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Ezo as relational territory: mapping and bordering Japan's north

By

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Abstract

This is a study into the political role of territory in a non-European context. The notion of territory has recently been the focus of a great deal of scholarship, encouraged by a concern with globalization that have worked to de-stabilize the linkage of territory with the modern, sovereign nation-state. However, much of this analysis has been historically myopic, accepting the claims made by the modern political map for a world of homogenous state spaces as indicative of actual political practice.

In order to understand how territory is constituted, this study will examine how the amorphous Ezo region to Japan's north came to be recognized as Japanese territory by the latter half of the nineteenth century. It will analyse the representation and incorporation of the lands associated with Ezo through the lenses provided by a pair of territorial practices, those of maps and borders. The emergence of Ezo as a demarcated, legible area of the earth's surface was not dependent upon a concept of territory that insisted upon its absolute and homogenous character. Rather, such practices serve as a series of ascriptive claims made about the world.

This study emphasizes the importance of maps and borders as territorial processes open to re-enactment in the constitution of territory at a variety of scales, stretching from the local to the global, and asserts the necessity of understanding such territories relationally in order to account for their centrality to politics. More broadly, therefore, the thesis will argue for the importance of examining territorial practices in order to understand territory relationally, both in the past and today.

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INTRODUCTION – Territorial Fluidity and Fluid Territories

At a routine press conference on February 5, 2013, the Japanese Cabinet Secretariat quietly announced the formation of the Office of Policy Planning and Coordination on Territory and Sovereignty.¹ According to the announcement, the Office was being established to communicate and coordinate information regarding Japan's disputed territories, while liaising with the Cabinet Office's pre-existing Northern Territories Affairs Administration. The Office's website² makes clear that its remit covers the three areas that Japan finds itself disputing with its neighbours. These are what is known in Japan as the Northern Territories Dispute between Japan and the Russian Federation, the Takeshima Dispute between Japan and the Republic of Korea, and the problems related to Senkaku Islands raised by both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China on Taiwan. As was emphasized at the press conference, although there is no territorial dispute over the Senkakus, it was deemed necessary to develop a unified national strategy in order to respond to the many subtleties that exist in discussions over territory. Consequently, the Office will pronounce upon the "Situation surrounding the Senkaku Islands", in addition to the Takeshima and Northern Territories "Issues".

As the invocation of both territory and sovereignty in the new Office's name makes clear, this heightened concern with territory is mediated by a concern with projecting power and exercising the sovereignty of the state over "sensitive spaces".³ This is an example of the

¹ See the transcript of the Press Conference at "Yamamoto Naikaku Tokumei Tantō Daijin Kisha Kaiken Yōshi – February 5, 2013", available at: http://www.cao.go.jp/minister/1212_i_yamamoto/kaiken/2013/0205kaiken.html

² The website, in English, Korean and Chinese as well as Japanese, containing the Takeshima and Senkaku Islands Archives Portals, educational materials, and paper crafts "for KIDS" is available here:

<http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/ryodo/>

³ Cons *Sensitive Space*.

normative behavior of the modern or Westphalian nation-state, rendered distinct from other forms of political organization by its concern with and enforcement of the linear boundary lines that demarcate its territorial extent. One of the first materials produced by the new office is a national map, which rhetorically asks if the viewer is aware of the ‘shape’ of Japan (*Figure 1*).⁴ The map provides an image of the nation that emphasizes these disputed territories as forming part of Japan’s ‘correct’ shape, with the bottom of the map highlighting how each of them forms part of the “integral territory” of Japan.⁵ The foregrounding of these disputed territories on the map highlights how increased interaction between state parties has failed to serve as a means of bringing the different sides of the dispute together.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was widely expected that globalization would lead to an amelioration of border and territorial disputes, due to the decreasing significance of physical territory,⁶ increased economic interdependence,⁷ the democratic peace-dividend,⁸ or the creation of multilateral mechanisms with which to deal with territorial disputes.⁹ Such expectations have been dashed by both the trend towards the unilateral fencing or walling of borders and the increasing prevalence of overt disputes over territory.¹⁰ For states worldwide, borders remains both worth securing and fighting for, and the “allure” of territory remains undiminished.¹¹ Such disputes show how we are experiencing the “reconfiguration of fixed territories...at the same time as dynamics of cross border flows and networks”.¹² With the disappearance of the ideological division of the world in the 1990s, ever-accelerating flows of people, goods and capital appear to be reshaping political imaginations. This did not only occur at the level of the state, as East Asia has seen a profusion of local civil society groups and administrative bodies capable of seizing upon territorial issues as a means of increasing their political influence.¹³ This occurs because territorial disputes themselves serve as a form of

⁴ This was the February 2015 version: http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/ryodo_eg/img/data/poster201502.pdf

⁵ *Koyū* 固有, the term is sometimes translated as ‘inherent’. In either case, it references the perceived importance of these territories for the maintenance of a sovereign Japan.

⁶ Paasi “Bounded spaces in a ‘borderless world’”.

⁷ Lee & Mitchell “Foreign direct investment and territorial disputes”.

⁸ Huth & Allee *The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century*.

⁹ Oxman “The Territorial Temptation”.

¹⁰ Brown *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*; Rosière & Jones “Teichopolitics”.

¹¹ Murphy “Territory’s continuing allure”.

¹² Newman “Territory, compartments and borders”, p. 775.

¹³ Cross border flows themselves alter the patterns of territorial production, visible in the manner in which local groups come to resemble their counterparts across the border as well as other groups within the space of the nation. The selective appropriation and patterns of mimicry extend across the many scales at which the border is

border process, with the myriad practices that surround them serving to constitute the institutional facts of the dispute.

This is clear from the extension of the notion of “integral territory”, which emerged in the specific context provided by Japan’s Cold War dispute with the Soviet Union, to refer to the claims made by Japan for the return of the Northern Territories (and, at least initially, the rest of the Kurils and southern Sakhalin). The Northern Territories dispute had its local origins in the denial of access to their traditional fishing grounds to Japanese fishermen, which subsequently came to be mobilized at the prefectural and then national levels.¹⁴ It is only in recent years that the ongoing territorial dispute with the Russian Federation has come to be officially equated with those occurring with Japan’s other neighbours, as local groups in Ishigaki and, particularly, Shimane Prefecture have been able to pattern their activism upon that of the Northern Territories. The increasing attention paid to these latter two disputes has homogenized understandings of the importance of this territory for Japan, with the result that the notion is applied to all of them today (*Figure 2*).¹⁵

The continuing “ontological insecurity” visible at various levels of the political process has resulted in the state’s utilization of foreign policy to respond this territorial uncertainty.¹⁶ The circulation of this fact, the presentation of the disputed territory of Japan as “integral” and its mobilization in the speech acts of political interventions at various levels of the political process,¹⁷ one that then comes to be re-presented in the appropriation of official discourses to articulate local concerns.¹⁸ The notion of “integral territory” has come to have an important structuring effect upon conceptions of Japanese territory, one that is being reflected in Japan’s political institutions. The institutional effect is particularly pronounced because of the shape of

reproduced, guaranteeing the endless reproduction of the border in a shifting matrix of meaning extending from the local to the global. See Bukh “Shimane Prefecture, Tokyo and the territorial dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima”.

¹⁴ Bukh “Constructing Japan’s ‘Northern Territories’”.

¹⁵ On March 20, 2011, a junior high school textbook review announced that children should be taught that ‘the Northern Territories’, ‘Takeshima’ and the ‘Senkaku’ are ‘Japanese territory’ over which Japan alone enjoys ‘sovereignty’, while in April 2014 it was announced that from the following academic year, all elementary school textbooks would also make mention of Takeshima and the Senkakus. Meanwhile, the August 2011 Defense of Japan Guidelines specifically referred to and connected all three disputes for the first time. In April 2014, this new map appeared on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ website, explicitly connecting these three disputes. The map displays an expansive territorial vision of Japan highlighting and largely homogenizes the three “sensitive spaces” of the Northern Territories, Takeshima and the Senkaku Islands.

¹⁶ Abraham *How India Became Territorial*, p. 21.

¹⁷ Cooper & Perkins “Borders and status-functions”, p. 57.

¹⁸ Reeves “Fixing the border”, p. 918.

Japan being pushed by the Office of Policy Planning and Coordination on Territory and Sovereignty. As the map indicates, this shape incorporates not only the nation's terrestrial extent, but also a vast swathe of maritime space, as the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) mandated by the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) comes to be rewritten as forming the boundaries of the nation.

In strictly legal terms, this representation is inaccurate, as the true extent of maritime territory according to UNCLOS extends only 12 nautical miles out from the shore. As the map indicates, however, this EEZ is becoming part of Japan's shape. Recent legislation makes this clear, as "letting islands become uninhabited is bad for national security" while their possession "expands our territory sixfold".¹⁹ Consequently, the maintenance of such a space becomes dependent upon the rule of particular islands, which provide the territorial fixity out from which control of these fluid maritime areas is able to be proclaimed.²⁰ Japan's new, self-proclaimed 'borders' have come to be bound up with the normative foundations of UNCLOS, and in all three disputes, the question of possession or otherwise has considerable ramifications with regards to the extent of the EEZ able to be proclaimed by Japan.²¹

The insertion of EEZs and maritime territory, more broadly, has served to raise the stakes of each of these issues, and thus made negotiated resolution more rather than less difficult to achieve, by seeming to transform possession of the islands into a zero-sum case of resource control. While there is nothing to prevent negotiated agreements over fishery and other resources, the connection of such questions with that of sovereignty over islands, understood as insular and thus indivisible repositories of political authority, makes such negotiations more difficult. Although UNCLOS was established in order to resolve the question of maritime claims, therefore, in its operation it has worked to make them more intractable, by connecting resource claims to territorial disputes and questions of state sovereignty. It is therefore indicative of the workings of global governance coming to influence territorial practices at the national level, as reflected on maps issued by state institutions seeking to create a new "logo"

¹⁹ Yaichi Tanigawa, quoted in Robin Harding. "Japan plans population push to secure remote islands." *Financial Times*. March 24, 2017. Available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/9edf4c3c-0afb-11e7-97d1-5e720a26771b>

²⁰ Maritime spaces are largely defined by what is present 'beneath the surface' of what is shown on the map.

²¹ Also, Japan's territorial disputes include an obviously volumetric component in another direction, out into the atmosphere, as seen in the complaints over the extension of China's Air Defence Identification Zone over the Senkakus in 2013, see Elden "Secure the Volume" for the territorial implications.

for the national body.²² Their dissemination offers a means by which the state is reproduced internally through what has been termed everyday practical and symbolic work.²³

Whatever the territory being reproduced through this work is, though, it is not the absolute, homogeneous space with which the modern sovereign state is associated. Neither is it, however, merely a “space of flows”²⁴ that works to overwhelm the fixed territory of the state. Rather than fixed, the production and deployment of these maps shows the reconfiguration of state territory that is occurring in East Asia. This is not of course visible on the surface of the maps themselves, nor through the borders displayed on them, which by their nature offer a series of static claims. Nevertheless, such claims serve to both represent and produce the world, working to provide a framework within which the world should be understood while also seeking to realize that which it represents on the map. These claims to territory are constituted through the representation of borders, which look to “geo-code” the extent of the state upon both the map and the portion of the material world that the map claims to represent.²⁵ The state’s border serves as an institution through which the state is able to bring its claims about the world into reality.

Much of the discussion about the shifting meanings of territory, breakdown in sovereign borders and remapping of the nation occurring in the contemporary era references the past in order to understand the present. Attention to the fluid and multiscalar nature of territory in the modern world has led to its description as a form of “neo-medievalism” in which the space of sovereignty was not contained by the homogenized colored blocks of the contemporary political map, but operated in a more networked fashion.²⁶ This invocation of the pre-modern past to explain the post-modern present reflects the search for an appropriate vocabulary to describe our contemporary condition, but also shows how our understanding of the ‘modern’ is shaped by notions of fixity: including that by the state over a defined territory. It is this that enables the contrast today to be made with the modern era, as our world comes to resemble,

²² Anderson *Imagined Communities*, p. 250.

²³ Reeves “Fixing the border”, p. 906.

²⁴ Castells *The Rise of the Network Society*.

²⁵ Pickles *A History of Spaces*, p. 5.

²⁶ This invocation is held to have more significance in Europe, in which modern territorial ideals are held to develop, see Chapter 1 for details. A good starting-point is “Introduction: The Neo-medieval Paradigm”, in Zielonka *Europe as Empire*.

in our analysis at least, a time before the demarcation of sovereign borders and mapping of the political space of the globe.

In so doing, it implicitly accepts the narrative that modernization constructed for itself, in which it came to be uniquely associated with the order and rationalization of social life. The histories of the construction of modernity in many fields, national, imperial, social, scientific, and spatial, have made it clear that we can no longer accept these claims unquestioned. In particular, we must be wary of modernity's claims to have constructed a uniquely fixed order, associated with an ideal of absolute and demarcable spaces. Our histories are shot through with such an ideal, through which the fluid and zoned outer boundaries of premodern polities are transformed into the geometric lines associated with the borders of the modern state. Nevertheless, this remained an ideal, one which we must go beyond merely reproducing in our histories, not only to better understand the past, but also our contemporary moment of territorial transformation.

This study proposes to do so through a particular focus on two practices that are associated with the production of territory, those of mapping, or attempting to create reproducible and mobile representations of an areal extent, and bordering, or setting the limits over a particular extent of territory. The justification offered for utilizing these two practices will be offered in more detail in Part 1 of this study, but the argument centres on the importance of providing an analysis focussed on territorial practices, rather than territorial concepts or ideals, in our histories of territory. The focus on practices is important because the notion of territory, understood as a defined area of space with a specific social meaning, is both ontological *and* epistemological, offering a set of assertions about the world whilst providing a framework within which the world is interpreted. This means it is never a case of merely applying our ideal notions of territory to the real world, as these notions have to be materialized through a variety of territorial practices, such as those associated with maps and borders. What this means in practice is that although it is common to define the bounds of Japan prior to the Meiji era with reference to notions like "sakoku" or "ka-i chitsu-jo",²⁷ these notions are unable to account for the attitudes and territorial practices being deployed in the area towards

²⁷ Closed country and Civilized-barbarian order respectively.

Japan's north prior to the nineteenth century. Such practices were instead underpinned by an understanding of Japan's territory that was "produced, mutable and fluid".²⁸

This thesis will examine the production, mutability and fluidity of notions of territory within one specific historical context, which is the place of Ezo within the Tokugawa era. The fluidity of these notions of territory is visible in the incorporation of Ezo, which by the end of the Tokugawa period was identified with what are now the islands of Hokkaido, Sakhalin and the Kurils, into the 'national body' of Japan over the course of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries.²⁹ This study will examine the practices of mapping and bordering undertaken during this period that created the possibility of constituting an Ezo space, both on the map and in the mind of the state and its officials. It will argue for the importance of the concept of *relational territory* as a means for understanding how this space of Ezo came into existence.³⁰ In doing so, it argues that an understanding of practices like mapping and bordering necessitates an appreciation that they did not function in totalizing manner, but operated within a context that served to both shape and be shaped by such practices. This is because not only are structures put into practice, but practices engage with the production of structure.³¹ The mutual imbrication of the two notions, which is also visible within both the practices and actual material products of mapping and bordering, necessitate a relational understanding of territory.

This study also takes O'Dowd's call for "bringing history back" in seriously, in which he argues that the over-emphasis on the novelty of contemporary transformations leads to a failure to recognize the past in the present and an inability to grasp what is distinctive about the territory of the state today.³² This study will explicitly bring history back into its examination of the significance of maps and borders by focussing on the incorporation of this region into Japan's national body in the period preceding Japan's adoption of the European-derived trappings of sovereign statehood and subsequent participation in the late-nineteenth century game of high imperial competition. This framing is significant because although the

²⁸ Elden "Land, Terrain, Territory", p. 812.

²⁹ Today, of course, of these three geographical designations, only Hokkaido remains under Japanese administration, although Japan continues to dispute Russian authority over the southernmost islands in the Kuril chain, as the 'Northern Territories Issue'.

³⁰ See Part 1 for more details, and on relational territory, Chapter 3 in particular.

³¹ Sewell "A theory of structure: Duality, agency, and transformation".

³² O'Dowd "From a 'borderless world' to a 'world of borders'".

colonization of Hokkaido has come to be incorporated in the wider story of Imperial Japan, which for a long time appeared to emerge *sui generis* in 1895, it remains strongly associated with post-Meiji development.³³ Currently, it remains common to reduce Japan's impulse to empire to a mere "mimetic imperialism", in which the claims and drive to empire resulted solely from Japan's internalization of the discourse and practices associated with the other imperial powers of the time.³⁴ This is despite a great deal of work in recent years that has sought to look across the formerly absolute divide of Tokugawa and Meiji histories.³⁵ However, this fails to explain the prior constitution of Japan's territory as including areas outside of Japan's 'traditional' boundaries.³⁶ It is this process of prior incorporation stretching from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries that will be the particular focus of this study.

OUTLINE

This study is divided into three parts, each consisting of three chapters. Part 1 sets out the theoretical, conceptual and contextual background to the study, before offering a brief outline of the notion of relational territory that will be developed over its course. Chapter 1 reviews and analyses the recent attention paid to the notion of territory, and examines how such notions have come to be reduced to the modern European state. Recent attention to the concept of territory has overemphasized the importance of an abstract notion of space as a precondition for the emergence of both the modern national state, and the bringing of the entire world within one European-derived political order. This is to misunderstand the relation between concepts of territory and their actual practice, which are never able to bring the material world into line with the concepts that legitimate them. This narrow temporal and spatial focus limits the utility of territory as a concept, which should rather be understood as a means of moulding social processes rather than being narrowly associated with a particular means of legitimization. The focus in this study will be on territorial practices themselves, and their ability to structure understandings about the world. These practices make possible the

³³ Oguma 'Nihonjin' no kyōkai.

³⁴ Eskildsen "Of Civilization and Savages: The Mimetic Imperialism of Japan's 1874 Expedition to Taiwan"; Suzuki *Civilization and Empire*.

³⁵ Two notable recent examples are Matsuda *Edo no chishiki kara Meiji no seiji e*, and Mervart "Meiji Japan's China solution to Tokugawa Japan's China problem".

³⁶ The imperial dimensions of which I have discussed in more detail in Boyle "Imperial Practice and the making of modern Japan's territory".

production of ascriptive statements about the world, which are able to be realized through a variety of political practices. It is through such practices that territory is able to be produced.

