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# **Small States Perceptions in Finland and Japan: A Reflection on Postwar Years**

**Hiroshi Momose**

## **Introduction**

Historical research covering any two countries may be carried out either as an observation of relations between them or as a comparative study of the two countries concerned. So far as the Finnish-Japanese relationship is concerned, the history of mutual intercourse between Finland and Japan has often been the subject of research,<sup>1</sup> but no attempt at comparing their historical developments has yet appeared, except for Hiroharu Seki's occasional observations on "Hiroshima" and the "Finland model."<sup>2</sup> The purpose of this paper is to discuss the "postwar periods" in Finland and Japan in comparative terms by focussing discussion on the "Small States" discourses, which prevailed in the two countries just after the end of the Second World War.

Both Finland and Japan experienced the postwar years as defeated countries under the control of the Allied Powers with Finland under a control commission consisting mostly of Soviet members and Japan under the American occupation forces. Moreover both countries were challenged by changes ranging from the political and economic fields to social and cultural ones, giving birth to periods, respectively named "Toinen tasavalta [the Second Republic]" for Finland<sup>3</sup> and "Sen-go minshushugi [Postwar Democracy]" for Japan.<sup>4</sup> While a comparative study of postwar Finland and Japan would need to cover various aspects of the period, the discussions on the problem of Small States prevailing in both countries in postwar days may be a topic with which we can start our work.

Even a look at Small States discussions in postwar Finland and Japan will reveal that they were different from each other, making one aware of a contrast in tone: realistic and pessimistic in Finland; idealistic and optimistic in Japan. If one seeks to go beyond Kipling's observation in his "East and West" (1885), one has to examine similarities and dissimilarities between the Finnish and the Japanese discussions in the light of postwar international circumstances. In the following chapters, this writer looks back on Small States debates in postwar Finland and Japan, outlines wartime experiences of both countries as background to these debates, examines the respective circumstances under which the debates developed in the early postwar years and then discusses the changes they suffered under the stress of the aggravating Cold War.

## **1. Postwar Images of the Small States in Comparison**

When one discusses Small State perceptions put forth in writings in Postwar Finland, one cannot but mention an interesting collection of essays on different aspects

of Small States in history.<sup>5</sup> The book belongs to a series of publication by the Finnish Historical Society. In the introduction of the book entitled "Small Nations in World History," the editor Arvi Korhonen, a leading Finnish historian, explains the reason why that subject was chosen for a book to be published in Postwar Finland. He starts his discussion on the role of Small States by reminding Finnish readers of their bitter experiences in the Second World War.

According to Arvi Korhonen, the contemporary or postwar world situation admitted no possibility of neutrality for Small States except for those that happened to be located on the periphery of the international political stage, and therefore outside the spheres of Great Powers' interests.<sup>6</sup> This was the result of the continually weakening position of Small States generally throughout modern history. Particularly after the Napoleonic Wars, there had been increasing struggles for the realization of the idea of nation states, which attained a high tide in the First World War, when the right for Small Nations and the right for national self determination were propagated bringing about the realization of these visions after the war. In parallel with this trend, however, there had also been a growing tendency to regard Small States as meaningless in the realities of power struggles in the international arena. Differentiations between the Small States and the Great Powers only increased. Power superseded right when the security for small and week states was endangered. "The future for Small States doesn't seem to be promising," Korhonen sighs.<sup>7</sup>

Nevertheless the Small Nations had not lost the war yet. In Korhonen's opinion, two historical experiences stood in the defence of the Small States. Firstly, nations could contribute to the culture of humankind only by forming independent states and secondly Small States were in many cases important cultural factors just as Great Powers were.<sup>8</sup> Western civilization was born and developed as the result of free intercourses between Great Powers and Small Nations. Spiritual activity is the field, where Small and Big Nations can enjoy equality. One can illustrate the fact merely by citing the examples of Greek philosophy, the Dutch art of painting, Swiss democracy or the freedom Nordic peasants have enjoyed. Accordingly, Korhonen's preface is followed by 7 articles discussing Small Nations' historical contributions in the fields of law, philosophy, literature, the art of picture, natural sciences, economic development and world wide activity.

One must hurry to say, however, that Korhonen's was not the only view of Small States born in Postwar Finland. Yrjö Ruutu, the first Finnish specialist of international politics, put forth a different perception.<sup>9</sup> Ruutu was also aware of the historical fact that Small States had lost much of their freedom in the shadow of Great Powers. Yet, he seems to have stuck to the idea that Small States could survive by coping with difficulties flexibly and sagaciously.

In Ruutu's opinion, national self-determination meant not only sovereignty without foreign intervention, but also the right of keeping neutrality as well as the right of concluding a treaty freely and on the basis of the equality of states.<sup>10</sup> According to Ruutu, the nucleus of Small States—Great Powers relations was the latter's concern with "place d' armes or" the military base. Throughout centuries, Great Powers had used Small States' territories as their troops' passages and military bases. In order to counter-balance such military base policy, the Small States devel-

oped the right to maintain neutrality. However, the development of modern military technology led to increasing infringements on the rights of Small Neutrals. A Great Power tended to regard even a Small State without any foreign military bases as a potential pawn for its rival, unless the Small State had a strong will and ability to defend its own neutrality.<sup>11</sup> In contrast with Arvi Korhonen, Yrjö Ruutu apparently believed in the possibility of neutrality for a Small State still under the contemporary difficult circumstances.<sup>12</sup>

Turning to postwar Japan, one has to mention the name of Hajime Kawakami,<sup>13</sup> who wrote an essay on Small States just after the end of the Second World War. This Marxist scholar of economics, who was to die very soon because of a long torturous prison life during the War, recommended to his compatriots a Small State way of thinking and living. Kawakami writes:

“[In spite of the defeat], it seems to me that the Japanese may become happier than ever in every respect only if they take this opportunity to understand the significance of Lao-tse’s discussion on a small country with a small population.”<sup>14</sup>

Lao-tse, a famous philosopher in ancient China had described an ideal small village community rejecting every human technology. Kawakami encouraged the Japanese nation to leap from the idea of a “Big country with a large population” strong in arms and wealth to that of Lao-tse’s shangrila. He even found a contemporary model in the Soviet Republics of the Caucasus. Although the Caucasus was similar to “Hondo [Japan Proper]” in territorial scale, he could not but regard “the small lovely republics of Caucasus,” which consisted of a population less than several times as large as that of Kyoto City as “a small country with a small population.”<sup>15</sup>

The position on the Small Country put forth by Kawakami was followed by numerous articles focussing mainly on European Small States. Those articles were surprisingly similar in tone, particularly in the sense that all of them discussed such states as models for postwar Japan. Switzerland was a most popular model among the Japanese people. Yasunosuke Gonda wrote:

“Only since the end of the last War, which pushed Japan and the Japanese people into the depths of poverty, have there been raised here and there in Japan such cries as ‘Learn from Denmark’ or ‘You should know Switzerland!’ Now that it is too late to do anything, these cries sound vain and ridiculous. It was really more than forty years ago that our Mr.[Iso-o] Abe pointed it out!... Our people, who had ignored his warnings reaped the natural results.”<sup>16</sup>

Toshizō Yoshinaga, who translated A. Siegfried’s book *Switzerland: A Witness of Democracy*, wrote in the introduction of its Japanese edition: “Postwar Japan should aim at independence and prosperity as a democratic peaceful country with Switzerland as its model.” According to Yasuichi Morita, a researcher of Swiss-Japanese relations, those works are evidence showing that “a model state theory on Switzerland acquired citizenship in postwar Japan ...owing to the idea of neutrality which had made Switzerland had messaged to Japan.”<sup>17</sup>

Denmark and Sweden were also chosen as models for a “small Japan.” Shigeyoshi Matsumae who later became the President of Tokai University had published a revived edition of his old memoirs, with a renewed title of *See How*

*Denmark Rose from Defeat.*<sup>18</sup> In that book, Matsumae wrote: “The history of Denmark after its defeat [in the Slesvig (Schleswig) War] serves Japan as a treasure of great lessons.” He encouraged the Japanese people, which had “declared the renunciation of war in the New Constitution before the world,” to learn from “defeated Denmark,” which had achieved reconstruction in an effort to establish a “country of peace and culture.”<sup>19</sup> Another supporter of the Denmark model, Eiichi Ōtani who had managed a “folk school” on the Izu Peninsula after his stay in Denmark before the Second World War, published a paperback entitled *Denmark: A Land of Peace.*<sup>20</sup> Ōtani wrote:

