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Political Fragmentation in Russia: Is the Multi-Party System Bound to Fail in a Post-Communist Country?***

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“Why do seeds of democracy bear such grotesque fruits on our soil?”
From: Irina Demchenko, “Epokha ‘Reformatorstva sverkhu’ v Rossii zakonchilas’,” *Nezavisimaaia gazeta*, 4 February (1993).

1. Problem Setting

It is an intriguing but difficult question for political scientists to define what kind of political system is emerging in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. What is certain is that a fundamental transformation of political system has taken place. The monopolistic rule is gone. The society has become pluralistic, that is, a large number of social groups with diverging interests have surfaced up and are given the possibility to publicly articulate their interests without control or intervention from the single commanding height. Apparently politics is made as a result of compromise among conflicting groups. Whether this is fully institutionalized or not is another question. It might be possible to suppose for analytical purpose that what we have to do with is the direction for a pluralist democracy. This does not mean that the process is irreversible or does not take a different direction. Under the present volatile circumstances any course of development is an open possibility. We assume just for technical purpose that the countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are heading for a pluralist democracy, in order to examine whether this is the case.

The author of the present paper has recently undertaken a comparative study of the institutionalization of pluralist democracy in Eastern Europe.¹ The author proceeds on the assumption that there are five important processes for a pluralist democracy to be institutionalized: growing consensus on the supreme power's location, establishing of legitimacy of rule, formation of political leadership, organizing of citizens' political life, and integration of centrifugal forces. Some of these processes may overlap one other, but each one has a significance in its own right. There may be processes that are of importance for other systems and not included here, but the author believes that these five are of cardinal importance for the institutionalization of a pluralist democracy. The present paper is an attempt to apply to Russia the scheme originally conceived for Eastern Europe, focusing on the fourth process: organizing of citizens' political life. The study is bound to be in comparative perspective, drawing heavily on East European experiences.

The organizing of citizens' political life is a process necessary for any political system to be institutionalized, but the way it takes place varies. Under the monopolistic rule the Communist party claimed to the exclusive

right to organize citizens' political life and guarded this right jealously. Whenever political centers other than the Communist party appeared and tried to organize citizens, they were isolated and severely suppressed. This led to a phenomenon called "atomization of citizens." For a pluralist democracy to be institutionalized, this state of affairs has to be overcome, and citizens' political life organized from bottom, without interference from the state authorities, and on a competitive basis.

At first citizens may be socially organized, that is, around certain economic, cultural, ethnic, religious, regional, and other societal interests. This is the task of social associations like trade unions, industrialists' unions, churches, etc. When they try to aggregate societal interests of members and transmit them into the political system, they turn into so-called pressure groups. Pressure groups are the indispensable element of a pluralist democracy. But the task of organizing citizens' political life rests first of all with political parties. Unlike pressure groups political parties do not limit themselves to certain segments of society, but compete against each other for influence over the entire population. Therefore, they try to integrate interests of citizens with diverse societal backgrounds into a general policy proposal for the nation as a whole. The ultimate objective of all political parties is to assume state power to put into practice their policy, which pressure groups do not aim at.

The locus where aspirations of political parties are translated into power is normally the parliament. If the president is elected by a popular vote and given a strong executive power, as is the case in Russia, the presidential office is another such locus. As under the pluralist democracy the parliament is formed through competitive elections, the fortune of political parties is determined by elections. They are strongly motivated to mobilize citizens for elections. Citizens are more or less organized into a constituency of this or that party. But for elections, political parties would be little interested in organizing citizens.

The most important function of elections is, however, to bring about the government authorities. Elections would be meaningless if their results would be such that no government capable of functioning could be called into being. In most countries, therefore, an electoral system is conceived which makes it easy for the parliament to form the government. The electoral system has the crucial importance for the way political parties organize citizens. It may favor certain parties far beyond the actual vote they receive and condemn other parties to the political periphery. Political parties are forced to adapt themselves to the electoral system, making a coalition with others or joining others to form a larger party. In some countries the political culture does not allow parties to make a compromise, and an electoral system is adopted which tends to produce a fragmented parliament. What kind of electoral system is adopted depends after all on the will of political parties. In such cases a permanent government crisis ensues. This might be fateful for the viability of a pluralist democracy.

Being basically an East Europeanist, the author must admit that his capabilities of elaborating Russian sources are limited. The study relies mainly on Russian newspapers in the last few months, materials he collected during his recent visit to Moscow, and secondary sources such as *RFE-RL reports*. There may arise serious gaps in his information that must be filled by further investigations.

2. Entry Conditions

Although some components of the new system date far back into the past, it is safe to assume for most of the East European countries that the new system started to take shape with the Round Table in 1989. The Round Table was an institution where the old and the new elites got together and set out to establish basic principles of political rule for the transitional period. An embryonic form of a multi-party system appeared already at this stage: the "government coalition side," meaning the Communists and their satellite parties, and the "opposition Solidarity side," as it was called in Poland. Before this date, dissident groups existed as an integral part of the old system, though surely they intended to undermine it. After this date, on the contrary, even the Communists became an integral part of the new system, though, again, their activities may undermine it.

As for Russia it is rather hard to establish such a dividing date. Perestroika was a gradual transformation that lasted for six years. During the long perestroika years no serious attempt appeared to call into being a Round Table-like institution. Finally in February 1993 a Round Table met in Moscow, but its task was not to establish principles of political rule in the country, but only to consult the society on economic reforms. Participants were not delegated from bottom, but nominated from above.² Even if it took upon itself the same mission as its counterparts in Eastern Europe, it could not perform the same function because the circumstances are completely different today. Some may take as a starting point the abrogation of the constitutional provision on the leading role of the Communist party in February 1990, but the one party rule continued to exist for a while. Indeed, a large number of non-Communist organizations such as "neformalnye," popular fronts, or even self-styled "political parties" popped up in 1988-89. In March 1989 the first, though half-way free, elections were held for the Congress of People's Deputies. At the Congress the so-called "Inter-Regional Group of Deputies" was formed. This may be called the first opposition party. None of these groups, however, deserved the name of a political party. They were nothing but a handful of intellectuals without stable organizational structures, not to speak of aspiring for state power. They were at most intellectual pressure groups within the old system.

Others may take the August Coup of 1991 as a starting point. Indeed, the aborted August Coup accelerated the collapse of the old system. The Communist party, the single most important pillar of the old system, was

banned. Soon followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union. But, institutionally speaking and as far as the Russian Federation is concerned, the August Coup represents no clear-cut divide. Almost all the important state organs of the Russian Federation: the President, the Supreme Soviet, and the Congress of People's Deputies continued to function in their old composition. Therefore, not the August Coup or the events that followed it, but rather the events preceding it, that is, the elections to the Congress of People's Deputies in March 1990 and the presidential election in June 1991 must be taken as a watershed in Russia comparable to the holding of the Round Table in Eastern Europe.