As the next two chapters will make clear, then actual operation of political practices was not determined by a specific concept of territory to which reference was made. Chapter 2 focuses on the notion of the map, moving away from recent studies that have tended to simplistically equate maps with power. Instead of an excessive concern with the finished object, here the focus is to examine the role of mapping as a process in the constitution of territory. It does this through a comparative examination of the mapping conducted by Tokugawa Japan and other early modern states undertaken in dialogue with recent theoretical contributions to the importance of mapping, in three particular registers. One is the concern of states with the mapping of land as a source of revenue, the second with the political mapping of their land, while the third concerns that of accurately mapping their place in the world. What will be stressed is that the actual practice of mapping was not dependent upon a particular understanding of territory, but rather the institutional context within which mapping by the state occurred. It was this which provide the background for the mapping of Ezo that occurred under the Tokugawa state, and enabled the representation of Ezo as Japan and its recognition as such.

Chapter 3 reconsiders the place of borders in the early modern state, by emphasizing the importance of a border as performance, rather than a material object. Drawing on the interdisciplinary insights of border studies, it argues for the role of borders as authoritative claims to spatial extent, ones which facilitate knowledge while tying together spaces represented on the state's map. It provides a comparative look at borders in Tokugawa Japan with those of other Asian states, examining how it was that administrative borders within these polities worked to define political space. Rather than an absolute division within space, it works as a means to manage and filter the movement of people and objects across the boundary, and thus to make sense of the movement occurring space. As is emphasized, the claims made for these boundaries were not qualitatively different than those at the edge of the state, which were similarly able on occasion to find representation in natural or artificial features that were not *necessarily* indicative of absolute barriers to movement. Rather, the geographical limits of the state were partially constituted by the authorities established to manage them, who served as a membrane filtering the movement of goods and people, a filtering as often dependent upon the priorities of local administration as national. While it was

possible to map these frontier spaces as part of the state, they were effectively constituted through the relation between local administrations and those from beyond the state's border, thus arguing for the importance of scale in considering the constitution of borders. Such scalar notions are crucial to a relational understanding of territory, which will be briefly set out at the end of this chapter.

Part 2 builds upon the theoretical and empirical background provided by the first part in order to dig into the constitution of Ezo as a political space in relation to Japan. In Chapter 4, it does this through first examining how Ezo came to be understood as a space bound off from the rest of Japan. This was partially constituted through a historical understanding of an unknown region populated by a barbarian peoples, which began to acquire definition at the outset of the Tokugawa era. However, the actual operation of a barrier between two areas, known as Matsumae and Ezo, was the outcome of local administrative requirements. These partially stemmed from the wider political structure within which the Matsumae were incorporated, but also reflected the specifics of their frontier situation. This border aided Matsumae claims to both authority and knowledge of its lands. As has long been argued, this border came to function as a strictly demarcated indication of status in the domain. However, while the ascription of status was not really based upon geography, the structure of rule necessitated the assertion of a geographic division. Although the border did not function as an effective means of separating or controlling the movement of population, this was nevertheless how it came to be represented on the map. In doing so, it served the same functional role as the borders that were examined in the previous chapter.

Chapter 5 highlights how the structuring effect of the border's authority also operated at the national scale, representing the Matsumae's administrative boundary as a national border filtering the movement of people and goods across it. Through the expansion of Japanese trade in the region, the space of Ezo came to be reconstituted as a series of places on the coast accessible from Matsumae, granting its geography official representation upon the maps of the state. This was in accordance with a number of other means through which the Matsumae sought to assert their place within the Tokugawa order. This meant that although the Matsumae stood outside the normative framework used for mapping the rest of Tokugawa Japan, as detailed in Chapter 2, its representation of the Ezo came to be assimilated onto the map of the state. However, their land was only made commensurable with that of elsewhere in Japan following the return of Matsumae and Ezo to the family after 1821, when the extent

of their lands had been reauthorized by its return to them from the state. This sanction allowed for the incorporation of this commensurably different space within the map of Japan.

Chapter 6 examines how the invocation of this border was incorporated into understandings about Japan's place in the world. Seen from Edo, and although ruled by the Matsumae, Ezo represented an exotic and distant land, about which little was understood. As such, however, over the course of the eighteenth century, the lands of the Ezo would come to be familiarized as demarcating the edges of Japan, providing the uncivilized other against which Japan was able to map itself. This was able to be achieved through emphasizing not only the Ezo's distance from Japan, but links with them, through a reinterpretation of China's tributary system to explain trade being conducted at Japan's frontiers. While this allowed for the incorporation of Ezo land on the map, however, it maintained a civilizational distance from the rest of Japan. This would only be overcome through the introduction of agriculture in Ezo, which was a project that only came to fruition after the Meiji Restoration. The understanding of Ezo that came to circulate within Japan came to be reflected back in Ezo itself, and ultimately how it was that the space of Ezo came to be delineated and incorporated into Japan in the nineteenth century as Hokkaido. The Part as a whole indicates how this Ezo territory was created in relation to that of the rest of Japan, which served to create the coordinates within which the Japanese idea of Ezo was understood.

While Part 2 relates the constitution of Ezo territory primarily with Japan, Part 3 seeks to account for how Ezo came to acquire territorial definition on the world's map. Chapter 7 traces out how the region of Ezo came to be represented and demarcated on European maps and within geographical texts of the period, and how these materials were subsequently reincorporated within Japan's own map of Ezo space. European accounts of the sixteenth and seventeenth century relied on a limited body of information about the region. Nevertheless, while Japanese were able to abstract Ezo space in order to position it solely in relation to its own national body, in Europe the extent location of Ezo was an issue bound up with other places, relations between which had to be adjusted and represented on the map. European speculation about Ezo's place in the world would find its way back to Japan, where it would come to unsettle the formerly fixed place of Ezo on the map. This destabilization occurred in the context of fears of the threat from Russia, whose presence came to be known around the same time. As a result, Ezo came to be reinterpreted within a wider geopolitical context within Japan, a context that unsettled the actual shape of the land represented upon the map.

Chapter 8 looks at the way this reincorporation encouraged a new attention to Ezo's extent, one which resulted in the representation of this space of Ezo, and a reinterpretation of the meaning ascribed to the borders in the region. This was done through a close attention to the geography of the region itself, which came to be the object of repeated investigation by both Japanese and foreign parties. Both groups were engaged in the same process of trying to make the space of Ezo commensurable with that of elsewhere on the world map, through an extensive process of geographical and cartographic exchange that served to bring the world to Ezo itself. This served to appear to make the segmented frontier strategy of the Tokugawa redundant and emphasize the connections between Nagasaki and Ezo, which came to be shown in the movement of people between them. The increasing concern of the both the administration and wider intellectual circles with what was happening beyond Japan's borders is shown by the career of Kondō Jūzō, who joins together the central shogunal administration with the oversight of Nagasaki and new necessity of direct administering the frontiers of Ezo. In the work he wrote on the occasion of a Russian trade mission's appearance at Nagasaki, Kondo examined the existant literature on Ezo in order to seek to answer the question of where to position Ezo in the world.

Chapter 9 follows the process by which this re-produced Ezo space came to be reinserted back into the world map. This occurred through the state's ability to bring together both global and local information and make it commensurable upon the same representation. Takahashi Kageyasu's mapping project hinged upon his interpretation of Northern Ezo, about which he published a text justifying his choice of representation. Through bringing together the latest western and Qing maps with empirical investigation on the ground and a new understanding of events in China a century earlier, Takahashi was able to provide a new, more accurate representation of the island that had been known in Japan as Karafuto, and thus came to fix Ezo's extent upon a map of the world. Through his exchange with, above all, Siebold, it was this vision of Japan's extent that would shape the world's understandings of Ezo as it incorporated Japan a half-century later, and thus authorize Japan in its subsequent determination to decisively incorporate as much of this land as possible within its own empire in the latter half of the nineteenth century. That incorporation continued to rely, however, upon an understanding of Ezo as having been part of Japan, a land whose extent was only finally determined in the course of this investigation.

While it remains common within Japan to understand the work of Takahashi and Ino Tadataka as indicating a modern concern with the location of Japan in a global, abstract space, in fact their surveys served to provide Japan with a series of institutional claims to territory. However, this was only possible through bringing together a whole series of practices of bordering and mapping that together served to newly reconstitute this Ezo space to Japan's north. This emphasizes the importance of maps and borders as territorial processes open to re-enactment in the constitution of territory at a variety of scales, stretching from the local to the global, and that the constitution of relational territory is not restricted in time, but the product of a territory's inevitable creation in its wider context.

In conclusion, this thesis confirms the value of bringing history back into the study of territory, specifically through asserting the value of a relational approach to understanding the concept. Much of the current literature on the topic asserts the importance of the emergence of 'abstract space', associated with a scaled vision able to incorporate the entire globe, as crucial for this process of transforming the world into a space of territorialized states. Here, the emphasis is on the notion of 'relational' rather than absolute territory, arguing for the territory to be understood as emerging in relation to other places, rather than constituted as a property of space itself. As such, offers a crucial contribution to understanding the notion of territory in the present, and provides context for the contemporary focus on the manner in which notions of territory are transforming.

PART 1 – Introducing Territory

In his recent examination on the Law of Nations in East Asia, Yanagihara Masaharu quotes from the Confucian scholar Itō Tōgai in order to demonstrate Early Modern Japanese attitudes to territory.¹ In the *Story of Late Learning* of 1729, Tōgai discusses the southern island of ‘Yaku- koku’,² and notes that it “used to be a separate country and to be ‘kegai no chi’, just like Ezo, and not yet been considered as being included in the ‘hanto’ of Japan”.³ In making this argument, Tōgai was drawing upon a long political tradition originating on the continent, which associated the assertion of control with representation on the map.⁴ This ritualistic equation of the mapping of territory as equating to power remained visible in the idea of *Ru Bantu* 入版図 (entry onto map and register), a notion common to both Chinese and Japanese political thought.⁵ Tōgai wrote within this Confucian tradition that emphasized “bringing land onto the map” as a marker of political control, and by the time he wrote, the island of ‘Yaku- koku’ was clearly considered as part of Japan.

By the time Tōgai put brush to paper, however, Ezo had been represented upon the official map of the Tokugawa for over half-a-century.⁶ Although appearing upon Japan’s maps, Ezo

¹ Yanagihara “Significance of the History of the Law of Nations in Europe and East Asia”; also Yanagihara “Bakumatsuki Meiji shoki no ryōiki gainen ni kan suru ichikōsatsu”.

² Today the UNESCO Natural World Heritage site of Yakushima, and part of Kagoshima prefecture.

³ Ito *Heishokutan*, p. 209.

⁴ Yee “Chinese Maps in political culture”, pp. 77, 82; see also Kawamura *Edo bakufu-sen kuniezu no kenkyu*, pp. 15-19.

⁵ Which was still being drawn upon during a much later period of Japanese expansion, as the term was applied to both Taiwan and Korea during their incorporation into the Greater Japanese Empire in the post-Meiji period.

⁶ That is, upon the maps of the entirety of Japan produced on the basis of the Shōhō provincial surveys, see Chapter 5, for details.

was nevertheless considered as ‘*kegai no chi*’. As Yanagihara’s article notes, it is therefore too simplistic to simply equate representation on the map with conceptions of territorial control, and “reference to maps can thus only offer a limited role when defining a territory”.⁷ Indeed, historians are generally satisfied that there did not exist a notion of territory analogous to that present within modern international law until the nineteenth century, when Japan came to be “socialized” into the international system.⁸ This occurred both through Japan’s adherence to a European-derived “standard of civilization”,⁹ and through a series of negotiations regarding the territorial extent of Japan.¹⁰ In the absence of this civilized standard and the agreements it mandated, it is largely accepted that Japan should be seen as a space surrounded by “border people”, who serve to ‘straddle’ the divide between it and other political formations.¹¹

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to understand the notion of Japan’s territory as emerging *sui generis*. As accounts of its socialization suggest, Japan was forced to assert itself in order to be granted recognition as a sovereign state, including with regards to its sovereignty. This study will argue that we need to understand how it was that Japan came to represent itself, and to be accepted as, a territorial state, in the absence of its conformity with European treaty norms and ‘standards’. Indeed, possession of territory served as a precondition for its ability to function internationally; for Japan to function as an actor in the international arena also necessitated authority over territory. It is therefore a mistake to conclude that the notion of territory is of no relevance in examining the politics of states operating outside of conditions associated with modern international relations and international law, as it was notions of territory that came to be constituted in tandem with the identity of those political bodies exercising authority over it.

In this Part, the aim is to argue for the importance of understanding how it was that territory functioned prior to its association with the modern sovereign state, where it serves as one

⁷ Yanagihara “Significance of the History of the Law of Nations in Europe and East Asia”, p. 362. This is clearly of relevance to contemporary territorial disputes, which frequently invoke old maps and read back modern notions of territorial sovereignty into them.

⁸ Suganami “Japan’s Entry into International Society,”; Kayaoglu *Legal Imperialism*; Suzuki *Civilization and Empire*.

⁹ Gong *The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society*.

¹⁰ Marked by a series of agreements and declarations such as the Treaty of St. Petersburg with Russia. Japan’s declaration of sovereignty over the Ogasawaras, and the annexation of the Ryukyu kingdom, Kawashima “Higashi Ajia sekai no kindai”; Fumoto, “Kakutei sareru kokkyō”.

¹¹ Shōsuke *Kyōkai wo matagu hitobito*.

component in the “battery of discourses”¹² that maintain the standard of civilization into the present.¹³ It proposes to do so by focusing its attention on territory not as a concept or idea, but as a series of practices, through which sense was made of the world. This is justified because it was through these same practices, both historically and in the present, that Japan came to legitimate its claims to territory after the Meiji period, and through which it continues to assert its authority today. The practices examined are those of mapping and bordering, which work to offer a series of claims about the world, through which politics is made to make sense. It is emphasized that these practices function in an ascriptive manner, irrespective of the notion of territory that underpins their legitimization. Rather, such practices serve to stitch the world together, and so doing, must be seen as operating in relation to one another. It is for this reason that the notion of relational territory is vital, not merely for this study, but for understanding how territory operates within the political sphere more generally.

¹² Duara *Rescuing History from the Nation*, p. 70.

¹³ Bowden *The Empire of Civilization; Elden Terror and Territory*.

1. TERRITORY: NECESSITY, THEORY, METHOD

“Just as crucial, territoriality appears to be evaporating in many ways before our eyes, a process partly and rather ahistorically captured by the notion of globalization. The contemporary dissolution of a structural order allows researchers to glimpse trends, formerly so ubiquitous they had not been perceived as issues for historical investigation. G. W. Hegel’s famous owl of Minerva takes wing at dusk. Territoriality has been so pervasive a principle for organizing societies that only as it has begun to dissolve have social scientists and historians come to fathom its role...”¹

The increasing tension visible between Japan and its East Asian neighbours has formed part of a larger nationalist resurgence in the region and around the globe, and has helped prove one previous notable invocation of Hegel’s ornithological signifier appearing optimistic at best in poking its beak out of the aviary.² Given the role of territorial disputes in fanning this tension, the notion of territoriality as disappearing or dissolving now also appears to have been a rash claim indeed. In fact, territory³ has come to be highlighted as a crucial component within many of the key issues facing us today, not only as territory disputed between states but within “secessionist conflicts; conflicts over stolen land; unoccupied islands, and frozen lands in the Arctic or territory under the sea; control over resources; control over boundaries; and the right to use force in defence of territory, to name a few”.⁴

Consequently, Maier was both correct and prescient in noting increased attention being paid to the role of territory across the social sciences. In a similar manner to the example of nationalism adduced earlier, this rediscovery of the “centrality of territory to the understanding of politics” and the recovery of what had “often been neglected as a factor in

¹ Maier “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History”, p. 809.

² “The owl of Minerva which brings wisdom, said Hegel, flies out at dusk. It is a good sign that it is now circling around nations and nationalism”, Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*, p. 192. The subsequent decades have rendered Hobsbawm’s prognosis optimistic at best.

³ We will engage with the relation between territory and territoriality below.

⁴ Moore *A political theory of territory*, p. 2; or see Stuart Elden’s even more extensive list in Elden, *The Birth of Territory*.

the social sciences”⁵ was indicative of a recognition that contemporary circumstances meant that territory could no longer be taken for granted as the state’s “rump material reality”.⁶ As the introduction to this study noted, today territory appears to be transforming in new and interesting ways; it is in response to this transformation that greater attention has come to be paid to the notion of territory. This is not before time. In 1973, Jean Gottmann noted in the preface to his *The Significance of Territory* that “amazingly little has been published on the concept of territory”⁷, while twenty years later, John Ruggie was able to exclaim that “It is truly astonishing that the concept of territoriality has been so little studied by students of international politics; its neglect is akin to never looking at the ground that one is walking on”.⁸

Despite the increased interest in the importance of territory, though, a further two decades down the line, there remains the sense that the ground being provided by territory in the study of politics and society is still somewhat unstable. Indeed, Stuart Elden, whose work will be central to this chapter, continues to claim that “Political theory lacks a sense of territory; territory lacks a political theory”.⁹ This chapter will therefore set out the prerequisites for a political theory of territory in some detail, before moving on in the following two chapters to the question of how such a theory is to be applied to the early modern history of Japan’s north. It is the intention here that the theory of territory constructed for the purposes of this analysis will not only be relevant to the study pursued here, but have wider applicability in examining contemporary as well as historic territorial issues. The question of the wider applicability of this theory of territory will be returned to in this study’s conclusion.

The need for a theory of territory

While is clear that territory is an important and emotionally-charged concept within politics, the question of what exactly its place is remains an open one much taken up in recent years. Elden’s contention that political theory lacks a sense of territory is one that, superficially, appears overstated. Recent years have seen a clear increase in the overt attention paid to the place of territory within theories of justice. In many instances this appears to be an attempt to

⁵ Keating *The New Regionalism in Western Europe*, p. 1.

⁶ Wendt *Social Theory of International Politics*, p. 96.

⁷ Gottmann *The Significance of Territory*, p. ix.

⁸ Ruggie “Territoriality and Beyond”, p. 174.

⁹ Elden “Land, Terrain, Territory”, p. 799.

reground the authority of the state and its sovereignty. For example, David Miller has recently argued from a jurisdictional perspective that the components of such a theory would include the relationship between three distinct elements: 1) a piece of land; 2) a group of people residing there; and 3) a set of political institutions governing people within that domain.¹⁰ Similarly, Margaret Moore has pointed to the three elements of territorial rights essential to a theory of territory as being: 1) the right of jurisdictional authority (to make and enforce laws); 2) the rights of taxation, regulation, and of controlling natural resources; and 3) the right to control or prohibit movement across borders.¹¹ While such works have been important in redirecting our attention to the notion of territory, though, there is nothing inherently distinctive about the way in which they relate to 'territory'. In both the examples above, exactly the same three elements could just as easily be referring to notions of sovereignty or the state.¹²

Such studies usefully point to a problem in utilizing territory as a political concept, which is the difficulty of separating the notion of territory from the state which it grounds. Modern political theory generally accepts the notion that the sovereignty of the state naturally involves control over a territory.¹³ This is because a conceptual overlap between the two notions is embedded within modern theories of the state, in which territory¹⁴ quietly serves as the foundations for sovereign authority.¹⁵ As long ago as 1890 it was noted that "in modern political thought, the connection between a political society and its territory is so close that the two notions almost blend".¹⁶ Definitions of the state within the social sciences frequently draw upon Weber, in

¹⁰ Miller "Territorial rights".

