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ARTICLES

The CPSU and the Sovnarkhoz Reform: Responses of the Obkom First Secretaries

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Introduction

This study is composed of three sections. The first section deals with the background of the 1957 reform, focusing on different aspects of the reform proposal and their implications for regional party secretaries. The second part makes general observations about the level of consensus discerned with respect to the four categories: goal perception, complexity, environment and the domain of the party. The last part of this article will be devoted to an analysis of attitudinal responses of these officials to the reform. A conceptual framework, based upon role theory, is proposed to analyze the statements made by these officials, and the three years covered are subdivided into three periods to make a linkage between different role emphases and different stages of the reform.

The Background of the 1957 Reform

To look at the immediate background, the reform was initially discussed at a Central Committee plenum in February Plenum 1957. It was elaborated in more detail in Khrushchev's "Theses" in March of the same year.¹ However, the reform should be viewed in the broader context of debates on changes of industrial administration since the death of Stalin — debates that were also a part of the ongoing political succession struggle. As will be shown, it is essential to keep this background in mind to understand the responses of the obkom party secretaries.² In particular, high politics set the political environment which influenced the responses of these officials.

At the time of the death of Stalin, there emerged a consensus among most politburo members, on the need to change investment priorities and the industrial management system. Too much emphasis on heavy industry had absorbed a large share of investment. Also, the highly centralized ministerial system had brought about a cumbersome and inefficient management apparatus. Terror as a negative means of incentive was an integral part of accomplishing state goals.

While the Soviet elite largely appreciated the need for changes in these areas, they differed in the extent and specific means proposed for introducing changes. Broadly speaking, there were two orientations. The first, which can be called the state-managerial approach, was adopted by people in control of the state bureaucracy, such as Malenkov, and backed by industrial managers. It argued for a shift of

investment priorities to consumer goods and the devolution of authority to lower levels of the state bureaucracy. The other approach can be called “party-state confrontational”. In this approach, revitalization of lateral involvement of the party in the management of the economy was viewed as central to revitalization of the Soviet economy. If the first approach is more geared toward micro aspects of Soviet economy, the latter’s main concern was with restructuring the organization chart. The second approach is, thus, organizationally radical in the scope of change, but conservative in changing the rules of the operation of economy.

Khrushchev endorsed the latter approach. The original proposal made by Khrushchev in February of 1957 was finally adopted by the supreme Soviet in May. However, it drew strong opposition from Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich, who were later labeled as the anti-party group.³ After the defeat of the anti-party group in June, the reform finally was ready for implementation. A complex entanglement of the reform with the political struggle at the top unavoidably affected its contents: the reform was hastily prepared, which was bound to create many problems in the process of implementation. At the same time, the fact that the top leader had to go through such a heated struggle for the reform raised the political importance to him of the success of the reform. This political background was likely to play an important role in determining the responses of obkom first secretaries.

Aspects of the Reform

Khrushchev’s proposal can be broken down into several aspects. In terms of organizational structure, he proposed to abolish most of the ministries at the center and to shift the center of gravity of management to the regional level by establishing Sovnarkhoz (regional economic councils). Sovnarkhozy were to be involved in planning, implementation of plans and supply of materials and technologies. By moving management closer to production, it was intended to improve timeliness and quality of decisions. More specifically, the functions of the Sovnarkhoz involved managing enterprises, guided by the tasks set by state plans, and setting up long-term and short-term plans which would be further subject to reviews by republican and all-union agencies. Sovnarkhoz were also given the right to control economic and financial activities, and bore full responsibility for the fulfillment of plans. Other functions included planning for specialization and cooperation and for supplies of raw materials and semi-finished products.

As the purview of Sovnarkhoz was limited only to a given oblast (province), the reform proposed to strengthen the role of Gosplan (the State Planning Committee) in terms of coordinating the long-term and short-term plans of the provinces in accordance with state interests. Gosplan was also charged with overseeing the operations of the economy through its branch departments, and with coordinating material supplies.

Along with these changes in the state sector, Khrushchev’s proposal called for increasing the role in plan fulfillment and public mobilization of communist party organs below the republican level, and of other mass organizations, such as trade unions and the Young Communist League. In the words of Khrushchev:

The reform in leading economy based on territorial principle demands that party organizations investigate more deeply questions related to industry and construction, that they lead enterprises of industry and construction timely and concretely and that they strengthen party's mass organizational work.⁴

As to the scope and structure of Sovnarkhoz, Khrushchev's proposal was unclear. He said that local condition, such as the level of industrialization of a province, should be taken into account. He advised not to combine geographical units with quite dissimilar levels of industrial development. He also advised against creating economic regions that were too large. Other than these guidelines, however, he left to the discretion of the implementers the task of establishing economic regions.

Khrushchev saw fundamental economic and organizational problems as departmentalism and overcentralization. He acknowledged that the centralized ministerial system had been conducive to the earlier stage of Soviet economic development, when quantitative growth of heavy industry had been given priority. However, according to the party leader, the Soviet economy was now at a different stage which required qualitative changes.

Khrushchev criticized departmentalism for multiplying organizations, inability to develop and apply new technologies, lack of coordination between and within regions, and other maladies. He pointed out that, at the new stage of development, when regional economics are relatively developed, and more qualified and reliable cadres are available, devolution of authority to lower levels would be politically feasible and economically rational.

Beyond this administrative devolution, however, Khrushchev envisaged increasing pressure on administrators and masses alike. Toward this end, he emphasized raising the role of the party and of mass organizations. He argued that, during the Stalin era, the party had become pervaded by fear, timidity, sycophancy, and conservatism, producing a stultified, stagnant, bureaucratic machine.⁵ He wanted to revitalize and reactivize the party by a variety of measures. In addition, he urged party organs to induce participation of workers and specialists in decision-making processes within factories.

By reactivizing the party at the local level, khrushchev had mind establishing a rather active and close checking mechanism by the party over economic organizations. He was afraid that, as the center of economic management shifted to the locale, the likelihood of occurrence of localism [*mestnichestvo*] might increase — replacing the previous ill of ministerial autarky. His scheme was to make sure that the revitalized party could hold a strong check on localistic tendencies. In short, the party was called upon to ensure the realization of state interests, as defined in Moscow. Thus, mainly relying on organizational men, Khrushchev's reform did not fundamentally address the problem of incentives, indicators, and the rights of enterprises.

For Khrushchev, the chief means of accomplishing economic goals was organizational. He was confident that his reform measures could tap hidden reserves by changing the locus of administrative coordination, and by pitting party and mass organizations against state bureaucrats. Thus, his success would largely depend upon the party's response, and the vigor of its search for visible and hidden waste.

Khrushchev appears not to have understood that, even if the search for visible waste was successful, further positive growth would require measures other than formal organizational changes.

Khrushchev's quick-fix, conservative nature were also evident in his approach to investment priorities. He emphasized continued priority for heavy industry: "the major task of the development of the Soviet economy lies in guaranteeing further vigorous growth of all branches of industry primarily based on the development of heavy industry."⁶ Although he addressed the issue of worker welfare, he placed greater stress on collective material reward and worker mobilization than on greatly increasing individual material rewards.

To sum up, Khrushchev's original reform proposal was to shift the system from the ministries-branch production line to a territorial one. Khrushchev's priority was still on the development of heavy industry. While he accepted the complexity of the economic developmental stage of the soviet economy, his prescription was short of dealing with incentives and price changes. The main focus was on redrawing the administrative map as the chief means of solving economic problems. Finally, the reform was thought out in the midst of a power struggle at the top. This, in turn, affected the preparation of specifics, leaving details open to revision as implementation proceeded.

Implementation of the Reform

In the area of planning, the original idea was to change from the branch-of-industry principle to a territorial one.⁷ Also, the planning procedure was to enhance the role of Economic Councils and republican Gosplan. However, Gosplan did not change to reflect such a territorial principle. Within Gosplan, branch departments still remained. At the republican level, industrial-branch divisions in Gosplan continued to exist to guide sovnarkhoz activities. The planning categories were supposed to be broader and more aggregated, and thus, at the local level, the intention was to assign global targets leaving detailed decisions up to the sovnarkhoz. Contrary to this original intention, the old branch-system planning, connecting Gosplan branch departments with local counterparts, continued as the reform progressed.

In the area of allocation and distribution, Gosplan was originally to plan 1,000 items, while 5,000 items were to be planned by Economic Councils. However, the centralized categories expanded. Gradually, Economic Councils allocated those products which are entirely produced and used within one administrative region, and therefore, their authority on the national scale was almost nil. The role of Sovnarkhoz in sale was reduced to supervising accurate execution of planned deliveries. During the transitional period, Gosplan's glavsbyty were charged with checking the correctness of decisions by into directive. Glavsbyty continued to be involved in assignment of inputs which are the other side of the sale. By 1959, Sovnarkhoz were not allowed to maneuver materials across branch lines, i.e., the independent maneuvering authority of the Councils was, in effect, restricted to the administrative boundaries of its branch of industry sub-units.

In the area of producer-user relations, the reform aimed at easing the burden of

the central planners through simplification. This was to be accomplished by direct ties between users and producers. Secondly, the reform was to correct irrationalities in ministerial linkages. In the old ministerial system, the standard method of establishing ties was contracts between ministerial supply establishments. Now this was to be replaced by more direct and detailed agreements between actors more closely involved in production. However, in late 1957 and early in 1958, due to the alarm about disorder in established producer-user ties, strong criticism of localism started to appear, of the failure to accomplish deliveries to other regions. The Sovnarkhoz were not allowed to change established producer-user ties without prior consent of users. Further, the rights of the Councils were severely impaired by limiting allowable changes in product mix and by increasing personal responsibility for fulfillment of delivery plans. Finally the sale and supply functions were transferred to republican and all-union Gosplan in 1958.

In the area of investment, important decisions, such as priority setting for broad sectors and geographic areas, assignment of budget funds to branches, and selection of significant projects continued to be made in Moscow. The rights of the councils in making investment decisions were quite limited: 1) In major areas such as coal, oil, gas, electricity, ferrous and non-ferrous metal, and defense industries, funds were simply assigned to centrally defined and controlled projects: 2) in other areas, the Councils could switch funds between projects, but subject to responsibility for fulfilling existing plans: 3) investment funds could be shifted between branches only with the permission of Gosplan. Sovnarkhoz were allowed to authorize projects below 1.0 million rubles. However, the original idea of turning over a lump sum to the councils was not realized. The order to the Councils to pay attention to cultural construction and housing was withdrawn as the reform progressed, and the fear of diversion of investment funds from major projects was raised high.

Nor were the Councils given the right to set wages and salary rates on their own. As before, the State Committee on Labor and Wages set these, and the councils just conformed to the centrally-decided bonus schedules for enterprise managers. The price fixing and adjusting powers of the Councils were also very limited.