To what extent, however, is it possible to say that with these events the new system started to work in Russia? Especially with regard to the organizing of citizens' political life in a pluralistic way? The answer is rather in the negative. Indeed, the elections to Russia's Congress of People's Deputies brought into the Parliament more radical elements than the elections to the Union's counterpart a year before. The electoral law was fairer to non-party forces than in the case of the Union's elections. The Democratic Russia (DR), a coalition of opposition forces, appeared victorious from the elections. It once controlled almost 40% of the seats. The presidential election was more clearly the case of multi-party contention in which the non-party candidate Boris Yeltsin won a landslide over Communist and other candidates. However, one should not forget that at that time the Russian Federation was nothing but a province of the Soviet Union. A majority in the parliament and even the presidency of the Russian Federation were hardly a force counterpoised to the mammoth Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In addition, the DR was not a stable structure, as we see below. Yeltsin's victory in the presidential election was not a victory of an organized force, but rather a victory of personal charisma. Yeltsin, confident of his own charisma, did not make haste, either before the election or after it, to set up a party that would provide him with a political arm. Instead, he tried to stand aloof from all political forces. He kept a certain distance even from the DR that actively campaigned for his presidency.³

Thus, the conditions of the entry into the new period were different between Eastern Europe and Russia. In Eastern Europe an embryonic party politics appeared at the Round Table, while in Russia parties played a marginal role in the elections to the Congress of People's Deputies as well as in the presidential election. Of course, one should be cautious of over-generalization. The Round Table was a product of pure elite politics, and the linkage between the elites represented at the Round Table and their potential constituencies remained to be defined. Of all East European countries, it is only in Poland that the Round Table more or less successfully carried out the tasks it took upon itself. Even in Poland the agreements attained at the Round Table became soon out-dated, and the Round Table coalitions broke up. Nevertheless, the fact that there was a kind of party politics at the threshold of the new system is significant in the light of later developments. In Russia

elections preceded the formation of parties. Surely there did appear a couple of groups that called themselves "political parties," but they had little role to play in elections. Therefore, neither parliamentarians nor the President felt bound to political parties or to their constituencies.

3. Formation of a Multi-Party System

If citizens were atomized under the old system, it is inevitable that an amorphous political life showed up from under the cover of monolithic uniformity when the old system collapsed. A large number of political groups mushroomed, and citizens were quite at a loss about which one of those they should identify themselves with. The initial stage of affairs was necessarily a political fragmentation.

In Eastern Europe the Round Table coalitions broke up as soon as it became clear that the old system collapsed ultimately. The satellite parties quickly deserted the government bloc and tried to adapt themselves to the new situation as independent parties. The Communists, when they lost the privileged status as monopolistic state party, tried to reconstitute themselves under a new name as a parliamentary party. Many splinter groups on the right and left seceded from the main stream and established new parties.

The opposition bloc named itself differently in each of East European countries: the Civic Committee of Solidarity in Poland, the New Forum in East Germany, the Civic Forum in the Czech Republic (the Public against Violence in the Slovak Republic), the Democratic Forum (DF) in Hungary, the National Salvation Front (NSF) in Rumania, and the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) in Bulgaria. They differed from each other in strength and orientation. Some of them were more united, and others not. Some were staunchly anti-Communist, and others centered around the opposition in the Communist party. But they had one thing in common: They tried to unite most diverse political trends in the country, from extreme nationalism through Christian democracy to social democracy, around the common goal of fighting against the Communist monopoly of power. Some were more successful, and others less. Most of them split into their proper components as soon as they came nearer to power and lost the common enemy to fight against.

In mid-1992 we have a most motley palette of political landscape in Eastern Europe: There are about 150 registered political parties and associations in Poland, 140 in Rumania, 80 in Hungary, 44 in Czechoslovakia, 42 in Bulgaria, and 18 in Albania. Most of them were combed out in elections. The political forces that managed to get represented in the parliament are: 29 in Poland, 9 in Rumania, 6 in Hungary, 15 in Czechoslovakia (8 in the Czech Republic and 7 in the Slovak Republic), 3 in Bulgaria, and 4 in Albania. Except Bulgaria and Albania, the numbers of the forces represented in the parliament are still substantial.

What kind of parties are they? Taking Poland for example, some salient features are singled out: First, in most cases they are parties organized around a few visible intellectuals. In this sense they are more a *Honoratioren-Partei* than a *Massen-Partei* in the Weberian sense. Constituencies identify themselves more with those personalities than with parties as such, their programs or organizational structures. Second, ties with a particular social stratum or class are difficult to identify. Most of the parties actively deny this and emphasize to represent the interests of the entire society or nation. Even as to those which pretend to cultivate special ties with a certain stratum, such relationship does not always exist in actual fact, except possibly for peasant parties. Third, few parties have a consistent program, not to speak of a *Weltanschauung*. True, some are more liberal-democratic, some others more conservative or clerical, still others more social-democratic, and so on, but not seldom the same party advocates contradictory policies. Fourth, the membership is very small. Only post-Communist and post-satellite parties can boast of a sizable membership. Even their membership drastically decreased, and to what extent those who remained in the party remained out of conviction or out of sheer inertia or expedience cannot be ascertained. Fifth, the organizational structures are underdeveloped or do not exist at all. Parliamentary fractions tend to replace formal decision-making bodies of the party. Finally, the party discipline is weak. Parliamentarians feel free to express their opinions running counter to the policy of the party leadership, break with the party, join another party, or found a new party. As a result, the constellation of forces in the Parliament constantly changes.

It is hard to say to what extent these features are attributed to the tradition or political culture, to the legacy of Communism, to the new institutional framework, or to general socio-economic conditions today. Certainly all these factors are at work. However, at least for the time being, the legacy of Communism seems to be decisive. Indeed, the pre-Communist past is still in vivid memory of many people in Eastern Europe. Everywhere serious attempts were made to revive so-called historical parties. But those resurrected parties have little resemblance to their historical antecedents and cannot do, because social strata that supported them, such as large landowners, individual farmers or peasants, independent entrepreneurs, small manufacturers, professionals, clericals, etc., were destroyed or seriously weakened during the long Communist period. They are now in the making or remaking. For the transitional period a more or less similar, fragmented and unstable multi-party system is crystallizing throughout Eastern Europe in spite of all national differences. Apparently the emerging system is a fragile one and not always adequate to integrate citizens' diverse interests into a general policy proposal. But at least it is fulfilling the task of organizing atomized citizens, however awkwardly it might be.

