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The Transformation of Border Security Practices from Fixed Borders to New Modalities and Privatization: From the Perspective of Critical Border Studies

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Abstract

The aim of this article is to examine the transformation of border security practices from the perspective of critical border studies. Contrary to the conventional image of borders, both the quantitative and qualitative transformation of borders has become apparent in the global war on terror, signifying a reconfiguration of sovereign power via technology and characterized by the emerging role for privatization in border security. The main question raised by this article is to what extent do new forms of border security practices create new opportunities and possibilities for state regulation over border control, given the way in which the private sector has become embedded in border security. How can we characterize the changing nature of state sovereignty and the democratic accountability of state authorities? Stated differently, what does the privatization of border security imply for the relationship between the state and private corporations?

Introduction

Borders have been the focus of intense securitization since the September 11 attacks. As contemporary borders become debordered and rebordered, their border security functions have shifted away from realizing the territorial limits of states and towards becoming diffused spaces situated beyond geopolitical lines. Border scholars have analyzed the spatial complexity of contemporary bordering practices, such as dataveillance,¹ biometrics,² and airports,³ noting that they require thinking beyond borderlines themselves, even while masking where and what borders are, and what they represent.⁴

While modern borders still represent the power of the nation-state, to some degree, state power is increasingly exercised by delegating practices and authorities of state sovereignty to local, transnational, and private actors, away from the state apparatus.⁵ Emerging actors and sectors get

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¹ Didier Bigo, "The (In) Securitization Practices of the Three Universes of EU Border Control: Military/Navy-Border Guards/Police-Database Analysts," *Security Dialogue* 45 (2014).

² Louise Amoore, "Biometric Border: Governing Mobilities in the War on Terror," *Political Geography* 25:3 (2006).

³ Mark Salter, *Politics at the Airport* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2008).

⁴ Reece Jones and Corey Johnson, eds., *Placing the Border in Everyday Life* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014).

⁵ Virginie Guiraudon and Gallya Lahav, "A Reappraisal of the State Sovereignty Debate: The Case of Migration Control," *Comparative Political Studies* 33:2 (2000): 163–195.

involved in new types of border security, whereas traditional security actors have “security mandates” and act in new ways with long standing purposes. Intelligence agencies, private security companies, police departments, military forces, and even banks and airlines—among others—have been making decisions about the transnational flow of people and goods, understanding their tasks as those of border security management.

Therefore, traditional models of the territorial state border are invalidated by the presence of border functions not at the edge of the state. States, private actors, and individuals generate the meaning for the border in their contravention—their actions make certain claims for decisions or positions. It can be said that these actors have begun to validate a new border, exploring a mixture of market mechanisms and border security, which is underpinned by neoliberal logic.⁶ The main question raised by this article is to what extent do these practices create new opportunities and possibilities for state regulation over border security, given the way in which the private sector has become embedded in border security. How can we characterize the changing nature of state sovereignty and the democratic accountability of state authorities? In other words, what does the privatization of border security imply for the relationship between the state and private corporations?

What is Critical Border Studies? Beyond “Lines in the Sand”⁷

The new theoretical framework for critical border studies puts an emphasis on the process of border-making, which can be considered to be the “performativity of the border.”⁸ Borders are being created and given meaning through their transgression. In this sense, the border as a line has been abandoned as the key metaphor in border studies. More recently, critical border studies (hereinafter CBS) has emerged within border studies. According to Mark Salter, while “the line” in the traditional sense has been a “dominant tool” of border studies for a long time, there is a growing awareness among border scholars of the need for critically investigating the spatial complexity of our times.⁹ In this regard, an increasing disjuncture between territory and the function of state borders has been established. Alexander C. Diener and Joshua Hagen note that “all borders are human constructs and as such derive their functions and meaning from the people they divide.”¹⁰ Hence, the notion of the border as line is facing theoretical and practical criticism and has been largely renounced as the

⁶ In terms of neoliberal policies within the different domains of border security, employment standards, informal caregiving, and childcare, Susan Braedley and Meg Luxton examined the ways in which neoliberalism has come to penetrate our social and political fabric and affected our daily lives in a critical viewpoint. Susan Braedley and Meg Luxton, *Neoliberalism and Everyday Life* (Ontario: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010).