As the reform progressed, these limitations caused continuous bottlenecks to emerge. However, in spite of the confusion, the reform was called a success. Khrushchev said in 1958 that he was "more than satisfied with the results of the reform."⁸

Conceptual Framework: Role Theory

In an effort to understand the implications of the 1957 reform for changes in the role of the obkom first secretaries, the industrial leadership role of local party organs before the reform will be recast in terms of role theory. A role in an organizational setting is defined as expectations held on a position by the position holder, by the higher organizational hierarchy and by society in general.⁹ A position may involve a multiplicity of roles. Merton defined that as a role set.¹⁰ Given a role set of a position, there can be harmonious or complementary relationships among different roles. In these cases, it is easier to avoid role conflicts. However, it is often the case

that conflicts exist between the requirements of different roles, either potentially of in real terms.

The universal patterns of resolving role conflicts are: 1) to try to synthesize the two conflicting roles by balancing them: 2) to accomplish them in sequence: and 3) to give up one for the other. Positive and negative incentive systems are closely related to determining which role will receive priority. A general consensus in the field is that people tend to pay more attention to the one for the accomplishment of which positive incentives are provided.

A distinctive feature of the CPSU, from the role theory perspective, is that the roles of the party are multiple but deliberately unclear about the priority in importance of different roles. Historically, however, it was unavoidable to take certain roles more seriously than others depending on the developmental stage. This lack of specificity of roles of the party, in a sense, has worked as a source of flexibility and has been viewed as conducive to such tasks as economic development.¹¹

The types of roles of the party can be categorized in various ways in terms of one's interests. From the vantage point of the regional party, an important role distinction can be made between political and bureaucratic roles. The drive of rapid industrial development led by the central leadership in conjunction with terror meant that role attention was given more to bureaucratic functions. The bureaucratic role involves strictly and faithfully following the center's plans, i. e., fulfilling and facilitating the implementation of the plans. On the other hand, the political role involves two different aspects: political deference to the top leader and representational role. As a politician, first of all, the obkom first secretary must be sensitive to the support of the top leader. This factor becomes more important when there is a patron-client tie between the top leader and a regional party secretary. Also, as a politician, he is to advocate the policies of the center, persuade and mobilize people and organizations in his region. In a reverse way, through mobilizing local people, he is to take local initiatives and advocate them at the central level. As a politician, he would be more concerned with direct contacts with people and persuasion as a means to achieve goals, while as a bureaucrat, results, especially efficient and fast, are the main concerns. Which of these two roles would be more important depends upon various factors such as the tasks defined by the regime, the priority and the style of the top leader, and the characteristics and personal situation of regional party secretaries. For example, Stalin's goal to achieve power consolidation through collectivization and high economic growth, and his leadership style, led to an emphasis on the bureaucratic role.

The two roles may be complementary as well as contradicting with each other. For example, a regional party secretary as politician is supposed to advocate the regional needs, though, from the national and center's perspective, so that localistic tendency will not be fostered. His bureaucratic role, on the other hand, narrows his focus on fulfilling the plans assigned to his region, frequently forcing him to violate the center's intentions. In this situation, the center's priority and sanction of either of the two roles will be the factors which will decide the orientations of the local parties. It has been well documented that during the Stalin period, in spite of violations of formal rules, fulfillment of the center's plans was encouraged. Local interests were ignored, and the authority relations inside the party, and between the party and society, were

extremely bureaucratized. The regional party secretaries' achievement was evaluated and rewarded more by the extent of the accomplishment of the bureaucratic role. This led to negligence of the representational aspect of politician role. Though not completely ignored, due to such a sanction mechanism during Stalin's rule, role conflicts were rather alleviated. And the consequence of such a mechanism was the collusion of the interests between the local parties and enterprises.¹²

Implications for the 1957 Reform

The 1957 reform enhanced the rights and responsibilities of the regional party secretaries. This would require redefinition of the role attention of these officials. On the one hand, by encouraging redefinition of the party vis a vis society, Khrushchev asked the local parties to renovate the political role of the party. At the same time, his emphasis on the use of reserves as a major means of continuing economic growth would mean a stricter delineation of interests between enterprises and party officials. In the past, preservation of some amount of reserves was the common interest for both local party officials and enterprises: now party officials were asked to search for unused and hidden reserves at enterprises. True, in the past, even this relationship between local party officials and enterprises was made more explicitly conflictual and visible. Thus, the role conflict for regional party secretaries between compliance with the demands of the center and continuity of the conventional relationship with enterprises arose. The demands on the local party officials to watch over state interests became much more visible. The visibility was further enhanced because of structural change in the management system, whereby localism became a real issue.

At the same time, regional competition was also made more visible and intense. Such an intensification of regional competition would further exacerbate role conflicts between serving the center's goals and fulfilling regional priorities. In this regard, several questions can be raised: How did the regional party secretaries try to reconcile the conflicts? Which strategies did they adopt? How did the efforts to solve these problems relate to their orientations to the reform itself? Were different types of resolution related to different stages of the implementation of the reform?

Finally, the reform brought about a momentary increase in the political role of regional party secretaries of advocating the initiative of the top leader. In the case of the 1957 reform, this issue became more acute because more acute because of the interne power struggle going on in Moscow. The fact that the reform was strongly identified with the top leader would demand stronger support for the reform from regional party secretaries, and the regional secretaries had to respond to such a demand with strong mobilization of the masses and more energetic advocacy of Khrushchev's reform idea.

Perception of Change

Economic thinking seen through discussions of the reforms can be analyzed along the four major criteria set up in the introduction: goal, complexity, environment, domain. At the outset, it can be pointed that there existed an overwhelming consen-

sus among secretaries on their perception of all four arenas. This may be due to the fact that there existed little variation in the generational backgrounds in that the majority of the obkom first secretaries in the sample belonged to the Brezhnev generation.

In terms of goals and investment priority, a uniform consensus on the growth of heavy industry was found. This may simply be viewed as reverberation of the center's goal and priority. Alternatively, it can be argued that Khrushchev might have taken into consideration an overwhelming consensus among the obkom first secretaries, especially in view of the gruelling struggles surrounding economic reform. At the same time, such a consensus might have to do with the nature of the reform. As mentioned earlier, the reform made inter-regional competition much more visible. This would mean that the achievements of an obkom first secretary would be evaluated more by visible results. Such changes are not likely to arise through light industry. It should be remembered also that a most important criterion for establishing an autonomous economic region was the degree of development of industry which, in many cases, meant the level of development of heavy industry. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the obkom first secretary of the region with predominantly light industry also emphasized the importance of the development of heavy industry.¹³

As will be seen below, such a heavy industry-oriented perspective brought about a conflict with the spirit of the reform, in that most of the projects related to heavy industry could not be handled within the purview of the sovnarkhoz, given the rights of that organization. With the demands on the center from the economic regions increasing, the whole idea of the decentralization was to be put into danger.¹⁴

Regional party secretaries showed a high degree of consensus on the locus of the problems facing the Soviet economy. None of the secretaries denied the past successes achieved in the Soviet economy. But for them, the growth of the economy had outdated the managerial system. With few exceptions, the locus of the problems was defined as the inability of the old system to cope with the complexity of current reality. All the ills of the ministerial system mentioned by Khrushchev were repeatedly criticized.

In the area of perception of complexity of issues and technology whereby to solve them, most of these officials, who defined the problem as primarily organizational, maintained a similar view to Khrushchev's solution to the problem, namely, the transfer of the focal point of decision-making closer to enterprises. They were fully aware that they were the major actor responsible for the implementation of the reform, and they welcomed the increases in their rights and responsibilities. Their views were, however, simplistic in that virtually no mention was made about micro-operations of enterprises and incentives. Supporting Khrushchev, their concern with incentives emphasized collective rewards, such as housing, health and education. What was especially striding was the overwhelming concern about housing. They welcomed the reform, for 30% of the overplan fulfillment could be used for housing purposes. Since there was lacking the systematic application of individual incentives, actual incentives were largely decided by the demands of situations. For example, in many coal mine operations, while in the past the bonus was paid for individual overfulfillment, the new system paid it only when the plan was fulfilled collectively.¹⁵

Mostly, along with the emphasis on collective incentives, mobilization was viewed as the chief means to solve economic problems.

In terms of specific means, regional party leaders pointed to the existence of unused reserves, and in order to tap the reserves, a new leadership style was demanded. The problem, they argued, was not only with the ministerial system but also with the old style of the leadership. One of the most frequently mentioned proposals was to reactivate the trade unions and to increase the participation of workers in searching for reserves. Another means was more direct guidance over the activities of enterprises. In contrast to the bureaucratic style of leadership, which relied on paper and formalistic meetings, they declared, new political leadership encourages direct contacts with masses and enterprise management.

Obkom first secretaries perceived the need to restructure the old relationship between the party and enterprises from a cooperatively overseeing one to a conflictual one, where the local parties had to intervene deeply in the workings of enterprises in order to dig out reserves.¹⁶ As the decision-making focus was transferred from the center to the regional level, the interests of the center were two-fold and partially conflicting. While it hoped for an increase of efficiency from the reform, it was not confident of compliance of the locals with the goals of the center (a familiar problem in the case of the relationship between the headquarters of big corporations and branches in the West).¹⁷

Regional party leaders shared khrushchev's criticism of the overgrowth of the economic administrative structure. Thus, an organizational solution that most of these officials referred to was to reduce the size of the administrative structure at all levels. It entailed a lot of reshuffling and new appointments of personnel. The obkom first secretaries paid their attention to appointing the right people to the right jobs, ensuring the quality of cadres. The members of the party also would be required to equip themselves with the necessary knowledge for efficient economic leadership. Thus, training cadres became an important task for the regional parties.

In addition to organizational solutions, introduction of new technology was much stressed by regional party leaders. There can be several different types of technology. One type may be already available but because of organizational barriers of lack of incentive, has not been introduced. Or, technology may be newly developed. Which type of technological innovation attracts most attention from the obkom first secretaries would depend on several factors, such as cost, risk, the time of application and return and political environment. It will be shown later that, as the political environment becomes tense and demands quick results, the scope of technological innovation becomes very constrained. In such an environment, the readily available technology is more likely to be preferred, as most obkom first secretaries did in the 1957 reform, rather than trying to develop new technologies.¹⁸ Such readily available technologies can be regarded as one form of reserves unused.