¹¹ Moore *A political theory of territory*, p. 8.

¹² Such works are representative of a recent 'territorial-turn' in political theory, a field that appears to have begun to define itself in terms of Lockean, Kantian and national views on territorial rights. These works assume the territorial nature of the modern state and then proceed to try to justify the right of states to possess territory within one of these coalescing traditions. They are not interested in theorizing territory as such, or even necessarily in the actual territorial nature of the modern state, being focused on justifying the right of the state to territory. See also Stilz "Nations, states, and territory", Ypi "A permissive theory of territorial rights" and Nine *Global justice and territory*, and Elden's criticisms of Klers in Elden "Land, Terrain, Territory", p. 812, n.1.

¹³ See Larkins *From Hierarchy to Anarchy* and Paasi "Territory", particularly p. 117.

¹⁴ Etymologically, territory stems from the Latin *territorium*, which it seems certain is derived from *terra* (land, earth) and *torium* (belong to, surround) and meant the land surrounding a town or city and under its jurisdiction, see Elden *Terror and Territory*; Gottmann *The Significance of Territory*. The word is common from the late-Middle Ages and has earlier antecedents, including Cicero. An alternative derivation from *terrere* (to terrorize or frighten) has been suggested, including by Grotius in *The Law of War and Peace*, and this latter association has served to emphasize the connection between political violence and the notion of territory, see Hindess "Bringing States Back In"; Neocleous "Off the Map".

¹⁵ As its "rump material reality" Wendt *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.96; or "natural physical base" Paul Alliès *L'invention du territoire*, quoted in Elden "Land, Terrain, Territory".

¹⁶ Sidgwick *Elements of Politics*, p. 201.

which the state is a “system of order that claims binding authority, not only over the members of the state, the citizens...but also to a very large extent over all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory organization with a territorial basis”.¹⁷ Within international law, too, territorial rights are considered part of the definition of what a state is, understood as entities “with fixed territories (and permanent populations) under government control and with the capacity to enter into relations with other states”.¹⁸ In International Relations, meanwhile, it is widely understood that “no state, no territory”.¹⁹ References to the sovereign state system presuppose the territorial state as the foundation of political authority, in which notions of sovereignty are assumed to imply a territorial base.²⁰ Indeed, this overlap is why these terms are frequently used to define one another.²¹ Borders and boundaries are typically defined as “lines that enclose state territories”, for example, while the notion of the state’s sovereignty is itself “typically related to a bounded territory”.²² As a result, it is very difficult to define territory independently of the concepts to which it relates.

The tightness of the linkages between these concepts reflects the fact that “across the whole of our modern world, territory [has been] directly linked to sovereignty to mould politics into a fundamentally state-centric social process...”²³ As a result, understandings of territory as fixed has been crucial to the definition of other abstractions of social life within the social sciences, with society being deployed as if the boundaries of social relations are spatially congruent with

¹⁷ Weber *On Charisma and Institution Building*, p. 56. See for example Michael Mann: “the state is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate to and from a centre, to cover a territorially demarcated area over which it exercises some degree of authoritative, binding rule-making, backed up by some organized political force”. Mann *A History of Power from the Beginning to A. D. 1760*, p. 55. As Poggi notes, quoting an Italian jurist, “the state does not have territory, it is territory”, Poggi *The State*, p. 22.

¹⁸ 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, which noted that “The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) the capacity to enter into relations with other states”. On this see Simmons “On the Territorial Rights of States”, p. 321; and Elden *Terror and Territory*, p. 139.

¹⁹ Wendt *On Charisma and Institution Building*, p. 221; on taking bounded space for granted in IR, see in particular Ashley “Untying the sovereign state”; Walker *Inside/Outside*.

²⁰ For example, Stephen Krasner notes, “The sovereign state model is a system of political authority based on territory, mutual recognition, autonomy, and control. Territoriality means that political authority is exercised over a defined geographic space rather than, for instance, over people, as would be the case in a tribal form of political order. Autonomy means that no external actor enjoys authority within the borders of the state. Mutual recognition means that juridically independent territorial entities recognize each other as being competent to enter into contractual arrangements, typically treaties. Control means that there is an expectation not only that sovereign states have the authority to act but also that they can effectively regulate movements across their borders and within them.” Krasner “Rethinking the sovereign state model”.

²¹ dell’Agnese “The Political Challenge of Relational Territory”.

²² Newman “On Borders and Power”, p. 123; see also Paasi ““Bounded spaces in a ‘borderless world’”.

²³ Taylor “The State as Container”, p. 151.

those of the territorial nation-state.²⁴ The “conceptual building blocks of the modern social sciences” – notions like state, society, economy, culture, and community – “presuppose a territorialization of social relations within a fixed, and essentially timeless geographical space”.²⁵ It is for this reason that territory holds “an epistemological centrality, in that it is understood as absolutely fundamental to modernity”.²⁶ The criticism offered for the “neglect” of territory as a concept, therefore, is not referencing a lack of appreciation for its importance, but instead arguing that its very centrality ultimately resulted in its meaning being simply assumed. The next section will focus on this question of how we should understand the notion of territory and relate to it within our political discourse, before moving on to provide theoretical justification for the methodology adopted in the current study.

Territorializing territory

Territory as a concept is typically taken to be “self-evident”²⁷ in a number of ways. The first of these is that territory merely equates to the material world. The second is that territory is a natural or universal phenomenon. The third has already been touched on, and is the converse of the second, that territory should be understood as simply and solely associated with the sovereign state.²⁸ This next section will seek to engage with each of these assumptions in turn.

The first way in which the meaning of territory is assumed is when it is reduced to meaning simply geography or geomorphology, or narrowly equated with the material world. In such an equation, political contestation for territory is universalized as a form of natural competition, in a manner that equates to certain forms (caricatures) of realist-inflected International Relations. Nevertheless, this is not a particularly convincing or useful means of attempting to understand territory, as it would seem to logically entail contestation over the entirety of

²⁴ Giddens *Power, Property and the State*; and Mann *A History of Power from the Beginning to A. D. 1760*. Anthropology assumes a territorialized culture as belonging to a localized, spatially fixed community (Gupta & Ferguson “Beyond ‘Culture’”; Wolf *Europe and the People without History*). Macro-economic theories conceive of production, exchange, and consumption as being spatially coextensive with the state’s territorial boundaries (Goswami *Producing India*; Taylor “Beyond Containers”). Even for concepts that would seem to go ‘beyond’ the boundaries of the state, for example when examining civilizations, the state retains its primacy as an actor in international politics serving as a precondition for discussion about the world (Jackson “Civilizations as Actors”).

²⁵ Brenner “Beyond State-centrism?”, p. 48.

²⁶ Agnew “The territorial trap”.

²⁷ Elden “Land, Terrain, Territory”, p. 800.

²⁸ Adapted from Kadencan “Triangulating territory”, p. 129.

space. This is, of course, not what we observe when we examine the situation in the real world, either historically or in the present, where territorial disputes predominantly occur over quite restricted and narrow expanses of terrain. An understanding of territory as referring to any or all of terrestrial space, then, does not appear to provide a useful means of thinking about territory.

This is because geography, the actual material world, would appear to form only one of the components required in order for the emergence of territory. While the space of the earth provides the raw material from which territory is constructed, it does not by itself serve as territory. For this to occur, Jan Penrose has noted, requires two additional steps, through which parts of the world “becomes a place when it acquires a ‘perceptual unity’ [and] becomes a territory when it is delimited in some way”.²⁹ The actual physical or geographical features of the space of the world provide only the first step in this emergence of territory, providing the ‘rump material reality’ towards which territory, as a political concept, is applicable. The contents of a given geographical space – its terrestrial features, natural resources, and so forth – are granted coherence as territory through both the demarcation of that space and assigning it a political or social significance (and thus granting it perceptual unity). It is the interrelation between these three dimensions of territory that serves to constitute it as a concept.

This aspect of the notion of territory, its non-equivalence with the simple material space of the world, is well-recognized within the literature. In what was one of the first sustained examinations of territory, Jean Gottman was particularly clear on this point, moved to emphasize that “The concept of territory, though geographical, because it involves accessibility and therefore location, must not be classified with physical, inanimate phenomena”.³⁰ To put this even more strongly, we should always emphasize that territories never just are, they must always be made, produced, or constructed in some fashion. A territory is not a pre-given entity, and its creation is the result of a “powerful geographic strategy to control people and things by controlling area”³¹. Although territory is often “used interchangeably with land or space...it connotes something more precise. Territory is land or space that has had something done to it—it has been acted upon. Territory is land that has been identified and claimed by a

²⁹ Penrose “Nations, states and homelands”, p. 279.

³⁰ Gottmann *The Significance of Territory*, p. 5.

³¹ Sack *Human Territoriality*, p. 5.

person or people".³² However, accepting that territories do not merely exist out there, awaiting discovery, does not by itself resolve the question of the naturalness, or universality, or of territory as a political phenomenon. Rather, it shifts attention to whether these two additional stages of perceptual unity and delimitation should be understood as naturally-occurring processes, or ones that should be understood as social.

The key term to understand this debate is through the related notion of territoriality. Territoriality refers to the understanding that territory does not merely exist, but has to be produced or constructed in some manner. Territoriality makes reference to the processes through which a territory is brought into being, through the ascription of meaning and demarcation to the material world. It is widely accepted that "territories are the product of human agency and this agency is usually referred to as 'territoriality'".³³ However, the central question here has been whether the drive behind this process should be seen as biological or social.³⁴ One common understanding of territory is in its ecological sense, referring to any area defended by an organism for such purposes as mating, nesting, roosting, or feeding.³⁵ The implication is that the creation of territory is a natural urge common across the animal kingdom, rather than being a process associated with humans in particular times and places. It is on the basis of such biological imperatives that Edward Soja defined territoriality as "a behavioral phenomenon associated with the organization of space into spheres of influence or clearly demarcated territories which are made and considered at least partially exclusive by their occupants or definers".³⁶ His invocation of 'behavioral' here lays stress on territoriality as being a natural phenomenon, something inherent to humans.

On the other hand, the key theoretician of territoriality as a social (that is, human) phenomenon is Robert Sack, who sought to develop the notion as signifying a relationship of dominance and control with respect to a geographic area by either an individual or group.³⁷ His aim was to formulate a definition for a particular strategy of access and control that could

³² Cowen & Gilbert *War, Citizenship, Territory*, p. 16.

³³ Penrose "Nations, states and homelands", p. 279.

³⁴ See Shah "The territorial trap of the territorial trap", p. 3; Elden "Land, Terrain, Territory", p. 801-2.

³⁵ Contrary to what is argued by Joe Painter in "Rethinking territory", territory does not appear to be synonymous with the concept of 'home range'. According to Britannica, "Possession of a territory involves aggressive behavior and thus contrasts with the home range, which is the area in which the animal normally lives."

³⁶ (Soja *The Political Organization of Space*, p. 19.

³⁷ Sack "Human territoriality: a theory", p. 55.

be contrasted with non-territorial means,³⁸ the changing nature of which would then “help us to understand the historical relationships between society, space, and time”.³⁹ What these two perspectives, social and biological interpretations of territoriality, share is an understanding of territoriality as being an active process (Sack: “strategy”; Soja: “behavior”) aimed at establishing a territory for some purpose. Again, this is an understanding that is acceded to by the majority of those who have written on territory, which indeed is generally understood as “a concept generated by people organizing space for their own aims”.⁴⁰ As such, then, both of these understandings would acknowledge the fact that “territory refers to a portion of geographic space which is claimed or occupied by a person or group of persons or by an institution...an area of ‘bounded space’”⁴¹, and that therefore “territoriality is a form of behavior that uses a bounded space, a territory, as the instrument for securing a particular outcome”.⁴²

This aspect is also crucial for the production of territory, which otherwise is just a demarcated space. Sack emphasizes that circumscribing or delimiting things in space is not by itself sufficient to create a territory, with that demarcated space becoming a territory only when its boundary is utilized in order to “mould, influence or control activities”. For Sack, it is the power to enforce control over a territory that differentiates territory from place. It is this “control of access” that allows a territory to come to be characterized by the “perceptual unity” that Penrose noted above. As the invocation of ‘control’ would suggest, “territories require constant effort to establish and maintain”⁴³, which is why the emergence of territories “are always manifestations of power relations. The link between territory and power suggests that is important to distinguish between a place as territory and other types of places”.⁴⁴ Places in general are parts of the material world that have been granted some sort of meaning. It is through “controlling access to a territory through boundary restrictions, the content of a

³⁸ As also did Jean Gottmann, see Gottmann *The Significance of Territory*, pp. 8-12.

³⁹ Sack *Human Territoriality*, p. 5.

⁴⁰ Gottmann *The Significance of Territory*, p. 29.

⁴¹ Storey *Territory*, p. 1.

⁴² Taylor, *State as Container*, p. 151.

⁴³ Sack *Human Territoriality*, p. 19.

⁴⁴ Paasi “Territory”, p. 111.

territory can be manipulated and its character designed".⁴⁵ Territory is "a bounded social space that inscribes a certain sort of meaning onto defined segments of the material world".⁴⁶

It is therefore the bringing together of all three of these dimensions that defines the construction of territory through territoriality. It is the interrelation between these three that defines territory as a political concept, even as it is possible to accept a more general biological imperative as underpinning this desire to 'territorialize' territory. This is implicitly acknowledged even by those who advocate strongly for territoriality as a behavioural phenomenon. As Johnson and Toft put it, "territoriality might be loosely considered not as 'hard-wired' but as 'soft-wired' – a component of human nature but one that is responsive to prevailing conditions".⁴⁷ This means that even though the tendency towards territorial behaviour is understood as "deeply ingrained and part of humanity's collective genetic inheritance", politics comes to serve as the crucial "intervening variable" that grants value to conceptualizing territory and seeking to study it.⁴⁸ When we examine the politics of territory, therefore, we are seeking to account for this process of delimiting and ascribing conceptual unity onto a portion of the material world.

This focus on territoriality has provided us with the means of overcoming the "self-evident" nature of territory on two registers. Territory can never be reduced to merely the 'ground upon which we walk', because the material world is only constituted as territory through being bounded and granted some form of coherence *as territory*. That is, it must be territorialized. This raises the question of whether this urge to territorialize control stems from biological necessity or social forces, and thus whether territory should be viewed as merely a natural or universal drive for humans. The invocation of territoriality above has clarified that in speaking about territory as a political notion, we must focus attention upon those practices of conceptualization and delimitation that serve to create territory out of the world. These practices are not in themselves natural or universal, and so although the drive to territory may be a natural, in its specific manifestations it is the production of territory through "a conscious act".⁴⁹ Although he had argued for territoriality as a "behavioural phenomenon", Edward Soja

⁴⁵ Taylor "The State as Container", p. 151.

⁴⁶ Delaney *Territory: a Short Introduction*, p. 14.

⁴⁷ Johnson & Toft "Grounds for War", p. 11.

⁴⁸ Vasquez *The War Puzzle*, pp. 139, 145, quoted in Johnson & Toft "Grounds for War", p. 8.

⁴⁹ Sack *Human Territoriality*, p. 31.

also accepted that, “societal territoriality is therefore a cultural phenomenon which varies in its structure and functions from society to society and from one time period to another [and is] a primary basis for the *political organization of space*”.⁵⁰

In overcoming the second of these “self-evident” conceptions of territory, therefore, we run headlong into the third: the association of territory with the sovereign space of the state. As already noted, this relation is central to the problem of utilizing territory as a concept today, given the ever-present tendency to reduce notions of territory to the area administered by sovereign states. In this register, territory is put forward as differentiating modern society from what had gone before it, as it is only under the modern state that the object of rule becomes “a territorial definition of society”.⁵¹ This also serves to conceptually sever the active process of territoriality from that which is produced, territory, by arguing for a state system based on territory as being one only able to emerge through the application of the theory of sovereignty. While “territoriality, like property, is not a simple concept, but comprises a variety of social arrangements that have to be examined in greater detail”⁵², meaning, as Soja noted, that such arrangements are both temporally and spatially distinct, the “modern system of territorialized rule” over “fixed and mutually exclusive enclaves of legitimate domination” is often adjudged as “unique in human history”.⁵³ That is, although territoriality would appear to provide a flexible means for constituting territory, the monopolization of our understanding of political space in the globe by the territory of the state means that in practice, territory is now associated with the “legitimate dominion over a spatial extension”⁵⁴ of the sovereign state. This assumption still threatens to restrict our understanding of territory to those times and places where the property of sovereignty has come to be associated with the state. The next section will reflect on how we escape this territorial trap and move towards providing a methodology through which the concept of territory is able to applied without reducing it to the notion of the sovereign state.

⁵⁰ Soja *The Political Organization of Space*, p. 33.

⁵¹ Rather than “a social definition of territory”, Soja *The Political Organization of Space*, p. 13

⁵² Kratochwil “Of systems, boundaries, and territoriality”, pp. 27-8.

⁵³ Ruggie offers two other ways in which “prior” systems of political rule operated: kinship but not territorially-fixed, territorially-fixed but non-exclusive, before culminating in the modern territorial ideal, Ruggie “Territoriality and Beyond”, pp. 149-151.

⁵⁴ Giddens *Power, Property and the State*, p. 45; Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond”, p. 148.