⁷ Noel Parker and Nick Vaughan-Williams, “Lines in the Sand: Towards an Agenda for Critical Border Studies,” *Geopolitics* 14:3 (2009): 582–587.

⁸ Mark Salter, “Theory of the / : The Suture and Critical Border Studies,” *Geopolitics* 17:4 (2012): 734.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 736.

¹⁰ Alexander C. Diener and Joshua Hagen, “Borders in a Changing Global Context,” in *Borderlines and Borderlands: Political Oddities at the Edge of the Nation-State*, eds. Alexander C. Diener and Joshua Hagen (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), 189.

dominant tool.¹¹ Although the linear image of the “border as a line” is largely abandoned, this does not imply that “borders are straightforwardly a ‘thing of the past’.”¹² This leads us to reexamine the nature and location of the border, and develop “alternative border imaginaries.”¹³

One of the important tasks for CBS is to create new analytical devices for considering “what and where borders are and how they are to function in different settings, with what consequences, and for whose benefit.”¹⁴ Analytical focus has shifted from “the line in the sand” to the technological ways in which border security practices have been performed, and how security threats cross borders in different ways.¹⁵ Concerning supranational systems, Deborah Cowen argues that:

Since the end of the Cold War, both military and civilian agencies have been actively rethinking security to respond to changing notions of threat. If a territorial model of security that allowed for the building of modern states both produced and relied on the distinction between “inside” and “outside” national space, then the current concerns for the security of supranational systems problematizes these simultaneously social and spatial forms. The division of inside-outside state space was said to order authority, jurisdiction, and rights.... But even as the division of authority and violence organized by the distinction of inside-outside was a sovereign fantasy as much as an everyday reality of the geopolitical state, it nevertheless had actual effects.¹⁶

Having said all of this, the borders themselves have never been managed in a way that the distinction of the inside-outside model would imply.¹⁷ However, they do allow us to uncover important changes in both the meanings and practices of sovereign power. It is a common trait in the CBS literature that a new face of sovereign space becomes apparent with clear-cut implications for how borders are governed, how actors act, and how they give meaning to their actions. In fact, a number of security agencies, especially in western countries, are acting based upon new proposals for

¹¹ David Newman also argues that “this transition from the study of the line per se to the social and spatial functions of those lines as constructs that define the nature of inclusiveness and exclusiveness, which would appear to characterize the contemporary debate concerning boundaries and borders.” David Newman, “Boundaries, Borders, and Barriers: Changing Geographic Perspectives on Territorial Lines,” in *Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations*, eds. Mathias Albert, David Jacobson and Yosef Lapid (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 151.

¹² Noel Parker and Nick Vaughan-Williams, “Critical Border Studies: Broadening and Deepening the ‘Lines in the Sand’ Agenda,” *Geopolitics* 17:4 (2012).

¹³ *Ibid.*, 729.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 729.

¹⁵ Nick Vaughan-Williams has proposed the analytical concept of the “generalised biopolitical border” which “unties an analysis of the operation of sovereign power from the territorial confines of the state and relocates such an analysis in the global terrain that spans ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ space.” Nick Vaughan-Williams, *Border Politics: The Limits of Sovereign Power* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009).

¹⁶ Deborah Cowen, “A Geography of Logistics: Market Authority and the Security of Supply Chains,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 100:3 (2010): 603.

¹⁷ John Agnew, “Mapping Political Power beyond State Boundaries: Territory, Identity and Movement in World Politics,” *Millennium* 28:3 (1999): 499–521.

sovereign space being debordered and rebordered.¹⁸ Transformation of this kind does not break up the border but establishes a different form of border management. One thus can describe these transformations as both quantitative and qualitative changes to borders.