Specialization, association and cooperation were proposed as means to bring about positive economic effects. Association is rather simple in that it unifies small-scale factories and shops which produce similar or identical products under the old ministerial system. From the national point of view, regional specialization makes more sense, especially when cooperation is fully achievable. However, from the local

point of view, a high level of specialization, in the short term, may mean losses of clouts because a region may lose variety in types of industry. It may also mean an increase of vulnerability to outside changes. With the emergence of reform based on the territorial principle, the issue of how far a region should go in terms of specialization became more serious. In fact this is the core of the issue of localism. Localism, simply put, is an attempt to contain a region from outside fluctuations. It would be quite reasonable for the obkom first secretaries and directors of factories to attempt to secure the predictability of the whole production process, such as supply of raw materials and equipment and sale. This problem was further exacerbated by the more visible regional competition.

In terms of perception of environment, the obkom first secretaries, did not show any sense of constraints in resources. Nor did they show their interest in international environment. But they perceived a very demanding and pressured bureaucratic environment. The fact that they were told to use reserves means that they had to achieve results with as few new means as possible. The fact that the reform emerged after an intense power struggle led local party leaders to identify strongly with the policy of the top leader, and this visibility of the top leader as initiator of the policy led the top leader to demand quick results, which, in turn, worked as pressure on these local officials. It will be shown, in more specific terms, how such a perception of the bureaucratic and political environment unfolded as the reform progressed in relation to the responses of the obkom first party secretaries.

In the area of party domain, Khrushchev demanded that the party come to terms with the increased level of education of people and the emergence of a new professional stratum. This raised the task of redefining the authority relationship between the party and society. Khrushchev saw a potential source for improving management and industry in such a redefinition of authority. How to reconcile this demand with the traditional role of the party remained a big task for obkom first secretaries.

Such a task also required change in leadership style in the direction of a more political and less bureaucratic style. While all the obkom first party secretaries acknowledged the importance of a relational political style of relating to people, their emphasis varied. Those secretaries of a region with industry such as coal mining where mobilizational techniques are more effective stressed more of the importance of that method.¹⁹ In highly industrial areas, mobilizational methods were not discussed at a general level: rather, they were mentioned only in the context of conducting economic policies.²⁰

The obkom first party secretaries were required to achieve economic growth by tapping potential human resources which were believed to be alienated from the management process. However, they were also required to do that with cheap means by not committing much material incentives. Khrushchev strongly believed that ideological and mobilizational methods could be linked to positive economic gains. This strongly smacks of the human relation theory of management in the West, in that by encouraging workers' participation at a superficial level, the management tried to tap human resources which had not been tapped under Taylorism.

In any case, the obkom first secretaries' overall orientation was congruent with the demands of Khrushchev. Some variations among themselves notwithstanding, they

strongly welcomed the idea. Workers' participation in planning and operational processes was strongly supported. Before the reform, for example, the trade union was a mere tool, without much role in the decision-making of a factory. Now the unions were urged to play an important role in identifying unshed reserves. Increased worker participation, however, was not solicited by the new incentive system. Thus, how long and steady the pseudo-participation without tangible reward would be remained a question.

The difficult bureaucratic and social environment meant the exposure of obkom first secretaries to conflicting demands. For example, in the area of supply of materials to other regions, if a region does not fulfill its obligations to other regions, it would be criticized for putting local interests above those of the state. If it does fulfill delivery obligations, it may put its own plan fulfillment in danger. This kind of situation is likely to generate role conflicts for the party secretaries. The responses of the obkom first secretaries to the 1957 reform were largely determined by the role attention of these officials. As the reform unfolded, the original consensus diminished. The following sections will analyze different orientations of these officials at different stages of the reform.

The First Stage: Discussions of the Reform and Role Synthesis

The first period roughly covered March-July 1957. This period is characterized by several features. In this section, the ranges of responses will be dealt with once the reform was proposed in March, 1957, and an attempt to explain these variations will be made. The range of views will be arranged in terms of differentiation. "Differentiation refers to the number of characteristics or dimensions of a problem that an individual takes into consideration."²¹ In the context of the reform, differentiation means how many aspects of the reform a discussion by a party secretary involves.

The aspects of the reform considered here are: 1) criticism of the old ministerial system; 2) advocacy of securing an autonomous economic region; 3) the structure of the Sovnarkhoz; 4) the rights and duties of the Sovnarkhoz; 5) the operations of enterprises under the new system, such as planning, supply, and sale of materials and goods; 6) the incentive system; 7) the role of the party and other organizations; 8) inter-regional considerations. A secretary who considers most of these aspects is regarded as showing a high level of differentiation.

It was found that the economic profile of a region was an important factor in determining the degree of interest and differentiation. The degree of interest refers to whether a secretary discussed the reform, while differentiation to the degree of sophistication given the discussions by him. If a region was primarily agricultural, the obkom first secretary showed little interest in the reform. The low level of interest was manifested in lack of discussion of the reform at all (Larionov-Ryazan, Zolotukhin-Tambov, Sizov-Kurgan Toka-Tuva, Doronin-Smolensk, and L. Efremov-Kursk) where the regions were predominantly agricultural. More than 70% of the population of these regions were engaged in agriculture. However, in view of the educational backgrounds of these secretaries, which were mostly in agriculture and areas related to agriculture, one might raise the question whether such educational

backgrounds had more to do with the low interest in the industry-oriented reform. One also can argue that the two factors reinforce each other.

This can be tested if only partially. One such case is L. Efremov who was the obkom first secretary of Kursk until 1957. The region was primarily agricultural area (80% of the population in agriculture). His educational background was in agricultural mechanization with some experience at MTS. He also worked as engineer and chief mechanic at a factory. Thus, his background is, at least, not totally agricultural. but he was silent in 1957. However, after he was transferred to Gorky Oblast in 1958, he immediately started talking about the Sovnarkhoz reform, with indicates that the regional character had something to do with the level of differentiation (See below for another possible reason for his interest in the reform).²²

Another body of evidence can be found in the contents of the discussions during the initial period by several first secretaries from agricultural regions. To this group belonged Danaylov (Dagestan), Kosov (Tyumen), Lebedev (Stavropol'), and Khakhalov (Buriat).²³ Their primary concern in discussion of the reform was only with securing autonomous economic regions. Of course, they criticized the old system but not as intensely as the group from highly industrialized areas. Clearly, the low level of industrialization did not provide much basis for broad discussions of the reform. Thus the major concern was to secure an autonomous region without which an independent evaluation by Moscow of the merits of the secretaries would become difficult.

Buriat-Mongolian Oblast, for example, was faced with a controversy over whether it was to be a part of the large Eastern-Siberian economic region. Contiguous with a more industrialized region, but with a low level of industrialization itself, the threat of becoming a part of the larger region must have been real. Where there was no such a threat, the first secretaries based their argument for autonomous economic regions on their future potential, as the following example shows:

It seems to us that in defining economic region for the country, not only the historical development that has been made but also the future perspective of this or other kraisi and oblasti should be taken into account. For example, it can easily be seen that in Stavropol' krai economic regionalization will contribute to the improvement of utilization of natural resources and to the growth of productive forces...²⁴

He further added a complaint about the lack of support from the center for developing coal deposits which would be useful for other regions.²⁵

The debate for an autonomous economic region, in fact, was widespread. But it was especially serious in regions with similar levels of industrial development which are geographically contiguous to each other. The conflict became more intense because khrushchev's theses did not specify criteria by which to decide the boundaries of economic regions. The problem was acute in Eastern Siberia where Krasnoyarsk Krai, Irkutsk, Buriat-Mongolian ASSR and Chita oblasti are located.

There was an idea of establishing a large Eastern Siberian Economic Region covering all of these oblasti, as the article of Silinski proposed.²⁶ His criteria and rationale were: i) historically developed economic and cultural linkages; ii) natural and geographical condition and agricultural conditions; iii) transport connections. Based

on these, he pointed out the patterns of specialization of industry of each region to be developed, centering around the Angara-Yenisei energy complex which would provide energy for this region. In conclusion, however, he argued that the center of the region should be placed in Irkutsk for economic, cultural and administrative reasons.

In his counter-argument, Organov, the first secretary of Krasnoyarsk krai, replied that the historically defined concept did not reflect the current complexity of industrial development. He argued that the complexity of the development of his krai itself deserved an autonomous region and that Silinski's idea assumed too huge a region: that unit would consequently be too clumsy in operation to meet the expectations of the reform. He also rejected the rankings of the oblasti suggested by Silinski.²⁷

A more important and deeper issue apparently revolved around energy sources. While Silinski was considering the Angara-Yenisei energy complex, Organov argued that Yenisei energy source alone would be sufficient. It is clear that a lot of calculation went through the minds of these officials on the economic advantages and disadvantages of an autonomous region. However, political considerations must have been equally important. In view of the more visible regional competition, it would mean not simply loss of power not to have an autonomous region: it would mean the loss of a base for the most important source of evaluation by the top leader and the center, thus possibly threatening the political future of these officials.

One of the prevalent themes of the obkom first secretaries was to advocate and autonomous economic region for their oblast, even when the size of the oblast seemed too small to make any economic sense. In such a case, the chief justification for establishing a separate economic region was the importance of the region from a national perspective. By demonstrating national importance, these officials tried to show that their political interest of having an independent economic region in their oblast was compatible with the state interest of need for an optimal size of an economic region.²⁸

Quite opposite to the above case were oblasti nearby the highly industrialized ones. For example, Zaporzhe, Kirovgorod close to Dnepropetrovsk Oblast and Novgorod Oblast close to Leningrad Oblast. Not much was said by the first secretaries of these oblasti, and in all of these cases, they expressed the satisfaction of being incorporated into the adjacent large economic regions.²⁹ One may argue that this was because of pressure from the center, and that is partly true.³⁰ However, one might raise a question of what advantages they might get out of autonomous regions. These provinces were industrially dependent upon the big regions, and thus, even with autonomous regions, their political and bureaucratic interests might not have been enhanced a great deal.

Another category is the oblasti with a single industry-dominated economic structure, such as Tatar and Kuibyshev. Oil extraction refining were the major industry. In the two oblasti, the administrative structure of the Sovnarkhoz was quite simple, with only one administration for gas and petroleum industry. The level of interest in speeches by secretaries of these oblasti was quite low, focusing only on the single industry. The first secretaries did not much address the reform. Even in the discussion in July, 1957, Ignat'ev, for example, did not mention the Sovnarkhoz of its

relation to his region.³¹ Efremov also simply repeated the importance of oil without going further to deal with other aspects of the reform. The low level of interest can be explained by the fact that regions with a simple industrial structure do not have deep interdependence with other regions and, thus, that the impact of the reform is not great. Particularly, investment in the oil industry frequently could not be handled by the Sovnarkhoz because of the size of the investment. Secondly, regardless of the reform, they recognized the national significance of oil, especially since Khrushchev gave priority to the chemical industry in 1958.