Currently a 10 volume handbook on Russian parties, associations, unions, and clubs is being compiled by a group of Russian political scientists and

historians.⁴ It strives to be comprehensive and list in alphabetical order all political groupings existing in Russia. In the 6 volumes that have appeared by the time of writing this paper, altogether 100 political organizations are listed. Supposed that the average number of groupings listed in one volume will remain the same for forthcoming issues, the total number will reach 163. Probably the number will go beyond it because new groupings will have been founded in the meantime.

Most of the groupings appeared in the wake of elections in 1989 and 1990. That means, they started as fractions of deputies or parliamentarians. Some of them tried to build a nation-wide organization, but many remained pure parliamentary groups. Some others were set up outside of the parliament. They have had no opportunity to take part in elections or refused to do so. In the meantime the transformation of the political system has made a great progress. A gap tends to open up and widen between the parliamentary politics and the political life outside of the parliament.

As noted above, in Russia there was no lining up of forces between the government and the opposition. Most of the leading personalities today were recruited from within the old system. One might say that the government camp split into two: one group took power, and the other went into opposition. This may be the real meaning of the "revolution from above" that took place in Russia. Let us begin with that group in the former government camp which went into opposition.

Unlike Eastern Europe, there could be no formal "government coalition" in Russia because there was a one party rule. In practice, however, there was a kind of coalition. The last phase of the Gorbachev administration may be called a coalition of party centrists and party conservatives. Yeltsin first belonged to the party reformers and then broke with the party itself. The August Coup was a shell shock for the government coalition. Yeltsin banned the Communist party and drove Gorbachev out of power by dissolving the Union. Characteristically no single party member rushed to the party headquarters on the Old Square to defend it against police forces Yeltsin sent to seal it off. Apparently the Communist party had long outlived its life as a political party and turned into something like a government organ. It disappeared just as a government organ closed down.

For the time being it looked as if old coalition forces had been completely erased out of the political scene. Gradually, however, successor organizations showed up here and there. First, ideologically oriented groups such as a Unity (*Edinstvo*), a United Front of Toiling Masses, a Marxist Platform, or a Russian Communist Workers' Party raised their voice.⁵ Finally, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) was resurrected with its second extraordinary congress on 13-14 February 1993.⁶ This may be regarded a legitimate heir to the old government coalition, though with strong emphasis on nationalism rather than on socialist internationalism. Gennadii Ziuganov, co-chairman of the Front of National Salvation (FNS), a bloc of nationalist parliamentarians that came into being in the fall of 1992, was elected

chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the party. The right wing weekly *Den'* loudly welcomed the rebirth of the Communist party.⁷ The other partner of the old government coalition, Gorbachev and his company, is still missing as an organized force. They are exposed to attacks from all sides. This is another difference from Eastern Europe where, in most cases, the Communist party was reconstituted in a social-democratic guise.

There was no united coalition of opposition forces in Russia. The DR may be the only group of this kind. At its first congress, held in October 1990, the DR declared its aim to be to deprive the CPSU and its apparatus of state power; it therefore embraced anyone who, for whatever reason, shared this aim. The DR was not composed of anti-Communists only; on the contrary, most of its leaders were loyal members of the CPSU before Gorbachev's ascent to power. In this sense it was a kind of post-Communist party. It assisted Yeltsin in his campaign for speakership and then presidency of the Russian Federation and form a parliamentary backbone for his administration. Yeltsin, however, once elected speaker, left the DR and has never returned to it. Then followed one desertion after another. During the second congress of the DR held in Moscow on 12 November 1991, the leaders of three Russian political parties – Nikolai Travkin of the Democratic Party of Russia (DPR), Viktor Aksiuchits of the Russian Christian Democratic Party (RChDP), and Mikhail Astaf'ev of the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) – declared that their parties were resigning from the DR because its policy might endanger the integrity of the Soviet Union. Oleg Rumiantsev of the Social-Democratic Party of Russia (SDPR) seceded from the movement, accusing it of becoming a super-party similar to the CPSU. In January 1992 five radicals, all founding fathers of the movement – Iurii Afanas'ev, Iurii Burtin, Leonid Batkin, Marina Sal'e, and Bella Denisenko – resigned from the DR, blaming it for having become a tool of the executive.⁸ Thus, the fate of the DR may be comparable to its East European counterparts, with one important difference: It was an offspring of the CPSU, far from being able to unite all opposition forces, not to speak of taking power.

There is another offspring of the CPSU that supported Yeltsin's administration, or, properly speaking, Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoi's power: People's Party of Free Russia (PPFR). The party grew out of the Democratic Platform of the CPSU and was founded by Rutskoi and Vasiliï Lipitskii in August 1991, just before the August Coup. After the coup it attempted to attract for the cause of reform a great mass of party members who felt completely disoriented and homeless after the ban of the CPSU. As Rutskoi, the founding father of the party, increasingly strengthens reserve against Yeltsin, the party tends to become an independent force both from Yeltsin and from the opposition.⁹

The political fragmentation is going on. A whole spectrum of orientations has surfaced up between the CPRF and the DR. Most of the groupings have sprung from the CPSU, but only a few resemble their Communist antecedent. Others are completely new in the Russian political scene. The features that

characterize the East European party system apply to the Russian one even to a greater extent.

First, the Russian politics is far more personalized than the East European one. Grigorii Pashkov, Director of the *Mnenie* Poll Service, told the author of the present paper in early February 1993 in Moscow that it is both impossible and meaningless to investigate how many percents of the population support a particular party, because people simply do not know what kind of party it is; it is much more useful to know which concrete politician they would vote for, and we can, to a certain extent, surmise from this how large support the party represented or symbolized by him enjoys. In the perestroika years, years of glasnost', many intellectuals made names, and people still identify themselves with, if any, these names. This is rather a correct understanding of the real situation, because most of the parties are formed around visible personalities and easily split when a conflict arises among them.

Second, the Russian society is still in great flux. Social strata or classes are in the process of formation. Under these conditions it is difficult to identify a meaningful linkage of parties to societal interests. What makes the matter more complicated is the special character of pressure groups in Russia. The Russian economy is state-owned up to 95% even today. If certain segments of the economy organize themselves into pressure groups, one has to ask the question whether these groups reflect the interests of society or the interests of state. Take, for instance, the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE), headed by Arkadii Vol'skii. This is an organization of directors of state enterprises. If so, is there a great difference between its interests and the interests of other state organs, let's say, Army or KGB (now Ministry of Security)? Of course, there may be conflicts among them, but little difference in nature. They are so-called institutional (as opposed to associational) interest groups. They may represent to the state authorities the interests of all those that serve in the same state institution. In this sense the interests of directors and the interests of workers converge. No wonder that the RUIE and the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FITUR, successor organization of the official trade union) jointly run the press organ *Rabochaia Tribuna*. The conflict between the RUIE and the government is, therefore, the one within one sector of the state administration rather than the one among societal interests.