From a ‘Borderless World’ to a ‘World Full of Borders’? The Quantitative Change of Borders

Over the past few decades, the concept of borders and its relationship with the concept of globalization has been heavily debated. This can be seen in the liberal interpretation of globalization, such as “These Borderless World” (K. Ohmae),¹⁹ “The End of Geography” (J. M. Greig),²⁰ and “The Flat World” (T. L. Friedman).²¹ These well-known phrases indicate the belief that both national borders and bounded territory are losing their meaning in the new era of “the rise of the virtual state” (R. Rosecrance).²² These exuberant viewpoints emphasized the positive effects of economic integration, free trade, and information. They believed that this interconnected world would lead to the rollback of the state and the breaking down of borders.²³ Much of the research on this globalization thesis had the tendency to regard borders as obsolete barriers and to assume that territoriality and borders would be replaced by a “mobilities paradigm” in a globalized world.²⁴

This thesis, however, has since been criticized by many on the grounds that it reveals a simplistic and utopian view of globalization.²⁵ Despite the fact that the role of state borders has been decreasing, they are an “abiding reference point” for border research.²⁶ Liam O’ Dowd argues that “state borders continue to be deeply constitutive of the way in which contemporary social scientists think about social change, mobility and immobility, inclusion and exclusion, domestic and foreign,

¹⁸ Chris Rumford argued that the agents in contemporary border security practices are not exclusively those hired by the state, but also include citizens who take on the role of temporary sovereigns in performing “borderwork.” Chris Rumford, ed., *Citizens and Borderwork in Contemporary Europe* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008).

¹⁹ Kenichi Ohmae, *The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy*, revised ed. (New York: Harper Business, 1999).

²⁰ J. Michael Greig, “The End of Geography? Globalization, Communications, and Culture in the International System,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46:2 (2002).

²¹ Thomas L. Friedman, *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century*, 3rd ed. (New York: Picador, 2007).

²² Richard Rosecrance, “The Rise of the Virtual State: Territory Becomes Passé,” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1996.

²³ Peter Andreas, “The Wall after the Wall,” in *The Wall around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and Europe*, eds. Peter Andreas and Timothy Snyder (Lanham: Lowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 1–2.

²⁴ John Urry, *Mobilities* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007).

²⁵ Gerard Toal, “De-Territorialized Threats and Global Dangers: Geopolitics and Risk Society,” in *Boundaries, Territory, and Postmodernity*, ed. David Newman (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 17–32; Peter J. Taylor, “Beyond Containers: Internationality, Interstateness, Interterritoriality,” *Progress in Human Geography*, 19:1 (1995): 1–15.

²⁶ Liam O’ Dowd, “From a ‘Borderless World’ to a ‘World of Borders’: Bringing History Back In,” *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 28 (2010): 1034.

national and international, internal and external, us and them.”²⁷ “From the 1990s onwards, ‘the borderless world’ debates have given way to a new emphasis on a ‘world full of borders’ and state borders are understood as one type of border among many—within and beyond borders.”²⁸ Similarly, John Agnew argued that “globalization entails its reformulation away from an economic mapping of the world in terms of state territories towards a more complex mosaic of states, regions, global city-regions, and localities differentially integrated into the global economy.”²⁹

Contrary to common perceptions, walls have been erected since the collapse of the Berlin Wall. This empirical analysis suggests that walls are a “global phenomenon” and the September 11 attacks marked a turning point in international relations (see Figure 1).³⁰ Globalization has led not to the removal of borders but rather to the changing nature of borders and new types of “fortifications.”




Figure 1: More Walls in a Globalizing International System (1945-2010)

Source: Elisabeth Vallet and Charles-Philippe David, “The (Re)Building of the Wall in International Relations,” *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 27:2 (2012): 113.

It turned out that the assumptions of “a linear evolution of societies towards a borderless world” were oversimplified. There is little evidence that the “space of flows” in a global polity will be replaced by the “space of places” in territorial states in the foreseeable future.³¹

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ John Agnew, “A World That Knows No Boundaries? The Geopolitics of Globalization and the Myth of a Borderless World,” *CIBR Working Papers in Border Studies*, 3.