From the discussion patterns on the advocacy for autonomous regions, the following becomes clear: First, it has been demonstrated that there were different degrees of impact of the reform depending on the degree of industrialization. Given a high level of industrialization, the complexity of industrial structure was a key factor in determining the level of differentiation in discussion of the reform. The lack or low level of interest in discussion of the reform by some secretaries of mainly industrial regions does not mean, however, that they opposed the reform. It seems that due to the economic profile of the provinces, they might not have had much interest in discussing the reform. But in their speeches, there is found no indication of opposition: First of all, the reform would not affect their power interest. Secondly, if the reform did not interest them in terms of bureaucratic role fulfillment, their interest in paying political deference to the top leader might have been a factor for supporting the reform. A good example of this is Larionov. He did not discuss the reform at all, but showed extreme deference to Khrushchev.³²

Secondly, one may conjecture an uneven level of concern with the reform as the reform unfolds. For example, the group of secretaries with a low level of differentiation may not be an anti-reform force if the reform unfolds smoothly. If the reform does not work as well as planned, however, this group would only stand to lose more than it gained. For example, what if they could not get machinery as fast as before the reform because of localistic tendencies? One cannot say flatly that this would automatically turn into a negative attitude to the reform, but it is clear that for certain groups problems exceed gains, which, in turn, would shape their evolving attitude to the reform.

Thirdly, the discussion, as mentioned earlier, was mostly about heavy industry. It seems that there was a strong connection between demands for autonomous regions and oblasts dominated by a heavy industrial base. There was not a single case in which light industry was used to justify establishing an autonomous region. Even where it turned out later that the administrative structure was based on light industry, heavy industry was stressed.³³ This partly reflects Khrushchev's priority, as mentioned earlier. More importantly, however, it reflects the prevalent economic and administrative thinking of the time: that tangible growth is only heavy industrial, and possibly that the achievement record of heavy industry remains more permanent and visible. This might have been closely related to the political interests of the obkom first party secretaries, who would be evaluated more by tangible results (for the list of secretaries of this group, see table 1 on the next page).

Table 1 Secretaries Who Showed Low Level of Interest

Region	Name	Birth (age in 1957)	Education	R:A
Dagestan	A. Danyalov	1908 (49)	Engineering & HPS	30:70
Buriat	A. Khakhalov	1914 (43)	HPS	18:82
Kamensk	G. Eniutin	1903 (54)	metallurgy	
Kuibyshev	M. Efremov	1911 (46)	engineering	62:38
Kurgan	A. Sizov	1903 (54)	agriculture	33:67
Kursk	L. Monashev	1914 (43)	agriculture	
Kursk	L. Efremov	1912 (45)	mech.of agri.	20:80
Penza	G. Zolotukhin	1911 (46)	incomplete higher ed.	26:74
Ryazan	A. Larionov	1907 (50)	same	30:70
Smolensk	D. Doronin	1909 (48)	same	32:68
Stavropol	I. Lebedev	1907 (50)	HPS	18:82
Tatar	S. Ignat'ev	1904 (53)	engineering	42:58
Tuva	S. Toka	1901 (56)	HPS	29:71
Tyumen	V. Kosov	1910 (47)	middle school	32:68

Source: 1) Biographical informations are from *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, 1958.

2) Area profiles are from *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo RSFSR*, Moscow, 1957.

* * HPS refers to Higher Party School.

Cases of the Areas of High Industrialization

To this category belong the following rations: Moscow, Gorky, Kiev, Dnepropetrovsk, Donets, Lugan, Stalingrad, Saratov, Vladimir and Sverdlovsk. In all these regions, more than 50% of the regional population lived in urban areas, and the administrative structure of the Sovnarkhoz was rather complex, the number of administration in the SovnarKhoz ranging from two to twenty-one (See table 2 at the next Page).

To show the lack of correlations between generational and educational backgrounds and the attitudes of secretaries to the reform, a closer examination of those backgrounds is in order. Although, as mentioned earlier, the majority of the sampled first secretaries belonged to the Stalin generation in the sense that none of them was born after 1920, some variations can still be detected. The median age of these officials was in 1957 40, and there were 18 years difference between the oldest and the youngest. In terms of the year of party entry, there was 15 years difference between the earliest and the latest entry in the sample. One can also see that Ukrainian first secretaries were younger on average than those of the RSFSR. The so-called Brezhnev generation, born around 1906, were in their fifties in 1957. This group went through the varied experiences of the NEP, Stain's industrialization drive, and the Great Purge. Those who were born between 1910 and 1918, in contrast, had less direct experience of the Great Purge and the first industrialization drive.

Thus, if one looks only at differences in the backgrounds, one may expect variations in terms of their responses to the reform, for example, in the degree of

Table 2 Secretaries of Industrial Regions

Region	Secretary	Birth (Age in 1957)	Education	Party Entry	No. of Admin. in the Sovnarkhoz
Moscow	I. Kapitonov	1915 (42)	Engineering	1939	13
Sverdlovsk	A. Kirilenko	1906 (51)	Aviation	1931	13
Saratov	G. Denisov	1909 (48)	HPS Engineering	1924	2
Stalingrad	I. Zhegalin	1906 (51)	HPS	1926	4
Gorky	I. Ignatov	1901 (56)	N.A.	1924	5
Donetsk	Kazanetz	1918 (39)	Metallurgy	1944	N.A.
Lugan	V. Klimenko	1906 (51)	Poli-Tech	1929	4
Kiev	P. Shelest	1908 (49)	Metallurgy	1928	6
Dnepropet- rovsk	V. Shcher- bitzkii	1918 (39)	Chemical Eng.	1941	6
Ivanovo	Titov	1910 (47)	Textile	1930	7
Chelia- binsk	N. Laptev	1909 (48)	HPS	1929	3
Vladimir	K. Grishin	1908 (49)	Same	1931	2
Leningrad	F. Kozlov	1908 (49)	Poli-Tech	1923	21
Kemerovsk	S. Pilipet	1910 (47)	HPS	1932	4

Source: 1) The Administrative Structure of the Sovnarkhoz is from US CIA, Foreign Document Division, Initial Period of Sovnarkhoz: Management in the USSR, Soviet Press Summary, no. 1714, May 28, 1958.

2) the rest of the information is from Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1958, Moscow.
* * N.A. means not available.

differentiation. However, comparisons of the responses of these officials did not show much difference when both definitions of generation were applied. This can be explained by the nature of the reform. Since the nature of the reform was such that most secretaries supported the reform, generational differences were hard to find.³⁴

The secretaries from highly industrialized areas acknowledged that the reform's impact would be greatest in highly developed areas. As Kapitonov said: "It is clear to everyone that the reform will have great economic effect in all regions, and particularly in places with strongly developed industry."³⁵

The regions with highly developed and complex industries much have suffered more from the old ministerial system, and thus the secretaries of these regions showed high degree of differentiation, dealing with all aspects of the reform.

In the area of planning, regional first secretaries were perplexed by frequent changes in planning under the old system. In Saratov Oblast, for example, the plans of more than 30 all-union and republican enterprises were changed from 2 to 6 times in 1956. A much worse case was in Dnepropetrovsk where, at the Pravda train factory, the production plan was changed over 14 times and, at one trust of the same region, the plan changed 19 times.³⁶ As a result, secretaries argued, this brought about

lack of faith in work, stoppage of equipment and other malfunctions. Thus, they strongly supported the new planning method.

Most secretaries were very keen on the issues of supply and sale. It is these areas that traditionally the role of the regional party as a “fixer” was most strongly felt. The reform had varying impacts on such a role, depending on situations. Roughly three situations can be considered. The first is one in which after the reform, external supplies of materials can now be replaced by local sources. In this case, the level of uncertainty about securing materials was to be reduced. In the second situation, some materials that used to be imported from other regions can now be produced on a local basis, if decision-makers allow diversification of local industry. The last variant is to import materials from outside the region which are not available within the region. In this case, the conventional role of the regional party is still maintained.

For local interests to secure certainty in supplies, it would be rational to produce locally as many materials as possible. In many cases, the first secretaries supported such an idea. This means they emphasized their bureaucratic role in order to secure certainty of material supplies even if that might entail weakening the “fixer” role under the ministerial system. The following are some examples.

On the first situation, Shcherbitzkii said:

...in our Oblast there are fifteen machine-building factories connected through cooperation with ten enterprises located in other regions. Those enterprises hardly even cooperate with the enterprises of the oblast. Many parts, though, can be produced locally. Yet there is no such within-oblast cooperation simply because enterprises are under different ministries and *glavki*.³⁷

Zhegalin, the first secretary of Stalingrad Oblast, provided an example of the second situation:

At the same time, it should be considered to create locally a raw material base for metallurgy. Such potential exists. Back in 1932, deposits of iron ore were found, covering 7000 square kilometers along the banks of the river Khaber in Dobrinsk and Uryupinsk raions. Its content and stocks are such that they can be steady raw material base for metallurgic enterprises of Stalingrad Oblast for many years.³⁸

He continues on another case:

Before the war, the work started, but after the war, departmental barriers, and a reluctance not to break the old links in starting production of Khonerski iron ore. For the purpose of liquidating long distance transport of raw materials, and for use of local resources, the deposits of Khnersk ore should be included in the Stalingrad Oblast.³⁹

All these orientations can be called “incorporating.” Incorporation refers to the efforts of an organization to reduce uncertainty in fulfilling organizational goals by bringing as many variables as possible under its control. The above phenomenon is clearly an attempt to secure as much certainty in supply of materials as possible, given the jurisdictions of the Sovnarkhoz.