Trapped by territory

The notion of the “territorial trap” was put forward by John Agnew in an article which specifically criticised three geographical assumptions widespread within International Relations theory. These were, firstly, that assuming territory as a set or fixed unit of sovereign space works to “dehistoricize and decontextualize processes of state formation and disintegration”. Secondly, this understanding of territory creates an absolute divide between domestic and international politics, ignoring how the two dimensions interact with one another.⁵⁵ Thirdly, assuming the “territorial state as existing prior to and as a container of society” ignores the complexity of the interaction between society, territory and politics.⁵⁶ Any effort to develop a theory of territory needs to grant due attention to Agnew’s call to “expand our horizons and understand the multi-faceted dimensions of territory – treating it not just as a tangible, fixed object, but equally as a symbolic (identity) and flexible construct of social and political power”.⁵⁷

The need to go beyond the “fixity” associated with territory has been a key justification for this study into the constitution of territory. In order to justify the method adopted, it shall first engage with the work of one of the most important thinkers of territory in recent years, and through a critique of his work, justify this study’s methodological choices. It will then provide the conceptual underpinnings for this methodology in the next section. The theorist in question is Stuart Elden, who for well over a decade has sought to emphasize how territory is not “merely an object”.⁵⁸ Elden offers four essential elements, or registers, necessary for understanding the emergence of territory. Two of these, political-economic and political-strategic, he equates with notions of land and terrain, with the former held as “implying ownership, exchange and use value, distribution, partition, division”, while the latter refers to “power relations in a narrow sense of contestation and struggle”. As he points out, neither of these is by itself sufficient to understand the more encompassing notion of territory, which also requires attention to what Elden terms the political-legal and the political-technical. The first of these “raises the spatial element of notions of jurisdiction, authority, sovereignty, supremacy, superiority, administration and so on”, while the second deals with “questions

⁵⁵ Kratochwil “Of systems, boundaries, and territoriality”, p. 27.

⁵⁶ Agnew, “The territorial trap”, p. 59.

⁵⁷ Newman “Territory, compartments and borders”, p. 773.

⁵⁸ Elden *The Birth of Territory*, p. 17.

such as the relation between developments in mathematics, particularly geometry, in making possible the large-scale cartographic and land-surveying projects that contributed to the modern sense of territory".⁵⁹ The incorporation of all of these elements enables territory to be understood as a "political technology",⁶⁰ one that is "produced, mutable and fluid".⁶¹

Nevertheless, the potential insights available through this notion of territory as a "political territory" are left undisturbed, because although so much of what Elden writes appears to offer particularly rich resources for a theory of territory able to go beyond the simple invocation of homogenous authority and demarcated boundaries, what results is a genealogy of an ideal-type of state territory. Territory understood as "the space within which sovereignty is exercised ... the spatial extent of sovereignty"⁶² leaves it entirely mediated by the state, indeed, "the State and territory interact in such a way that they can be said to be mutually constitutive".⁶³ This results in a definition of territory "as a bounded space under the control of a group of people, with fixed boundaries, exclusive internal sovereignty, and equal external sovereignty".⁶⁴ While it is clear that his project is primarily epistemological, following how the idea of the sovereign state as territory has come into existence, rather than taking it as an "ahistorical category"⁶⁵, this has obvious ontological consequences. In Elden's interpretation, it is territoriality which is ahistorical, whereas territory is a concept with a history. Yet "[s]trategies and processes towards territory – of which territoriality is but a fraction – conceptually presuppose the object they practically produce".⁶⁶ This captures the incoherence at the heart of his project, as he is effectively stating that territoriality both does (as a strategy and process towards territory) and does not (being ahistorical) always conceptually presuppose territory.

While Elden offers an impressive elucidation of the elements involved in understanding the notion of territory, the claim that territory is "a word, a concept and a practice, where the

⁵⁹ Summary of the project appearing in Elden "Secure the Volume".

⁶⁰ Elden *The Birth of Territory*, p. 322.

⁶¹ Elden "Land, Terrain, Territory", p. 812.

⁶² Elden *The Birth of Territory*, p. 329.

⁶³ Lefebvre *De l'E'tat*, Vol. 4, p. 278, quoted in Brenner & Elden "Henri Lefebvre on State, Space and Territory", p. 362.

⁶⁴ This definition is actually more appropriate for the state; states possess 'sovereign territory', to be sure, but sovereignty is the property of the state rather than the territory itself, Elden *The Birth of Territory*, p. 18.

⁶⁵ Elden "How should we do the history of territory?", p. 11.

⁶⁶ Elden "Land, Terrain, Territory", p. 803.

relation between these can only be grasped genealogically" is a problematic one.⁶⁷ Elden argues that territory forms "a distinctive mode of social/spatial organization, one that is historically and geographically limited and dependent, rather than a biological drive or social need".⁶⁸ This mode of organization is presented as having come into being when the word, concept and practice of territory overlap to define the modern sense of territory as "the spatial extent of sovereignty". However, the relationship between them remains distinctly unbalanced, dominated by the interweaving of word and concept, the genealogical and conceptual histories of the term, and as a result the "connection between the linguistic and material/performative dimensions of territory is tenuous at best".⁶⁹ While particular practices (particularly those of surveying and calculation) are understood as essential for the development of the modern *definition* of territory, ironically their actual *practice* (that is, the actual definition and demarcation of territory by means of surveying and calculating) is entirely irrelevant to territory's emergence.⁷⁰

Therefore, although Elden aspires to understand territory as a "political technology" comprising "techniques for measuring land and controlling terrain",⁷¹ what he has produced is the history of the idea of state territory, one punctiliously grounded in texts and contexts but the actual political role of which remains opaque. While Elden defines modern territory with reference to a homogenized territorial image apparently visible in the works of Hobbes and Leibniz, there is little evidence that political practice during their lifetimes was influenced by this understanding of modern territory.⁷² Rather, Elden's assumptions regarding the importance of 'modern territory' to the practice of politics in a period dominated by the Wars of Religion and the Holy Roman Empire echoes the traditional perspective of political theory

⁶⁷ Elden "Land, Terrain, Territory", p. 812.

⁶⁸ Elden *The Birth of Territory*, p. 10.

⁶⁹ Koch "Should political geographers do conceptual history?" p. 350.

⁷⁰ This problem ultimately stems from his attempt to unite conceptual history with a history of practices. In Koselleck's formulation, they are fundamentally distinct, see Koselleck *The Practice of Conceptual History*, p. 35.

⁷¹ Elden "Land, Terrain, Territory", p. 811

⁷² See Elden *The Birth of Territory*, p. 301 for the conjoining of sovereignty and territory in Hobbes, and p. 316-321 on Leibniz. By contrast, in the *Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, Quentin Skinner has convincingly demonstrated how territorial considerations were of secondary consideration to Renaissance and Reformation scholars. The invocation of Leibniz is distinctly odd, given that he desired a "modernized and rationalized medieval system" which retained a clear role for both Church and Empire, see Riley *Leibniz' Universal Jurisprudence*, p. 238. Elden concludes his study by noting that "While it might appear that Hobbes's absolute sovereignty and Newton's absolute space define modern politics and geography, Leibniz's relational views of both are closer to how politics was actually practiced" *The Birth of Territory*, p. 321. The importance of the relational in territory will be returned to in the next section.

and IR, in which the Peace of Westphalia signals the emergence of the sovereign state. Consequently, what we are left with is “ultimately based on a somewhat conventional argument about a ‘turning point’ in the mid seventeenth century when the modern state system was enacted”.⁷³ This conventional understanding has been repeatedly debunked in recent years, and it is therefore limiting to have it serve as the end-point for the development of modern territory.⁷⁴ As a result, there is once again no conceptual difference able to be drawn between state and territory, and ultimately Elden skirts around rather than moves “beyond” Agnew’s admonitions.⁷⁵ Territory is once again “self-evidently” associated with the sovereign state, prior to which it cannot be created.

This matters because today those elements used to define territory – linear, demarcated borders, homogenous administrative spaces and clear internal/external distinctions – are seen as breaking down. Increasing human and material flows, conceptually brought together under the all-encompassing rubric of ‘globalization’, were anticipated in the immediate post-Cold War era to overwhelm the sovereign borders between states and ‘flatten’ the globe, signifying the “end of history”.⁷⁶ The notion of the state’s territorial fixity appeared suddenly to contrast with a profusion of movement and flows in people and goods now held to form history’s real subjects. Attention given to successive rounds of deterritorialization and reterritorialization meant that territory was seen as no longer the stable and unquestioned actuality it once was. Rather than assumed given, its position and status is now in question”.⁷⁷ The breakdown of the modern sovereign state system promised to result in a post-modern world characterized by the “uncoupling” of the state and territory and an international system coming to be characterized by a “neo-medievalism”.⁷⁸

The immanent disintegration of these normative linkages defining global politics indicates that the position of these concepts was historically-, rather than universally-, determined.

⁷³ Heffernan “Genealogies, choices, consequences and languages”, p. 111.

⁷⁴ See Teschke “Theorizing the Westphalian System of States”; Osiander “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth”; and Beuleauc *The Power of Language in the Making of International Law*.

⁷⁵ Elden *The Birth of Territory*, p. 3.

⁷⁶ See for example, Jan Aart Scholte’s claim that “Globalization has made the identification of boundaries . . . more problematic than ever. To this extent, a new, non-territorialist cartography of social life is needed”, in “Beyond the buzzword”, p. 48–49; or Neil Brenner’s warning that “the container-like qualities of states is . . . highly problematic”, “Beyond State-centrism?” p. 40.

⁷⁷ Ó Tuathail *Critical Geopolitics*, p. 139.

⁷⁸ Williams *The Ethics of Territorial Borders*; Ruggie “Territoriality and Beyond”.

However, this presumed inability of the modern political map to accommodate the movement associated with postmodern reality is assumed to reflect a transformation in notions of territory, rather than their disappearance. This transformation in territorial practices, in how particular spaces of the globe are delimited and conceptualized, has neither demolished the importance of territory, nor removed the importance of engaging in its study. “Territory’s allure, in short, remains a powerful force in our contemporary world of flows, relational spatial understandings, and new ways of envisioning space. Our fascination with the latter should not blind us to the power of the former”.⁷⁹ This power, indeed, remains particularly apparent whenever it is that territory comes into contention.⁸⁰ That is, territory is able to be analysed as existing, even in the absence of conditions that reflect its supposed normative basis, as Elden himself has detailed.⁸¹ The question therefore becomes whether territory as a concept should be narrowly associated with a Westphalian ideal of it being a clearly demarcated space over which states exercise exclusive sovereign rights, or should it demonstrate sufficient conceptual plasticity that is able to exist in the absence of a world conforming to the sovereign state image that its connection with sovereignty would demand? Given the apparent importance of territory in this “neomedieval” world in which territorial images and practices appear to no longer match, the answer must surely be the latter. The argument here is that this allows for the utilization of the concept of territory prior to the supposed emergence of this “modern system of territorialized rule”, too.

The reason for that this understanding is being adopted here is that while the semantic and conceptual grounds for the modern notions of state, sovereignty and territory are European, developing out of a European-wide political discourse, any examination of the political history of state development in Europe makes it clear that these political notions remained normative ideals rather representing actually-existing political forms.⁸² That is, the invocation of notions such as “absolute sovereignty” and “exclusive zones of jurisdictions” works as a myth, with little relation to social reality. This lack of relation between such notions and the way the world

⁷⁹ Murphy “Territory’s continuing allure”, p. 1224.

⁸⁰ Newman “The Lines that Continue to Separate Us”.

⁸¹ What first drew the attention of those concerned with diagnosing the disruption of the post-Cold War era was the suggestions that the conceptual confluence of state, sovereignty and territory, held to have defined the international system since the Peace of Westphalia, was breaking down. This highlighted how relations between this trio of concepts served as a normative ideal rather than an actual description in the world: none of sovereignty, the state, or territory functioned as they should in the global political system.

⁸² Keene *Beyond the Anarchical Society*; Skinner “The State”.

“works” applies not only during the period in which the sovereign state is held as coming into existence, as noted in relation to Elden above, but equally during its heyday, in which despite the representation of the global political map as a number of distinct, compact, territorially-homogeneous state territories, it remained characterized by the cross-cutting flows of material, men and ideologies that was not necessarily bound by the image of this sovereign territorial order. The notion of the exclusivity of both the Westphalian order and modern practice is “little more than a quaint lesson derived from a visit at ‘Lego-land’ which serves as the preferred theme-park for many international relations specialists”.⁸³

What this means is that notions of sovereignty and territory were utilized to justify practices, rather than constituting the outcomes of such practices. If we want to understand how the modern world has come to work, we need to pay more attention to how it was that the practices that came to be justified through notions of sovereignty and territory came to constitute the framework within which these concepts were mobilized. This is particularly the case with regards extra-European spaces. Although recent efforts have been made to incorporate a more global perspective with regards questions of law and sovereignty, such work has tended to rethink these concepts from within a European Imperial context in which, while the geographical setting has shifted to extra-European space, its conceptual lineage remains resolutely European in origin.⁸⁴ Elden himself acknowledges that his study is entirely Eurocentric and affirms that other “traditions would have very different histories, geographies and conceptual lineages”⁸⁵. However, it is difficult to see how relevant these other traditions can be within the terms of the study that he has produced, given how it is ultimately the semantic content of the term territory that defines whether practices are able to be adjudged territorial or not. If these “other traditions” are characterized by “conceptual lineages” that do not result in a notion of territory in accord with that of the modern state’s, than the emergence of such territory around the globe can only ever be the result of Western imposition, and consequently these histories become largely irrelevant to modern territory as actually practiced. The manner in which Elden engages with the question of territory

⁸³ Kratochwil “Of Maps, Law, and Politics”, p. 8. Lego-land as the world is constituted from spatially-differentiated but functionally identical colored blocks able to be assembled in any form, the jigsaw-like modern political map.

⁸⁴ Anghie *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law*; Howland & White *The State of Sovereignty*; Koskenniemi *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations*; Pagden “Fellow Citizens and Imperial Subjects”.

⁸⁵ Elden “Land, Terrain, Territory”, p. 811.

“historically”⁸⁶ in the *Birth of Territory* means that while he claims to be opening up the concept of territory to a more sustained analysis,⁸⁷ his method and conclusion actually serve to tightly circumscribe both the definition and application of the concept, limiting the potential for a theory of territory to aid us in attempting to analyze global politics. By accepting territory as being the space of the sovereign state, Elden remains trapped by the assumption that territorial practices were granted coherence through this notion of territory. Elden thus denies the possibility of talking about territory until it has been defined by Leibniz and himself, so that, for example, “boundaries only become possible in their modern sense through a notion of space, rather than the other way round”.⁸⁸ Clearly, practices have not been folded into this account, with primacy being accorded to words and their definitions.⁸⁹

It is the history of these practices through which territory is produced that is required, rather than a conceptual history of territory itself. In order to do so, we need to set to one side the general assumption that the Westphalian state offers a ‘universal standard’ for the constitution of territory.⁹⁰ The maintenance of a division between the applicability of notions of sovereignty and territory to European states from, for example, the period following the Treaty of Westphalia and its inadmissibility in other times and places merely reproduces the logic of a standard of civilization, that which determined the possibility of entry into international society that was prevalent in the nineteenth and early-twentieth.⁹¹ While Elden claims not to espouse this view of territory by emphasizing it as process and political technology, focusing on the conceptual lineage of particular traditions will only ever grant us a static understanding of territory. Leaving territory as a description applicable to states understood as sovereign leaves territory as an entirely secondary property. However, that this is not the way international society has worked is visible through the role of territory in political theory, where its possession serves as a marker for statehood. In this sense, the notion of territory should be adjudged as an *ascription* of a particular status (as being a state)

⁸⁶ Elden *The Birth of Territory*, p. 2.

⁸⁷ Affirming that “the historical conceptual approach and its specifics would be useful in other such analyses”, Elden *The Birth of Territory*, p. 16.

⁸⁸ Elden “Land, Terrain, Territory”, p. 811. Marco Antonsich has also pointed out this problem, which Elden does not address, see Antonsich “Rethinking territory” and Elden “Response to Antonsich”.

⁸⁹ As he admits, the “point is to look at how place and power were understood in ... different texts and contexts, and to trace how the modern concept of territory emerged out of these debates”, Elden *The Birth of Territory*, p. 11.

⁹⁰ Murphy “The sovereign state system as political-territorial ideal”; Penrose “Nations, states and homelands”, p. 283.

⁹¹ Anghie “Finding the Peripheries”; Gong *The standard of ‘civilisation’ in International Society*.

rather than a mere description. The focus of this study will reflect the interplay between the two notions in its examination of the space to the north of Japan, where the concern is to chart how this space was both described and came to be ascribed as part of Japan.

Following Elden, the theory of territory adopted in this study will focus on the role of practices within this “political technology” of territory.⁹² In so doing, it is following his admonition to look at the “more general question of the practices that relate politics or power to place ... out of which, it seems to me, the concept of territory emerges”.⁹³ For Elden, this emergence is characterized by the semantic and conceptual unification of territory on the basis of “a notion of space that emerges in the scientific revolution is defined by *extension*. Territory can be understood as the political counterpart to this notion of calculating space, and can therefore be thought of as the *extension of the state’s power*”.⁹⁴ Territory thus serves as a description for the actual existing political situation in Europe during the period, during which territory serves as the basis for the sovereign state. This study, on the other hand, is interested in the notion of territory as being an ascription, indicative of not the actually existing political situation, but as a marker of status amidst wider political questions. The difference is that this concept of territory will not be “trapped” through being defined as the sovereign space of the state, thus restricting the possibility for territory’s emergence to Europe. This is because it serves to deny the possibility that the same practices occurring elsewhere in the world, which in Europe are held as essential for the emergence of territory and the sovereign state, are concerned with territory in an extra-European setting.⁹⁵

⁹² As Heidegger argued, the essence of technology is not, in itself, technological. Rather, it is a way of grasping and conceiving of the world. See Mitchell *Colonising Egypt*.

⁹³ Elden “How should we do the history of territory?”, p. 11.

⁹⁴ Elden *The Birth of Territory*, p. 322.

⁹⁵ In doing so, it entirely accepts the three interlinked propositions that Elden put forth as necessary for a history of territory: (1) Territory must be approached as a topic in itself; rather than through territoriality. Indeed, it may well be the case that the notion of ‘territoriality’ with regard to humans can only be appropriately understood through a notion of territory. In other words, while particular strategies or practices produce territory, there is a need to understand territory to grasp what territoriality, as a condition of territory, is concerned with; (2) Territory can be understood as a ‘bounded space’ only if ‘boundaries’ and ‘space’ are taken as terms worthy of investigation in their own right as a preliminary step. These terms require conceptual and historical work themselves, rather than being sufficient for an explanation; and (3) ‘Land’ and ‘terrain’ – as political-economic and political-strategic relations – are necessary but insufficient to grasp ‘territory’, Elden “Land, Terrain, Territory”, p. 811. However, as has been shown, the way Elden has chosen to conduct his history means that its method cannot be usefully applied to extra-European geographical contexts, and so we need to build upon the tools that he offers in order to usefully apply and historicize notions of territory in other parts of the world.

Methodologizing territory

This study will concern itself with territorial practices in order to analyse how these have functioned in a specific time and place, that period during which the space to the north of Japan came to be incorporated into the state. In so doing, it will actively overcome Agnew's territorial trap, through which territory is fixed, has a clear inside/outside division, and contains society, by arguing for these practices as resulting in a territory that is, indeed, "produced, mutable and fluid". Territory will be understood as a section of the material world that is unified and delimited. This understanding of territory is essentially that of Sack, who focussed his attention particularly upon the necessity to "classify by area; communicate its boundaries; and enforce control over access into or out of the area".⁹⁶ The accomplishment of these three tasks will lead to the creation and maintenance of a territory. This is territory as produced.