“After Japan’s defeat, such voices as ‘Learn from Denmark’ reach our ears. It is nearly half a century since Mr.Kanzo Uchimura advised us to do it. At that time, however, Japan regrettably rushed into militarism and imperialism, of which Mr.Uchimura had feared and warned.”<sup>21</sup>

As for Sweden, Shinichirō Watanabe, who had stayed in Stockholm during the Second World War as a correspondent of *Asahi Shinbun*, wrote a book entitled *Walking about in the History of Sweden.*<sup>22</sup> In Watanabe’s opinion, Sweden could give lessons to Japan on its way to reconstruction. Sweden “had once been a politically first-class Power armed with militarism and then rolled down into the status of a second-class Power by losing all its colonies abroad as the result of defeat in war,” only to be reborn as a “culturally first-class Power.”<sup>23</sup>

As was mentioned in the introduction of this article, one may be struck by the contrast which the two types of Small States perceptions show with each other. The one in Finland was colored by, so to speak, a pessimistic-realistic view of the contemporary international society. There was scarcely room for neutrality which had once been a retreat for a Small State. Even if there was any chance for neutrality, a Small State needed a strong will and ability to defend its own neutrality. The other in Japan could be characterized by an optimistic-idealistic view that what you needed to do was just to give up arms and love peace: you could remain safe outside struggles for power just like a shangrila in the bosom of nature. In this writer’s opinion, however, both perceptions had rooted in the realities reflecting the historical backgrounds, as well as the international circumstances of each country.

\* A Small State idea showing a contrast with those that appeared in “Hondo (Japan Proper)” shaped itself in moves among the inhabitants of the Yaeyama Islands belonging to Okinawa (the Ryukyu Islands) toward the end of the war when they founded an autonomous polity. This small republic born out of a vacuum of political power was soon occupied and liquidated by the U. S. Army. In general, Japanese people under the postwar democracy could enjoy American favor so far as they forgot Okinawa as well as Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Another famous episode is that a few Ainu leaders and intellectuals joined together to put forth an idea of Hokkaido Republic just after the Second World War.

## 2. Backgrounds to the Small States Discussions

Finland’s experience in the Second World War may be compared to a two

storied building with the Winter War forming the ground floor as the basis for the first floor of the Continuation War. Although the whole building is registered under the name of “the Destiny of a Small State in the Whirlpool of Power Politics,” each floor has its own logical structure of causes.

Causes of the Continuation War fought with the Soviet Union for four years from 1941 to 1944 remain still open in an important point: What was the purpose of the Soviet Union after the end of the Winter War?<sup>24</sup> Nevertheless, the process of Finland’s entry into the war is now more evident than it had once been. After the Peace Treaty of Moscow, March 1940 putting an end to the Winter War, the Soviet Union increased pressure on Finland in every respect by keeping a good many watchers at the Soviet Consulate on the Åland Islands, by demanding the Soviet troops’ use of the Finnish railroad to the Soviet naval base in Hanko, by demanding concessions on Nickel deposits in Petsamo or by openly supporting the Finnish-Soviet Friendship Society which included many Communists. Afraid of a Soviet annexation of Finland, the Finnish government conceded in September 1940, the right for German soldiers stationed in Northern Norway to pass through the Finnish territories on their way back to Germany. Soon after Soviet Foreign Minister V. Molotov’s visit to Berlin in November 1940 had proved that I.V. Stalin could not easily be maneuvered, A. Hitler decided to attack the Soviet Union by drawing countries adjacent to it into his anti-Communist crusade. Finland under Soviet pressure was also invited through negotiations between the German and the Finnish military top leaders. When the German Army invaded the Soviet Union in June, 1941, Finland, with German troops stationed in its northern territory, took advantage of Soviet airraids against Finnish cities to enter another war, that is, the Continuation War with the Soviet Union.

There had once prevailed the “ajopuuteoria [driftwood theory]” presented by Arvi Korhonen on the causes of the Continuation War. Finland could be compared to a driftwood without any freedom of action in the rushing streams of Great Powers’ political struggles. The German proposal for German soldiers’ transits was “mana” from Heaven.<sup>25</sup> Thus, Finland was involved in a German military plan against the Soviet Union without knowing about it. When the German-Soviet War began, Finland had still believed in her possibility for neutrality, which was lost by the Soviet airraids. This “Ajopuuteoria” seems to have been in a formative stage at the time when Korhonen edited the aforementioned book on Small States, though no contemporary Finnish historians believe the hypothesis in the light of new evidence revealed later.<sup>26</sup>

For all the new evidence, Finland’s participation in the Second World War should be discussed on a different dimension from that of the Axis Powers. Indeed, nobody can say that Finland was a simple driftwood. Nor was it a motor-boat which could run against the stream. It was rather a raft with a raftman on it at least. Worried by an approaching dangerous bank the raftman steered the raft toward the other side in a kind of emergency evacuation, leading to Finland’s falling into Nazi Germany’s orbit, though it tried by all means to fight the Continuation War as “a separate war.”<sup>27</sup>

Apart from criticisms on the foreign policy decision making process of the Finnish wartime government and the very fact that Finland fought on the side of the

Axis Powers, the story of Finland's entry into the Continuation War was the twice told tale of an unhappy small country driven by a threatening Power into an alliance with its opponent, though there was room for Paasikivi's comment that a Small State should stick to diplomatic means even to the last moment without leaving the situation to take its course.<sup>28</sup>

In contrast, one may discuss causes of the Winter War from a different point of view, which is concerned with a lesson Finland learned from them by way of an afterthought. The Soviet proposal to Finland from the middle of the 1930s did not change in essence, though its demands increased over time.<sup>29</sup> If Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union through Finland, the Red Army could not sit behind the Finnish-Soviet border, but it would march into Finnish territory to encounter the enemy. If Finland did not want to see it, Finland had to consult with the Soviet Union about measures it could take. There could be an alliance or an exchange of territories to strengthen the Soviet defence of its border. This was a constant idea behind the Soviet demands. The Finnish attitude to repeated Soviet proposals scarcely changed.<sup>30</sup> Neutrality and territorial integrity should not be endangered at all. Any compromise in this sense would deprive Finland of its sovereignty.

When the Soviet Union raised demands for territorial exchanges again in the autumn of 1939, they included even the lease of Hanko, a port far west of Helsinki, as a base for the Soviet Navy. The aim of the Soviet government was to attack an enemy invading into the Gulf of Finland on both flanks by using Hanko and Paldiski already secured from Estonia. The Finnish government turned down essential parts of the Soviet proposal though it consented reluctantly to cede a few small islands in the Gulf and to move the frontier line on the Karelian Isthmus a little bit northward. The Finnish refusal to accept Stalin's alternative proposal for the lease of islands near Hanko apparently led to a Soviet decision to have recourse to violence in order to attain its own security on the western border.<sup>31</sup> On 30 November 1939, the Red Army invaded Finland under the pretext of defending Soviet territory against a "Finnish provocation."

It is easy to talk about a "miscalculation" on the part of the Finnish government. Prime Minister Eljas Erkkö believed that the Soviet leaders were merely fishing in troubled waters. If Finland gave way, "A dynamic Power" like the Soviet Union would resort to more expansionism. Only a firm attitude would make the Soviet government retreat.<sup>32</sup> This interpretation of the situation shared by most of the other members of the Cabinet partly under the pressure of Finnish public opinion proved wrong. As authorities on Russian affairs like J. K. Paasikivi, the envoy to Moscow on the eve of the Winter War, and Marshal C. G. Mannerheim had observed, a military and strategic necessity had apparently pressed the Soviet leaders to hurry to act, however ridiculous their sticking to a traditional idea may have appeared.<sup>33</sup>

For all this evidence, however, nobody could retort Max Jakobson's hypothesis that Finland survived by fighting.<sup>34</sup> There is no doubt that the Winter War could have been avoided if the Finnish government had followed Paasikivi's and Mannerheim's advice that Finland should come to terms with the Soviet Union. However, one can not but wonder if Finland's compliance in 1939 might have produced stabilized international circumstances for it, particularly considering the destiny of the Baltic States

which, in spite of their acceptance of Soviet demands for military bases in autumn 1939, were occupied by Soviet troops and annexed by the Soviet Union on what Molotov called the “third stage,” beginning with the defeat of France in June 1940.<sup>35</sup> Only the Finnish Army’s heroic fight in the Winter War may have given an “object lesson” to the Soviet leaders who apparently hesitated to take a rash step in their dealings with Finland during “Välirauhan aika [the time of truce]” preceding the outbreak of the Continuation War.<sup>36</sup>

The experience of the Winter War served the Finnish nation as an important lesson only in the postwar years, when there were new conditions enabling them to use the experience to create a new relationship with the Soviet Union. Through an agonizing reappraisal, the Finnish leaders, as well as the Finnish people, apparently learned the lesson that a Small State had to do something to survive. They had believed throughout the years that Finland could survive untouched, if it did not harm others. Finland had only pursued foreign policy to remain aloof from war, hoping only to live in peace.<sup>37</sup> Peace loving Finland had every reason to turn down Soviet proposals that infringed Finland’s right to live without foreign interference. Nevertheless, postwar Finland was aware of the reality that it was inevitable for its own survival to take into consideration its big neighbors’ vital interest. Instead of remaining with folded arms, it had to do everything to put off the seeds of threat, which had once showed itself in the Winter War.

