	7.3
1973	100.0	14.6	8.8	28.3	11.2	36.5	26.2	3.9	4.7
1974	100.0	13.7	10.0	44.0	9.1	21.9	13.6	2.8	4.5
1975	100.0	10.4	10.8	33.8	18.3	35.3	19.9	5.2	9.2
1976	100.0	6.3	6.7	47.2	30.6	31.0	21.0	3.2	6.1
1977	100.0	10.4	7.9	28.5	18.0	40.8	28.7	4.6	6.5
1978	100.0	5.2	7.5	29.0	21.3	47.8	33.4	7.7	5.7
1979	100.0	6.0	8.1	41.8	30.6	32.8	20.2	6.4	4.9
1980	100.0	8.8	12.1	34.8	19.6	31.4	18.3	4.7	7.5
1981	100.0	8.1	8.1	40.4	29.5	32.2	19.6	3.8	7.9
1982	100.0	5.6	7.0	41.2	32.6	37.6	26.7	3.2	7.0
1983	100.0	8.5	8.7	36.4	25.8	33.6	22.3	4.2	6.0
1984	100.0	7.8	9.2	37.9	28.4	30.6	18.2	5.3	5.5
1985	100.0	6.1	9.4	31.4	23.8	38.2	22.8	6.9	7.2
1986	100.0	3.8	7.3	36.3	31.4	41.8	26.5	6.1	8.2
1987	100.0	4.3	13.0	39.0	31.0	33.0	21.1	8.4	2.5
1988	100.0	3.5	11.5	40.2	26.9	35.0	20.4	9.3	4.4
1989	100.0	4.5	11.9	25.5	12.8	45.0	25.6	12.4	5.0

Note :

- ① : Total Exports.
- ② : Textile.
- ③ : Chemicals.
- ④ : Iron and Steel.
- ⑤ : including, Steel Pipe.
- ⑥ : Machinery.
- ⑦ : including, Machinery in General.
- ⑧ : Electric Machinery.
- ⑨ : Transport Machinery.

Source :

Japan Association for Trade with Soviet Union & Central-Eastern Europe (SOTOBO).