Territories are produced through specific practices which serve to unify perceptions of at particular part of the world and offer the means to demarcate it off from others. These practices provide a processual means through which territories are created. However, "for territories to exist in any meaningful sense, their demarcation and constitution also need to be periodically and systematically reified through institutionalized practices".⁹⁷ That is, these processes of defining and marking out territory have to develop some means of maintaining the territory so created. In order that a territory be maintained or institutionalized, it must be incorporated into the social rules through which a territory is constituted and delimited. These rules will have their own structures of legitimization, for example, the sovereign state, or the tributary system, which affect the way in which the rules structures the constitution of a territory.⁹⁸

Maintenance of the territory as a delimited and meaningful section of the material world grants it a status. Collective recognition of this status provides it with a status function. Continued recognition and acceptance of the existence of the territory is marked through continued deployment of its status. This deployment of a territory constitutes it as a speech

⁹⁶ Sack *Human Territoriality*.

⁹⁷ Kadercan "Triangulating territory".

⁹⁸ Kratochwil *Rules, Norms, and Decisions*, p. 27.

act open to representation. Both speech acts, as a public performance, and representation, indicating the commitment of the speaker towards the truth of what is being represented, serve to constitute territory as an institutional fact. General acceptance of these constitutes legitimization, in the Weberian sense. Additionally, the rule structures which underpin the creation of these institutional facts are themselves both restrictive and facilitative, as well as overlapping while retaining varied sources of legitimacy.⁹⁹ This means that agents can have different strategic perspectives on a territory depending on the rule structure they are drawing on in order to make legitimate claims about what the territory is. This recognition of overlapping rule structures with different sources of legitimacy sensitizes analysis to the interplay between sense-making regimes and their authoritative underpinnings.¹⁰⁰ As rule structures are ultimately interpretive, this means that a territory is constituted through both the practical and discursive practices of various actors, able to draw upon these resources in order to make valid arguments about what a particular territory is, or normatively what it can be. The power involved in the institutionalization of territory is thus strategic as well as constitutive, in seeing to shape the rules through which specific territories are constituted. Altering the structures within which the territory is constituted alters the territory.

The conceptual flesh to these somewhat abstract theoretical bones will be provided over the next two chapters, but in practical terms, this means that this study is concerned with not only how the “political technology” of territory was deployed by Japan to its north played out, but how this technology was granted recognition as producing territory by other actors. It is here that we find the possibilities for a global history of territory that assumes neither the development of a universal notion of territory nor the absolute replacement of indigenous political concepts with European-derived notions associated with the ‘modern’. Examining only the putative notion of territory that underpinned its representation and demarcation enables us to engage with territory solely as an epistemological concept, as offering the framework within which we understand the world.

Territory is therefore both mutable and fluid, made so by both changes in the background assumptions that provide the truth conditions necessary for the creation of territory, and by the strategic deployment of varied rule structures by agents in order to make legitimate claims

⁹⁹ Giddens *The Constitution of Society*.

¹⁰⁰ Cooper & Perkins “Borders and status-functions”, p. 56-57.

about a territory. The existence of a territory as an institution does not require agreement regarding the rule structure under which it is produced, but merely that they all recognize that such an institutional structure exists.¹⁰¹ In that respect, territory offer a clear example of “dynamic nominalism”,¹⁰² in which the relationship of naming with the thing being named is constantly being renegotiated. This is done through the speech acts serving as public performances of these rule structures. Irrespective of its underlying truth, the circulation of social facts about a territory helps create that territory as fact. This factual territory is thus constituted by how it is produced.¹⁰³ As was already noted, this production occurs through a process of *status ascription*,¹⁰⁴ through which it comes to be known, recognized and described as being the territory of the state. The importance of the notion of status is to indicate that this creation of territory, through the delimitation and conceptualization of certain portions of the material world, does not solely depend upon self-description. Rather, it is crucially dependent upon the notion of *recognition*, through which territory is understood as such through both its description, via processes of demarcation and perceptual unification, and the acceptance of such a description by other actors.

Therefore, the method adopted in this study is to examine the practices through which territory came to be constituted, and examine the relations between acceptance of such practices and recognition for the existence of territory. The actual practices utilized within this study are those involved with the mapping and bounding of territory. Both of these notions have a well-attested role in the production of territory, and indeed are obvious means of territoriality. The mapping of space is essential to the classification and communication of territory, while that of borders is vital to its delimitation and enforcement. Therefore, both are concerned with the emergence, in Elden’s terms, of land and terrain as well. At the same time, we can consider them as not only territorial practices that serve to produce territory, but as the results of ascribing the status of territory to a particular section of the material world. Borders and maps, therefore, will be understood here as practices that allow us to examine the political technology of territory itself, as well as in relation to land and terrain.¹⁰⁵ Such a

¹⁰¹ Searle *The Construction of Social Reality*, p. 57.

¹⁰² Hacking *Historical Ontology*, p. 2. See also that “Categories of people come into existence at the same time as kinds of people come into being to fit those categories, and there is a two-way interaction between these processes”, p. 48.

¹⁰³ “Existence comes before essence; we are constituted by what we do.” Hacking *Historical Ontology*, p. 22

¹⁰⁴ This draws upon Chapter 4 & 5 of Searle *The Construction of Social Reality*.

¹⁰⁵ Elden “Land, Terrain, Territory”, p. 804.

perspective allows us to register how it is that territory not only is shaped by, but also shapes its wider political context. By engaging with both the practices and outcomes of territory, we become able to analyse the role of territory in itself, rather than as a concept that is solely either reducible to or an outcome of the modern state. It is only by doing so that we are able to understand what the political role of territory is.

Territorial practices

In understanding territory as a political technology, this study will focus upon those practices that enable territory to come into being. Following on from Elden's understanding, the notion of political technology invoked here incorporates actual material techniques or tools, the legal or institutional apparatus that supports their use, and the worldview that underpins their deployment.¹⁰⁶ However, as the above has indicated, in Elden's reading, territory as a political technology presupposes the object that it produces, by associating the concept of territory exclusively with that of the modern sovereign state. His central aim is to understand how it became possible to describe the world through this modern notion of territory, focusing on the epistemological underpinnings of the concept. The aim of this study is distinct, in that it is far more interested in the manner in which the world came to be made up of territory. As such, it is concerned with how the world came to operate in a fashion able to be understood as territory. For this reason, its concern is with the performance of territory, of how territory as a technology came to be applied to the world, rather than in its semantic status. Such a perspective is also appropriate for a study occurring outside the space within which European-derived modern political theory was developed, in which the genealogical and conceptual models for the modern term of territory in Japan will be inevitably inflected by the adoption of these European-derived concepts into Japan's social reality.

In order to develop our understanding of territory as technology, it proposes to analyse through two of its constitutive practices. These practices form a coherent set of social processes which produce both material traces and political effects. The presence of such materialization within the context of the state is indicative of institutionalization, and therefore associated with the two stages required to transform part of the material world into

¹⁰⁶ Elden *The Birth of Territory*, pp. 16–17.

territory. As already noted, such processes are those of mapping, which provides a means of producing perceptual unity over certain parts of the material world, and borders, through which certain portions of the material world are delimited off from others. In this study, both are referred to as active processes rather than merely passive products, as practices of bordering and mapping whose institutionalization is essential for the maintenance of territory.

The justification for focusing on these two practices as processes will be provided in more detail over the next two sections, in which this study will begin to set out this notion of relational territory. It will do so by offering an interpretation of the state as a co-ordinating entity, one which makes particular reference to recent historiographical efforts at comparative history under the rubric of the global early modern. The following sections will then provide the justification for understanding of maps and borders as practices, rather than merely material outcomes or products, before providing further explicit conceptual justification for the deployment of the notion of relational territory, which will be utilized to illuminate the wider significance of the case study adopted here. The wider applicability of the notion will be returned to in the study's conclusion.

2. MAPPING JAPAN IN EARLY MODERN ASIA

“To map a territory means to formally define space along the lines set within a particular epistemological and political experience”¹

This chapter attempts to understand the role territorial practices in the emergence of the sovereign territory of Japan, through an investigation of how those practices functioned in the constitution of territory to Japan’s north. The practices examined will be those of mapping and bordering, through which the territory referred to by the Japanese as Ezochi² came into being. It shall do so by relating how the imposition of such practices is thought about in the context of early modern Japan in comparison with other states in both Europe and Asia.³ Over the following two chapters, this comparison will be undertaken in two registers, through a primarily conceptual investigation into recent literature on mapping the state, and a more focused empirical comparison which will primarily focus on contextualizing early modern Japan’s experience in the light of those of its closest peers, and most particularly Russia and China.

It has traditionally been more common for Tokugawa Japan to be explicitly compared to absolutist or rationalizing states in Western Europe, in order to search for the roots of Japan’s post-Meiji transition.⁴ More recently, research has sought to re-embed the Tokugawa within the wider East Asian context from which they emerged and largely operated.⁵ At the same time, far greater attention is now being paid to the continuities visible across the Tokugawa/Meiji divide, and thus noting how this East Asian context played an important structuring role in how post-Meiji Japan developed.⁶ The intention across these chapters is a

¹ Neocleous. “Off the Map”, p. 417.

² Ezochi literally means “land of the Ezo”, and refers to the identification of the land with a barbarian people constituted in opposition to the Japanese state, see Chapter 4. While modern historians add ‘chi’, meaning land, this was not done consistently in the early modern period, meaning the distinction between land and people is not as clearly reflected in language as it is today.

³ In which the map serves as “a representation of a part of the earth’s surface”, Andrews, “What Was a Map?”.

⁴ McClain, Merriman & Ugawa *Edo and Paris*.

⁵ Makabe *Tokugawa kōki no Gakumon to Seiji*.

⁶ Matsuda *Edo no chishiki kara Meiji no seiji e*.

little broader, which is to briefly consider how a slew of complex political societies that we see across Asia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries operated, in order to relate the mapping practices that emerged in Japan to those of other non-European formations.⁷ This will provide the context for examining how these practices functioned within Japan during the early modern era, and the utilization and institutionalization of such practices in the lands of Ezo. In both this chapter and throughout the study, reference will be made to European developments as well, but it will be understood that the history of the emergence of territory in Europe through its realization in specific political practices is largely folded into the theoretical and conceptual arguments regarding the nature of territory offered in the previous chapter, as well as those concerned with mapping and bordering that will be built upon in this and the next chapter.

In offering an account for the emergence of the Ezochi that takes into account developments in other parts of Asia, this study is seeking a global history of Ezo as territory.⁸ The new global history of the early modern has been valuable in ‘provincializing’ Europe and emphasizing earlier interconnections across the globe, and the history of mapping and cartographic production has been a notable beneficiary of such a trend. There has been a dramatic increase in our understanding of the variety of “graphic representations that facilitate a spatial understanding of things, concepts, conditions, processes or events”⁹ produced in the world, and how the European appropriation, however inexactly and inexpertly, of indigenous knowledge enabled the globe to be mapped. This history has followed a stream of Europeans into far-off places and detailed how they have sought to take possession of them on the map. It has also highlighted how Asian and other states sought to represent and reproduce themselves on maps of their own. However, what has remained unclear are the implications of this. Should the presence of cartography, or a certain variety of it, be conflated with notions of territory, with the shift from medieval to modern being marked by the concern of the state to

⁷ Victor Lieberman has recently sought to conduct a similar exercise, but grounds his comparisons in a string of national histories that, consequently, tend to show a strong degree of affinity for one another. See his two volumes on the *Strange Parallels* in the early modern state-building process in southeast Asia and then across Eurasia.

⁸ As chapter 1 noted, work on territory to date has largely been conducted from within a resolutely European context, with few exceptions. One is Buchanan & Moore (eds.), *States, Nations, and Borders*, which while not specifically focused on territory does encompass a number of related concepts and how they are understood within various ‘traditions’ (Confucian, Christian, etc., but also liberal or international law). However, it remains relatively unconcerned with practice, being far more focused on what texts identified with these various traditions have to say about borders and territory.

⁹ Harley & Woodward, *The History of Cartography* Vol. 1, p. xvi.

map itself in space, for example?¹⁰ Or should territory be interpreted as a European-derived political concept, so that the replacement of the cultural underpinnings for other means of mapping the world by a modern western spatial epistemology leaves practices to “store, communicate and promote spatial understanding” that were utilized by other cultures as effectively illegible to us?¹¹

In struggling with such issues, this study of the emergence of the territory of the Ezochi needs to be aware of the shortcomings suffered by this new global history, which is happiest in avoiding the cultural realm that remains “the most difficult to conceptualize in terms which correlate with our materialist visions of politics and economy”.¹² This is driven by the entirely worthy desire to avoid a totalizing, Parsonian vision of culture that for so long posited a divide in worldview and *mentalité* between the rationalist West and superstitious East.¹³ Yet territorial practices will only be comprehensible through examining both “the complex accretion of cultural engagements with the world that surround and underpin” their practice, and the insertion of these practices “into various circuits of use, exchange and meaning”.¹⁴ This section will provide the context within which these circuits of use, exchange and meaning developed, within processes of state formation and maintenance across Asia. This will help reconstitute the spaces within which these territorial practices were deployed in and their meanings was made. Practices of mapping and bordering have been the notable beneficiaries of recent trends attending to the constructed nature of social reality and role of cultural material in aiding in the provision of the cognitive frameworks within which individual actors function.

Comparisons will also be briefly developed with a number of Asian early modern states, those representatives of the sixteenth and seventeenth century military and material efflorescence that collectively grant some coherence to the notion of a global early modern. These are the East Asian states of Ming and Qing China, Europe’s perpetual periphery of Russia, expanding across Asia and to the edge of Ezo during this period, as well as, more succinctly, the Islamic ‘Gunpowder Empires’ of the Ottomans, Safavids and Mughals. The territorial understanding of

¹⁰ Wood, Fels & Krygier, *Rethinking the Power of Maps*.

¹¹ Barbara *The Mapping of New Spain; Turnbull Masons, Tricksters, and Cartographers*.

¹² Lee, “Review of Manning”, p. 2.

¹³ As clearly inflects work like those listed in n. 11 above.

¹⁴ Cosgrove, *Mappings*, p. 9. Cosgrove’s call was to follow the processes associated with maps, both in their creation and deployment.

the Tokugawa period, which both explains and provides the context within which bordering and mapping during the period occur, will be developed through these chapters in order to provide the context for the territorial practices undertaken in Ezo that provide the focus for the rest of this study.

The state of state mapping

Much recent work in the history of cartography has emphasized the frequently close connections between states and maps, and how these relations functioned differently within different contexts. Nevertheless, understandings of such maps produced in other cultural contexts are generally refracted through the history of cartography within Europe. Here, “maps were practically unknown in the Middle Ages”,¹⁵ and what we understand by ‘cartography’, or administrative mapmaking in the service of the state, is an early modern development.¹⁶ A sudden vast growth in the survival of cartographic material provides material evidence of the historical process through which the modern nation-state came into being. This is through maps serving as markers of bureaucratic rationality,¹⁷ with a state’s production and use of cartographic material a proxy for its ‘modern’ character. The spread of maps encouraged the expression of all social relationships through spatial representations of the state, as the personal relations between ruler and ruled came to be overlain with those of territory, which to facilitate organization were then surveyed and plotted on an abstract mathematical grid.¹⁸ This abstract, geometric conception of state space then comes to define the state’s territory, which functions as a bounded “power container”, one whose contents become amenable to being rearranged, filled or emptied at the behest of sovereign

¹⁵ Harvey *Medieval Maps*, p. 1.

¹⁶ Buisseret *Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps*; Kain & Baigent *The Cadastral Map in the Service of the State*; Wood, Fels & Krygier, *Rethinking the Power of Maps*.

¹⁷ As national maps, cadastral maps, military maps, transport maps, and so forth. The result emphasized the inherent continuity of French ‘national’ mapping from the mid-seventeenth to mid-nineteenth centuries, one in which the French Revolution provided a consummation of prior trends, while simultaneously bringing into being a state that moved rapidly and radically towards a recognizably modern conception of national space, Konvitz “The Nation-state, Paris and Cartography in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-century France”, see also Bagrow *History of Cartography*; Konvitz *Cartography in France*.

¹⁸ P. Sahlins “Natural Frontiers Revisited”; Turnbull *Masons, Tricksters, and Cartographer*.

authority.¹⁹ Maps are thus evidence for the shift from a socially defined territory to the territorially defined society of the state.²⁰

This territorial understanding of the state is subsequently held to encourage a nationalism that homogenizes relations between state and population, due to the efficiency of territoriality as a form of classification in specifying by area rather than type.²¹ There also emerges a growing ‘planetary consciousness’²² which meant “the whole of the earth’s territory could be mapped as one” and that “all localness would vanish in the homogenization and geometrization of space”.²³ This achievement, made possible by the Renaissance rediscovery of the works of Ptolemy, underpinned European imperial expansion, not only by facilitating the exploration of the globe itself, but also by allowing the incorporation of all geographical discoveries on a Cartesian mathematical grid, making the entire world both ‘knowable’, and subsequently divisible into commensurable areas of control. This spatial abstraction makes possible the knowledge and division of the entire world into a territorialized sovereign state order. This relation between the modern state and cartography is seemingly confirmed with the emergence of the word itself in the early nineteenth century.²⁴ From the perspective of the map itself, the modernity of both cartography and state become mutually reducible to one another, with the modern state characterized by use of cartography, and modern cartography defined by its deployment in state administration.²⁵ Consequently, much recent research has focussed on the emergence of this putative ‘cartographic consciousness’ or ‘map-

¹⁹ Giddens *The Nation-state and Violence*, p. 120, and material in the previous chapter.

²⁰ See Chapter 1, and also Mann *The Rise of Classes and Nation-states*. “Conventional Western perspectives on spatial organisation are powerfully shaped by the concept of property, in which pieces of territory are viewed as ‘commodities’ capable of being bought, sold, or exchanged at the market place. Space is viewed as being subdivided into components whose bound areas are ‘objectively’ determined through the mathematical and astronomically based techniques of surveying and cartography.” Soja *The Political Organization of Space*, p. 9.

²¹ Sack. *Human Territoriality*, p. 32.

²² Cosgrove *Mappings*.

²³ Craib “Cartography and Power”, p. 14; Thongchai *Siam Mapped*, pp. 52-53; Turnbull *Masons, Tricksters, and Cartographers*, p. 19.