On the other hand, a sizable number of free enterprises and societal associations have sprung up in the wake of liberalization. They have organized themselves into pressure groups of their own. Some of them founded even political parties, such as the Party of Economic Freedom (PEF), headed by Konstantin Borovoi, or the Farmers' Party of Russia (FPR) (They use "*krest'anskii*" in the sense of "farmers'." Hence this translation). The Russian Christian Democratic Party (RChDP) may be regarded as representing the interests of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Theoretically speaking, there must be a sharp conflict of interest between state enterprises and free enterprises. The relationship between Borovoi and


Vol'skii is, however, unclear: sometimes antagonistic, sometimes cooperative. The fluctuating relationship may indicate that free enterprises in Russia are still rather parasites of the state economy and do not feel able to assert themselves against state enterprises. State enterprises themselves are changing and becoming something like free enterprises. As a result, there may exist real common interests between state enterprises and free enterprises in the proper sense. Today industrial generals feel free from intervention from any side. The dissolution of the Communist party emancipated them from the grip of the party nomenklatura. Even the ministers cannot appoint or fire directors of state enterprises standing under their jurisdiction. As Aleksandr Vladislavlev, co-chairman of the industrial lobby Renewal Union, said, Russia's state enterprise directors have already invested so much energy in their companies over the years that they have acquired some kind of ownership rights to at least a share of them.¹⁰ If state enterprise directors feel being owners of their factories, they are nothing but capitalists in the proper sense of the word! This is also one of the peculiarities that distinguish Russia from Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, in Russia labor conflicts tend to arise not between the enterprise management and workers with the state authorities' standing as a neutral arbitrator, but between the state authorities and workers with the enterprise management's standing on the side of workers.

A new comer to the Russian political scene is regional pressure groups. When the Soviet Union collapsed, national republics became independent. The same process can be observed today in Russia itself. Republics of national minorities within Russia are pushing through their demands for more autonomy. Not only national minorities but also Russians in the provinces vigorously defend their regional interests against Moscow. Currently eight regional associations are at work: Central Russia, the Black Earth Lands, Greater Volga, Siberia, North-West Russia, North Caucasus, the Far East, and Ural. Leaders of these associations hold regular meetings and conduct negotiations with the central government.¹¹ Their voice has become so powerful that no party could ignore them unpunished. The government as well as the opposition are making great efforts to enlist the support of "administrators (local governors)" on their side. President Yeltsin helped to found a Russian Union of Leaders of Territorial Executive Organs of Government in the fall of 1992.¹² The Civic Union (CU) asserts that they pay special attention to local affairs and enjoy the support of "administrators."¹³ True, the specific weight of Moscow in the country's policy-making has diminished. This may be a symptom to be welcomed in the sense of local autonomy which was missing in Russia since the days of *zemstvo*. However, whether and to what extent the "regionalizatsiia" contributes to the organizing of citizens' political life is another question. Given the lack of a dense network of political or societal organizations cutting across the border of regions in Russia, the "regionalizatsiia" is likely to lead to vertical fragmentation.

Third, few parties can be said to possess a consistent policy program. One of the exceptions may be the Democratic Party of Russia (DPR) which consciously pursues to be a program party with organizational discipline and nation-wide network. One should be cautious not to take the party name at its face value. Take, for instance, the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union (LDPSU), headed by Vladimir Zhirinovskii, which has nothing to do with liberal democracy in the Western sense. It would be rather a fascist party in the West.¹⁴ Even the democrats (supporters of the DR) are not democrats in the Western sense; they initially meant just anti-Communists and today actively support the emergency law regime to introduce "democracy."¹⁵ The Western concepts like Left and Right cannot be applied to Russia today where we find such truly bizarre alliances of forces as an alliance from Communists to Monarchists, a Red-Brown alliance, a Right-Left alliance, and so on.

In order to have a clearer picture of the political constellation in Russia today, let us make a matrix with two axes: "Free Economy – Social Protection" and "Openness to the World – Emphasis on National Values," and tentatively place main political groupings in Russia in the four fields. The first axis is rather problemless, but admittedly the second one is a little bit confusing and less useful. In Europe the second axis would be "Secular – Religious" which used to be a dividing line of political orientations. It is the case in Poland still today. Such an axis does not work in Russia where the religious thinking does not penetrate politics. "National Values" may mean two things at the same time in the Russian context: state values and ethnic values, and these may exclude each other. If you put too much emphasis on ethnic Russian values, this may lead to disintegration of the Russian statehood, as it was implicit in Solzhenitsin's famous proposal on "small Russianism." On the other hand, if you put too much emphasis on state values, this may lead to self-restraint and ultimately self-negation of Russian ethnicity, as it was implied by the concept "*sovetskii narod*" or "*sovetskii chelovek*." Both emphasis on ethnic values and emphasis on state values may consist with "Openness to the World," if they do not contradict universal values, as is the case with many countries in the West. However, given the fact that Russia is an empire and cannot be otherwise, too much emphasis on ethnic or state values inevitably leads to rejection of universal values and isolation from the world. Therefore, the author of the present paper believes this axis to be still useful, though it leaves much room for ambiguities.

Table: Political Constellation in Russia, January 1993.



- CDP Constitutional Democratic Party (M. Astaf'ev)
- CPRF Communist Party of the Russian Federation (G. Ziuganov)
- CU Civic Union (A. Vol'skii)
- DPR Democratic Party of Russia (N. Travkin)
- DR Democratic Russia (S. Filatov, G. Starovoitova)
- Edinstvo Russian Unity (S. Baburin, V. Isakov)
- FNS Front of National Salvation (V. Alksnis, G. Ziuganov)
- FPR Farmers' Party of Russia (I. Chernichenko)
- LDPSU Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union (V. Zhirinovskii)
- Pamiat' National Patriotic Front "Pamiat'"
- PFE Party of Free Economy (K. Borovoi)
- PPFR People's Party of Free Russia (A. Rutskoi, V. Lipitskii)
- PPR People's Party of Russia (T. Gdlian)

RChDP	Russian Christian Democratic Party (V. Aksiuchits)
RCWP	Russian Communist Workers' Party (V. Anpilov)
Renewal	All-Russian Renewal Union (A. Vladislavlev, V. Pavlov)
RMDR	Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms (G. Popov, A. Sobchak)
RPRF	Republican Party of the Russian Federation (V. Lysenko)
SDPR	Social Democratic Party of Russia (O. Rumiantsev, B. Orlov)
Smena	New Generation – New Policy
Sobor	Russian National Assembly (A. Sterligov, A. Prokhanov)
WR	Working Russia (V. Anpilov)

*Some of the groupings, such as CV, DR, FNS, RMDR, Sobor, and WR, are coalitions of several groupings. Therefore, their membership overlaps that of other groupings.