Closely related to such an incorporating tendency were attempts to absorb adjacent regions into one economic council. For example, Kozlov argued for incor-

porating the enterprises under Novgorod and Pskov oblasts. The Cherepovetski metallurgical plant, it was argued, would almost guarantee the full needs of Leningrad Oblast.⁴⁰ Similar incorporation can be observed in the inter-regional disputes over raw materials and energy sources, such as electricity. Zhegalin, for example, argued that the oil producing raions of Astrakhan Oblast should be put under the Stalingrad Economic Council in order to better use the rich technology of his own region, and in the near future to sharply increase the production of oil in the lower Volga region, especially as all the oil was to be refined at Stalingrad Plants currently under construction.⁴¹

Another area of concern in their initial discussion concerned the rights of the Sovnarkhoz and enterprises. Virtually all the regional party secretaries of highly developed regions referred to this aspect of the issue. Thus, it provides an opportunity to see what kind of Sovnarkhoz they envisaged. First, at the more general level, most of them were concerned with the optimal level of rights of the Sovnarkhoz. Kirilenko of Sverdlovsk said that "it is our conviction that the creation of the Sovnarkhoz, endowed with all the necessary rights to realize economic and financial activity, and much more fully to understand concrete situations in the work of enterprises, will allow us to achieve a new upsurge in industrial production."⁴² Similarly, Denisov of Saratov made a statement that "it (the Sovnarkhoz) must be empowered with all rights necessary for the realization of economic and financial activity and for taking full responsibility for the fulfillment of plans of production and for the economic results of the activities of enterprises."⁴³

What were the specific rights considered by the first secretaries? First of all, in the planning area, Kozlov stressed that the Leningrad Sovnarkhoz be given the right to plan not only for current and mid-term, but also for long-term purposes. In his own words:

Success in fulfilling plans, and the rhythmic work of enterprises of economic regions, to large extent, depends upon this (planning). We consider that the most correct system of planning would be one in which the Gosplan would consider the proposals of economic regions in drawing up annual and long-term future plans. This will increase the responsibility of leaders of enterprises and economic councils. Along with this, it is necessary to grant appropriate rights to enterprises and the Sovnarkhoz. Also the issues such as granting appropriate rights to the Sovnarkhoz and branch administration, expanding the rights and independence of directors of enterprises and giving economic issues should be once again examined.⁴⁴

In the same discussion, Spiridonov, who succeeded Kozlov in the latter part of 1957, further elaborated that the Sovnarkhoz should have the right to determine prices and costs and to decide wages, rate of wages and bonuses for all categories of workers in the region.⁴⁵

Kazanetz proposed that branch administrations, trusts and combines subordinate to the Sovnarkhoz, be economically accountable units with circulating capital and separate balances. He further proposed that, when necessary, branch administrations, combines and trusts be allowed to transfer raw materials between enterprises. The same principle would be applied to profits and circulating capital.⁴⁶

Kazanetz's proposals might not be practicable possible without the rights of the Sovnarkhoz mentioned by spiridonov. All of these rights went beyond the final version of the reform proposal except the last one on the transfer of raw materials and changes in priorities within the same industry. It cannot be determined, based on the limited data, whether these proposals were widely shared among the first secretaries. But one can conjecture that, given the abstract and vague comments made by these officials on the rights of the Sovnarkhoz, such views may have been shared by other officials.

Another area was the issue of expanding the autonomy of plant directors. In Moscow and Leningrad Oblasts, this issue was widely discussed during the initial period. For example, Fomichev of Moscow Oblast argued:

In connection with the reform of the system of management, it is necessary to expand the rights of the directors. Now, for example, all indicators of the production plans are given from above. It is known that directors can only give orders on the purchase of any part of material the sum of which does not exceed 50 rubles. In practice, there are a lot of situations which meet difficulties. There are issues that directors cannot decide independently. All of these need to be considered.⁴⁷

The positions of the first secretaries of Leningrad oblast, in contrast, were generally lukewarm on this issue. For instance, Kozlov and Spiridonov mentioned the issue in passing as an item for further consideration. kapitonov, first secretary of Moscow Oblast, in his speech, made no reference to this issue. Here, it is clear that the first secretaries made a distinction between the rights of the Sovnarkhoz and its branch administration, on the one hand and those of directors of enterprises, on the other.⁴⁸

As already seen, negative consensus on the problems of supply and sale under the old system was strong. However, whether the sovnarkhoz should have the right to independently make contracts with other regions was not clearly discussed. Most attention was drawn to cutting waste by marginally changing the old system. This was primarily because they were more preoccupied with fulfilling the 1957 plan. Thus, while they criticized the old supply system, they were reluctant to see a drastic change in that supply system. Almost all of the secretaries of highly developed areas did not conceal their concern about the impact of abrupt changes in supply networks. As Ignatov noted:

In order to maintain normal and uninterrupted work of enterprises and construction organs during the first period of transfer from ministries and departments to the Sovnarkhoz, it is necessary for all-union and republican ministries that are scheduled to be liquidated to define precisely the annual plans, including ones no nomenclature and technological-economic indicators, to fully provide annual plans and limits on labor and wage funds, and capital investments, to give final plans of capital construction, and to approve itemized lists for 1957. They are also obligated to earmark funds for material and technological supply, equipments and transport means for enterprises and construction organs. It should be done in such a way that the current inter-regional and inter-enterprise cooperation be maintained.⁴⁹

It would appear that these officials were quite perplexed by the contradictory demands of simultaneously having to implement the reform and fulfill the 1957 plan. It is also clear that their strong interest in annual plan fulfillment, for both political and bureaucratic reasons determined their policy advocacy regarding reform of the supply system.

Why are these people so concerned about annual plan fulfillment? This is perhaps due to the political pressure being exerted by Khrushchev, who was so anxious for quick results, and thus made it impossible to separate the long-term process of the reform from the short-term requirement of annual plan fulfillment. In this regard, it is interesting to note that, while recognizing the possible mistakes and thus urging a more tolerant attitude toward the reform, Ignatov was so serious about the impact of the reform on annual plan fulfillment.⁵⁰

The speeches of secretaries from highly industrialized areas were also marked during this initial period of the reform by concerns that transcended their specific regional needs: by concerns for “state interests” and by interregional ties. For example, Kapitonov stressed the need for observance of state discipline and for educating cadres to give priority to state interests.⁵¹ Kirilenko made a similar point:

In order to cope with the tasks before us, obkom, gorkom, and raikom organs must direct industry and construction more deeply and with more qualification. They must not see things only from the perspective of the development of their own economic region. They must resolve issues in full accord with the interests of the all-state plan, and in the interest of the development of our country's national economy.⁵²

Along a similar line, but with more emphasis on an inter-regional perspective, Ignatov said:

Enterprises of Gorky oblast are closely connected with many economic regions of the country by supplies of metals and other materials. In particular, the link of our enterprises with metallurgy of Yuga and Ural is a great one. Without improving these links, it is impossible to further develop industry in a series of economic regions of the major Central oblasts of the country including, of course, ours. In this connection, the main task of the Sovnarkhoz is not only to identify the needs, distribute industrial resources, and conduct sales, but also to develop links with other regions in terms of supply and sale.⁵³

As will be seen later, this state perspective became more intense as the reform unfolded. An important question is why these officials from highly developed areas showed such strong concern with state interests. The role theory itself suggests one answer. This could be viewed as an attempt to play the role of politician by going beyond local interests and thus trying to combine both bureaucratic and political roles. Why are they, then, interested in playing political role? Personal connections and positions might be related to this. Moscow (Kapitonov) and Gorky (Ignatov) were the original locales for the reform, and thus drew the attention of the top leader. Kirilenko was a candidate member of the Presidium. That position might have pushed him to take a more state-oriented perspective.

Alternatively, and more importantly, regional characteristics must have worked toward a state-wide perspective in that, as Ignatov himself pointed out, the more

industrially developed a region, the more it becomes interdependent, if not dependent, upon other regions. This means that to take a state-wide position does not create any contradictions with satisfying regional interests, given the nature of the 1957 reform. Actually, a state-wide perspective facilitates supply of materials. In contrast to these regions, it was found that, in industrially simple areas, evidence for a state-perspective was very scanty. Only the national importance of local economies was stressed by secretaries from areas of low industrial development.

To sum up, the following points can be made on the initial period discussions. There were different degrees of differentiation in their discussions of the reform. The main determinant of their responses was the regional economic character. Rural regions with simple industrial structure showed a low degree of differentiation, while the opposite was true of the highly developed areas. Given the level of industrialization, the complexity of industry played a significant role.

What do the different levels of differentiation mean in terms of the role theory? The secretaries who showed a low level of differentiation limited themselves basically to securing their bureaucratic interest by having autonomous economic regions. In the area most affected by the reform, mainly regional characteristics led the secretaries to display incorporating tendencies such as expanding their regions of diversifying their economic base. On the other hand, the same regional character led these officials to direct their attention to inter-regional and state perspectives. Thus, due to the regional character, the obkom first secretaries were able to inadvertently synthesize the two roles. However, increasingly difficult as the reform was implemented.

Finally, two general points may be made. One is that while there existed a wide negative consensus on the ills of the old system, the fact that the reform's impact differed from one region to another raises the question of the extent and intensity of positive support for the reform as the reform developed. The other point is that personal characteristics in determining the attitudes of the secretaries to the reform. This means that background factors may of any not be important depending upon the nature of a reform.

The Second Stage: Role Synthesis in Action

The second stage started with the implementation of the reform in July, 1957 and lasted until the early part of 1985. During the first stage, the obkom first secretaries showed their bureaucratic and political concerns related to the reform.⁵⁴ But those concerns were yet to pass reality testing as the reform was implemented from July onward.

The second stage was characterized by heightened salience for the politician role. As mentioned earlier, role contents are not something fixed: they vary with situations, and particularly so in the case of salience among different role expectations. In the case of the 1957 reform, major political role expectations were: identification of the reform with the top leader, sensitivity to the leader's demand for quick results from the reform, and struggle against localism.

The traditional bureaucratic role of fulfilling plans was not incompatible with the leader's demand for quick returns. But the compatibility depended considerably

on how to achieve quick results. In the case of 1957, these were obtained through mobilizing unused reserves, but the obkom first secretaries dutifully complied with the political demand to attribute the results instead to the reform, and ultimately to the top leader. As long as unused reserves were found, and the implementation of the reform did not show any serious problems, it was possible to maintain this fiction on the sources of the quick results, i.e., whether or not they were a result of the reform.

The second stage covers the period of such a happy “confusion.” It will be shown in the following section how pervasive was the perception of the demand for quick results among these officials, whether there were any variations among them in this regard, what attempts were made to respond to central demands, and, based on these questions, how secretaries’ attitudes to the reform were affected.