²⁴ indeed, Matthew Edney has taken the appearance of the word itself as demonstrating ‘modern cartographic practice’, see Edney “Reconsidering Enlightenment geography and map making”.

²⁵ For example, Denis Wood has reconceptualised the notion of the phrase ‘early modern’ so that it refers to the state use of maps in administration, thus positioning twelfth-century China, sixteenth-century England and seventeenth-century Japan as in the same ‘timeframe’ on a state-centric map of his own devising. Wood’s state-centrism results in the return of ‘stages’ of development; the problem is that his prior reading of the development of cartography with the state within Europe is privileged in his understanding. Wood, Fels & Krygier, *Rethinking the Power of Maps*, p. 30-35.

mindedness²⁶ with an important role in constituting territory for the state, whether in national or imperial contexts.²⁷

Frequently, it is not the production of maps itself, but the development of a specific form of mapping, one based upon “abstract space”, which is understood as both foreshadowing and responsible for the emergence of the modern territorial state. In Japan, this kind of nationalized, spatially abstract mapping has traditionally been associated with that of Ino Tadataka.²⁸ Ino’s survey of Japan’s coastline is generally understood to represent not only the first ‘scientific’ mapping of Japan, but to also serve as its national map, given that his work made no reference to the internal provincial boundaries within the nation, situating the entirety of Japan within a global framework.²⁹ However, the assumptions underpinning this narrative have been worn away in recent years, and the study of maps viewed from a much broader perspective.

One vital shift was away from an understanding of maps as uniquely scientific objects, and to one in which they are considered cultural products. In the cultural history of maps, cartographic representations created by individuals allow them to take “visual and conceptual possession” of the state within which they live.³⁰ In this reading, maps serve as a new form of cultural production that “had an inescapable part in creating the cultural entity they pretended only to represent”.³¹ Through national mapping, therefore, the nation created itself,³² with a visual image of its territory as a repository of political allegiance supplementary to, but also

²⁶ Edney. “Mathematical Cosmography and the Social Ideology of British Cartography”; Branch *The Cartographic State*.

²⁷ Anderson *Imagined Communities*; Barrow *Making History, Drawing Territory*; Barrow *Surveying and Mapping in Colonial Sri Lanka*; Burnett *Masters of All They Surveyed*; Ramaswamy “Visualising India’s Geo-Body”; Reinhartz “Maps from Inspections of the Northern Frontier of New Spain”; Winichakul *Siam Mapped*; Zandvliet “The Contribution of Cartography to the Creation of a Dutch Colony and a Chinese State in Taiwan”

²⁸ Ino conducted the first survey of Japan’s coastline in the early nineteenth century, in what appears to have been largely a traverse survey with astronomical observation. For details of a traverse survey, see Burnett *Masters of All They Surveyed*; for more on Ino, see Chapter 9.

²⁹ On this see Uesugi *Chizu kara yomu Edo-jidai*, p. 211-213; Kawamura *Edo Bakufu no Nihon Chizu*; Sugimoto *Ryōiki Shihai no Tenkai to Kinsei*, p. 285.

³⁰ Helgerson “The Land Speaks”, p. 51.

³¹ Helgerson “The Land Speaks”, p. 81.

³² See Helgerson *Forms of Nationhood*, particularly Chapter 4 “The Voyages of a Nation”, where he draws on the works of Hukly as creating a lineage of British exploration and Empire before its actual existence. This idea was later developed in relation to one specific location, British Guyana, in Burnett *Masters of All They Surveyed*.

separate and distinct from, the sovereignty of the monarch.³³ That is, mapping and its associated techniques were not solely analysable as techniques within the service of the state, but as instruments with the power to produce novel effects, disaggregating the state and its sovereignty from both ruler and ruled.³⁴ As a result, while formerly it was accepted that the state had produced maps, it was now maps that produced the state.³⁵

Nevertheless, it is clear that such work has been too quick to accept the claims on the map as reality, confusing abstract representations on the map with realities of state administration. This has been most marked in studies of imperial mapping, which have been particularly characterized by assertions for the ‘totalizing’ nature of the map as asserting the overwhelming nature of imperial power. This stems from an excessive focus on the map itself, as studies in this vein too easily accept the map’s own claims to accurately represent reality. Rather than assuming that the seeming similarity or difference between designated modes of mapping is representative of either indigenous or European cultural rationalities, this chapter will argue that it is the reincorporation of such maps within social and institutional structures is essential to understand how such maps work. The reincorporation of such material objects within their milieu, and the subsequent re-presentation and reproduction of these material

³³ Subsequently, “cartographic representation undermined the dynastic principle by objectifying political authority,” as the ‘physicality’ of the sovereign was itself transferred from the monarch to the territory of the state. Bartelson *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*; Kantorowicz *The King’s Two Bodies*; Thongchai *Siam Mapped*.

³⁴ This notion of the importance of tracing through the effects of power is of course indebted to Foucault, and is therefore open to many of the same criticisms. A key initial thinker in this regard was Brian Harley, who through seeking to answer why cartographic representations came to have the status of empirical fact, reopened all maps to being analyzed as cultural products. Harley’s notion of critical cartography indeed centered on a perception that ‘the state’ and its interests were responsible for the selection and ‘silences’ that went into deciding just what was to be represented upon the map (Harley, “Silences and Secrecy”, “Deconstructing the Map”, “Cartography, Ethics and Social Theory”). In so doing, Harley held what was essentially a particularly totalizing, indeed paranoid, view of the state as distorting all knowledge production (Black, *Maps and Politics*). Therefore, as important as Harley’s engagement with the ‘hidden agenda’ of cartography was, his studies correctly situated maps as cultural products while failing to engage with mapping as cultural production (Belyea, “Images of power”; Edney *The Origins and Development of J.B. Harley’s Cartographic Theories*; Wood “P.D.A. Harvey and Medieval Mapmaking”). As a result, he moved from a cartographic history overly-reliant on a teleological perception of the growing accuracy of mapping to one where the content of the map could be explained and reduced to the power of the state. Consequently, his interest in territory was still mediated through the state, as Harley inherently believed that without the distortions of power a more ‘accurate’ mapping would be possible.

³⁵ This perspective has moved a long way from the claim of Alfred Korzybski that “the map is not the territory”. Rather, a postmodern attention to the constitutive power of representation is clear, for “henceforth, it is the map that precedes the territory” as “the very definition of the real becomes that of which it is possible to give an equivalent reproduction”, Baudrillard *The Illusion of the End*, p. 2, 146.

objects in a constant process of remapping, that serves to create meaning, and thus constitute territory.

In order to highlight the unfolding of this process, the remainder of this chapter will trace the outlines of such practices, setting Japan's early modern cartography within the wider context provided by its fellow political formations across Eurasia. In doing so, it wishes to clarify how we should interpret the mapping conducted by these states within a framework that acknowledges both their functional role, instructional role, and cultural significance. It will begin by sketching out how it was that these states related to the land under their authority, and the role of cartography in the constitution of land as territory.

Mapping land

The previous chapter has traced out how the notion of territory does not only refer to land as a material object, but to land that possesses a conceptual unity and some sort of meaning. Indeed, the reason why states needed to know their lands, and therefore sought to create graphic depictions of them, is due to the meaning that was associated by the state with its lands, or which were imposed upon it through this process of mapping. Denis Wood has noted that it is, "the ability to *link the territory with what comes with it* that has made the map so valuable" for the institutional structures which undergird the state, such as taxation or military service.³⁶ From our perspective, however, it is the mapping of *what comes with it*, through providing or ascribing meaning to part of the earth's surface, which leads to the emergence of territory. This is the association of the possession of land with participation in a variety of organizational and institutional settings that not only represents land as belonging to the state, but grants such land a meaning within the context provided by the state. One of the most obvious ways in which it does so is through attempting to represent and record the means through which the state is able to lay claim to resources. For Japan, as for most of the early modern states across Eurasia to which it is able to be compared, the most important of these was agricultural, as it was control and extraction of agrarian production that enabled the establishment of what we term the state. This section will initially examine how these early modern states sought to order and represent their control over by far the most important

³⁶ Wood & Fels *The Power of Maps*, p. 10.

section of their economies, that of agrarian production, and sketch out the relationship between control over and extraction of such resources, and the ascription of meaning to the land associated with this resource base.

Describing the agrarian states that we see emerging across Eurasia during this period as 'early modern' encourages the assumption that attempts to impose administrative authority would have to involve the mapping of territory.³⁷ This is true to the extent that all of these states undertook strenuous efforts to know and record the resources and revenue under their control. The Ottomans undertook repeated surveys within their Empire. The Safavids promoted the settlement of populations and the state administration of agricultural land. The Mughals laboriously compiled provincial revenue statistics and classified both lands and proportionate dues of sovereignty. Two years after the capture of Beijing, the Qing regent Dorgon ordered the first cadastral survey of China for 60 years, in order to sort out the regime's chaotic revenue situation.³⁸ The ambition of such states is clearly evident in the drive to have all land surveyed, known and recorded. That this did not necessarily involve the state in conducting actual surveys of land was because such states were heirs to traditions of local record-keeping that they were able to enrol within their own efforts to map revenue. These included a system of Byzantine and Mamluk bureaucratic practices for the Ottomans, a class of Persian-speaking administrators mediated via traditions of Timurid rule and accompanying village-level tax rolls for the Safavids, or a long tradition of state concern with land revenue for the Qing. These empires all sought to maintain their maps, via, for example, the inspection of village practices, or resurveys of individual provinces. Thus, their mapping ambitions, the desire to retain knowledge of all the land under their authority, were clear.

Japan possesses some of the earliest examples of material maps in the world, which clearly offer evidence for an ambition to rationally order the world in accordance with its representation on paper.³⁹ Successive rounds of state formation in the Japanese archipelago

³⁷ Indeed, for Wood himself, in his somewhat idiosyncratic but telling understanding, the notion of the 'early modern' is itself reducible to a state's production of cartographic material, see n.25 above.

³⁸ Wakeman Jr *Great Enterprise*; Hostetler *Qing Colonial Enterprise*, p. 70.

³⁹ The Emperor Kōtoku supposedly requested each province submit maps of their land holdings, known as *denzu* 田図. According to the *Nihon shoki* (*Nihongi*), in 645 the court ordered provincial governors to "regulate the myriad provinces. When you proceed to your posts, prepare registers of all the free subjects of the State and of the people under the control of others, whether great or small. Take account of the acreage of cultivated land." Aston *Nihongi*, p. 200.

had concerned themselves with questions of access to land and its utilization as a means of political authority,⁴⁰ and the re-establishment of centralized political control occurring throughout the sixteenth-century was no exception. The preceding warring-states period is generally seen to have resulted in a process of military competition and integrated state formation, and each of Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and the Tokugawa moved rapidly to both assert and legitimate their authority across the entirety of the imperial realm associated with the *ritsuryō* state.⁴¹ One means of doing so, in accordance with Chinese practice, was to demand the submission of maps and tax rolls from subordinate authorities.⁴² The immediate context for Hideyoshi's nationwide cadastral survey, however, was the invasion of Korea, which began the following year.⁴³ The goal of the survey was rooted in its military function; the assessed level of agricultural productivity of lords provided a transferrable standard for judging their appropriate military contribution to the Korean campaign.⁴⁴ The surveys sought to calculate the total area of land under production and then convert that into a value, expressed in *koku*.⁴⁵ Despite the determined threat of violence that accompanied the order, however, it seems likely that the survey was never completed as intended. A document of 1593 indicates that while cadastral registers had been received for 40 provinces, only 13 of these had submitted maps.⁴⁶

⁴⁰ Unno "Cartography in Japan".

⁴¹ The *ritsuryō* state refers to the introduction of civil and criminal codes modelled on those of the Tang dynasty. By the latter half of the seventh century, a system of administrative divisions appears to have been established. We will return to these below.

⁴² The abbot of the Kōfukuji in Nara recorded in 1591 that "orders have been given to all the districts in the country to map fields as well as seas, mountains, rivers, villages, temples and shrines . . . [and] send them immediately to the court." Kawamura *Edo bakufu-sen kuniezu no kenkyū*, p. 22. The importance of precedent meant that the demands for the survey and maps ordered by Hideyoshi were legitimized as coming from the Emperor, a pretense that the Tokugawa later dropped. By the Genroku survey, the emperor has been effaced from the mapping of the state, see Sugimoto *Ryōiki Shihai no Tenkai to Kinsei*, p. 159. On the Chinese example, see Yee "Chinese Maps in political culture"; Unno *Chizu no bunkashi*.

⁴³ See for example Elisonas "The Inseparable Trinity".

⁴⁴ The maps were submitted at the level of districts; only two examples survive from Kubiki and Seba in Echigo province. Provincial maps were apparently to be constructed, it is unclear if a national map was envisaged, but thought highly probable. Kawamura *Edo bakufu-sen kuniezu no kenkyū*, pp. 21-26; Kawamura *Edo Bakufu no Nihon Chizu*, pp. 12-17, reproductions on pp. 14-15

⁴⁵ 5.1 bushels of rice.

⁴⁶ Unno "Cartography in Japan", p. 394, The discrepancy between the two numbers is significant in that providing textual records to the regime was presumably a much easier process, refer to the previous section on this point. As this discrepancy suggests, in Japan too, frequently these "records were descriptive, with no drawings", Kark "Mamlük and Ottoman Cadastral Surveys", p. 49.

This system, which based its assessment of contributions from domain rulers upon the total agricultural productivity of villages under his control, was the one that the Tokugawa inherited. In common with other states Eurasian states, therefore, the Tokugawa came to possess a “centralized and highly bureaucratic state apparatus, a system of state ownership [of land]... a written record of systematic management of state land resources with periodic cadastral and taxpaying surveys of the empire’s vast territories, and a central imperial cadastral register”.⁴⁷ As the example of Hideyoshi’s survey suggests, though, such records did not necessarily incorporate maps. That these records were textual should have aided the ‘reflexivity’ of the state’s monitoring.⁴⁸ This would only be maintained, though, if changes were able to be reflected in further surveys. However, these early modern states were simply unable to consistently and repeatedly undertake surveys in a manner that Giddens has characterized as the “reflexive monitoring” associated with modern government.⁴⁹

If we examine the history of these surveying efforts in other states across Eurasia, the reasons for this are clear. They were of necessity immensely laborious undertakings. On conquering the Mamluks, the Ottoman Empire, due to both the initial concealment of the land records and their insufficiency, ordered a survey of Egyptian land use in 1517. This took 60 years to accomplish and another 30 years to extend into the south of the country. Understandably, there was little Ottoman appetite for another, and no further survey of the lands of Egypt was to be undertaken until that by the French in the late-eighteenth century.⁵⁰ In 1387, the Ming Emperor Hongwu had ordered maps to be drawn up showing the boundaries and ownership of all agricultural land, with every plot to be paced out and measured. As Timothy Brook recounts, “The resulting Fish-Scale Registers...created the official public record of who owned what land and who paid the taxes on it [and] was the most exhaustive mapping program any government in China undertook prior to the twentieth century”.⁵¹ Yet updating these registers proved impossible, and when an impoverished Ming sought to do so in 1580, it was forced to

⁴⁷ Kark “Mamlük and Ottoman Cadastral Surveys”, p. 49.

⁴⁸ This should have aided the updating of records; working with purely textual material was a much less skilled occupation than the drafting of maps. Where they exist, maps should be seen as aiding in the creation of the initial framework within which figures would be amended textually, enabling the state to simply and repeatedly remap its sources of revenue.

⁴⁹ Giddens *The Nation-state and Violence*, p. 216. Giddens was influenced by Foucault and his concept ties in with the latter’s notions of governmentality, see Foucault *The Birth of Biopolitics*.

⁵⁰ Kark “Mamlük and Ottoman Cadastral Surveys”, p. 47, see also Mikhail *Nature and empire in Ottoman Egypt*.

⁵¹ Timothy Brook *The Chinese State in Ming Society*, so called because the pattern of plots on the summary map at the front looked like fish scales.

use a totally different system to survey all of the state's agricultural land. As a result, despite Dorgon's desire in the first half of the seventeenth century, noted above, to assert the authority of the new dynasty through a tax assessment, "the early Qing relied on Ming registers of which households owned what – registers that everyone knew to be faulty and outdated".⁵²

It is therefore not ambition that these state's lack, but the ability to enforce this monitoring, as the records of these early modern states prove anything but reflexive. This is also obvious in the efforts of the Tokugawa to resurvey their lands. The Tokugawa regime ultimately committed itself to four nationwide cadastral surveys; two in their first 25 years of rule, the third in the Genroku-era (1688-1704) a further 50 years later, while another 150 years passed before the final one during the Tenpo period (1830-1844).⁵³ Even this simple description, which suggests a state becoming progressively less able to enforce the monitoring of its lands, exaggerates its reach. After the Genroku era, large-scale resurveys occurred only in individual provinces, such as Mito and Hagi, and it was widely recognized that the information gathered was increasingly unsatisfactory. During the fourth survey, ordered in 1832, the state was unable to ignore the obvious insufficiency of its records, and sought to rectify this through having its local authorities submit their 'true productivity'.⁵⁴ This led to an increase in assessed yields in some cases, but was reliant upon cooperation with subordinate authorities, who had every incentive not to comply. Local rulers powerful enough or distant enough, like the Satsuma, were able to ignore the dictates of Edo and refuse to submit information for the lands under their authority.⁵⁵ Consequently, the Tenpo cadastre indicates that the productivity of these provinces was identical to those of the first survey over two centuries previously, despite a massive expansion in both population and area of land under cultivation, and the government gave up its plans to update the nation's tax rolls.⁵⁶ In most parts of the

⁵² Rowe *China's Last Empire*, p. 43. The survey ordered by Dorgon had only been of areas under Qing control, excluding a vast swathe of south China. Ultimately, the situation was made into a virtue, as following the 1712 publication of the Qing's sole empire-wide cadastral survey, the Emperor Kangxi introduced "a moratorium on the increase of land taxes, which guaranteed no new land taxes and as a result no new cadastral surveys for the rest of his reign. Instead he declared that the previous cadastral survey of the Wanli Emperor (1580) would suffice", see Wang *Land taxation in imperial China*, p. 29.

⁵³ These are the era dates. The surveys will be discussed again in more detail in the context of maps produced.

⁵⁴ See the details in Kawamura *Edo bakufu-sen kuniezu no kenkyū* and the summary in Sugimoto "Kuniezu", pp. 319-21.

⁵⁵ See the table provided in Kawamura *Edo bakufu-sen kuniezu no kenkyū*, pp. 260-261; the response is analyzed in Roberts *Performing the Great Peace*, pp. 70-73.