³⁰ Elisabeth Vallet and Charles-Philippe David, “The (Re)Building of the Wall in International Relations,” *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 27:2 (2012): 112–114.

³¹ Gabriel Popescu, *Bordering and Ordering the Twenty-first Century: Understanding Borders* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 25.

The increased mobility of social relations has not displaced their territoriality. Instead, it has modified it. State borders are becoming more complex and differentiated rather than withering away. They exist simultaneously on various spatial scales, in a myriad of practices and discourses.³²

In the post-September 11 world, the security-related approach regarding border functions has come to the fore: a “selective reduction of barrier roles of state borders for specific categories of flows.”³³ The securitization discourse has become a focal point as governments move towards making borders much more difficult to cross for certain categories of people, reclosing and reinforcing their borders in the face of “perceived threats” such as terrorism and illegal migrants.³⁴ The consequence of border securitization is the hampering of the flow of people and goods across the border. For instance, even for U.S. and Canadian citizens, belonging to one of the world’s closest national relationships, it has become onerous to cross the border since September 11. However, we should not consider these movements to be a hardening or closing of borders in the classical sense of international relations. Rather, borders are understood as a “filter” that can control mobility by becoming more dispersed through the entire society.³⁵

The Social Construction of Borders through Debordering and Rebordering: The Qualitative Change of Borders

The contemporary world has been experiencing dynamics that occur in a “world in motion.”³⁶ In this context, multidisciplinary efforts to address the problematic issues of borders have made progress in our way of thinking about “the practice of bordering.” Introducing the notion of “bordering” into border studies opens a new dimension which understands borders as something continually “being made.” As the relationships between space and power are being perpetually transformed, various forms of territoriality have emerged on all spatial scales; such social practices as *classification* by area, *communication* of boundaries, and *control* over access to areas and things within them persist in bounded space.³⁷ From an historical perspective, those transformations are not necessarily out of the ordinary.

The meaning of borders has varied widely from place to place as well as from time to time. Borders did not exist in the same location since primordial time, nor did they perform the

³² Ibid., 25–26.

³³ Ibid., 26.

³⁴ Peter Andreas and Thomas J. Biersteker, eds., *The Rebordering of North America: Integration and Exclusion in a New Security Context* (New York: Routledge, 2003).

³⁵ William Walters, “Border/Control,” *European Journal of Social Theory* 9:2 (2006): 187–203.

³⁶ Victor Konrad, “Towards a Theory of Borders in Motion,” *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 30:1 (2015): 1–17.

³⁷ Robert D. Sack, *Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Anssi Passi, “Bounded Spaces in a ‘Borderless World’: Border Studies, Power, and the Anatomy of Territory,” *Journal of Power* 2:2 (2009): 216.

same functions in all places at all times. Borders are not fixed; they are not simply lines, but rather areas, networks, even volume of variable depth.³⁸

With this in mind, recent border construction does not emphasize rigid control but social construction, which leads to the multiplication and complexity of borders in our daily lives. In this context, David Newman argues that “we are more interested in the way that borders are socially constructed, which are in a constant state of flux.”³⁹ From non-geographical perspectives, Étienne Balibar “has done more than anyone to challenge geostrategic assumptions about the nature of borders.”⁴⁰ In his influential work, he argued that borders have a “polysemic” nature associated with various meanings and practices: “they do not have the same meanings for everyone.”⁴¹ He also pointed out that borders are “overdetermined” because they can be performed in multiple ways that go beyond their ability to mark out territory.⁴² Furthermore, he worked out the concept of “heterogeneity” that operates at various sites, excepting the borders as physical lines: “some borders are no longer situated at the borders at all, in the geographico-politico-administrative sense of the term.”⁴³

In a similar vein, using Michel Foucault’s notions of “heterotopia” and “confessionary complex,” Agnew seeks to overcome the typical image of borders with which we have long been obsessed, proposing we need to reframe border thinking.⁴⁴ First, heterotopia are places that challenge the various functions associated with “like” locations. Second, the confessionary complex is characterized by the “docility and anxiety” typically experienced by having to run the gauntlet of state security agents at airports, etc.