It appears from this mapping that the field II is sparsely populated. The main cause of it is doubtless that the social-democratization of the Communist party failed. The most densely populated field III is, properly speaking, a field for conservatives. But no party populating here does not look like a conservative party in the Western sense. This may be explained by the fact that landowners and clericals, the backbone of all conservative parties in the West, are missing or weak in Russia. It looks as if the lack of social democracy and conservatism would bring Russia close to the USA where neither a social democratic party nor a conservative party, but only two liberal parties exist and compete for power against each other. Of course, this is not the case, because there is no social basis for liberals (big business and minorities) in Russia. Three centers of gravity may be singled out: I, III, and crossing of two axes. It is the DR, the CPRF, and the CU respectively that symbolize these centers and are trying to attract other groupings in their vicinity.

Fourth, parties growing directly out of the Communist party boast of a sizable membership. The CPRF is said to number over half a million, and the PPRF 100,000. Of the non-postcommunist parties, the PFE may be the largest: It numbers 200,000 according to its own statement. All other parties are extremely small in membership. If one party has over 10,000 members, it can be safely ranked in the middle size. Most of the parties number only several hundred. This applies particularly to parties growing out of parliamentarians' clubs, such as Edinstvo, Renewal, the SDPR, and Smena. But the membership does not always tell real influence. The CDP, for instance, though it numbers only 1,000 including sympathizers, commands a considerable impact upon the public opinion. What counts under the present circumstances is how many visible intellectuals the given party involves. Parties are not encouraged to organize the population when elections are not held. Only elections would make it possible for them to translate numbers into power. Even if elections are held, however, one may doubt whether citizens' political commitment will increase. A deep-seated political apathy is the main cause for parties to remain small.

Fifth, when the life of a party is short and the membership small, the organizational structure inevitably remains underdeveloped. There are only a few that have a nation-wide network. Most of the parties exist only in Moscow. Indeed, party congresses are held fairly frequently. In most cases, a chairman, a "central coordinating committee" and a standing secretariat are elected. But the structure below the central level remains in the dark. Formally press organs exist, but one seldom sees them in kiosks. The general impression is that parties are just gatherings of like-minded intellectuals. The exception is the CPRF. It has taken over from the old CPSU almost all organizational principles including the ban of factions. *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, the party organ, has a wide circulation. How far the Communist party can retain the same organizational structure under radically changed circumstances remains to be seen.

Finally, the party discipline is almost non-existent. The voting behavior and statements in the parliament indicate that parliamentarians feel responsible only for themselves and not bound by any instruction of the party or bloc to which they belong. Most of the parties do not punish parliamentarians for violation of discipline in fear of losing their membership. One observer attributes this to the fact that the last elections of 1990 were not conducted between competing parties; parliamentarians show no sign of expecting to make their future political careers within the framework of a particular political party; they do not, therefore, feel any compulsion to submit to party discipline.¹⁶ The constellation of forces in the parliament changes constantly, even more radically than in Eastern Europe. The parliament today presents a completely different physiognomy from that in 1990 though the composition remains the same. When such an amorphous situation prevails in the parliament, there is little room for parties to play a role in policy-making.

Thus, the picture we obtain of the emerging multi-party system in Russia is more or less the same as in Eastern Europe: fragmented and unstable. However, the linkage of parties to their constituencies and their participation in the policy-making process is much less defined. For the moment, it is not parties but rather individual politicians that involve the population in politics and formulate policies.

4. Impacts of the Institutional Framework

In most of the East European countries elections have been held several times over since 1989, for executives and parliaments, and on both central and local levels. Parties are strongly motivated to mobilize citizens for their cause whenever elections are held. Electoral laws have been a constant focus of attention throughout Eastern Europe. In many countries they have been adjusted so that a stable majority capable of forming a government might appear from elections. Most countries adopted a proportional electoral system with a percentage clause a la Germany, and some a one-seat or two-seat

electoral district system a la Great Britain. Political parties have had to adapt themselves to the new rules of game. The multi-party system in Eastern Europe has differentiated in the course of such institutional developments.

A subtle difference in the political landscape has appeared between the Balkans and Central Europe. In the Balkans post-Communist parties retain a substantial power, against which opposition parties tend to stick together. In Central Europe post-Communist parties definitely went to opposition, and former opposition parties compete for power without fear of the post-Communist challenge.

In Bulgaria, for instance, the UDF and the Socialists (heir to the Communists) were almost balanced in the elections of October 1991 (34.4% versus 33.1%). Rumania's situation is more complicated. The NSF which was both an opposition bloc and a post-Communist party won an overwhelming majority in the elections of June 1990 (66.4% for the House of Representatives). With the passage of time the NSF turned into a pure post-Communist party, as most of the non-Communist groups seceded from it. The party split into two factions in March 1992, and they faced in the elections of September 1992 a serious challenge from the Democratic Convent for Rumania (DCR), a non-Communist opposition bloc. In the final analysis the Democratic National Salvation Front (DNSF) headed by President Iliescu, the main stream faction of the NSF, defeated the DCR, but by no great margin (27.7% versus 20.0% for the House of Representatives). Only in Albania an opposition party (Democratic Party of Albania – DPA) won a landslide in the elections of March 1992 (62.1%). This is unique throughout Eastern Europe in the sense that a former opposition party alone secured a stable majority in the parliament. But the position of the DPA seems not to be guaranteed enough against the post-Communist challenge, as local elections in the summer of 1992 indicated.

In Central Europe where the post-Communist challenge virtually disappeared, the politics tends either to become extremely fragmented and unstable as in the case of Poland or to stabilize with one former opposition party taking a dominating position as in the case of the Czech Republic. Poland was the only country in Eastern Europe that adopted an almost pure proportional electoral system for the Sejm, and the result was a crippled parliament with 29 parties fighting against one another. In Poland, however, even if a percentage clause had been introduced, the result would not have been much different, because the vote was almost evenly distributed among the top 9 parties. In the Czech Republic the bloc of Civic Democrats and Christian Democrats won 48.5% of the seats in the People's Chamber of the Federal Parliament, creating a solid basis for Vaclav Klaus' government. The same applies to the Slovak Republic where the movement for Democratic Slovakia headed by Vladimir Meciar won 47.1% of the seats. The case in between is Hungary. Hungary is the only country in Eastern Europe that did not need to repeat elections. The first elections of March 1990 already

produced a relative majority for the Democratic Forum (42.7% of the seats), providing a stable basis for Jozsef Antall's government. But opinion polls reveal that in the meantime the support for the government coalition has greatly eroded, and nobody knows what results the next elections in 1994 would produce.