If Finland’s wartime experience can be compared to a two storied building, that of Japan may be described as something like a many storied building with a big well in the center. The theory of “Fifteen Years’ War,” which regards various wars including the Manchurian Incident of 1931, the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–45 and the Pacific War of 1941–45 as a single long-drawn war, has few supporters in academic circles.<sup>38</sup> Indeed, there had been very many turning points, where political leaders could act otherwise to evade catastrophe.<sup>39</sup> In contrast to Finland, however, Japan had a long tradition of military expansion, which had run through different stages of the modern history of Japan beginning in 1868. Thus, criticism of Japanese expansionism became consistent in tone, focussing interest on the virtue of smallness.

It is interesting to follow the history of Japan’s intermittent expansion, which gave birth to different self-portraits at different stages. During a couple of decades after the Meiji Restoration (the birth of modern Japan), Japan’s self-portrait was wavering, which was reflected in an essay discussing the merits and demerits of Small and Big States,<sup>40</sup> and in a romantic novel describing cooperation between a Japanese man and people of oppressed nations in Asia and Europe.<sup>41</sup> The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 put Japan on the road to a Power joining the international community of western origin at the expense of Asian neighbors.<sup>42</sup> Japan secured its position as a “Great Power” through the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05, during which the first voices of protest were raised by pacifist intellectuals putting forth such a Small State as Switzerland or Denmark as a model for a peace loving Japan.<sup>43</sup>

When the First World War broke out in 1914, Japan, now a colonial empire with Korea and Taiwan annexed to its own territory, was again on a forked road. A neutral Japan might be in a position to fish in troubled waters even if it remained neutral. Through the participation in the war and the 21 demands to China, however,

Japan jumped into the water “foolishly”<sup>44</sup> to grab fish with fingers, betraying its insatiable ambition, which awakened the Chinese people to national protest movements against Japan.

It was just at this time that Tamzan Ishibashi, a young journalist, raised a voice of protest against Japan’s expansionism by presenting an idea of “Little Japanism.”<sup>45</sup> His activity of this sort had already begun around 1912 until it produced in 1923 an integrated theory consisting of four points: 1) Japan should take an initiative of giving over all the colonies it gained since the Sino-Japanese War of 1904. 2) Japan should go hand in hand with all the weak states, particularly of colored peoples. 3) Japan should contribute to a disarmament of the world scale. 4) Japan should appropriate military expenses for an increase of competitive power in international trade. Ishibashi’s warning remained as a voice in wilderness.

Japan was faced by alternatives at every crossroad even after the 1920s. However, Japan continued to choose the worse road at every turning point of history. Or, more exactly to say, the Japanese leaders as well as the Japanese people left their country on the path to catastrophe laid at the starting point of modern Japan simply by responding to occasional situations. What dominated their minds was the Great Power perceptions. Typical was a confession by an old Japanese diplomat, who had once been a secretary of Foreign Minister Jutarō Komura at the time of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05:

“Although there is a little bit different appearance nowadays, so-called international politics are Great Powers’ consultations, adjustments of interests, feelings or positions among the Great Powers or conflicts as products of the failure of such adjustments.”

It was only natural that the people of defeated Japan should have fumbled for a new line free of the legacy of modern Japan, though the new situation was again brought from “above” and “outside.”<sup>46</sup>

### **3. Roles of Small State Perceptions in Early Postwar Years**

What lay behind the discourse on the Small States in postwar Finland was the “War Guilt Trial” which invoked heated discussion in Finnish public opinion. The punishment of “war criminals” had been provided in Article 13 of the cease-fire agreement between Finland and the Soviet Union in September 1944.<sup>47</sup> For all Premier Paasikivi’s efforts to find a way out by making wartime leaders retire from public life, the Allied Control Commission (ACC) obliged him to agree to the enactment of a new law to put them on trial on the charge of leading Finland into an alliance with Nazi Germany to fight the Soviet Union.<sup>48</sup>

Premier Paasikivi complied with the A. C. C.’s demand as a necessary evil that he thought to be an inevitable cost Finland had to pay in order to get free and return to international society. The act passed the Finnish Diet, with a large number of the MPs voting for it reluctantly. They were apparently supporters of what was to be called “ajopuuteoria” later. Yet one cannot ignore the fact that a considerable number of the Diet members, including those who had belonged to the Peace Opposition, was in favor of the withdrawal of wartime leaders and even punishment of them,

though they were not monolithic in their interpretations of what had happened.<sup>49</sup>

Perceptions of the Small States played a noticeable role in these moves. It was Premier Paasikivi himself who dealt with the problem of responsibility for war from a Small States point of view. In his opinion, a Small State after the failure of the League of Nations had to recognize that the idea of equality of Big and Small States was an illusion and that “reason” surpassed “right” in the conduct of a Small State, particularly toward its big neighbor.<sup>50</sup> A Small State could secure its survival only by creating mutual confidence with its neighboring big state through meeting its demands short of outright conquest. Paasikivi knew that the Soviet interest in Finland had always been military and strategic.<sup>51</sup>

What distinguished the Finnish Communist (FCP) leaders from other critics of the Finnish wartime leaders and their policy was that the FCP leaders ignored the Small State theory. Hertta Kuusinen’s argument was a typical case. In her discussion on the problem of war responsibility, she targeted the contention that Small States could not be saved from the War. “In our country, they say that we would have been trampled by war anyhow. This view is not correct at all. Our geographical position is special. The Soviet Union had promised to defend our country..., and in the west, there was Sweden which had remained neutral. At the same time, we would have been on the side on which Norway and Denmark fought for the cause of freedom. We would have belonged to the democratic front opposing the cruelist brute power in the world.”<sup>52</sup> Although she mentioned such words as Finland’s “special position,” or “Swedish neutrality which one might associate with “Small States,” Hertta Kuusinen apparently stressed the division of the world into the Fascist and the Democratic camps. Her way of describing Finnish wartime leaders as “our Hitlers”<sup>53</sup> implies nothing less.

In contrast, leftwing social democrats, who had belonged to the Peace Opposition during the Continuation War, opined differently. The Kuutoset, or group of six MPs who had opposed the Continuation War only to be arrested as traitors, used the concept of “Small State” in their interpellation of 25 January 1945, which concerned the problem of responsibility for wars against the Soviet Union:

“[On the eve of the Winter War] the Finnish government, as well as a few circles whom it had given information about those matters, obstinately refused the [Soviet] proposal as if the policy of our small state could have been formed independently of world politics and without paying respect to other countries’ interests.”<sup>54</sup>

This statement reflects the logic of Small States, which cannot be found in the Communist leaders’ words.

Other leftwing social democrats, who were located to the right of the Kuutoset on the spectral line of political ideology described the position of their own country in clearer terms of Small States. For instance J. W. Keto who was to join the SKDL soon after, wrote in the notes of his speech dated 26 September 1944 (that is, just after the truce):

“In the field of foreign policy, Small States located near to the actual sphere of influence of a Great Power are compelled under threat to observe a rule which never fails to follow the very Great Power in outline... The same with those

smaller countries located closely around the Soviet Union. They come under the power zone of the Soviet Union, where there is no room for a foreign or defense policy other than cooperation with the Soviet Union... Nowadays, for instance, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Bulgaria are such surrounding countries of the Soviet Union. And in these days, our Finland belongs to such a group, too.”<sup>55</sup>

Keto’s theory of the Small States was a natural product of his observation that the Continuation War was “unfortunate,” which apparently refuted any arbitrary accusation of Finland’s responsibility for the war. It is interesting to see that his same theory implied also a possibility that Finnish workers could take advantage of the postwar situation to realize “socialism” in Finland.<sup>56</sup>

K. A. Fagelholm who, in spite of obvious ideological differences, moved to cooperation with the FCP, advised that his SDP had to “start from the reality that the Soviet Union with 200 million population was, and will be, our neighbor, with which Finland should bring about thoroughly friendly and trustworthy relations.” It was a “great future of small Finland.”<sup>57</sup> Although Fagelholm did anything but admit that the wartime Social Democrats were “war crazy” or “fascists,” he still criticized Finland’s former attitude toward the Soviet Union, which had had much to be desired. “When uneasiness began and when Great Powers began to look around, it was natural that they should have paid attention to their close neighbors. The Soviet Union regarded Finland as untrustworthy.”<sup>58</sup> Fagelholm did not develop any concrete theory of the Small States, but the context of his contention was logically based on Small States perception.