This dual focus takes us away from the simple obsession with borders as easily guarded land borders characteristic of much border thinking (and anti-border thinking) and towards the complexity of what borders do and how they are managed for both territorial and networked spaces.... Rather than taking place only at borders on a map, bordering practices are much more *widely diffused geographically*.⁴⁵ (emphasis added)

³⁸ Gabriel Popescu, *Bordering and Ordering the Twenty-first Century*, 7.

³⁹ David Newman, “Borders and Bordering: Towards an Interdisciplinary Dialogue,” *European Journal of Social Theory* 9:2 (2006): 173.

⁴⁰ Chris Rumford, “Towards a Multiperspectival Study of Borders,” *Geopolitics* 17 (2012): 889; Krishnendra Meena, “Locating Borders in an Age of Global Flows: Is Border Thinking/Instance Everywhere?” *Eurasia Border Review* 5:2 (2014): 69–70.

⁴¹ Étienne Balibar, *Politics and the Other Scene* (London: Verso, 2002): 81.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 81.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 84.

⁴⁴ John Agnew, “Borders on the Mind: Re-framing Border Thinking,” *Ethics & Global Politics* 1:4 (2008).

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 183–184.

The Technological Transformation of Border Security Practices and Public-Private Issues

(1) Technological Revolution in Border Security Practices

Richard A. Falkenrath, former Deputy Assistant to President George W. Bush and Deputy Homeland Security Advisor, drew an analogy likening the revolution in military affairs of the 1990s to the “revolution in border security,” in which developments of technology have the potential to transform border security practices.⁴⁶ This “revolution” largely consists of the Department of Homeland Security (hereinafter DHS) using technology as a “force multiplier” to increase the capabilities of officers as well as embracing a strategy of “pushing borders out” beyond US territorial boundaries.⁴⁷ Technology is used increasingly at the physical borders of developed countries and new devices are designed to monitor borders and create a “virtual fence.”

Berry Tholen has examined and compared the old “classical border control” to the “new border control.”⁴⁸ (see Table 1) In this shift, less attention has been paid to the physical lines of territorial borders than the border space as a whole, from visa applications to the monitoring surveillance of our everyday life. This new type of border control has led to the multiplication of borders and actors. Rather than being a single borderline, border control in western countries can be illustrated by a “model of concentric circles.”⁴⁹ The EU has a four-tier border security model in the Schengen agreement: 1) measures at third countries, 2) cross-border cooperation among member countries, 3) border checks and monitoring at the EU external border, and 4) measures within the EU.⁵⁰ Put differently, travelers and immigrants cross a variety of borders before reaching their final destination.

Table 1: Transformation of Borders from Line to Space

	Border guard	Border control	Border security
Modus operandi	Reaction	Pre-action	Prevention
Location	Border line	Border zone	Cyberspace
Focus of Control	Territory	Flows/people	Data subject
Moments of Control	Single	Multiple	Continuous
Actors	Military	Law enforcement	Security apparatus
Technology	Surveillance	Identity/biometrics	Data management
Threat	Military	Migration	Terrorism
Idea of government	Guard/segregation	Surveillance	Governance
	End of Cold War	September 11	

Source: Markus Heiskanen, “Border Games: From Duel to Russian Roulette at the Border,” in *Borders, Fences, and Walls: State of Insecurity?* ed. Elisabeth Vallet (New York: Ashgate, 2014), 70. (modified by author)

⁴⁶ An excerpt from Stephanie S. Kostro and Scott F. Mann, *Innovative Immigration and Border Control Reform* (Washington DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2013).