In sharp contrast to Eastern Europe no elections have been held in Russia since the new system was inaugurated. Indeed, elections were held preceding to it, but under the old system. The paradox of the Russian situation is that institutions of the new system are still based on the elections held under the old system. In the fall of 1991 President Yeltsin took a fateful decision not to conduct elections from top to bottom, in the belief that he already had a parliamentary basis strong enough to carry out reforms and for fear that party conservatives might win in free elections. Since elections are not envisaged until 1995, no serious discussion takes place on the electoral law. Political parties are not motivated to mobilize citizens for their cause and feel free from compulsion to adapt themselves to an electoral system. The Russian party politics, though noisy, looks like a balloon which is no longer tied to the earth by a robust string called elections, drifting freely in the air.

While the parties remain weak, a strong rivalry has unfolded between the legislative power and the executive power. The rivalry is all-embracing and tends to shadow all other political conflicts, including those among parties. In fact, the rivalry may be regarded a substitute for party politics. What is more intriguing, the third power in the state, the Constitutional Court headed by Zor'kin, seems to try to join the game. The Constitutional Court seems to believe that its main task consists in balancing or mediating between the legislative and the executive. Its readiness to play this role surely helps to take off the acrimony of the situation. However, whether this enhances its authority as juridical power leaves room for doubts, because it runs the risk of becoming a party to the political game.

Just before the seventh Congress of People's Deputies in early December 1992, *Izvestiia* received a study on the voting behavior of people's deputies from scholars who wanted to remain anonymous for a while.¹⁷ According to this study, from the first to the fourth congress the structure of the corps of people's deputies had a simple and clear character, and its voting behavior was predictable. It was divided into two groups on the basic issues at that time: the power monopoly of the Communist party, the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, the deideologization of the state, and the creation of the presidency. At the third congress in March-April 1991 clear pro-Communists were 464, clear pro-democrats 479, and oscillators 95. A great change set in at the fifth, particularly at the sixth congress. Issues of contention shifted after the coup. The main issues at the sixth congress were: conflicts between the legislature and the executive, additional plenary powers for the President, and attempts to force the government to give up its reformist course. At this congress there were 240 supporters for the government, 571 opponents, and 227 centrists. The dissolution of the Union provoked much controversy, but

694 deputies approved it as a *fait accompli*, 187 did not know how to respond to this historical event, and 157 were consistent supporters of the unshakable and indivisible Union.

“It is difficult to say exactly how many fractions there are in the corps of deputies. It is also difficult to give exactly how many deputies this or that fraction counts. Not seldom one deputy joins several fractions, which would be a political nonsense. Therefore, no wonder that members of one fraction vote differently on one and the same issue. To which fraction the deputy belongs is not so important. It is his place in the structure of administration that influences his behavior. When they were elected, 22% of the deputies occupied a high, 36% a middle, and 21% a low echelon in administration. Up to the August 1991 the course of the Russian congress was a compromise between the deputies belonging to the *nomenklatura* class and the ones striving to abolish that system... However, after the August... we observe a victorious offensive of *nomenklatura* forces on all fronts... One more unexpected thing happened: a mass desertion of ‘democrats’ to the enemy camp. For example, of the 476 democrats at the time of the third congress, 98 went over to the group of extreme opponents of reforms, 155 became oscillators, and only 226 remained at the previous position... Now Communists and former democrats are united by the pro-*nomenklatura* position on land, the economy, reforms, freedom of press, and so on.” Concluding that the voting behavior of people’s deputies has increasingly become unpredictable, the anonymous scholars warned that the government would suffer a defeat at the next congress.¹⁸

As predicted, President Yeltsin and his government suffered a serious setback at the seventh Congress of People’s Deputies. Generally speaking, the Congress of People’s Deputies is more radical than the Supreme Soviet. If a shift in the conservative direction occurred to the Congress of People’s Deputies, it must apply even more to the Supreme Soviet.

What is really amazing is the strong position of the legislature vis-a-vis the executive. First of all we have to bear in mind that this is not exactly the legislature as understood in the West. Sergei Alekseev, jurist and former chairman of the Union’s Constitutional Commission, draws attention to the phenomenon of the legislature’s “takeover” of executive functions. This is one of the legacies of the past ideology: “All the power to the soviets.” For instance, the legislative organ is entitled to dispose of the federal property. It is already carrying out immediate administrative activities in this sphere and has obtained a colossal amount of money. Also the Central Bank is subordinated to the Supreme Soviet. The Fond of State Property (*Fond imushchestva*), a super-ministry managing a gigantic complex of properties of the national economy, comes under the jurisdiction of the legislative organ. The government loses thereby the material basis for administration. The vertical axis of state administration is endangered by local soviets’ taking over all administrative functions, a rule fixed in local constitutions on *krai* and *oblast*’ levels.¹⁹

In October 1992 a surprising fact was revealed to the world: The Supreme Soviet maintains its own police forces in the size of 5,000 men. President Yeltsin decreed the dissolution of it, but in vain. At the seventh Congress of People's Deputies all "coercive ministers (*silovye ministry*)," meaning defense, security, and interior ministers, declared their faithfulness to the law. This is interpreted as an oath of loyalty to the law-maker, that is, the Supreme Soviet as opposed to the President.²⁰

It is also strange that such an institution as the Congress of People's Deputies is maintained under the new system. This institution, as the incarnation of people's will and thus the ultimate source of all powers in the state, diametrically contradicts the constitutional principle of division of three powers. But an overwhelming majority of people's deputies, 837, object any change of its status, and only 55 agree with political reforms.²¹ Nobody could act against its will. Nobody could abolish it if it itself would not wish this.

The strong power position of Parliament's Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov vis-a-vis President Yeltsin is also striking. In no East European country does the parliament's speaker hold such a power position as in Russia, not to speak of Western countries. This is partly explained by the above-mentioned irregularity. The Parliament's Speaker represents the legislature as a whole, not only one of the chambers of the parliament as is the case in most Western countries, and not only the Supreme Soviet, but the entire legislature including the Congress of People's Deputies. Of course, Khasbulatov's talent as politician or tactician doubtless contributes to this phenomenon. But this is not enough to explain his power. There is a precedent to it: Anatolii I. Luk'ianov. Luk'ianov was nothing but a right hand man of Gorbachev when he was Vice-Speaker of the Union's Supreme Soviet. As soon as Gorbachev became President and gave away the speakership to him, he started to build up his own power position and became a serious rival of Gorbachev. Khasbulatov was also a right hand man of Yeltsin when he was Vice-Speaker of Russia's Supreme Soviet. Here is a kind of *zakonomernost'*. Khasbulatov's position is strengthened by the amorphous situation in the parliament, a fictitious party politics. If the party politics were well developed, there would be little room for the Parliament's Speaker to manipulate and accumulate power for himself.