The first salient feature of the second stage was the acknowledgment on the part of the obkom first secretaries that they identified themselves with the top leader. This was expressed in the form of condemning the anti-party group. The following are several examples:

All the party and all the Soviet people singlehandedly and actively support the decisions of the June plenum of the CC of the CPSU on the anti-party group of Malenkov, G.M. Kaganovich and Molotov. The June plenum got into one of the most important pages in the history of struggles of our party for the leninist unity of its members.⁵⁵

Only politically blind people who are apart from the reality of the party and the country did not notice how the participants of Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov and Shepilov, who joined them, betrayed themselves. Finding themselves in the captivity of the old idea and method, not seeing new initiatives and environment, they turned out to be incorrigible conservativists, sectarians and dogmatists. The participants of the anti-party group strive for the outdated form and methods of work, repudiation what is created by reality and what has resulted from the development of Soviet society.⁵⁶

The achievement of the Moldavian people reflects the striding successes which socialism has achieved. This is the reason that the vain attempts of the anti-party group of Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, and Shepilov, who joined them, look wreckless and groundless. They underestimated the achievements of our economic construction and discredited the policy of the party which, under the leadership of the Leninist CC, will carry out the big task of successful fulfillment of the historic decisions of the 20th party Congress...⁵⁷

This kind of condemnation was pervasive, with little difference in time and context, and regardless of the backgrounds of these officials. What is striking is that while these officials condemned the anti-party group, they did not mention Khrushchev’s name, instead only referring to the Party and the Central Committee. This might reflect, in part, that Khrushchev had not yet fully consolidated his authority by early 1958. Put differently, this might also reflect the prevalent theme of collectivity in leadership. As one secretary remarked:

The work of the party on the establishment of the Sovnarkhoz has great significance. The sovnarkhoz have only just started their activity, but what a rich spring of creativity spurts around them! The time has arrived when produc-

tive forces are growing in all corners of the country... Collectivity in discussing and resolving the problems of the party is always coupled with personal responsibility. Party committees are obligated to strengthen the authority of leaders and build collegial work for it to be conducive to the fulfillment of the intended plans...⁵⁸

Along with this indirect recognition of Khrushchev, these officials strongly felt pressure to demonstrate early positive results for the reform. Given the political environment, Khrushchev must have felt a strong need for early successes as part of consolidating his authority. This need was well perceived by regional first party secretaries:

Recently, particularly after the establishment of economic regions and the creation of the Sovnarkhoz, people came to show more initiative in improving industrial production, to better use equipment and reserves and to more easily achieve rhythmic work in enterprises. This convincingly shows how much the anti-party group... was divorced from the life... and tried to distract the party from the correct course.⁵⁹

After the creation of the Sovnarkhoz, not much time has past. But already the correctness of the party is positively evaluated.⁶⁰

Only four months have passed since the Zaporozhe Economic Administrative Region was created and the activity of the Sovnarkhoz began. Practice and the experience we have accumulated show that the reform was fully justified. Bringing leadership close to production positively affected the activity of enterprises.⁶¹

The reform is giving remarkable results. The reform allowed us to significantly accelerate technological progress in industry, to improve qualitative indicators of the work of enterprises, and to set up specialization and cooperation better. The 1957 plan was fulfilled ahead of schedule by 104.9%...⁶²

From the above examples, one can detect the urgency of showing the correctness and positive results of the reform in such expressions as "only four months since...", "It is not long since..." Although one cannot ignore the positive results of the reform, one may still question whether such results could be solely attributed to the reform, or whether those results were possible even through other means. Given the means that they used and considering the confusion, lack of preparation and length of time spent on implementation (only 4-5 months), one can sense the pressure to show off early positive results and to make a link between those results and the top leader. At the same time, such pressure might have been accepted as natural by these officials in light of their high level of support for the reform.

The pressure for early results can be better understood by reviewing how they tried to achieve those results. The technologies used organizational, mobilizational and scientific-technological means. Organizational technologies refer to reestablishing relations between enterprises. Coordination of raw materials, and strengthening specialization. This can be seen as the immediate benefit of the reform. For example, two oil refineries in Ufa which before the reform received raw materials from different sources came to get them regularly from the same region.⁶³

Mobilizational methods included more frequent workers' meetings for new

proposals and ideas, and closer contacts of party members with workers for mobilization purposes, for example, in mines. All these are familiar themes requiring no examples. What is important is the frequency with which these mobilizational methods were taken up by local parties after the reform increased the power of local parties in industrial management. It is also important to point out that regional party first secretaries linked these techniques to the effects of the reform.⁶⁴

The sense of urgency can also be understood in the area of application of science and technology. More often, concern with quick results and cheap cost led to the "introduction" of so-called "modernizing" machines that are already in use. Faced with the pressure, one secretary frankly said when the issue of replacing old weaving machines with new ones of introducing automation came up, that "the introduction of new machines takes time."⁶⁵ In short, the whole mood was to draw upon readily available cheap means for quick results.

There would not be any conflict between political and bureaucratic roles as long as quick fixes brought about positive results. However, as quick results were exhausted, and as the reform moved to another stage, concern about confusion in the process of implementation became louder. It was especially so in the area of inter-regional supply and sale of goods and materials. Such concern was largely because of incorporation behaviors.⁶⁶ As inter-regional supply issues became serious, calls for a state perspective from regional party secretaries of developed areas became louder.⁶⁷ All of these were signs of the conflict between political and bureaucratic roles.

To sum up, during the initial period of the implementation of the reform, the obkom first secretaries had to respond to their political role expectations as politicians. The implication of the response for their attitude to the reform was that they had to take a position of exaggerating the effects of the reform. During this period, the reform was supported by these officials as long as the expanded rights given to them enabled them to fulfill both long-term plans and demands to demonstrate quick results from the reform. However, as the reform proceeded, they were faced with new issues which gave rise to a new conflict between fulfilling plans and "taking state perspectives." How this conflict developed, and how it affected their attitude to the reform, is the focus of the third stage.

The Third Stage: From the Latter Half of 1958

The main characteristic of this stage was the realization by these officials of the hard reality that the Sovnarkhoz reform was not compatible with their bureaucratic role fulfillment.⁶⁸

This meant the end of the close tie between support for the reform by demonstration positive results and support for the top leader. Thus, with the discussion of the Seven Year Plan (1959-1965), the two became separate. Although their support for Khrushchev became stronger as Khrushchev's power and authority were further consolidated, the complaints about the reform became more vocal, the responses of these officials showed more variety than in the first two stages. At the same time, a new kind of role conflict emerged between the "state-wide perspective" and the localistic tendency to concentrate on plan fulfillment at all costs. The high level of

consensus on the reform clearly began to show the signs of breakdown.

What was latent in the second stage, in terms of the identification of Khrushchev as the top leader, became more explicit and stronger in the third stage. Khrushchev's name was more frequently mentioned as the man in control of the Party and the Central Committee. This was more so in the cases of secretaries who were politically dependent on Khrushchev.⁶⁹

Yet, while Khrushchev was more visibly recognized, the close link made between the positive results of the reform and the Central Committee of Khrushchev came to an end. Even those who strongly identified with the top leader stopped mentioning the reform. For example, Denisov was quite vocal about the early results of the reform in 1957, but in his two articles in 1959, he did not even mention the reform. It may be that, once the leader had consolidated his power, the need for a strong linkage between the reform results and the top leader became unnecessary, especially when the reform started meeting problems. As the high politics became routinized, the concern now of regional party leaders with fulfilling their own routine roles such as plan fulfillment became as important as mere broadcasting of their loyalty to the leader.

This separation between the positive results of the reform, and the attribution of their results to the top leader, did not mean total lack of support for the reform. For example, Kapitonov praised the reform: "Today at the Congress of the Party, we cannot but once more do justice to the revolutionary measures taken by the Central Committee on restructuring the management of industry and construction. The new form of management already gave significant results and opened a broader perspective for the future."⁷⁰

However, these claims of positive results could be regarded as purely formalistic, for their statements were not followed by discussion of specific future role of the Sovnarkhoz. Instead, they were followed by discussion of constraints on the operation of the Sovnarkhoz. Commentary ranged from total lack of attention to the Sovnarkhoz, demands related to various aspects of the operation of the economy, to complaints about the operations of the Sovnarkhoz itself. In all, there emerged a pattern of increasing demands on the center.

There were three distinct groupings among the secretaries as regarded their view of the Sovnarkhoz in this period. To the first group belonged Denisov, Shelest and Klimenko. These people, without making any reference to the Sovnarkhoz, registered many complaints and demands on the center. Denisov, for example, complained about energy sources, needed for the chemical industry and machine building. He demanded transfer of a hydroelectric station to his region. Shelest also complained about slow and insufficient supplies of equipments and technologies by Gosplan USSR.⁷¹ Klimenko's complaints were more revealing of the tenacity of the old system of planning and allocation. The capital allocation for the Seven Year Plan, he pointed out, was concentrated only on the last year of the Plan, and yearly requests for material and technological supply were made without agreement on a production plan.⁷²

Gaevoi, Kapitonov, Spiridonov, Elistratov and Khvorustukhin were a second grouping. They recognized the positive aspects of the Sovnarkhoz but at the same

time, expressed concerns about problems in the operation of the sovnarkhoz. Gaevoi, for example, acknowledged positive aspects of the reform:

The growth of industrial production, courageous introduction of new technology into production, finding of reserves, bringing leadership and cadres closer to factories and shops speaks to the correctness of Khrushchev's proposal for the reform of administration of industry and construction.⁷³

However, he quickly added commentary on serious problems with the material supply system. His statements are very revealing of how much these officials were preoccupied with plan fulfillment at the expense of the spirit of the reform:

In order to put all these factories into operation faster, we need to solve several basic problems of securing construction materials, metals and equipment. USSR Gosplan, as of now, is the single planning and distributing organ. It has to clearly fulfill its functions, learn the needs of enterprises and their production potential. However, we have gone the way of excessive decentralization in the question of distribution of materials and resources and it may lead to serious complications.⁷⁴

The need has become urgent to create under Gosplan USSR a central administration for supply equipment and cable goods and to the most important industrial projects in the Seven Year Plan. From our point of view, authorization for supply of equipment and goods should be drawn up in the all-union sale organizations of Gosplan USSR.⁷⁵

It is also striking to note that in the area of sales, Gaevoi wanted to expand the rights of the Sovnarkhoz, rights that, even after the reform, were held by republican supply and sale agencies. The felt-need for simultaneous centralization and decentralization on supply and sale may reflect the differential degree of control over these two issues by regional party secretaries. The need for central control was similarly made in the area of science and technology.

Apart from indirect complaints about the operation of the Sovnarkhoz, there were stronger complaints about the limits of its authority. Elistratov complained that the planning agency (Gosplan Ukrainy) did not consider the confirmed norms of the length of time for construction projects, and that it allocated money without concentration on those projects nearing completion. Such allocation, he argued, stemmed from a tendency to define goals mainly in terms of volume of construction without considering the needs of locals and branch industries. Then, he went on to point out the limits of the rights of the Sovnarkhoz: "The Sovnarkhoz sees clearly the pointlessness of such a way of carrying out construction, but does not have the right to independently redistribute capital investment between branches of industry..."⁷⁶ He further complained of the tendency to smother local initiative in planning by sending down detailed plans from the center.

Another distance category were those party secretaries who were appointed right before and after the reform. As Rigby has argued, appointment to a new position by the top leader is a very important way of establishing patron-client ties in the Soviet Union.⁷⁷ Then, how did they differ from other officials in terms of their responses?

Quite a few of the obkom first secretaries in my sample were appointed between

1955 and 1959: Denisov (1955, transfer), Kirilenko (1955), Spiridonov (1957), Nuriev (1957), Kokarev (1958), Gaevoi (1958), Efremov (1958, transfer), and Goryachev (1959, transfer). Among these secretaries, distinctive attitudinal responses can be detected with the two secretaries, L. Efremov and Goryachev, who were transferred at the late second or early third stage of the reform implementation mentioned above.