⁵⁶ See Marcia Yonemoto "Silence without Secrecy?", p. 33.

country, “the inaccuracies of the surveys in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries remained uncorrected until the land tax reform of the 1870’s”.⁵⁷

Early modern states were wrestling with a similar problem, the creation of a system through which they would be able to reflexively remap their territory. In each case, the universal nature of their ambitions to know the land under their control is apparent. These empires sought to grasp their lands in such a way that the realm was comprehensible within a single framework, allowing for it to be brought under a system of revenue administration. The states’ claims to land were made real through this representation of absolute knowledge and control. Whatever the ‘reality’, these imperial states were absolute with respect to their lands. However, in all cases they struggled with the enforcement of the system. In an era of seemingly general economic efflorescence, Asian state’s consistently recorded static or declining revenue, indicating they were unable to effectively monitor their land despite their claims and efforts to do so.⁵⁸ Although they claimed the entirety of the land, then, the Tokugawa, as other Eurasian states, were reliant on the cooperation of local authorities in order to know them, a cooperation which was both never absolute and declined over time.⁵⁹

Nevertheless, an excessive emphasis upon these states’ failure to achieve the reflexive ‘updating’ of such records is itself misleading, in that it suggests that the problem was the maintenance of initially accurate records, of the textual record being updated sufficiently to enable the empire to be regularly ‘remapped’. This presumes that the initial “exhaustive mapping programs” of the state had provided an accurate framework within which textual records could be subsequently updated. The Tokugawa had stipulated uniform methods of measurement in order to ensure accuracy in mapping the state’s agricultural land. However, these measures were able to be manipulated or ignored by its subordinate lords, who occasionally claimed more extensive lands in order to ‘promote’ a ruler, but more frequently reduced a region’s tax burden by concealing its productivity. Given also that, despite Tokugawa stipulations, vast areas of the country relied on either simple estimates of land area or

⁵⁷ Brown “The Mismeasure of Land”, p. 116. Prior to the Meiji period, the Tokugawa surveys registered 2.91 million hectares of arable land, which jumped to 4.03 million with the completion of the first Meiji survey in 1881. Seavoy *Subsistence and Economic Development*, p. 225.

⁵⁸ Vries “Governing Growth”.

⁵⁹ Studies that emphasize the increasing authority of the Tokugawa, or increasing ability to force compliance, tend to focus upon limited fields within which the shogunal government and their domains shared significant interests. See for example White “State Growth”; Totman “Preindustrial River Conservancy”. This dynamic has been well-captured recently in Wilson *Defensive Positions*.

requiring villages to submit details of their total agricultural production,⁶⁰ and there was room for such manipulation at every level of the system. Finally, tax contributions were calculated in rice, even in areas of the country that didn't grow any.⁶¹ This problem was not exclusive to the Tokugawa, as shown by, for example, the Mughal's *Ain-i-Akbari* representing tribal lands as properly measured and regularly assessed territories – that is, as agricultural lands – despite a total absence of agriculture on them.⁶² In all these states, the end result was no uniformity in “what came with” territory for the state; revenue exactions varied greatly in different areas of the country.⁶³

It is important to recognize that for the Tokugawa, as for all these states, there existed a tremendous discrepancy between reality and that represented in the state's efforts to document it. The monitoring undertaken by these states was not reflexive enough in order to capture the various times and spaces of its rule, despite the claims of the state. This is easily visible in the historiography that surrounds any of these states, in which arguments for “highly centralized administrations” and “absolute monarchy”⁶⁴ are challenged by revisionist views emphasizing the multiplicity of power holders with overlapping rights and obligations, the lack of

⁶⁰ The Tokugawa case is well-studied, and has been summarized by Phillip Brown. From his research on Kaga province, he notes that in a number of cases, including in lands directly under the central authority, surveys used a *kandaka* (cash-value) standard and then converted that to *kokudaka* when submitting results. He additionally notes that of the three survey techniques commonly used, two of them could not measure individual fields and that all three methods regularly produced area estimates in error by 20%-30%, they also *systematically* underrepresented agricultural output. Daimyo were able to manipulate this method of survey through the use of non-standard measures in order to either promote themselves within the Daimyo hierarchy (Nambu, Tsugaru, Mito, Daishoji) or to conceal resources (Chosokabe). Brown notes the case of a hatamoto called Shoken Hyozaemon, who shortened the measuring rod used to measure his land by almost a third in order to raise his productivity to Daimyo status. The land was measured and then assessed at a level of production, so overstating the amount of land he held by 25% to 33% raised his *assessed* productivity enough to reach *mankoku* 万石 status, essentially equivalent to a premodern accountancy trick. Brown *Central authority and local autonomy*.

⁶¹ Rice was used because it “was the prestige cereal, credited with all sorts of benign properties, mystical, as when offered to the gods (for no other grain would do), and tonic, as when pressed on the sick as a preservative”, Bolitho “The Han”, p. 214. A corollary of this is the “idea that the Japanese have always been a rice-farming people is a central component of national identity. Social historian Amino Yoshihiko has criticized this as the ‘rice monocultural theory’ (*inasaku ichigenron*) and devoted a substantial proportion of his career to emphasizing the importance of nonagriculturalists-hunters, fishers, tradespeople, and others-throughout Japanese history. Obviously, it is undoubtedly true that many Japanese throughout history have made their living without farming rice (or indeed, anything else). Subjectively it is not true: such is the power of ethnic (or national) identity”, Batten *To the Ends of Japan*, p. 119. See also Chapter 6 below.

⁶² Wink *Akbar*, p. 76.

⁶³ See the calculations in Ravina *Land and Lordship in Early Modern Japan*, for example.

⁶⁴ Habib *The Agrarian System of the Mughal Empire*, p. 364. Such claims can be multiplied indefinitely, for example, “Never was the Divine Right of Kings more fully developed than by the Safavid shahs”, Savory “The Safavid administrative system”, p. 351.

a singular locus of state sovereignty⁶⁵ and the persistence of a “dialectic between centrifugal and centripetal tendencies”.⁶⁶ In the case of the Tokugawa, as for others, the difference of opinion often appears the result of whether a greater focus is placed upon the records of the central administration, or upon examining how these practices actually functioned at a local level.⁶⁷ Greater attention to the latter has made it clear how such states were never able to match their own claims.⁶⁸ Although it based tax-collection on the extraction of peasant productivity, the Tokugawa did not attempt to calculate peasant production accurately, or tie peasants to specific plots of land, ruling instead through local rulers, who all acknowledged Tokugawa rule while not conforming to one model. As a system of rule, therefore, Tokugawa governance was characterized by a lack of homogeneity, with different survey techniques utilized, different systems of land tenure within villages over time and across space, and a lack of effort to revise or resurvey the tax base, even over the course of 250 years. Even at their moment of origin, however, these surveys of taxable agricultural resources were not the consistent, unified investigations they were presented as being, with the original survey open to manipulation and subversion at various points within the system.

While there is broad agreement that the Tokugawa state failed to penetrate either very far or consistently into the lives of villagers, together with other early modern states, it uniformly claimed to have surveyed and mapped all of its territory.⁶⁹ In *presenting* itself as conducted uniformly across the entirety of the land under the state’s rule, such surveys provided a framework within which the wealth of the land was able to be legitimately claimed by the state. This is because such cadastral surveys were not only practices of knowledge production, but also performances. These performances served as markers of legitimacy, ones which were

⁶⁵ Bayly *Origins of Nationality*.

⁶⁶ Haldon *The State and the Tributary Mode of Production*. Obviously such differences often stem from whether one takes a ‘local’ or ‘national’ history perspective, and the weight afforded the claims made by the state’s archives as against other sources.

⁶⁷ Much recent work in English has sought to highlight the independence of domain administrations and their relationship to shogunal power; see Brown *Central Authority and Local Autonomy*; Ravina *Land and Lordship in Early Modern Japan*; Roberts *Mercantilism in a Japanese Domain*; Howell *Capitalism from Within*; Wigen *The Making of a Japanese Periphery*. Recent work in Japanese has been far less interested in describing the entire sweep of the Tokugawa period using a single term.

⁶⁸ Luke Roberts has made this issue the focus of a recent monograph, in which he ascribes such discrepancies as being the result of a *particularly* Japanese political culture, but Japan is not as exceptional as he assumes in this regard. Roberts *Performing the Great Peace*.

⁶⁹ Land tenure systems within villages even within the same domain remained diverse throughout the Tokugawa period. The research of Narumi Kunitada has emphasized the utilization of surveying and maps at a more local level, see Narumi *Kinsei Nihon no chizu to sokuryō*.

most frequently associated with newly coalescing states ‘stating’ their existence to local holders of authority, providing a means of centralizing governments to make visible their universal claims. That all of these states presented themselves as having homogenized and ordered all of the state’s land to make it ‘legible’ to the state shows that this was a crucial claim to legitimacy for these states, one which created the possibility of mapping the realm.⁷⁰

Maps of Japan

Asian states surveyed their land in order to legitimate both their right to extract resources from it and their authority over subordinate political authorities. Such surveys were presented as part of the universal ordering undertaken by these states, and appear to provide the possibility of graphically-representing such ordering in map form. In East Asia, certainly, we know that these representations were present. Maps of the Chinese and Japanese ‘nations’ are known to exist from the twelfth and fourteenth centuries respectively, although presumably with earlier antecedents. In the Japanese case, the medieval image of Japan that emerged was supposedly based on an 8th century original associated with Gyōki, the legendary Nara-period monk, who “drew...the shape of the country as a *tokko*”, the Buddhist single-pronged *Vajra*.⁷¹ This association is, however, almost certainly a later attribution that connects the monk with this genre of maps, which generally tie the individual provincial spaces into a unified whole through a network of ‘circuits’ emanating out from the capital of Kyoto, and seem to mimic the ‘fish-scale’ maps being developed in China around this time.⁷² This emphasizes how the space of Japan was made up of “66 provinces and 2 islands”.⁷³ These

⁷⁰ Scott *Seeing like a State*, used by him to indicate the ‘high modernist’ drive of the modern state but clearly applicable to the (failed) ambitions of imperial states in the early modern period.

⁷¹ Kuroda “Gyōkishiki ‘Nihonzu’ to wa nani ka”; Kuroda *Ryū no sumu Nihon*. This Buddhist reading of the country ascribed to Japan’s outer form could also extend to its internal structure, as the “five-fold division of the provinces denotes the dharma nature of the great elements in the Womb Mandala. The seven roads are the seven forms of consciousness of perfect enlightenment producing the subtle attainment of non-duality”. *Keiran shūyōshū*, 511a, quoted in Moerman “Demonology and Eroticism”, p. 257.

⁷² The map at Ninnaji in Kyoto notes that it was drawn by Gyōki, but it may well be that the general understanding of the genre as being associated with him is an error. For Uesugi Kazuhiro, the gyōki-style maps represent a first stage in Tokugawa mapping generally, associated with the religious figure of the monk, to be followed by those associated with Ishikawa Ryūsen (artistic) and Inō Tadataka (scholarly), see Uesugi *Chizu kara yomu Edo-jidai*, p. 221.

⁷³ 六十六圖二島, which frequently served as a shorthand for the entirety of the country, see Unno *Chizu ni miru Nihon*, p. 127.

provincial components associated with the seventh-century *ritsuryō* state provided a flexible representation of Japan as a whole, able indeed to serve as the logo of the state,⁷⁴ one both comprehensible to and recognized by contemporaries.⁷⁵

Consequently, this was a logo available to represent a newly-unified polity. The *Taikō kenchō* of 1591 had demanded the submission of both cadastral surveys and provincial maps.⁷⁶ Hideyoshi did not attempt to map the land in accordance with the actually existing political system, which remained a confused morass of lordly holdings, but emphasized his claim to national unity⁷⁷ by decreeing that maps be submitted in the form of the districts that made up the administrative divisions of Japan's provinces.⁷⁸ This was a system with clear historical precedents, symbolizing the extension of legitimate authority across the realm, an authority concentrated in the person of the Emperor's retired regent, Hideyoshi himself.⁷⁹ Authority was over the *Tenka*, a Japanese space mapped as the *ritsuryō* state, and the emperor, as the symbolic head of this political order, was retained *in situ* in modern Kyoto.⁸⁰ Following the decisive battle of Sekigahara, the Tokugawa allocated to themselves a huge swathe of the

⁷⁴ Particularly associated with modern maps today, Anderson *Imagined Communities*, p.250.

⁷⁵ So that upon reaching Japan, the Jesuits immediately assumed a country of 66 kingdoms, see below.

⁷⁶ It seems difficult to imagine that Hideyoshi's desire for mapping was not also partially stimulated by the images of the world that were becoming available in Japan through the Europeans at around this time.

⁷⁷ The point has been made with regards to Europe that state maps were "ahistorical" in disguising the temporal variations within which different territories were incorporated into the state. See Konvitz "The Nation-state, Paris and Cartography", p. 7.

⁷⁸ Only two examples survive, from Kubiki and Seba in Echigo province. Provincial maps were apparently to be constructed, it is unclear if a national map was envisaged, but thought highly probable. Kawamura *Edo bakufu-sen kuniezu no kenkyū*, p. 21-26; Kawamura *Edo Bakufu no Nihon Chizu*, p. 12-17, reproductions on p. 14-15

⁷⁹ Hideyoshi legitimized the survey by pretending it was conducted on behalf of the Emperor, a pretense that the Tokugawa later dropped; by the Genroku-era maps, the emperor has been effaced, Sugimoto *Ryōiki Shihai no Tenkai to Kinsei*, p. 159.

⁸⁰ Both Hideyoshi and the Tokugawa also made use of the system of court ranks, but separately from the business of government, retaining the emperor as an ideological prop while granting him no authority whatsoever. See Roberts *Performing the Great Peace*, pp. 22-23. The emperor remained politically insignificant until the tail end of the eighteenth century. Referring to him as emperor is in accord with modern practice, following the Meiji Restoration and the use of the title for Mutsuhito. European observers in early modern Japan referred to the Tokugawa Shogun's as Emperor (Kaiser, etc.), while occasionally comparing the 'emperor' in Kyoto with the Pope. In this study, as far as possible, English equivalents have been deployed in place of the standard terms used in Japanese historiography, which have become known in English (Bakufu, etc.), on the grounds that these were not known to contemporaries. Given that this work aims to be comparative, it makes most sense to deploy equivalent terms wherever possible, so as not to excessively "exoticize" a system which contemporary European observers viewed as comprehensible. The Tokugawa theoretically ruled for this emperor as a kind of *primus-inter-pares*, with the emphasis on 'first'. As already noted, there are numerous ways of understanding this governing structure, see also n. 67 above. Rather than one ideology (Neo-Confucian, tributary, etc.), it is best to view its claims to legitimacy as "syncretic"; asserted differently in various times and places. See also Chapters 5 and 6 in particular. "Syncretic" is from Ravina "State-building and political economy in early-modern Japan", p. 1017.

most productive land in central Japan, and ruled the remainder through local lords, who were granted revenue from specific villages together with the responsibility of governing them.

Along with two other policies originating with Hideyoshi, the separation of warriors and farmers and the removal of the samurai from the countryside, the survey represented the structure of the Tokugawa social order in important ways. With villages the economic base upon which warrior rule rested, but from which they were physically separated, they were largely left to govern themselves.⁸¹

The large-scale mapping projects undertaken by the Tokugawa are referred to by the year they were ordered, generally considered the Keicho, Kanei, Shōhō, Genroku and Tenpo surveys.⁸² Ordering the submission of these maps were a means of asserting control; others included the provision of labour for government projects, military duties, and from 1635 their actual physical presence at the Tokugawa's capital of Edo.⁸³ These maps represented the villages of a province, color-coded by district rather than by domain overlord.⁸⁴ Through allocating villages to local rulers, the state was able to abstract the entire field of hierarchical social relations in a region. Daimyo and their retinues could, and frequently were, transferred round the realm like pawns on a chessboard, because their holdings were no longer legitimated by their own personal power within a given area.⁸⁵ Whether intended or not, in a time of considerable political flux this cartographically separated local rulers from their lands and effectively effaced their control.⁸⁶ Individual provincial surveys were then combined into a map of the entire realm which, with villages no longer marked, is divided up into the uninterrupted blocks of

⁸¹ Ooms *Tokugawa village practice*; Scheiner "The Japanese village".

⁸² There is disagreement over the number of surveys. Because *Gōcho* were not submitted, Kawamura considers the Kan'ei as a reworking of the Keicho survey rather than a national mapping project, see *Kuniezu*, p. 219; he also asserts that the national map hitherto believed to have been a result of the Keicho survey is a Kan'ei one. Kuroda Hideo has argued that there was one continuous period of surveying between the Genna and Shōhō periods (1615-1647), and that these should not be divided into separate survey projects.

⁸³ This does not exhaust the means by which Tokugawa control and authority over the daimyo was proclaimed. In 1634, Iemitsu marched an army of 300,000 men through Kyoto, and from this date on not only did the Shogunate make no reference to the Court at Kyoto until the 1790's, but the Court itself was forced to send annual 'tribute' to the enshrined deity at Nikko, see Ooms *Tokugawa Ideology*; Vaporis *Tour of Duty*.

⁸⁴ This was not initially the case everywhere, but had become standardized by the Genroku survey. See also Chapter 5.

⁸⁵ Berry *Japan in Print*, pp. 84-87.

⁸⁶ Significant given the nearly 800 occasions by the end of the seventeenth century in which domains had been reduced, enlarged, abolished, created, transferred, or otherwise altered.

color representing the spaces of “sixty-six provinces and two islands”.⁸⁷ Such a map, as Toby has noted, appears to form a cartographic panopticon, with the central state being given an unobstructed view down to every corner of its dominions.⁸⁸ Through a spatial grid of autonomous, tax-producing villages and imperial provinces, the entirety of the realm is open to view.

While the use of provinces to structure the mapping may appear anachronistic, therefore, it worked to unify both the representation and what was being represented. Tokugawa maps replicated “the territorial imperatives of a particular system”, while painting the landscape of the present in the colors of the past;⁸⁹ colors that served to legitimize present Tokugawa hegemony.⁹⁰ As Berry notes, these were maps in which, although “the pull of the center remains curiously unpronounced”, the realm *itself* worked to legitimize Tokugawa rule over other lords, who emerge on the map only in the form of a network of castle towns that were all forced to take their lead from Edo.⁹¹ The reproduction of the essential elements of this mapping on commercial cartography, such as the division of the realm into provinces, their ranking by rice production, and linkage through a dense network of roads, characterizes much of what we understand about both Tokugawa maps and Tokugawa society more generally (*Figure 3*).⁹² These early Tokugawa maps, therefore, appear to represent the space of the Tokugawa ‘protonation’,⁹³ and while therefore not understood as ‘modern’, as with contemporary European mapping projects, they are concerned with defining the state on the map.

