Politics of Folk Psychology : Believing what Others Believe

Tooming, Uku

Theoria. Revista de Teoria Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia, 2021, 36(3), 361-374

Permalink : https://hdl.handle.net/2115/83715

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ファイル	フォーマット	サイズ	閲覧回数	説明
https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.21966

アクセス権	metadata only access
URI	https://hdl.handle.net/2115/83715
タイトル	Politics of Folk Psychology : Believing what Others Believe
著者	著者名 Tooming, Uku
言語	英語
キーワード	belief
	belief attribution
	folk psychology
	epistemic injustice
	testimony
発行日	2021-03-10
出版者	Universidad del Pais Vasco. Servicio Editorial
収録物名	Theoria. Revista de Teoria Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia
巻(号)	36(3)
ページ	361-374
抄録	In this paper, I argue that by attributing beliefs the attributer is pushed toward taking a stand on the content of those beliefs and that what stand they take partially depends on the relationship between the attributer and the attributee. In particular, if the attributee enjoys a higher social standing than the attributer, the latter is disposed to adopt the attributed belief, as long as certain other conditions are met. I will call this view the Adoption-by-Attribution model. Because of the non-epistemic influence that derives from the relation of inequality, belief attribution can reinforce the existing unequal power relations and contribute to epistemic injustice.
資源タイプ	学術雑誌論文
出版タイプ	Version of Record
PISSN	0495-4548
関連情報 (isIdenticalTo)	出版社版DOI https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.21966