Apart from MPs of the SDP, U. K. Kekkonen, who had also been a member of the Peace Opposition, was a Finnish political leader who boldly described the position of Small States in the postwar world. In the autumn of 1944, Kekkonen published a book on Finland’s position in international society, presenting an idea he was to pursue in subsequent years. Looking back on the Interwar period, he noticed that the principle of equality of states had proved to be an obstacle to lasting peace, particularly because it had resulted in rivalries between Small States and the use of them by Hitler.<sup>59</sup> The coming international organization would be based on an alliance of Great Powers not on any abolition of it. It was also natural that economic and political power should have centered on Great Powers. Small States could occupy their places only within a framework formed by Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>60</sup> The sovereignty of Small States was now limited. What they could do now was to build their own economy and culture under the circumstances of domestic independence.<sup>61</sup> As for Finland, it belonged to Russia’s “natural sphere” of interest in which only friendly relations with the Soviet Union served Finland.<sup>62</sup> The special features of Kekkonen’s discussion may be the contention that a radical social reform will contribute to cooperation with the Soviet Union.<sup>63</sup> He differed from Paasikivi in this regard, though otherwise Kekkonen was the strongest theoretical supporter of Paasikivi’s foreign policy doctrine in every sense.

In the case of postwar Japan, the International Military Tribunal opened in Tokyo played no significant role in the discussion on Small States. A part of the reason for it was that the tribunal was held by the Allied Powers, in spite of the

Japanese government's request that those responsible for war would be put on trial on Japan's own hands. More than anything, however, Japan had been an aggressive Great Power, which nobody could question. The problem of Small States could be raised only in the context of the coming policy line of a reconstructed Japan.

If there was any significant factor that stimulated discussion on Small States it was the new Constitution of Japan, particularly Article 9 which renounced war. It was only natural that debates in the National Diet should have focussed on the question of how an unarmed state, which was in this writer's opinion precisely a "Small State" in modern international society, could survive.

Debates in the Constituent Assembly in 1946 particularly reflected the political atmosphere of the early postwar years. The Diet Record shows that the conservative government led by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida denied the right to defend, categorically. Premier Yoshida asserted that Japan had preceded other countries of the world by renouncing war under "a provision without parallel in other countries."<sup>64</sup> How could Japan defend itself, then?

The model of what Nils Örvik calls "traditional neutrals," or the way of European Small States, drew little attention at this stage of the postwar period. Reikichi Kita (a member of the Liberal Party of Japan) was the only MP who recommended "movements for permanent neutrality." He complained that a mere renunciation of war by a defeated and disarmed country might make little impression. It reminded him of a poor man who declared "I save money." Since the aim of the new Constitution was a thoroughgoing democratization of Japan and the spread of pacifism outside Japan, the Japanese government should take initiative of propagating permanent neutrality so that "this powerless Japan can live in peace."<sup>65</sup>

However, other MPs denied the way of permanent neutrality as "anachronism" or unpractical. It would not work without arms.<sup>66</sup> Instead, many MPs were interested in a possible guarantee by the United Nations. Hitoshi Ashida, Chairperson of the Committee of Constitutional Amendment was one of them: "Our coming entry into the United Nations is the only condition under which our country can occupy an honored position in international society."<sup>67</sup> In his opinion, Japan could enjoy the right to defense only if Japan joined the United Nations. "In case Japan is invaded, the Security Council of the United Nations is obliged to defend Japan with its available armed forces in hands." Kenzō Takayanagi also preferred a "positive participation in an international organization" to a "passive neutrality."<sup>68</sup>

A superficial observation of the above state of affairs might come to the conclusion that Japanese political leaders were also pessimistic about the destiny of Small States. But, a careful reading of the texts will immediately reveal that they were rather optimistic in the sense that they believed or pretended to believe in an "international society striving for the preservation of peace."<sup>69</sup> Their low estimation of neutrality rather resulted from the assumed success of international society in its declaration of any war as illegal, involving the disappearance of neutrality.

The Japanese people hoped for a bright future precisely because they felt they were living miserable lives. One opinion leader of postwar Japan Yoshio Nakano, who was a steadfast supporter of the Small States doctrine in postwar Japan, confessed later that he had felt in postwar years that "Japan became a Small State, or the

third class country.”<sup>70</sup> “But, I pondered on it. A Small State. It is all very well... Let us build a new Japan by starting from the fact that Japan has become a Small State.” Thus, Nakano determined to “find a new meaning of the Small States in terms of happiness for humankind.” For all the miserable experiences, a defeat brought about a change of mind to most Japanese people. One writer surmises that what he felt in his home city Hiroshima might be shared also by other Japanese living in cities suffering ordinary airraids. “A vacuum which appeared in the center of the city [Hiroshima] showed the loss of what had formed the nucleus of inhabitants’ ways of living. A radical change brought about by a defeat following an atomic airraid led us to accept the destruction of the city as natural. More or less, we felt like atoning for sins [of Japan] voluntarily.”<sup>71</sup> He recollects how he, as a young boy, passed water on the ruins, praying for the revival of lives.

While these examples show that Japanese selfportraits as a Small State were born out of postwar realities, one cannot deny they lacked consciousness about severe international circumstances surrounding Small States. Only if you hope for peace, you can live in peace. This lay at the bottom of people’s minds when they talked about peace in postwar Japan. Even Hajime Kawakami confessed that he hoped to live a peaceful life in the Caucasus protected under the wings of the Soviet Union, that is, a socialist Great Power. This communist intellectual apparently shared an idea to live in a Small State even under others’ protection with the Japanese general public. This idea reflected the hatred and disgusts ordinary Japanese endeavored toward the protracted terrible war, but at the same time, it betrayed an egoism of the “peace for ourselves” type.

The Japanese people had failed to regain peace by their own efforts, which made them feel that peace had come in the natural course of events, though the truce was achieved through the Allies’ rivalries over the coming stage of international politics. The Allied [U. S.] Occupation Forces seems to be a natural phenomenon like the god of thunder who would provide them with food and democracy unless they gave offense to its will. The Japanese people were honor students in the eyes of a teacher of democracy named “the Allied [U. S.] Occupation Forces,” who encouraged them to study any subject except “atomic bomb casualties.”<sup>72</sup>

General Douglas MacArthur, who had enjoyed the support of Japanese people by pressing the reluctant Japanese conservative government to adopt the idea of New Constitution renouncing war, gained more popularity by putting forth an idea of Small States model for Japan. On 3 March, 1949, he did it in an interview with a correspondent of the Daily Mail: “What the United States wishes for Japan in the case of a war is Japan’s neutrality. Japan should be a Switzerland in the Pacific.”<sup>73</sup> MacArthur’s statement apparently raised a curtain for lively discussion on neutrality in Japan. He struck out this design on an assumption that the United States could defend a neutral Japan with its military bases on Okinawa Islands. It was an irony of history that MacArthur put this idea before Japanese people just when the United States began to realize that it needed Japan as a military partner in the intensification of the Cold War.<sup>74</sup>

#### 4. The Impact of the Cold War on Small States Perceptions

Growing tension between the East and the West, or the Cold War process, put Finland and Japan under new international circumstances. The Marshall Plan outlined by the United States in the early summer of 1947 may have been a watershed dividing the postwar years into two different periods. The United States, which planned to solve two questions — European reconstruction and the needs of the American economy for markets abroad — at one time, decided to leave the Soviet Union outside the Plan out of the fear that the latter might hinder the work of European reconstruction by participating in it.<sup>75</sup> The Soviet response was the formation of Cominform whose purpose was to create and maintain a tight bloc of East European countries of the Soviet type around the Soviet Union. Intensified struggles for power in the countries to the south of Finland resulted in the formation of Communist governments.<sup>76</sup> East Asia could not remain outside the Soviet-American confrontation, either.