⁴⁷ Stephen E. Flynn, “Beyond Border Control,” *Foreign Affairs*, 79:6 (2000): 57–68.

⁴⁸ Berry Tholen, “The Changing Border: Developments and Risks in Border Control Management of Western Countries,” *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 76:2 (2010).

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 264.

⁵⁰ Markus Heiskanen, “Border Games: From Duel to Russian Roulette at the Border,” in *Borders, Fences, and Walls: State of Insecurity?* ed. Elisabeth Vallet (New York: Ashgate, 2014), 68.

The use of new technologies in border spaces leads to a transformation of how borders are monitored and securitized. The older model of tight security at border crossing points has been replaced by a model that strives for “total awareness” and “effective border management” over the entire border zone, which implies the borderline itself and a larger zone, “with the ground beneath it and the air above it.”⁵¹ Borders are requiring increasingly elaborate technology, creating a new industry and new markets in which the private sector plays a crucial role. In the context of securitization of border discourse, the “border security complex” conflates security with private actors.

(2) The Emergence of the “Border Security Complex”: Conflating Security with Private Sectors

Border control itself is becoming more sophisticated than ever before. Although the idea of a “closed” border never vanished from the traditional landscapes of geopolitics, new systems of border security have been developing since 9/11. They have tended to introduce high-tech mechanisms into the field of border control, fostering the growth of the “border security complex,” an increasingly profitable market.⁵² During the past 40 years, a multibillion-dollar border industry complex has been created, bearing a striking resemblance to “the military industrial complex” that President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned about in 1960. The foundation of the complex is the private sector. Many corporations dependent on military spending have expanded into the field of border security.

The notion of *governance* can be used to conceptualize the new forms of collaboration on border security. At the most general level, the term governance implies “any form of coordination of independent social relations.” For example, Heiner Hanggi defines governance in a broader way: “the structures and processes whereby a social organization – from the family to a corporate business to an international institution – steers itself, ranging from centralized control to self-regulation.”⁵³ Judging from this definition, government means unified and authorized political control by a central state, whereas governance has a wide-ranging definition, which includes the formal and informal totality of all governing processes.

Given the exclusive monopoly of the sovereign state on security-related issues, the concept of governance would be incompatible with the security policy domain. However, the situation around this concept has changed because the state itself increasingly cannot manage new security challenges, such as the network-styled threats of adept terrorists and criminals. In the same vein, Rita

⁵¹ In this regard, Stuart Elden suggested that “recognizing the vertical dimension of territory shows that territory is a volume rather than an area, and noting that lines on maps have only a limited height when translated into lines on the ground showcases a new level of vulnerability.” Stuart Elden, *Terror and Territory: The Spatial Extent of Sovereignty* (London: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), xxii.

⁵² Kyle Longley, “Industry of Border Security Creates Extra Layers of Regional Problems,” *Statesman*, 21 January, 2012. Accessed August 28, 2017: <https://www.alipac.us/f9/longley-industry-border-security-creates-extra-layer-regional-problems-248824/>

⁵³ Heiner Hanggi, “Approaching Peacebuilding from a Security Governance Perspective,” in *Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, Geneva: Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, eds. Alan Bryden and Heiner Hanggi (London: Lit Verlag, 2005), xx.

Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams proposed *global security assemblages*, “settings where a range of different global and local, public and private security agents and normativities interact, cooperate and compete to produce new institutions, practices, and forms of security governance.”⁵⁴ Therefore, security governance becomes new forms of collaboration that go beyond the outer edge of sovereign states and encompasses a variety of actors within and without the state. It can be argued that states are new kinds of security governance with a strategic relation to other forces of social control— i.e., private security providers.⁵⁵

Both researchers and policy makers share an understanding that borders deserve special attention in the security policy domain after the September 11 attacks. Nevertheless, the notion of governance has yet to be fully applied in the context of border security. Against this backdrop, “border security governance” has emerged as a key concept in border security.⁵⁶ DHS has new mandates to appoint and operate private sectors. Public-private partnerships to develop border security policies and infrastructures have been facilitated.