5. Au lieu de Conclusion

If the rivalry between the legislature and the executive is a substitute for party politics, one has to ask the question whether these institutions fulfill the task of organizing citizens' political life and whether it is permissible within the framework of pluralist democracy. Let us assume that the parliament and the president play the role of pseudo-parties: a Parliament's party and a President's party, which seems to be the case in actual fact. The two parties' efforts to mobilize the population do not seem to be very

successful. A public opinion poll among Moscovites on 12-13 December 1992 shows that 58.5% are for the resignation of Khasbulatov, and 24.7% against; 28% for the resignation of Yeltsin and 59.7% against.²² The public opinion in Moscow appears to give more favor to the President than to the Parliament's Speaker. Yeltsin's popularity, however, markedly declined from the all-time high just after the coup. He received only 27% in Russia as a whole according to the opinion poll conducted by the same institution in the end of November 1992.²³ This may be still taken as biased in favor of Moscovites and "democrats." An opinion poll conducted in Torzhok, a small town in the Tverskaia oblast', by an amateur and published in *Sovetskaia Rossiia* tells: Would you vote for Yeltsin today? 5% - yes, 86% - no, 9% - difficult to answer; do the activities of deputies of all levels satisfy you? 6% - yes, 90% - no, 4% - difficult to answer.²⁴ All this indicates that the public trust to the two institutions is extremely low.

The two institutions are state organs and cannot be political parties. If they try to organize citizens' political life, as they seem to be doing, it contradicts one of the basic tenets of pluralist democracy: Citizens' political life should be organized without interference from the state authorities. Thus, the legislature's and the executive's efforts to enlist the support of the population on their side, even if they are successful, are likely to undermine the system.

The rivalry between the legislature and the executive brings forth another problem: There is no legitimate means to solve it unless the constitution provides for certain rules. It turned out that the Russian constitution does not clearly stipulate the rules for solution of conflicts among the three powers. This brought about a situation in which powers mutually paralyzed (*patovaia situatsiia*). This is a source of constant government crisis which nobody knows how to get out of.

What was expected to cut the Gordian knot was a referendum. The discussion on the referendum started in the late fall of 1992. It is President Yeltsin and the "democrats" that strongly demanded the holding of a referendum. However, a lot of complicated problems surfaced up: What questions do you want to ask the population and how do you formulate them? If you hold a referendum, why don't you move up general elections or convene a Constitutional Assembly? In the meantime a number of republics declared that they would not take part in an all-Russian referendum so long as their status in the Russian constitution has not been made clear in a satisfactory way. Under these circumstances the referendum would threaten to lead to a further decomposition of the Russian state. It was also feared that, given the general political apathy, not many people would show up for the referendum; if the government would not succeed in having more than 50% of the eligible citizens to participate in the referendum, as is required by the constitution, it would be a great fiasco for the President, the initiator of the referendum.²⁵ For these reasons, those who expressed reserve to the idea of referendum increased even among those who had at first fervently embraced it.²⁶ The

President Yeltsin's position continued to decline vis-a-vis the Supreme Soviet. He had to make one concession after another. His proposal of a referendum was turned down by the Congress of People's Deputies in March 1993.

Precisely at this juncture he went over to an offensive first with a proposal of a Special Presidential Rule. Evidently this would be a violation of the existing Constitution, which the Supreme Soviet tried to exploit to impeach the President. The Constitutional Court seemed to join the Supreme Soviet in this attempt. The President promptly withdrew the proposal and instead renewed the proposal of a referendum. This time the undertaking got through. The referendum was held finally on 25 April 1993. The outcome was: President Yeltsin won politically, yet he could not resolve the constitutional crisis.

The course of events is full of surprises. It will take a long time to fully clarify how the referendum came about and why the voters behaved in such a way as they did. For the purpose of the present paper, suffice it to dwell a little bit upon the meaning of the referendum for the organizing of citizens' political life.

The referendum was the first free popular vote in Russia since the August Coup. We could not overestimate the significance of this event. Again Yeltsin stood the test. No other statesman in Russia today than Yeltsin, except heads of national republics and the mayor of St. Petersburg, can say that he is confirmed in his post by the free popular will. Moreover, it must be very reassuring for Yeltsin that, contrary to the prediction, the participation was rather high and even his unpopular economic policy received the support of a majority. However, Yeltsin's victory is not complete. The referendum is not an election. Its effect is bound to be limited, as the contention focuses only on certain issues at stake. The citizens are not placed before the choice among competing policy proposals. As the experience in other countries shows, voters answer, more often than not, "yes" to all questions to come up in the referendum.

Doubtless the referendum contributed to the organizing of the civic life. The two contenders, the President and the Parliament, made much efforts to mobilize their constituency for their cause. Here again, however, some qualifications might be in order. Parties in the proper sense were missing in the campaign. The presidential camp carried on the campaign again without its own political arm. Its only instrument was the person of Yeltsin. Of numerous opposition parties it was only a few that managed to take clear position on the questions of the referendum. The renewed Communist party was one of those few: *No* to the first question (trust the President), *no* to the second (support the reform policy), *yes* to the third (move up the presidential election), and *no* to the last (move up the election to the Congress of People's Deputies). This was a position diametrically opposite to the presidential camp. Not all the votes cast against Yeltsin were Communist, but surely a substantial part of them. Member-parties of the center-right coalition Civic Union could not agree on how to respond to the questions of the referendum.

In this sense the referendum was an apple of discord for center-right parties. The Civic Union may fall apart as a result. If parties remained relatively inactive, how were citizens mobilized in the referendum? Mass media, first of all TV, seem to have been most effective, and most of them were in the hands of the presidential camp. It is not known whether and to what extent local authorities tried to influence the behavior of voters, and whether they were instructed to do so from above. Anyway, such an "official" intervention may not have been very effective, because the state machinery is not functioning well in Russia today.

The referendum did not solve the constitutional problem, as "yes" to the fourth question exceeded indeed the majority of those who had voted, but not those who were eligible, as required by the Congress of People's Deputies and the Constitutional Court. Theoretically speaking, the Congress of People's Deputies can remain in office until its term has expired (1995). Its position has, however, become psychologically untenable. Already Nikolai Travkin, leader of the Democratic Party, declared to resign, since the majority of voters expressed non-confidence to the Congress of People's Deputies in its present composition. No other party has yet declared to resign, but everybody senses that new elections are imminent. All of sudden, parties rush to make preparations for elections. This may encourage them to organize their constituency.