First, these people displayed extreme deference to Khrushchev. Both of them dwelt on criticizing the anti-party group and, during 1958-59, they strongly identified Khrushchev as the top leader of the party. Second, they still expressed strong support for the reform even when serious problems emerged in the course of implementation. This is in striding contrast to those secretaries who either initially refrained from showing support for the reform or added complaints to their support around 1958 and 1959.

Goryachev, when he was first secretary of Kalinin Oblast, seldom showed interest in the reform. After his transfer to Novosibirsk, however, he showed strong support.⁷⁸ Efremov also did not show any sign of interest or support before he was transferred to Gorky in 1958. After that, his support was quite strong: "new successes of socialist industry are attributed to the party's reform of the administration of industry and construction. The results again and again indicate the wisdom and sagaciousness of the central Committee of the party..."⁷⁹

The responses can be explained, in part, by the political role expectation placed on the officials by the top leader in return for their appointments, and in part also by the fact that these new appointees did not go through reality testing of the reform, because they had been transferred from rural areas.

In contrast, those who were appointed earlier (in 1955 and 1957) apparently came to see the fulfillment of their bureaucratic role as more important than showing political deference to the top leader, especially when he had already consolidated his authority. They were fully aware that political deference without tangible results would not carry much weight for their future political careers.

Thus, during the third stage, as the top leader consolidated his power and authority, we find that obkom first secretaries started paying more attention to their bureaucratic roles. At the same time, we find fewer promises of quick results, even in discussions of the Seven-Year Plan (which was so ambitious as to require mobilization of reserves). Instead, the reform now ran into the real challenge of whether the Sovnarkhoz had sufficient rights to cope with the tasks of the Seven-Year Plan. Most obkom first secretaries found the Sovnarkhoz to be insufficiently equipped to handle the tasks of the Plan. Furthermore, confusion in the implementation and operation of the reform became extensive by 1959.

What is interesting is how varied were the perceptions of problems and the responses to them. These ran from demands for more rights for the Sovnarkhoz to recentralization of certain functions, accompanied by strong demands on the center. Complicating this pattern of response were new political loyalists who blindly showed their support for the reform in spite of the problems.

Personal differences in background and regional character may explain different degrees of interest in the reform during 1957-1959. But it is difficult to come up with any strong independent variables to explain the variety of responses at the third

stage. The responses appear to have been tailored to situational factors. Most probably, it can be argued that the responses reflected efforts by harried officials to fulfill their plans. That fulfillment was complicated and threatened by the distinctive bottlenecks they faced in their regions. Nonetheless, it can be observed that the variety of responses observed at the third stage reflected the breakdown of consensus among these officials on the desirability or workability of the reform.

Conclusion

It has been shown in this paper that the attitudes of obkom first secretaries toward the 1957 reform varied depending on two major factors: regional profile and role expectations placed on these officials. The priority given by these officials to bureaucratic versus political roles was closely related to the political situation in Moscow.

The 1957 reform basically increased the control of regional leaders over the management of the economy. Thus, initial negative attitudes to the reform were difficult to find. However, the degree of interest and of differentiation in discussion of the reform was largely a function of regional profile. If a region was predominantly agricultural, the level of interest in the reform was quieter low. If a region was highly industrialized, the opposite was true. However, in such cases, the degree of complexity of the industrial structure was a factor in determining the level of differentiation.

As the reform progressed, the attitudes of regional leaders changed with the role expectations demanded of them. The way in which the reform was born, and the top leader's expectation of quick results from the reform, led obkom first secretaries to emphasize their political roles by showing extreme deference to the top leader and exaggerating the early results of the reform.

However, as the political situation at the center changed, these regional leaders began to pay more attention to their bureaucratic roles. Fulfillment of the bureaucratic role made it difficult to deal with the problems related to ongoing implementation of the reform. It is at this stage that the consensus built in the initial period started to break down.

Notes

- 1 For the text of Khrushchev's speech, *Pravda* (March 30, 1957).
- 2 On the political background of the 1957 reform, George W. Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders*, chapters, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
- 3 Robert Conquest, *Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R.: The Study of Soviet Dynamics* (London: Macmillan, 1961), pp. 292-328.
- 4 *Pravda* (March 30, 1957).
- 5 William Conyngham, *Industrial Management in The soviet Union: The Role of the CPSU in Industrial Decision-Making, 1917-1970* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1973), Chapter 4.
- 6 *Pravda* (March 30, 1957).

- 7 The following discussion is heavily dependent upon Adnris Trapans, “*A Study of Soviet Industrial Administration: The Sovnarkhoz Experiment*,” Ph.D dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1978, especially chapters, I and II.
- 8 *Ibid.*, p. 76.
- 9 Literature of role theory is extensive. Major examples are: Neal Gross et al., *Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of the School Superintendency Role R* (New York: John Wiley, 1958); Bruce Biddle and Edwin Thomas, Ed., *Role Theory: Concept and Research* (New York: John Wiley, 1966); Theodore Sabin and Vernon Allen, “Role Theory,” in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson (ed.), *The Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), pp. 223-258; Leonard Reissman, “A Study of Role Conceptions in Bureaucracy,” *Social Forces*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (March 1949), pp. 305-310; Lionel J. Neiman and James W. Hughes, “The Problem of the Concept of Role: A Re-Survey of the Literature,” *Social Forces*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (December 1951), pp. 141-149; Alvin Magid, “Dimensions of Administrative Role and Conflict Resolution Among Local Officials in Northern Nigeria,” *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. XII, (September 1967), pp. 321-338. For an example of application of role theory to Soviet studies, Erik Hoffman, “Role conflict and Ambiguity in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,” in Roger Kanet (ed.), *The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies* (New York: The Free Press, 1971), pp. 235-258. Also, although not explicit, role theory is an underlying theme of Hough’s work, *The Soviet Prefects*, *passim*.
- 10 Robert Merton, “the Role Set: Problems in Sociological Theory,” *British Journal of Sociology*, 8, 1957, pp. 106-120.
- 11 Jerry Hough, *The Soviet Prefects*, Chapter XIV. T.H. Rigby, “Politics in the Mono-Organizational Society,” Andrew Janos (ed.), *Authoritarian Politics in communist Europe* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, U.C., Berkeley, 1976), pp. 31-81.
- 12 One informant among former soviet citizens remarked on the collusion of interests between local party organs and enterprises during the early years of the Soviet rule: “Self-interest and various inducements,” supplemented by fairly close working relations with management, create a predisposition for the party secretary to identify with the firm — to think of it as “we”. Joseph S. Berliner, *Factory and manager in the USSR* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 226.

An example for the post-Stalin period, “Repeatedly one reads that” some Party organs has developed a servile attitude toward a certain manager, that it has not been sufficiently “demanding.” Even when the Party organs are demanding, it may be in the wrong direction. Instead of fighting localism, for example, the Party officials “may compel the economic leaders [to take action] favorable to local interest.” Hough, *The soviet Prefects*, p. 179. On the same theme, *Idem.*, “The Prerequisites of Areal Decentralization: The Soviet Experience,” in James J. Heap [hey](ed.), *Spatial Dimensions of Development Administration* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1971), pp. 132-176.

One Western Sovietologist aptly pointed out the failure of khrushchev

- expectation of local Party organs in fighting against localism: “Evidently Khrushchev thought that the regional party secretaries would ensure that their Sovnarkhozy enforced national priorities. They did not work out.” Alec Nove, *An Economic History of the U.S.S.R.*, pp. 360-361.
- 13 F. Titov, first secretary of Ivanovo obkom, stressed the development of heavy industry for textile industry. At the same time, he also mentioned the existence of heavy industry in his region as follows: “But, in our oblast, not only light industry is developed. Ivanovo oblast has long since stopped being a region of cotton as it had been called in olden times. Now we have machine building and other branches of industry.” *Soviet Profsoyuz*, 1959, No. 4, p. 6.
 - 14 This, However, does not mean that the regional leaders did not pay attention to light industry at all. It only means that the industry was only of secondary importance.
 - 15 Ivan Kazanet, *Partiinaiia Zhizn'*, 1957, No. 10, p. 14.
 - 16 A. Gaevoi, first secretary of Dnepropetrovsk obkom, emphasized one of the important aspects of the reform as bringing leadership closer to finding unused reserves. *Pravda* (January 31, 1959).
 - 17 Richard B. Heflebower, “Observations on Decentralization in Large Enterprises,” *Journal of Industrial Economics*, Vol. LX, No. 1 (November 1960), pp. 7-23.
 - 18 On the ties of technological development, Gregory Grossman, “knowledge, Information, and Innovation in the Soviet Economy,” *American Economic Review*, LXI 2 (May 1966), pp. 118-129.
 - 19 For examples of areas where mobilizational techniques are emphasized, Lugan and Donetsk oblasts can be cited where coal mining was a major industry.
 - 20 the theme of mobilization and ideological indoctrination was quite weak in the case of first secretaries of highly industrialized areas, such as Leningrad, Moscow and Gorky oblasts.
 - 21 Philip E. Tetlock, “cognitive Style and Political Ideology,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 45, 1, 1983, p. 119.
Confusion may arise in terms of meaning between complexity and differentiation. Complexity refers here to the level of interdependency of various aspects of economy without particular connection with the reform, while differentiation means the degree of sophistication of discussion on the reform.
 - 22 In his article, *Pravda* (March) he did not make any reference to the reform. See his article, *Pravda* (November) and his strong support for it can be seen his 1959 article, *Pravda* (January 20, 1959).
 - 23 D. Danaylov, *Pravda* (June 14, 1957); V. Kosov, *Pravda* (April 26, 1957); A. Khakhalov, *Pravda* (May 6, 1957).
 - 24 I. Lebedev, *Pravda* (March 6, 1957).
 - 25 *Ibid.*
 - 26 P. Silinski, *Pravda* (April 3, 1957).
 - 27 N. Organov, “K Voprosu ob Ekonomicheskom Raionirovanii,” *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 4, 1957, pp. 37-39.
 - 28 G. V. Eniutin said, “From our point of view, an economic region cannot be considered definitely as a geographic concept. This is defined in a complex way

and distinguished by certain level of development of productive force and the existence of industry with takes and important place in the national economic system and for the future development of economy. We have a definite specialization as a region of coal mining industry with national significance.” *Pravda* (May 5, 1957).