Naomi Klein argued that “the dismantling of borders, the great symbol and promise of globalization, has been replaced with the exploding industry of border surveillance, from optical scanning and biometric IDs to the planned high-tech fence on the border between Mexico and the U.S. government, worth up to \$2.5 billion for Boeing and a consortium of other companies.”⁵⁷ This means that the state is increasingly devolving parts of its function to the private sector. The DHS budget has expanded rapidly since its creation in 2003.⁵⁸ The annual budgets for immigration enforcement and border security have more than doubled since the creation of DHS, rising from \$7.4 billion to \$14.9 billion in 2009. Outsourcing to the private sector by DHS has increased at even a faster pace than annual budget increases, rising from \$4.2 billion in 2003 to \$13.7 billion in 2009.⁵⁹ Outsourcing encompasses a wide range of governmental operations, with private contractors “now doing everything from running prisons, protecting U.S. embassies, gathering intelligence, interrogating foreign prisoners, building virtual and real border walls, and fighting the global war on terror.”⁶⁰ Private contracting has far surpassed federal budget increases even for such “favored programs as border security.”⁶¹

⁵⁴ Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, “Security beyond the State: Global Security Assemblages in International Politics,” *International Political Sociology* 3 (2009): 3.

⁵⁵ Elke Krahmann, “Security Governance and Networks: New Theoretical Perspectives in Transatlantic Security,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 18:1 (2005): 15–30.

⁵⁶ Jason Ackleson and Yosef Lapid, “New Direction in Border Security Governance,” in *Regional Governance in Post-NAFTA North America*, eds. Brian Bow and Greg Anderson (New York: Routledge, 2015), 54–57.

⁵⁷ Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of the Disaster Capitalism* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007), 303.

⁵⁸ Tom Barry, “Privatizing Homeland Security,” *Border Lines*, October 28, 2009. Accessed August 29, 2017: <http://borderlinesblog.blogspot.jp/2009/10/privatizing-homeland-security.html>

⁵⁹ Ibid. This number does not include supplemental funding and special administration initiatives for border fences and drug control.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

Table 2 shows that the top 25 companies were given \$5.38 billion in contracts in 2010. These companies have taken notice of the business opportunities. Of the six largest U.S.-based defense companies (Lockheed Martin Corp., Boeing Co., Northrop Grumman Corp., General Dynamics Corp., Raytheon Co. and L-3 Communications), all rank as top 25 homeland security contractors.⁶²

Table 2: The Top 25 of Homeland Security 2010

Rank	Recipient	Amount	No. of Transactions
1	IBM	\$560,334,181	301
2	Lockheed Martin Corporations	\$422,729,555	260
3	Unisys Corporation	\$398,524,112	145
4	Science Applications International Corporation	\$376,208,261	326
5	Computer Sciences Corporation	\$343,101,285	220
6	Bollinger Shipyards, Inc.	\$323,925,170	45
7	L-3 Communications Corporation	\$269,838,038	447
8	The Boeing Company	\$215,281,093	119
9	General Dynamics	\$213,024,197	269
10	Booz Allen Hamilton Inc.	\$197,940,402	426
11	European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company	\$188,552,139	1074
12	Safran Group	\$168,459,798	270
13	Dell Inc.	\$168,167,569	293
14	Accenture	\$167,575,296	161
15	Hewlett Packard	\$157,194,055	235
16	Raytheon Company	\$143,077,083	178
17	Northrop Grumman Corporation	\$136,644,193	290
18	Chenega Corporation	\$132,708,561	51
19	Siemens AG	\$131,159,158	74
20	G4S Plc.	\$125,793,152	120
21	Defense Support Services Llc.	\$117,031,295	10
22	SGS SA	\$115,279,174	49
23	OSI Systems Inc.	\$103,628,439	78
24	The MITRE Corporation	\$100,546,306	124
25	Security Consultants Groups Inc.	\$ 99,527,579	682