To begin with the situation Finland faced, the intensification of the Cold War pressed the Finnish government to conclude the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance [FCMA] with the Soviet Union in 6 April 1948. Indeed, it was Yrjö Ruutu who had had the idea materialized in the treaty.<sup>77</sup>

Toward the end of the Continuation War, Ruutu had created a prototype of the Finnish counter proposal presented to the Soviet Union in negotiations leading to the conclusion of the FCMA Treaty. Ruutu's draft was entitled "the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Diplomatic Cooperation and Defence Alliance."<sup>78</sup> According to the draft, "diplomatic cooperation" obliged both parties not to conclude with other countries any treaties that conflicted with continuing mutual understanding and the defence alliance, though it did not oblige Finland to participate in any agreements that "conflict with Finland's interests or endanger Finland's neutrality in international conflicts not extending to the Baltic Sea (or the Arctic Sea) region." (Article 2). "The defence alliance" would be put into operation on the occasion that "the third country aims at attacking the Soviet Union through Finnish territory, or by using it." On the other hand, "If a third country attacks Finland, the Soviet Union is obliged to assist Finland by forces on land at sea and in the air, provided that the Finnish government requests such assistance and on such a scale and in such a way as will be arranged specifically." (Article 4). Article 5 is particularly interesting, because it obliged the Soviet Union to give back to Finland the regions deprived of her by the Peace of Moscow of 13 March 1940.

On 10 August 1944, Ruutu left his draft personally to Foreign Minister Carl Enckell, but when an audience was delayed he sent it also to President Mannerheim. Ruutu's hope that it would serve Finland in the coming truce negotiations was not fulfilled.<sup>79</sup> However, Ruutu did not give up his idea, believing that it would be of use, for instance, on the occasion of a peace conference. According to Timo Soikkanen, the author of Ruutu's biography, neither Mannerheim nor Paasikivi had been influenced by Ruutu's idea until Zhdanov played with a proposal of alliance between Finland and the Soviet Union, leading them to expect that Ruutu's draft might serve as a

counterproposal.<sup>80</sup> Apparently the Kremlin had not been moved by Zhdanov's whimsical idea with the result that Mannerheim and Paasikivi were dodged by Zhdanov at the time when they wanted to sound him out.<sup>81</sup>

After the specter of a Finnish-Soviet alliance temporarily disappeared, the Finnish government concentrated on an effort to carry out obligations imposed by the Truce Treaty of 1944. When the effort was rewarded by Finland's return to international society through the conclusion of the Peace Treaty in February 1947, Finland stepped into a new stage to face the trials of an intensifying East-West confrontation. Apart from developments in domestic affairs,<sup>82</sup> the first trial on the international arena took place when the Soviet government, which had once contemplated participation in the Marshall Plan, withdrew from it, demanding that Finland should follow the Soviet Union.<sup>83</sup> While the Finnish government could not but comply, it established the line of policy to remain outside any conflicts between Great Powers.<sup>84</sup>

Yet, the second and biggest trial tapped on the door when the Soviet Union made a proposal to Finland to conclude a treaty of mutual assistance in the beginning of 1948, with Ruutu, who had been sticking to his original idea, and the United Socialist Party consisting of leftwing social democrats, having failed to realize Ruutu's idea of concluding a Finnish-Soviet alliance on Finnish initiative in exchange for former Finnish territories.<sup>85</sup> Once a proposal for mutual assistance was formally made by the Soviet government, President Paasikivi, who had been critical to Ruutu's idea, swiftly switched positions, now using it as a counterproposal to avoid the worst.<sup>86</sup> Although the Soviet leaders might have been informed about the Finnish counterproposal, they were apparently under pressed conditions, of which Paasikivi was likely aware, to give up their original proposal for a pact of the East European type, and to accept the Finnish one almost as it was, with some ambiguous points remaining, on which the interpretation of the pact might depend.<sup>87</sup>

Yrjö Ruutu, whom one may describe as a typical advocate of the Small States theory in postwar Finland, was indeed a realist so far as international politics was concerned. In a meeting of the United Socialist Party of 6 November 1947, he confessed:

“From the standpoint of maintaining independence, good relations with the Soviet Union should take precedence. The Soviet Union can menace our independence, but, the United States can't, though [our alliance with the Soviet Union] will lead to conflicts with the United States.”<sup>88</sup>

In spite of vast differences between the SKP's and Ruutu's view, however, his observation involved two questions. Firstly, his point of view simply lacked global consideration, which showed itself, for instance, in Yrjö Kallinen's criticism of the Finnish-Soviet Treaty.<sup>89</sup> Secondly, Ruutu retained a certain optimism reflecting the favorable mood of the 1930s, toward Soviet socialism (Communism), which apparently contributed to his view of the world.<sup>90</sup>

The Cold War of European origin spread to East Asia, casting a shadow on the political situation in Japan, through a change of the U. S. occupation policy. The United States now switched from the disarmament and democratization of Japan to the creation of a bulwark against “international communism.” The GHQ representing the U. S. government found its ally in conservative circles in Japan, putting down

radical labor activity cultivated during the early postwar years.<sup>91</sup> From around 1949 negotiations for a peace treaty with Japan was on the agenda with heated discussion over the question how the treaty was to be achieved. Public opinion in Japan was then divided into two hostile camps with one regarding the conclusion of a peace treaty only with Western Powers as inevitable and the other contending that the peace treaty should be concluded with all former enemies. The former, consisting of conservatives and business circles, expected an alliance with the United States.<sup>92</sup> The latter including radical intellectuals, socialists and trade unions under their influence hoped for the neutrality of Japan to be guaranteed by all the participants in the peace conference.<sup>93</sup> A Small State model for Japan prevailed in the leftwing camp. The Diet debate was flooded with the word “chu-ritsu [neutrality].”<sup>94</sup>

Interesting socio-cultural changes were taking place behind the political scene. Labors with class-consciousness had grown in number in the earlier period of occupation, and they attempted a general strike in February 1947, when the GHQ prohibited it.<sup>95</sup> This was a turning point, after which Japanese labor movements tended to come into confrontation with the GHQ and the conservative government supported by it. Particularly, the Communist Party, which had increased its influence among working people, students and intellectuals, agitated against the interventions of foreign occupation forces.<sup>96</sup> An air of national consciousness grew among the general public. Indeed, it was the first time that national feeling “from below,” in this case carried mainly by leftwingers, appeared on the stage in modern Japan.<sup>97</sup> Intellectuals began to reappraise the word “minzoku [nation; ethnicity],” which had been a taboo in the leftwing movements in Japan.<sup>98</sup>

What reflected this trend was the rise of the anti-atomic bomb movements in Japan. When the GHQ’s strict control on information about atomic bomb casualty was relaxed, there developed movements propagating the “Stockholm Appeal, “the purpose of which was to collect signatures protesting the use of the atomic bomb.”<sup>99</sup> Although the movements sponsored by the WCP [World Council of Peace] played the role of supporting the Cold War strategy of the Soviet Union, which had to compensate for its inferior military position without atomic bombs by mobilizing pacifism among ordinary peoples, they no doubt enjoyed support even among ordinary Japanese people. “Genbaku bungaku” [atomic bomb literature] reached a new level with a strong color of nationalism.<sup>100</sup>

Small State perceptions in postwar Japan also underwent an interesting transformation. In the early 1950s, there appeared two books on the history of Small States: Finland and Turkey. They were entirely different in approaches toward the Small States problem from their predecessors of the early postwar years. The book most worthy of our attention is Masami Saitō’s one on the history of Finland entitled “The Throes of an Independence: the History of Finland.”<sup>101</sup>

Most part of the book is devoted to a description of the Swedish and the Russian dominations of Finland and the Finnish people’s struggle for national awakening and independence. Characteristic of Saitō’s description is emphasis on the brutality and cowardice of rulers, respect for peasants and workers and interest in a modern historical development where the bourgeois have given place to the working people. Setting aside a large amount of erroneous descriptions apparently derived from poor

source materials, Saitō recorded his own concern with Asian nations in this sketch of Finnish history. His readers can easily know his motives for writing the book by referring to the introduction, where Saitō writes:

“Storms of nationalism are howling endlessly in postwar Asia under the banner of ‘independence.’... From the middle of the 19th century to the beginning of this century, Europe had an age of storms like this... Such a storm howled also in Finland, a small country in the Arctic North frozen in snow and ice... A history of independence drawn there on the quiet land of woods and lakes...is a volume of the most typical history of national independence... The history of Finland is a torch lighting the dark and hard way for Asia in confusion.”<sup>102</sup>

While the nucleus of the book is the story of Finnish independence, the last chapter entitled “Soviet-Finnish War” describes Finland’s political history during and after the Second World War. In his sketch of the Winter War, Saitō apparently admits that the Soviet Union attacked Finland, though he attributes a partial cause of the war to the “pro-German and anti-communist trend” of Finland between the Wars. According to Saitō, however, the Soviet Union could only squeeze border territories from Finland, leaving its pro-German trend untouched. The Finnish leaders worked on Hitler to guarantee Finland’s security, resulting in an involvement in the Nazi crusade against the Soviet Union.