- 29 For examples, first secretaries of Kirovgorod, Zaporozhe and Novgorod oblasts did not discuss the reform at all in 1957, showing low level of interest in the reform. Further, Novgorod obkom expressed that it supported the inclusion of industries in the region into Leningrad economic region. *Leningradskaiia Pravda* (April 9, 1957). A similar phenomenon occurred in the cases of Zaporozhe and Kirovgorod. See, Shcherbitski, *Pravda Ukrainy* (April 9, 1957).
- 30 In his March speech cited in the above, khrushchev made a reference regarding the inclusion of Novgorod into Leningrad Sovnarkhoz.
- 31 M.T. Efremov, “Problemy Neftianoi promyshlennosti v Srednem Povolzh’e,” *Kommunist*, No. 7, 1958, pp. 42-52. In the case of Tatar oblast, See, S.D. Ignat’ev, *Pravda*, February 4, November 18, 1959. In the two oblasts, the administrative structure of the Sovnarkhoz was quite simple with one administration for Gas and Petroleum industry, indicating that they are single industry-dominant regions. It was natural that they were heavily oriented towards heavy industry. At the same time, they clearly recognized that the impact of the Sovnarkhoz on the oil industry which requires high investment (and thus beyond the control of the sovnarkhoz would not be great. Reflecting this, for example, Efremov did not specifically address the issue of sovnarkhoz operation even in 1958. Instead, he kept referring to Khrushchev’s name five times and his policy emphasis on oil and gas as a means to pressure Gosplan USSR and Gosplan RSFSR.
- 32 For a typical example, A. Larionov expressed extreme deference to Khrushchev either by his name or by condemning the anti-party group, while his interest in the reform was almost nil. *Pravda*, February 26, 1957; March 23, 1957; and January 29, 1959.
- 33 In addition to F. Titov, G. Eniutin, first secretary of kamensk oblast, tried to show the potential for development of heavy industry in his region, even though the administrative structure of the Sovnarkhoz showed was composed only of one administration, that is, light industry. *Pravda* (May 6, 1957).
- 34 Although it is not clear what role differences in educational background played in terms of supporting the reform, it seems that those who graduated the Higher Party School stressed the effectiveness and importance of ideological tempering and mobilization in industrial management.
- 35 I. Kapitonov, *Pravda* (March 7, 1957).
- 36 V. Shcherbitski, *Pravda Ukrainy* (April 9, 1957).
- 37 Shcherbitski, *op. cit.*; Denivov, *Ibid.*, p. 27.
- 38 I. Zhegalin, *Pravda* (April 25, 1957).
- 39 *Ibid.*
- 40 F. Kozlov, *Leningradskaiia Pravda* (April 12, 1957).
- 41 Zhegalin, *Pravda* (April 25, 1957). A similar theme can be found in the articles of kazanet and Kirilenko. Kazanet, *Pravda Ukrainy* (April 19, 1957); Kirienko,

- Pravda* (April 10, 1957).
- 42 Kirilenko, *Ibid.*
 - 43 Denisov, *PZ*, 1957, No. 7, p. 27.
 - 44 Kozlov, *LP* (April 12, 1957).
 - 45 I. Spiridonov's discussion on the reform in *LP* (April 12, 1957).
 - 46 Kazanet, *PU* (April 19, 1957).
 - 47 *Moskovskaia Pravda* (April 14, 1957).
 - 48 Kapitonov, *MP* (April 14, 1957); Kozlov, *LP* (April 12, 1957).
 - 49 N. Ignatov, *Pravda* (March 6, 1957). Kozlov also said, "...all the plants are obligated to strictly fulfill existing sub-contract relations. At the same time, it is necessary to prepare proposals on changes in existing production connections with the consideration of more rational inner and inter-regional relations. The liquidation of present connections between enterprises can be made only by departments of all-union Gosplan." *LP* (April 12, 1957).
- Kapitonov also remarked, "It will serve a purpose to commission Gosplan along with ministries to examine and decide all the questions of supplying the programs of this year (1957) with necessary materials and finished goods." *Pravda* (March 7, 1957). Kirilenko made a similar comment in *Pravda* (April 10, 1957).
- 50 Ignatov, in this regard, continued to say, "It should be done in such a way that for the year of 1957, the current cooperation between enterprises be maintained." *Pravda* (March 6, 1957).
 - 51 Kapitonov, *Pravda* (June 14, 1957).
 - 52 Kirilenko said, "In order to cope with the tasks, obkom, gorkom and raikom party organs are called more deeply and with more qualification to lead industry and construction and not to see from the perspective of development of its own economic regions. They must resolve tasks in full accordance with tasks of all-union plans and in the interest of the development of all people's economy of our country." *Pravda* (April 10, 1957).
 - 53 Ignatov, *Pravda* (March 6, 1957).
 - 54 The size of sample in this section is 18.
 - 55 Kirilenko, *Pravda* (October 23, 1957).
 - 56 Ignatov, *Pravda* (July 31, 1957).
 - 57 I. Serdiuk, *Pravda* (September 25, 1957).
 - 58 Denivov, *Pravda* (August 16, 1957).
 - 59 Z. Nuriev, *Pravda* (September 7, 1957).
 - 60 S. Pilipets, "Raschet Tvorcheskaia Aktivnost' Trudiashchikhsia," *PZ*, 1957, No. 18, p. 20.
 - 61 A. Gaevoi, *Pravda* (November 25, 1957).
 - 62 Kirilenko, *Pravda* (June 23, 1958); Kapitonov, *Pravda* (June 12, 1958); Kokarev, *Pravda* (September 2, 1958); and other examples are Denisov, Zhegalin and Spiridonov.
 - 63 Nuriev, *Pravda* (September 7, 1957).
 - 64 For example, in Stalingrad oblast, workers brought in 15,000 propositions which aimed at using inner reserves of production to improve management of industry

and construction. A specific application of such propositions was that at Krasnyi Oktiabr', a metallurgy plant, by the initiative of steel workers, melting time was cut down by 15 minutes. Zhegalin, *Pravda* (October 17, 1957).

A more serious and a large scale of mobilization can be seen in extraction industry, such as coal mining and construction. These areas are labor intensive, so they are more suitable for mobilizational methods of economic leadership. On this point, see also, Hough, *The Soviet Prefects*, p. 207.

- 65 F. Titov, first secretary of Ivanovo obkom, had three options in renovating weaving machines: The first one was automation which would require complete replacement of old machines by new machines. Apparently, only partial automation was introduced due to the difference in size between new and old machines and to the effect of replacing on production — another indication for short-term bureaucratic role concern. The second option was to introduce not the newest machines but more efficient machines already available. Nonetheless, it would require disrhythmic operations in the process of replacement. Finally, what was adopted was to modernize machines currently in use. For details, Titov, "Rukovodstvo promyshlennost'iu v nobykh usloviakh," *Kommunist*, 1958.

The above examples of quick fix, however, do not include the instances of more serious long-term efforts on the part of regional leaders to introduce technology. However, exceptions are hard to come by. For instance, Leningrad obkom reported that the obkom organized a joint scientific-technological development by bringing in different research institutes to turn research results into advanced technologies. It was reported that in 1957 alone, more than 300 of new machines were worked out and produced. Spiridonov, *LP* (March 6, 1958).

However, such examples were rare. The general mood was geared toward use of available technologies and simple organizational techniques for quick results.

- 66 Examples are abundant: One typical one was that Voroshilov Sovnarkhoz proposed the use of local sulphur instead of importing from other regions. It brought about not only severance from the past supply system: the quality of delivered good afterwards was not as good as in the past.

Another type of problem was the unsmooth transition from the ministerial system to the sovnarkhoz. In Cheliabinsk Sovnarkhoz, the organization of material-technological supply was impeded because the main departments of abolished ministries did not report to the Sovnarkhoz all the primary data on the material resources of enterprises.

- 67 Kirilenko, *Pravda* (June 23, 1958); Kapitonov, *Pravda* (June 12, 1958).

- 68 Gaevoi, *Pravda* (January 31, 1959); Spiridonov, *Pravda* (January 26, 1959).

For a typical example, Denisov, who was appointed to Saratov obkom first secretary in 1955, devoted one third of his speech to discussion of the Seven Year Plan and condemnation of the anti-party group. *Pravda* (February 4, 1959). Nuriev described Khrushchev as the leader of the party and the CC. *Pravda* (February 3, 1959).

- 69 Nuriev, *Pravda* (January 10, 1959); Denisov, *Moskva*, 1959, No. 7, pp. 156-164;

Pravda (February 4, 1959).

- 70 Kapitonov, *Pravda* (January 30, 1959); Gaevoi, *Pravda* (January 31, 1959). Gaevoi remarked that the reform of administration of industry and construction recorded positive affect on the development of the economy.
- 71 Shelest, first secretary of Kirov obkom, said, "Capital investment in development of chemical industry by Kirov Sovnarkhoz increased in 1959 by two times in comparison with that of 1958, amounting to 300 million rubles. Meanwhile, the plan of material-technological supply in the first quarter of this year was realized only by 60% in high quality metal and by 15% in pipe supply. The supply of technological equipment and finished goods were insufficient. Gosplan USSR, along with related committees and organizations should work in the question of supplying material and technological supplies... *Pravda* (February 6, 1959).
- 72 V. Klimenko, *PU* (December 19, 1958).
- 73 Gaevoi, *Pravda* (January 31, 1959); Kapitonov, *Pravda* (January 30, 1959); Spiridonov, *Pravda* (January 10, 1959); A. Khvorostukhin, *Promyshlennaia Ekonomicheskaiia Gazeta* (December 21, No. 2, 1958).
- 74 Gaevoi, *PU* (December 5, 1958).
- 75 *Ibid*; Khvorostukhin, *Promyshlennaia Ekonomicheskaiia gazeta* (December 21, No. 2, 1958).
- 76 P. Elistratov, "Luchshee ispol'zovanie kapitalovlozhenia," *Pz*, no....?
- 77 T. Rigby, "The Soviet Regional Leadership: The Brezhnev Generation," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 37,(March 1978), p. 12; John Willerton, Jr., "Clientelism in the Soviet Union: An Initial Examination," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Vol. XII, No. 2, 3 (Summer/Autumn, 1979), pp. 159-184.
- 78 For example, in his article in 1958, when he was first secretary of Kalinin obkom, he addressed mainly agricultural and husbandry issues, reflecting local character. At the same time, he mentioned difficulties of the Sovnarkhoz in its operation, such as transportation of milk, cattle and other products. *Izvestiia* (December 14, 1958).

In contrast to this, after he became first secretary of Novosibirsk in 1959, he not only showed extensive support for Khrushchev: he also attributed economic achievements to the Sovnarkhoz: "All these facts of high organizationality and new communist consciousness lime and again convincingly speak to the fact that Soviet people with all their works fully support the policy of the Communist Party, its Leninist Central committee, to the fact that our people consider as their vital matter, the matter of their life and honor the matter of the party which is daily carried out by the Presidium of the Central committee led by N.C. Khrushchev. *Den'gi i kredit*, 1959, No. 1, p. 8.

- 79 L. Efremov, *Pravda* (January 20, 1959).