Source: *Homeland Security Today Magazine*, April 2011, 24. Accessed August 25, 2017:

<http://www.hstoday.us/magazine/single-article/top-25-and-rising-10-homeland-security-companies/0053dcd73e45c196c23a6317ff517cc9.html>

⁶² *Homeland Security Today Magazine*, April 2011, 24. Accessed August 25, 2017: <http://www.hstoday.us/magazine/single-article/top-25-and-rising-10-homeland-security-companies/0053dcd73e45c196c23a6317ff517cc9.html>

The Homeland Security and Defense Business Council was created in 2004, extending the public-private partnership in Homeland Security.⁶³ The council mentions that it provides “a forum among the leading private-sector companies and senior homeland security leaders to implement the administrative and legislative landscape dictated by the creation of DHS.”⁶⁴ Most of its members are the above-listed contractors, including Lockheed Martin, L-3 Communications, Northrup Grumman, and Raytheon. M. Pearl, the business council’s president and CEO, told Congress that the council promotes the public-private partnership in the field of Homeland Security because this “partnership provides our government with the ability to access the best solutions and capabilities to achieve mission success – a safer and more secure nation.”⁶⁵ This council also includes former DHS officials on its advisory board.⁶⁶ The seven members were formerly all in high positions at DHS and are all involved in the booming business of homeland security. For instance, council advisor Andrew Manner, the current CEO of the National Interest Security Company, was the former chief financial officer at DHS.⁶⁷

Most criticism of the outsourcing of DHS has brought into focus the department’s inability to oversee its private sector contracts. The harshest critics of DHS come from the U.S. government itself – a variety of congressional committees, the General Accounting Office, and the DHS Office of Inspector General.⁶⁸ Whereas critics from congress and government reports show apprehension about the squandering of taxpayer money due to the shortfall of adequate inspection processes, there is little assessment of the DHS public-private partnership itself.

Conclusion

Some of the arguments presented this article should contribute to border research projects that extend the traditional understandings of the functions of border security and how border and security interact in the post 9/11 context. The subject of privatization is central to CBS as it contends that the fields and actors involved are not only interchangeable to the inside-outside model but also to the public-private partnerships which can reconfigure the modalities of the border security complex as mentioned above. It follows that the boundaries between the state and the private sector are becoming more obscure than ever before. Public and private spheres are increasingly interdependent today. In other words, borders are key sites for exploring the obscure boundaries between the public and private logic of security that is increasingly becoming merged into a “single security field.” However, given the fact that the multifaceted aspects of border security are increasingly being outsourced to private companies, it is important to examine its implication for the transformation of

⁶³ Tom Barry, “Homeland Security Partnership Promoted by New Business Council,” *Border Lines*, October 27, 2009. Accessed August 30, 2017: <http://borderlinesblog.blogspot.jp/2009/10/homeland-security-partnership-promoted.html>

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

borders and the accompanying effects privatization has had on established tools for cost-effectiveness and democratic accountability. In the United States, outsourcing centralizes power in the hands of the executive branch and lessens the opportunities for congress to manage and monitor border security policy.

More importantly, private sector provision of security functions emphasizes the changing nature of the state and its role in securing its sovereign territory and protecting those within its territorial border. Peter W. Singer emphasizes that, in the United States, three times as many people are hired by private security companies as by public law-enforcement agencies.⁶⁹ Moreover, this phenomenon should be understood as the “privatization of sovereignty” in which power is distributed to a great number of actors in various situations yet has the force of the state behind it.⁷⁰ Contrary to the thesis that the state delineated by its territorial border is on the wane, due to the transnational flows of people and goods, it is now clear that the privatization of borders represents the expansion of state sovereignty, in which the private actors exert a decisive influence in terms of advancing and applying technology.

⁶⁹ Peter W. Singer, “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security,” *International Security* 26:3 (2001): 186–220.

⁷⁰ Deborah D. Avant, “The Privatization of Security and Change in the Control of Force,” *International Studies Perspectives* 5 (2004): 153–157.