With this description as background, Saitō comes to discuss how postwar Finland has survived owing to its “neutralism never to invade a neighbor’s land and pacifism to pray for peace by abandoning arms.”<sup>103</sup> Nobody can call Finland “a Soviet satellite.” In spite of the revival of a strong communist party, a conservative coalition cabinet rules Finland, where people are free of any such darkness as [C. V. Georgiu’s] *La vingt-cinquième heure* shows. Labor and capital coexist within the framework of a republican constitution guaranteeing people’s rights. The reason why such is the case is simple. “Because Finland intends to live as a good neighbor of the Soviet Union... Honest Finland pays reparations [to the Soviet Union] correctly without any delay. Learning from bitter past experiences, Finnish leaders don’t want to rely on others for their country’s security. Finland doesn’t want to join NATO. Nor does it want to ally itself with other Nordic countries. Isn’t this the biggest reason why Finland has successfully avoided provoking the Soviet Union to intervene in Finnish domestic affairs?” Saitō’s conclusion is: “Finland will enjoy a pacific land of Karevala, unless it gives up its will to defend its own independence and peace with its own hand.”<sup>104</sup>

The above book on Finland and a book discussing Turkey, were planned as a pair dealing with the problem of independence by a publisher playing the role of an opinion leader on the “Peace Treaty question.”<sup>105</sup> This fact qualifies the two books, particularly Saitō’s book, as reflections of a trend in Japanese public opinion at that time.

The Japanese conservative government under Premier S. Yoshida concluded a peace treaty without the participation of the Soviet Union and its allies, and simultaneously a security pact with the United States. Although Yoshida ignored domestic opposition in this sense, he took advantage of it to evade the U.S.’s demands for Japan’s rearmament.<sup>106</sup> While he was not interested in any prevailing Small State

model at all, Yoshida used a Small States orientation among the general public as an excuse for Japan's concentration on its own economic reconstruction, which prepared a new stage of Japanese history with 1955 as the turning point.<sup>107</sup>

## Conclusion

There seems to be two common factors at the bottom of the Finnish and Japanese discussions on Small States perceptions in the postwar years. The one is the fact that both Finland and Japan were defeated countries, where the air of despair at miserable conditions under a control commission or occupation forces dominated peoples, invoking discussions of their own countries as "Small States." The other is the contemporary international circumstances, under which the sovereignty of a state was questioned. In the whirlpool of the Second World War, it was generally believed that the Small States were doomed to know limits to their own sovereignty. The appearance of atomic bombs at the end of the war made many people believe that the concept of sovereignty was to be reexamined.<sup>108</sup>

For all those similar conditions faced by the two countries, there were differences between the Finnish and Japanese perceptions of the Small States. Firstly, the differences may be partly attributed to their respective traditions of interpreting things. The Finns chose to face crude realities by replacing "national romanticism" by "national realism," while the Japanese beautified their miserable realities by advancing an idealistic view of international relations. In contrast to European traditions, there has been a Japanese trend to accept even a tragedy as something bearable by weaving the story into a cloth of beautiful imagination.

Secondly, but more importantly, postwar Finland had to face the Soviet Union alone, without any Allied country willing to assist it in its hard negotiations on the implementation of the truce of 1944. For Finland which was drawn into the Second World War by a Soviet attack in 1939, such obligations as territorial concessions, a huge amount of reparations, the punishment of wartime leaders and so on were unbearable. Indeed, they were burdens the Finnish nation had to carry by "sisu" [stubborn spirit] in order to make themselves free.

For Japan, the situation was entirely different. It was also true that the Japanese government had to deal with the GHQ, which ruled Japan without substantial interventions from Allied Powers other than the United States. Yet, the GHQ, as well as the United States, gave a chance for Japanese people to become aware of democracy. The Japanese general public, who felt that Japan had been driven to a war of aggression by their own abominable Army, hated its war-time leaders. Moreover, the rich United States was interested more in giving to Japan than in taking from it even if this conduct was based on the necessity of drawing Japan into an American design for the world. It was natural that the postwar years should have been more gloomy for the Finns than for the Japanese. Only when the United States changed its occupation policy toward Japan in overt confrontation with the Soviet Union, and when the Soviet Union without atomic bombs relied upon peace movements in coping with the United States, did a change take place in the Japanese public opinion, leading to the birth of the Small States theory with an emphasis on the aspect of national

self-determination.

What is characteristic of both postwar Finland and Japan is that they presented models for coming international relations in advance, though they lacked steady grounds for persuading others to believe that they were doing so. The Finnish way of guaranteeing one's own security through guaranteeing the security of the hypothetical enemy was apparently a precedent example of the "common security" conceptualized in the beginning of the 1980s. Yet, this aspect had been difficult for outsiders to understand at least until Finland's contribution to "Nordic balance," which had put Scandinavia relatively free of the tension of East-West confrontation. The idea of a demilitarized state put forth as a program in the Constitution of Japan still remains as unfinished dream for humankind. Japan's message assumed to be based on experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki will continue to be weak, unless the faults of Japan's "Postwar Democracy" are overcome in every respect.<sup>109</sup>

One may discuss the postwar Finnish and Japanese perceptions of Small States not only in comparative terms, but also in terms of relation. Masami Saitō's interest in postwar Finnish foreign policy is an indication. Saitō was a mediator of a message from a postwar Finland struggling for survival to postwar Japan fumbling for a model, after which Japan could realize its own ideal expressed in the new constitution. While Saitō's work no doubt "beautified" the situation in Finland to a considerable extent, still he gave an observation from his own standpoint critical of the earlier postwar democracy and pacifism in Japan, which shows itself in Saitō's association of Finland's struggle for independence with Asian nations' liberation movements, as well as in his mention at Finland's will to self-determination as reflected in its postwar foreign policy.

## Notes

- 1 Olavi K. Fält, *Eksosismista realismiin: Perinteinen Japanin-kuva Suomessa 1930-luvun murroksessa* [*From Exoticism to Realism: A Traditional Finnish Image of Japan in the Crisis of the 1930s*] (Rovaniemi: Societas Historica Finlandiae Septentrionalis, 1982); Motojirō Akashi, *Rakka Ryusui: Colonel Akashi's Report on His Secret Cooperation with the Russian Revolutionary Parties during the Russo-Japanese War*, Chiharu Inaba (trans.) and Olavi K. Fält and Antti Kujala (eds.) (Helsinki: SHS, 1988); For the Present author's early contribution, see Hiroshi Momose, "Japan's Relations with Finland 1919-1944 as Reflected by Japanese Source Materials," *Slavic Studies*, No. 17, 1973.
- 2 Seki has developed this contention in different papers and articles, among which is a paper entitled "International Theories Are Challenged by the 50 Years of Nuclear Weapons' History: The Meaning of Hiroshima in Human History," presented to the Congress of JAIR (Japan Association of International Relations) held in 18 May 1996. He defines "Hiroshima" and "Finland Model" as antitheses against "Westphalian System."
- 3 The name of "Toinen tasavalta" in the broad sense is being used to describe a period beginning with the end of the Continuation War, 1944 and ending with the