In the wake of political transformation a multi-party system was shaped in Russia. Thanks to it, many channels opened up for public contestation, which constitutes an important prerequisite for a pluralist democracy. However, the immediate result was a political fragmentation. The freedom of public contestation is not enough to overcome the legacy of monopolistic rule, an atomized civic life, and to translate the popular will into a concrete policy. The multi-party system as has been shaped in Russia does not seem to be adequate to fulfill those tasks: It is not able to organize the civic life and form a government capable of functioning. The substitute mechanism, the rivalry between the legislature and the executive, cannot fully replace the party politics. What is worse, it is likely to undermine the foundation of pluralist democracy and paralyze the political life. The fate of the multi-party system in Russia is still extremely delicate and precarious.

Notes

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1 Takayuki Ito, "Tagenteki minshushugi no seidoka. Too shokoku ni okeru keiken, 1989-92 [The Institutionalization of Pluralist Democracy. From

- Experiences in Eastern Europe, 1989-92],” *Rosiya kenkyu [Russian Studies]*, No. 16, April (1993), pp. 5-39. The same issue carries a number of articles dealing with the institutionalization of pluralist democracy in Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Moldova and Russia.
- 2 Valerii Vyzhutovich, “Pervyi ‘kruglyi stol’ mozhnet stat’ predvestnikom natsional’nogo soglasheniia,” *Izvestiia*, 6 February (1993); Otto Latsis, “‘Kruglyi stol’. Rezkii start v neopredelennom napravlenii,” *Izvestiia*, 9 February (1993).
 - 3 Early in 1992 Gennadii Burbulis, then Yeltsin’s State Secretary, opined that Yeltsin needed his own, “presidential” party to support his economic reforms. It was assumed that the segment of Democratic Russia that had remained faithful to Yeltsin would become the nucleus of such a party, along with the members of Yeltsin’s team, governmental officials in the Russian provinces, and other supporters of the president. But Burbulis gave up when it met a strong critique among the opposition. See Julia Wishnevsky, “The Rise and Fall of ‘Democratic Russia’,” *RFE-RL Reports*, 15 May (1992). At the end of the year Georgii Arbatov, Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and Konstantin Frolov, Vice-President of the Russian Academy of Sciences, proposed to set up a presidential party. It remains to be seen whether the proposal materializes. “Partiia Prezidenta,” *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 1 December (1992), and Vera Kuznetsova, “‘Prezidentskaia partiia’ byla zadumana eshche v sentiabre,” in the same issue of *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*. See also Valerii Vyzhutovich, “Burbulis stanovitsia gensekom?” *Izvestiia*, 30 November (1992).
 - 4 *Rossiiia: Partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Sbornik materialov i dokumentov*, 10 vols. (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo “RAU-Press,” 1992-93). The official editor of this publication is the Institut massovykh politicheskikh dvizhenii, Rossiisko-amerikanskii universitet. It was “recommended to publication by the Scientific Council of the Institute of History of the USSR of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.” Author-compilers are: V. N. Berezovskii, N. I. Krotov, V. V. Cherviakov and V. D. Solovei. As of February 9, (1993), vols. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 have been published. According to the plan, all the volumes will have been published by May (1993).
 - 5 Wishnevsky, “The Rise and Fall,” *RFE-RL Reports*, 15 May (1992). See also *Rossiiia...*, vol. 2, pp. 109-142, vol. 5, pp. 20-58, vol. 3, pp. 149-179, and vol. 7, pp. 74-82 respectively. Exactly speaking, of these four, only the last mentioned is a post-coup foundation.
 - 6 Anna Ostapchuk, “Kommunisty vnov’ stanoviatsia samoi massovoi partiei strany,” *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 16 February (1993).
 - 7 “RKP – partiia unizhonnogo naroda,” *Den’*, 14-20 February (1993). See also Gennadii Ziuganov, “Pered Novym rozhdeniem,” *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 11 February (1993). The CPRF cannot be identified only with national-

conservatives. It was joined also by former dissidents such as Roy Medvedev.

- 8 See also *Rossia...*, vol. 2, pp. 34-44.
- 9 Elizabeth Teague and Vera Tolz, "The Civic Union: The Birth of a New Opposition in Russia?" *RFE-RL Reports*, 14 July (1992).
- 10 *Ekonomika i zhizn'*, No. 23 (1992), quoted in: Teague and Tolz, "The Civic Union," *RFE-RL Reports*, 14 July (1992).
- 11 Anton Antonov-Ovseenko, "Lidery rossiskikh regionov ishchut kompromis," *Kommersant-Daily*, 9 February (1993).
- 12 Vasilii Kononenko, "Sozdan Soiuz gubernatorov Rossii. Ukrepit li eto ispolnitel'nuiu vlast'?", *Izvestiia*, 17 November (1992).
- 13 *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 24 June (1992), quoted in: Teague and Tolz, "The Civic Union," *RFE-RL Reports*, 14 July (1992).
- 14 *Rossia...*, vol. 3, pp. 118-139. See for an interesting reportage of the party's inner life, "Who's Afraid of Vladimir Wolf?" *Moscow Magazine*, April/May (1992), pp. 40-47.
- 15 Alexander Rahr, "A Russian Paradox: Democrats Support Emergency Powers," *RFE-RL Report*, 26 November (1992).
- 16 Teague and Tolz, "The Civic Union," *RFE-RL Reports*, 14 July (1992).
- 17 Nikolai Andreev, "Vstav na preds"ezdovskoiu vakhty... Povedenie deputatskogo korpusa stalo nepredskazuemo. I eto trevozhit," *Izvestiia*, 11 November (1992).
- 18 *Ibid.*
- 19 Sergei Alekseev, "Tikhii perekhvat vlasti," *Izvestiia*, 19 November (1992).
- 20 See the statement of G. Starovoitova quoted in: Georgii Ivanov-Smolenskii, "'Demokraticheskaia Rossiia' vozderzhivaetsia ot priamoii konfrontatsii s prezidentom," *Izvestiia*, 21 December (1992).
- 21 Andreev, "Vstav," *Izvestiia*, 11 November (1992).
- 22 "Opros obshchestvennogo mneniia, provedennyi moskovskim otdeleniem VTsIOM 12-13 dekabria," *Izvestiia*, 14 December (1992).
- 23 "Ostav'te vse kak est'!" *Izvestiia*, 1 December (1992).
- 24 G. Mikhailov, "Sprosili v Torzhke," *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 11 February (1993).
- 25 "Referendum: 'Za' i 'Protiv'," *Argumenty i fakty*, No. 6, February (1993).
- 26 For instance, see Iuliia Sal'nikova, "Rossiiskie profsoiuzy vystupili protiv referenduma," *Kommersant Daily*, 13 February (1993).