- end of Kekkonen's regime in the 1980s. (For instance, see Pertti Alasuutari, *Toinen tasavalta: Suomi 1946-1994*, Jyväskylä: Gummerus, 1996.) This article uses the concept in the narrow sense by putting the lowest limit to 1948 when the tripartite system of the Social Democrats, the Agrarians and the SKDL (the Communists and the Leftwing Social Democrats) ended. (An example of such usage is: Paavo Kähkölä, Toivo Pihlajaniemi, Sauli Pyyluoma, *Toinen tasavalta*, Helsinki: Otava, 1976.)
- 4 Usually the word of "Sengo minshushugi" has been used for a period from the Defeat of Japan in 1945 to a turning point called 1955 system.
  - 5 *Pienet kansat maailman historiassa* [*Small Nations in World history*], toimittanut Historian Ystävän Liitto (Porvoo: WSOY, 1951).
  - 6 Arvi Korhonen, "Pienten kansojen ongelma [The Problem of Small Nations]," in *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.
  - 7 *Ibid.*, p. 13.
  - 8 *Ibid.*, p. 15.
  - 9 For Yrjö Ruutu's discussion on the Small States, see Timo Soikkanen, *Yrjö Ruutu: Näkijä ja tekijä itsenäisyyden eheyttämisen ja uuden ulkopolitiikan juurilla* [*Yrjö Ruutu, Who Observed and Practiced at the Bottom of Independence, National Unification and New Foreign Policy*](Porvoo: WSOY, 1991), p. 385 ff.
  - 10 *Ibid.*, p. 391.
  - 11 *Ibid.*, p. 394-395.
  - 12 Yrjö Ruutu, *Suomen politiikka 1939-44: Olisiko sodat Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton välillä voitu välttää?* [*Finland's Politics: Could the Wars between Finland and the Soviet Union be Avoided?*](Helsinki, 1945), pp. 35-36.
  - 13 Hajime Kawakami, "Shōkoku kamin [A Small Country with a Small Population]," in Hajime Kawakami, *Jijoden* [*an Autobiography*], Vol. 5, 1952.
  - 14 *Ibid.*, p.277.
  - 15 *Ibid.*, p.280.
  - 16 Quoted from Yasuichi Morita, *Suisu: Rekishi kara gendai e* [*From History to Present*](Tokyo: Tosui shobo, 1980), p. 44.
  - 17 *Ibid.*
  - 18 Shigeyoshi Matsumae, *Haisen denmāku no fukkō no michi* [*Defeated Denmark's Way to Reconstruction*](Tokyo: Tokai shobo, 1945).
  - 19 In prewar days Matsumae had visited Denmark to study the Danish agrarian life.
  - 20 Eiji Ōtani, *Heiwa no kuni denmāku* [*A Land of Peace: Denmark*](Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1948).
  - 21 *Ibid.*, p. 5.
  - 22 Shinichirō Watanabe, *Suwēden no rekishi wo sanpo suru* [*Walking about in the History of Sweden*](Tokyo: Asahi shinbun sha, 1947).
  - 23 One may be surprised by similarity in tone among postwar admirers of Small States if one reads Watanabe's following expression: "There prevail in our country such voices as 'Let us turn Japan into a Sweden in Asia'..."
  - 24 After I wrote the following article on this question, works discussing Finnish-German military cooperation on the basis of new source materials, for instance,

- Mauno Jokipii, *Jatkosodan synty* [*the Birth of the Continuation War*](Keuruu: Otava, 1987) was published: Hiroshi Momose, "Finrando no tai so kankei 1940-1941 nen: 'Keizoku sensō' zenshi ni kansuru oboegaki [Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union 1940-1941: A Note on the Origin of the Continuation War]," *Slavic Studies*, No. 16, 1972.
- 25 Arvi Korhonen, *Barbarossa-suunnitelma ja Suomi* [*The Plan Barbarossa and Finland*](Porvoo: WSOY, 1961), p. 95.
  - 26 For instance, Tuomo Polvinen, *J. K. Paasikivi: Valtiomiehen elämäntyö* [*J. K. Paasikivi: A Statesman's Life Work*] 3. 1939-1944 (Porvoo: Helsinki, 1995), pp. 294-295.
  - 27 The problem of the origin of the Continuation War is not of a simple "black or white" type. Jokipii, the first historian who overthrew the "ajopuu" theory, put the question in relative terms: "To what extent Finland's activeness influenced her destiny is open yet." (Jokipii, *op. cit.*, p. 5).
  - 28 U. K. Paasikivi, *Toimintani Moskovassa ja Suomessa* [*My activity in Moscow and Finland*] 1939-41, II (Porvoo: WSOY, 1958), p. 221.
  - 29 The present author wrote the following article on the basis of new source materials: "Fuyu sensō gen'in ron saikō [The Winter War Revisited]," *Kokusai-kankei gaku kenkyū* (Tsuda College), No. 22 (March, 1996).
  - 30 New Soviet source materials published under the Gorbachev regime suggests that Elijas Erkko, the Finnish foreign ministry, had tended to the idea of stepping up to the Soviet demands a little more. "The Winter War Documents on Soviet-Finnish Relations in 1939-1940," *International Affairs*, No. 9 (September 1989), p. 6.
  - 31 This view has been shared by almost all researchers discussing the origin of the Winter War.
  - 32 Muistio Pohjoismaiden ulkoministerin neuvotteluista Tukholmassa [Memorandum on Nordic Foreign Ministers' Conferences in Stockholm](18-19 October 1939), UM 109. A. 6 p. 3; Muistio neuvottelusta valtioneuvotossa [Memorandum on the Conference of the Council of State](16 October 1939), UM 109. A. 6 p. 6.
  - 33 Muistio neuvottelusta... (16 October 1939), UM 109, A. 6.
  - 34 Max Jakobson, *Diplomaattien Talvisota: Suomi maailmanpolitiikassa 1938-40* [*Diplomats' Winter War: Finland in World Politics*](Porvoo: WSOY, 1956).
  - 35 See the conclusion of the book mentioned in the note 34.
  - 36 This hypothesis is also an open question unless the Soviet archives will be opened to put an end to the discussion.
  - 37 The following scene of the Finnish-Soviet negotiations on the eve of the Winter War is symbolic. To Paasikivi's words, "We want to continue in Peace and remain apart from all incidents," Stalin flatly responded: "That's impossible." Vaino Tanner, *The Winter War: Finland against Russia 1939-1940* (Stanford, California: Stanford U. P., 1957), p. 30.
  - 38 While the 15 Years' War theory originally put forth by Saburō Ienaga, a leading Japanese historian, tended to be dogmatic, its critics often lack a perspective for the "wood" by focusing on individual "trees."
  - 39 For a balanced description of Japan's road to war, see Akira Iriye, *The Origins*

- of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific* (London: Longman Group Ltd.; 1987).
- 40 A good example is: Chōmin Nakae, *San suijin keirin mondo* [*Three Persons Discuss Statecraft in Wine*], 1887. In some other articles, Nakae nicknamed “Rousseau in Japan” appreciated European Small States’ struggle to maintain independence.
- 41 Sanshi Tōkai [Shirō Shiba], *Kajin no kigū* [*A Chance meeting with a Fair Lady*], (1885-97) in *Nihon bungaku zenshu* III (Kōdan sha, 1965).
- 42 For a recent interesting symposium on this problem, see: Hikaku shi, hikaku rekishi kyōiku kenkyūkai (ed.), *Kurofune to nisshin sensō: Rekishi ninshiki wo meguru taiwa* [*The “Black Ships” and the Sino-Japanese War: A Dialogue on Views of History*](Tokyo: Mirai sha, 1996).
- 43 Shūsui Kōtoku, a socialist who was put to death by the Japanese authority later, had opposed the war bravely by admiring neutral Denmark and Switzerland. Kanzō Uchimura, a leader of non-church movement, appreciated Denmark which “took back at home what was lost abroad.”
- 44 Richard Storry, *A History of Modern Japan* (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1967), p. 152.
- 45 Shōjirō Shōda, “Ishibashi Tanzan no shō nippon shugi [Tanzan Ishibashi’s Little Japanism]”, *Teikō no keifu* [*The Heritage of Opposition*](Tokyo: Kindai bungei sha, 1993), p. 189-190.
- 46 Kumatarō Honda, *Tamashii no gaikō* [*A Soulful Diplomacy*](Tokyo: Chikura shobō, 1941), p. 309.
- 47 For the text of the Armistice Agreement, see Appendix A in John H. Wuorinen (ed.), *Finland and World War II: 1939-1944* (New York: The Ronald Press, 1948).
- 48 J. K. Paasikivi, *Paasikiven päiväkirjat* [*Paasikivi’s Diary*] 1944-1956, I (Porvoo: WSOY, 1985), pp. 185-186.
- 49 Yrjö Soini, *Kuin Pietari hiilivälkeällä: Sotasyllisyyksiasian vaiheet* [*Like Peter in the Light of a Fire*] 1944-1949 (Helsinki: Otava, 1966), p. 87.
- 50 J. K. Paasikivi, *Toimintani Moskovassa ja Suomessa 1939-41, I: Talvisota* (Porvoo: WSOY, 1959), pp. 75, 95-96.
- 51 J. K. Paasikivi, *Paasikiven linja I: Puheita vuosilta 1944-1956* [*Paasikivi’s Line I: Speeches of Years 1944-1956*](Porvoo: WSOY, 1962), p. 36.
- 52 Hertta Kuusinen, “Isänmaa ja demokratia,[Fatherland and Democracy],” Puhe itsenäisyyspäivänä [Speech on Independence Day] 1944-45, *Kansan arkisto*, p. 6.
- 53 Hertta Kuusinen, Puhe v. 1945 (Sotasyllisistä)[Speech in 1945 (Concerning War Guilt)], *Kansan Arkisto*, p. 2.
- 54 Soini, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
- 55 J. W. Keto, Alustus: “Kapitalismin rappiokausi ja sosialistisen poliitikon tehtävät” [Outline: “The Decaying Period of Capitalism and Politicians’ tasks”], *Kansan Arkisto*, 26. 9. 1944.
- 56 *Ibid.*
- 57 K. A. Fagelholm, “Mitä tahtoo sosialidemokraattisen puolueen oppositio [What do the Opposition Group of the Social Democratic Party Want?],” Puheita 1945

- [Speeches 1945], *Työväen Arkisto*, p. 4.
- 58 K. A. Fagelholm, “Jälleenrakennustyön poliittinen tausta [Political Background to the Work of Reconstruction],” *Työväen Arkisto*, p. 4.
- 59 Pekka Peitsi [U. K. Kekkonen], *Tässä sitä ollaan [What is to be Done]*(Helsinki: Tammi, 1944), p. 73.
- 60 *Ibid.*, p. 81.
- 61 *Ibid.*
- 62 *Ibid.*, p. 70.
- 63 *Ibid.*, p. 89.
- 64 Susumu Kasuya, *Sengo nihon no anzenhoshō rongi: Kenpō 9 jō to nichibei anpo no genten [Security Debates in Postwar Japan: The Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and the Origin of the US-Japan Security Treaty]*(Tokyo: Shinzan-sha, 1992), p. 23. This book discusses extensively security debates in the Diet in postwar Japan.
- 65 *Ibid.*, p. 16.
- 66 *Ibid.*
- 67 *Ibid.*, p. 10.
- 68 *Ibid.*, pp. 17, 106.
- 69 The Preamble of the New Constitution reads: “We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace...”
- 70 Yoshio Nakano, “Shōkoku shugi no keifu [The Heritage of Small State Idea],” *Shin okinawa bungaku [New Okinawa Literature]*, No. 44 (March 1980), p. 10.
- 71 Ryūichi Fumizawa, “Kaze wa konoma wo nutte [Wind Blows through the Branches],” *Aki Bungaku*, No. 33 (Dec., 1972), p. 4. The author of this essay, a famed writer living in Hiroshima, is far from making light of the abominable suffering by the atomic bomb. He only intends to mention how his [citizens’] state of mind had been “different from mere misery and despair which people (living in 1972) attribute to postwar Hiroshima.” It was even a sort of irritation that made him write the essay (*Ibid.*, p. 5).
- 72 Seiji Imahori, *Gensuibaku jidai: Gendaishi no shōgen [The Nuclear Ages: The Testimony from Contemporary History]*, I (Tokyo: Sanichi shobō, 1959), pp. 113–117. See also Monica Braw, *The Atomic Bomb Suppressed: American Censorship in Japan 1945–1949* (Tokyo: Liber Fōrlag, 1986). In general, Japanese did not protest the American control of speech concerning atomic bomb casualties. Tamiki Hara protests in his poem like story against discrimination shown by the Japanese general public toward sufferers of atomic bomb (Tamiki Hara, “Chinkon ka [A Requiem],” Tamiki Hara, *Natsu no hana /Shingan no kuni [A Summer Flower/The Land of Heart’s Desire]*(Tokyo: Shin chō sha, 1973), p. 215.
- 73 Kasuya, *op. cit.*, p. 87.
- 74 Shōichi Koseki, *Shin kenpō no tanjō [The Birth of the New Constitution of Japan]*(Tokyo: Chuō kōron sha, 1989), p. 247. For MacArthur’s interview by J. P. McEvoy see *Readers’ Digest* (Japanese Edition)(June 1950), p. 4. Here, MacArthur uses the words “a Switzerland in the Far East.” MacArthur had sent a message criticizing possible atomic wars to a ceremony held on August

- 6 1947 in Hiroshima, which may sound unbelievable in the light of his words and deeds during the Korean War (Imahori, *op. cit.*, p. 192)!
- 75 On the other hand, the Soviet leaders apparently feared that the United States might “intervene” in Eastern Europe as their own security zone.
- 76 The process was accompanied by an reinterpretation of “people’s democracy.”
- 77 Yrjö Ruutu was the founder of international political science in Finland, an advocate of friendly relations with the Soviet Union and an advisor for political circles.
- 78 For the text of the draft Ruutu presented to the Finnish ministry of foreign affairs, see Soikkanen, *op. cit.*, pp. 366-368.
- 79 *Ibid.*, p. 365.
- 80 *Ibid.*, pp. 373-376.
- 81 *Ibid.*, p. 376.
- 82 In April 1947, the Finnish domestic politics faced a crisis similar to those of Italy and France, which, however, was got over, leading to the continuance of Mauno Pekkala’s tripartite government.
- 83 For recent accounts on this problem, see Mikhail Narinsky, “The Soviet Union, Finland and the Marshall Plan,” and Mikko Majander, “The Limits of Sovereignty: Finland and the Marshall Plan in 1947,” *Finnish-Soviet Relations 1944-1948*, Jukka Nevakivi (ed.)(Helsinki: The Department of Political History, University of Helsinki, 1994).
- 84 In her reply to Great Britain’s invitation, the Finnish government put forth Finland’s will to remain outside Great Power’s conflicts.
- 85 Soikkanen, *op. cit.*, pp. 381-382.
- 86 *Ibid.*, p. 382.
- 87 For this author’s description of the process leading to the conclusion of the FCMA treaty, see Hiroshi Momose, “1948 nen no finrando soren jōyaku no seiritsujijō ni kansuru oboegaki [Background of the Finno-Soviet Treaty of 1948],” II-III, *Slavic Studies*, Nos. 27-28, 1981.
- 88 Soikkanen, *op. cit.*, p. 382.
- 89 Kallinen warned that the treaty would cause “suspicion, uneasiness and fear” leading to the division of the world. (Kallinen’s Diary, March 18, 1948. Työväen Arkisto 92 Kallinen, Yrjö H3)
- 90 Soikkanen, *op. cit.*, p. 402
- 91 Yoshitake Oka, “Gaiatsu to hannō [External Pressure and Response],” in Nihon seiji gak gakkai [Japanese Political Science Association](ed.), *Sengo nihon no seiji katei [The Political Process of Postwar Japan]*(Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1953), pp. 3-25 is the earliest but still excellent description of the postwar political process in Japan.
- 92 *Ibid.*, p. 23.
- 93 *Ibid.*
- 94 For this, see Kasuya, *op. cit.*
- 95 Oka, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
- 96 The “Red Purge” by GHQ began in June 1950, when MacArthur divested all the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Japan from

- public service.
- 97 In the beginning of modern Japan, the Japanese government got rid of movements for democratic rights successfully, after which the Tenno [Japanese Emperor] System functioned well to absorb desires among general public including nationalism. Even fascism, if there was any, took a special shape of “Tenno sei [Emperor System] fascism.” In the postwar years, “nationalism” reminded Japanese people of the war fought under the name of Emperor. The situation was entirely different toward 1950.
- 98 A remarkable evidence for this is, for instance, the minute book of a congress of Rekishigaku kenkyūkai [The Historical Science Society of Japan] held in 1952. See Rekishigaku kenkyūkai, *Minzoku no bunka ni tsuite* [On National Culture](Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1953). See also: Shō Ishimoda, *Rekishi to minzoku no hakken: Rekishigaku no kaddai to hōhō* [Finding Nations and History: Problems and Methodology of Historical Science](Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppan kai, 1952).
- 99 For the Stockholm Appeal in Japan, see Imahori, *Gensuibaku jidai*, II.
- 100 Hiroyoshi Nagaoka, *Genbaku bungaku shi* [A History of Atomic Bomb Literature], Tokyo Fūbai sha, 1973, pp. 177-81.
- 101 Masami Saitō, *Dokuritsu e no kumon: Finrando no rekishi* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1951).
- 102 *Ibid.*, p. ii.
- 103 *Ibid.*, p. 175.
- 104 *Ibid.*, p. 177.
- 105 Masami Saito to Hiroshi Momose. The idea was realized also in Masashi Suzuki, *Sokoku no kaihō — Toruko no baai*, [The Liberation of Fatherland: Turkey's Case](Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1952).
- 106 In debates in the Diet, Yoshida fled into obscurity by repeating such words as “Disarmament should not be spoken of lightly” in response to the oppositions standing on the position of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.
- 107 Eiichi Tatsumi, “Saigunbi to Yoshida san no ganko sa [Rearmament and Mr. Yoshida's Stubbornness],” attached to Shigeru Yoshida, *Kaisō jūnen* [Memoirs of Ten Years], II (Tokyo: Shinchō sha, 1957), p. 181.
- 108 Toyofumi Ogura, *Hiroshima — Zetsugo no kiroku* [Hiroshima: A Record on What Will Never Be](Tokyo: Taihei Shuppan, 1971 <1948>), pp. 216-217.
- 109 A question which still remains open is “What did the Communist and the Soviet Union mean for postwar Finland and postwar Japan respectively?” It needs another article to find an answer to this question. This writer intends to discuss it in a forthcoming study.