⁸⁷ The map long thought to represent this first unified map of the realm, dating from the Keicho-era, has been shown by Kawamura to be the product of extensive later surveying, and should be dated to around 1639. See Kawamura “The National Map of Japan in the Tokugawa Shogunate”.

⁸⁸ Toby “Kinseiki no ‘Nihonzu’ to ‘Nihon’ no Kyōkai”, ‘panopticon’ is from Foucault drawing on Bentham’s model for the perfect prison, having become a metaphor for increased state surveillance.

⁸⁹ To invert the words of Brian Harley, who wrote of painting the landscape of the past in the colors of the present, see Harley *The New Nature of Maps*, pp. 54-55.

⁹⁰ As a result, when the effect of growing commercialization and the spread of publishing became a factor towards the latter half of the seventeenth century, the representation of the realm that was adopted to be sold in the market was that of the Shogunate itself. Moriya “Urban Networks and Information Networks”; Yonemoto “The ‘Spatial Vernacular’ in Tokugawa Maps”.

⁹¹ Berry *Japan in Print*, p. 94.

⁹² Such as the maps of Ishikawa Ryusen, in particular. See Yonemoto *Mapping Early Modern Japan*, Uesugi *Chizu kara yomu Edo-jidai*.

⁹³ Mitani Hiroshi *Meiji Isshin to Nashonarizumu*, Chapter 1 for ‘protonation’, which largely underpins the assumptions of many scholars.

While the representations on these maps provide seductive explanations of the state of Tokugawa Japan, it is worth considering how it functions. The spatial grid of tax-producing villages and imperial provinces serves as the framework within which the representation of Japan is produced, serving as the spatial epistemology through which knowledge of the nation is made manifest. However, the map itself simultaneously serves as a number of assertions about the world, arguing for the construction of space as being fundamentally structured by those same epistemological props. Therefore, maps are representations upon which epistemological knowledge frameworks and ontological knowledge claims cannot easily be separated. Instead, the new history of cartography has sought to recover culturally-specific epistemologies from cartographic materials in order to better understand the particularity of certain histories of mapping, a process to which histories of Japan have contributed. Nevertheless, such studies have tended towards a static interpretation of these epistemologies, one in which they are only able to be compared as culturally-defined systems of representation.⁹⁴

Recontextualizing such maps emphasizes how their presence in the records shows that the 'offering up' of maps by the provinces to the center was part of the performance of statehood. These demands for cartography ritualized a homogenized presentation of state territory, reflecting numerous other acts of submission to the center that characterized these imperial formations; of taxes, gifts, hostages, and military obligations, amongst others. It is these that provide the state with an order, one in which the various rituals were made to overlap. Nevertheless, none of this is apparent from the map itself, only through due consideration of the wider circumstances within which the knowledge on the map is able to find representation. This focus on maps as cultural products, therefore, has been extremely useful for rehabilitating the maps produced at the outset of the Tokugawa period, and considering their role within the early modern state.⁹⁵ This has been possible by understanding state maps

⁹⁴ Suny "Back and Beyond".

⁹⁵ Much of the recent interest in maps has sought to move away from technical accounts of their construction and towards a greater engagement with their status as cultural objects. Within this framework, maps have been viewed as being complicit in creating that which "they pretended only to represent", being granted a far greater "productive power" in bringing into being what was asserted on the map. This is a claim of central relevance to questions of territory, as the development of 'modern' cartography by European states, both back within Europe and overseas, provides such an effective shortcut to explain the key characteristics of the sovereign territorial state. These include; the territorialisation of political power, its centralization through nested hierarchies of scalar governance, the rationalization of political space, and the representation of this space of the state upon "logo

as not solely being those concerned with the “scaled representation of things in space”,⁹⁶ but rather representations used for a variety of purposes. Demanding submission of the maps provided a means of asserting legitimacy, while the production of maps from the results also asserted the Tokugawa’s right to rule. Nevertheless, in moving beyond the traditional concern of the map with accuracy, we are left with a representation that appears complicit in the establishment of a particular state order. That is, whereas previous studies of maps frequently reduced their importance to a question of accuracy, this first generation of revisionist scholarship sought to define maps by their role in the construction of state power. In order to go beyond this, it is necessary to pay greater attention to the reception of such maps, and how they existed as part of a process.

Mapping the world

East Asia is often considered as exceptional in the history of cartography, because of the obvious bureaucratic role of cartographic materials, as well as the fact that this usage does not map exactly upon the European experience. Traditional Chinese political ideals emphasized the importance of the submission of maps from local authorities and power-holders as indicative of submission to the political centre, a tradition maintained, if not necessarily practiced. In both China and Japan, records of maps far outnumber actual maps prior to about 1500, so it remains possible that they were present more “in idealized descriptions of government than actuality”.⁹⁷ However, their presence in the records indicates that the ‘offering up’ of maps by the provinces to the centre was part of the performance of statehood. This longevity of Chinese and Japanese provincial spaces would suggest that graphic representations were deployed in order to create a “model for” what they purported to represent.⁹⁸ Their success would appear to be indicated by the administrative geography of successive Chinese dynasties reconstituting itself around these ‘central’ provinces, while in Japan provincial gazetteers

maps” that provide a recognizable and reproducible representation of state authority. Nevertheless, there is no inherent reason to accept these claims more than those of the map to accuracy.

⁹⁶ Andrews, see n. 2.

⁹⁷ Yee “Chinese Maps in Political Culture”, p. 75.

⁹⁸ Thongchai *Siam Mapped*, p. 310.

submitted to the emperor provided a tradition within which both Hideyoshi's and Tokugawa demands for representing revenue obligations were framed.⁹⁹

The absence of maps by these states is often understood as indicating a lack of "conviction of the merits of mapping" as "a precondition for mapping itself".¹⁰⁰ However, the emergence and extended existence of these other Asian states suggests that perhaps the value to the state of such graphic representations is not necessarily as clear-cut as we would expect.¹⁰¹ It is perfectly possible for the body of the state to be envisioned in the absence of maps. The sixteenth century saw the 'reassembly' of states such as Safavid Persia and Muscovite Russia, which apparently lacked unifying graphical representations of national space, as well as the coalescence of Mughal and Ottoman states over new imperial realms.¹⁰² Each of these would find their own means of representation. In the Safavid state, for example, Shah Abbas's efforts to symbolically project his power were "bolstered by new articulations of imperial space, which operated with deliberate temporal and spatial boundaries"¹⁰³ that took the form of elucidations of its provinces, one which nevertheless remained resolutely textual. Similarly, in 1579-80 the Mughal ruler Akbar decreed the division of his realm into twelve provinces, each with a governor and a full set of officials, with these comprised of more than a 100 *sarkars*, or 'districts', that were themselves aggregates of *parganas* or *mahals*. The *Ain-i-Akbari*'s "statistical and geographical survey of the empire" contain the laborious compilation of provincial revenue offices and chapters on the classification of lands arranged according to these divisions, the lower levels of which remained the basis of fiscal administration into the British period and even beyond.¹⁰⁴

Administrative definitions of states do not require their graphical representation. Chinese imperial culture had always laid great stress on the importance of maps, but arguably as symbolic tokens of tributary submission, rather than providing a graphic representation to aid

⁹⁹ Unno "Cartography in Japan"; and Yonemoto, *Mapping Early Modern Japan*.

¹⁰⁰ Kain & Baigent *The Cadastral Map in the Service of the State*, p. 343.

¹⁰¹ "Which is why modern nations like the United Kingdom and Norway still lack a mapped-based cadaster", in Wood, Fels & Krygier *Rethinking*, p. 32.

¹⁰² Visible also in the 'reunifications' of the Kingdoms of England and France, where the centralization of territorial authority clearly preceded its graphical representation, rather than resulting from it.

¹⁰³ "...the mandate of Shah Abbas and his ancestors was explicitly fused with the historical, pre-Islamic legacy of Iran as a distinct political space. Thus, there is contiguity to Abbas's correspondence between 'the Safavid dynasty' and 'the empire of Iran' not discussed in earlier *insha* material". Mitchell *The Practice of Politics in Safavid Iran*, p. 177.

¹⁰⁴ Mann "Mapping the Country".

in the state's administration. While the provincial production of gazetteer's had grown out of "the Han-dynasty practice of recording geographical information on cadastral survey maps", by the Ming-era the maps that accompanied the gazetteers had become simplified, stylized depictions of the county as seen from the magistrate's headquarters.¹⁰⁵ As Yee has made clear, until the end of the Qing, making maps of the areas under their control was simply something these provincial administrators did, even if, to our eyes, such maps appear to lack any sort of functional role¹⁰⁶ because of the "need to record types of knowledge in greater descriptive detail than a visual summary allowed".¹⁰⁷ This mapping ideal was also transferred to Japan, where a similar tradition of presenting provincial gazetteers emerges, although by the Tokugawa period, the gazetteers largely lacked maps, and the geographic descriptions of the provinces they offered remained textual.¹⁰⁸ This shift in the functional role of gazetteers indicates that maps did not exist within a vacuum, with the geographical information on them understood in terms of a much broader spectrum of cultural production, rather than emerging solely off the map. Karen Wigen has shown how this 'imagined' province, which for a long time seems to have primarily existed in textual descriptions rather than the circulation of visual images, remained available for representation upon what proved to be remarkably "malleable" maps.¹⁰⁹

The malleability of such maps stems from the manner in which the knowledge which they purported to display existed within circuits of meaning, available to be remapped. Not all such geographic knowledge did so. Over the past two decades, the famous surveys conducted with the help of the Jesuits in the reign of Qing Emperor Kangxi and the creation of atlases on the basis of data produced within them, have been used to argue for a 'global early modern' that should be characterized by "momentous changes in conceptions of space and thus cartography".¹¹⁰ A number of scholars have been moved to argue for the participation of the Qing within what should be understood as a global early-modern imperial cartographic project,¹¹¹ with the Kangxi atlas being "based on the world's first systematic application of a

¹⁰⁵ Brook *The Chinese State in Ming Society*, p. 46.

¹⁰⁶ Yee "Chinese Maps in Political Culture", p. 90.

¹⁰⁷ Brook *The Chinese State in Ming Society*, p. 44.

¹⁰⁸ Sugimoto Ryoiki *Shihai no Tenkai to Kinsei*.

¹⁰⁹ Wigen *The Malleable Map*.

¹¹⁰ Subrahmanyam, "Connected histories", pp. 736-7.

¹¹¹ See Hostetler *Qing Colonial Enterprise*; Hostetler "Qing Connections to the Early Modern World"; Millward "Coming onto the Map"; also, extending this idea to Japan, Walker "Mamiya Rinzō and the Japanese exploration of

trigonometric survey, then the cartographic state-of-the-art, to an entire state".¹¹² While the mapping visible in traditional Chinese gazetteer's may have had significant differences from Western tropes, the cartographic projects of the Kangxi and Qianlong reigns show an early modern state mobilizing the latest cartographic technologies in order to both comprehend and assert its control. These triangulated maps of the Qing served to fix the territorial boundaries of the Qing state both internally and on the maps of Europeans. This demonstrates the essential compatibility and commensurability of the Qing 'empire' with contemporary European states.¹¹³

However, this places excessive focus on the contents of the map itself. What is required is to seek to understand the map within the context provided by the conditions of its own making, which will enable us to seek to understand those conditions, rather than attempting to read them off the paper-thin surface of the map itself. Irrespective of the suitability of some of these comparisons,¹¹⁴ significant is how it is conducted in terms of the 'Imperial', 'modern' mapping (and these terms largely overlap) that supposedly characterizes the European cartographic project. This is a view that sees Western imperialism supported by a world-view uniquely underpinned by a Cartesian absolutist conception of space, and reduces European mapping to such a conception, while implicitly accepting its claims to accuracy. The understanding is that such surveys represent "an empirical, objective and unproblematic science concerned only with the presentation of geographic information",¹¹⁵ and thus accepting the claims of the map at face value. Given the subsequent history of the Qing, however, and it is clear that these surveys were only ever "a profoundly 'flawed' panopticon" able to nourish "illusions" regarding "absolute and rational control".¹¹⁶

These claims are made almost entirely on the basis of the finished project, rather than considering the role of the map and what it represented within general geographic discourse.

Sakhalin Island". Contra Yee "Traditional Chinese Cartography and the Myth of Westernization"; Smith *Chinese Maps*; Smith *Mapping China and Managing the World*. Yee's basic contention is that "from the late sixteenth to the beginning of the twentieth, Chinese cartographic practice bears few traces of European influence", p. 170.

¹¹² Millward "Coming onto the Map", p. 72.

¹¹³ Hevia *Cherishing Men from Afar*; Larsen *Tradition, Treaties, and Trade*; Needham "Geography and Cartography of China"; Waley-Cohen "China and Western technology in the late eighteenth century".

¹¹⁴ The Jesuit survey bore even less resemblance to 'triangulation', as the term is used in reference to European cartography, than that of Inō Tadataka in Japan.

¹¹⁵ Edney "Mathematical Cosmography and the Social Ideology of British Cartography", p. 101.

¹¹⁶ Bassin "History and philosophy of geography.", p. 111.

In this case, access to this atlas remained highly restricted and the practices necessary for its creation were not institutionalized,¹¹⁷ while as Matthew Mosca has argued, the basis of geographical knowledge in the Qing empire continued to be overwhelmingly textual until well into the nineteenth century.¹¹⁸ Mosca's notion of a Qing transition from Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy will be one that this study engages with extensively, and on this point, his work also shows that maps need to be studied, 'in the context of the beliefs and values of the ruling elite' rather than "abusing" them by imposing modern conceptions of cartography.¹¹⁹ This is essential as maps "are made to be used, and as such they reflect the needs of the societies for which they are produced".¹²⁰ It is for this reason that more attention is required to both the context from within which the map emerged and within which it circulated, as it was this that determines the value of a map. This is the problem with the idea that "Qing expansion to the northwest parallels European state-building and expansion in its concern with measurement and the 'scientific' gathering of geographic and ethnographic data to undergird national and imperial control, *even when that data was not always practically useful.*"¹²¹ In the absence of "use", both in terms of functional role and active engagement, such cartographic products were not incorporated within geographic discourse and therefore politically inconsequential.

It is clear that studies have tended to over-emphasize the constitutive power of individual map images. In doing so, it merely inverts the traditional understanding of how these specific representations are to be understood: rather than stressing the similitude of map with reality, it instead focuses attention on the power of the map to seemingly force reality into the shape represented by the map itself. Neither perspective, however, adequately represents how it is that maps function. Rather than representations of space simply able to be mapped onto reality, or vice-versa, maps instead provide simplified pictures of aspects of reality, grids able to facilitate knowledge. This is not merely knowledge of space, for as has been shown, what is important is not only the relative location of things within a space, but of what it is that those things bring with them. They are not merely reflecting reality, but providing a certain framework within which certain aspects of reality are able to be understood. Maps only serve to

¹¹⁷ Yee, "Traditional Chinese Cartography and the Myth of Westernization".

¹¹⁸ Mosca shows how, well into the nineteenth century, geography was still studied primarily through texts rather than images. Wing mapmakers were themselves well aware of how conjectural the images they produced were. Mosca *From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy* pp. 27, 45-46.

¹¹⁹ Yee "Reinterpreting Traditional Chinese Geographical Maps", p. 55.

¹²⁰ Keates *Understanding maps*, p. 194.

¹²¹ Millward "Coming onto the Map", p. 76.

make the world if utilized to do so by their users. By their nature maps involve a process of selection and simplification in order to make such representations useful and comprehensible. As we have seen, states were quite capable of expressing their own extents through ritual and textual means as well as expressing the wider geography within which their state's existed. Yet all of these means of representing territory served to map both the state and its extent in the mind of its officials. These offices were legitimated and coordinated by reference to a single center, the same center that serves to focus the varying claims of the state to legitimacy, creating a representation of the body of the state in its official mind.¹²² This body was able to exist as a claim to order, irrespective of the reality which it purported to represent.

This was because the accurate representation of state territory was irrelevant to the universal orders within which these states existed. The ordering of patterns of territorial control, whether represented graphically or not, formed part of a complex of activities which centered political and social life upon the imperial center, ritual, statistics, history, and religion, and drew upon varied sources of legitimacy. The Qing embodied Confucian moral order and Chinghiz Khan's charismatic authority while being both Buddhist Llama's and conquerors mandated as Son of Heaven; the Ottoman sultan was khan, caliph, tsar and imperator; while they, the Safavids and Mughals were all heirs to "multiple and sometimes overlapping traditions – Turco-Mongol, Islamic-Prophetic, Islamic-mystical, secular-Persian, to fashion an ideology of dynastic legitimacy"¹²³; the Tokugawa were legitimated within a shifting field of native, Confucian and Buddhist traditions, martial acclaim and delegated Imperial authority. The diversity of such sources of legitimization is concealed by our modern glosses of them as the 'Chinese Tributary system' or 'Japanocentric World Order', granting them the character of a unitary ideology which disguises the fact that their coherence *is* their connection with the state, rather than standing outside and above it. It is this diversity of legitimization is what provides these states with their universal character, allowing them to incorporate and order the diversity characteristic of social life.

¹²² There is no space to detail it here, but the understanding of the 'official mind' of the state is drawn from the "coordinated network of territorially bound offices exercising political power" that Braddick holds defines the abstract idea of the early modern state in Europe. It is knowledge of the state in the minds of its officials that enabled the early modern state to function as "a mind without a body". See Braddick *State formation in early modern England*, pp. 19, 20.

¹²³ Faruqui *The Princes of the Mughal Empire*, p. 17.

The accurate representation of its territory by the state was not part of this order for early modern Asian empires, but neither was it for European ones. It primarily emerged as one component in a scientific ‘standard of civilization’ in the nineteenth century, characterized by a fetishizing of accuracy that needs to be recognized as intensely political rather than natural¹²⁴. This is obvious when we consider the issue of mapping borders, in which the claims of ‘scientific’ mapping to be concerned with the unambiguous location of things in space are conflated with an insistence on imposed linear political boundaries between states as being scientific. This is to confuse the unambiguous representation of a boundary with its existence ‘on the ground’, for the graphic representation of a linear boundary provides its unambiguous location on the map without that representation necessarily having any correlation to the actual division of political space, as the next chapter will clearly indicate.¹²⁵ The question of why early modern Asian empires did not utilize surveying techniques in order to correctly position their territories upon a global geometrical grid of abstract space is the wrong question, because it inevitably depoliticizes mapping, ignoring that it served as an ordering device as ideological as those underpinning the Asian early modern empires claims to universal order. The ‘scientific’ character of European mapping serves as its own political claim, visible in how Mughal material was remapped by Europeans in order to claim they had accurately surveyed the subcontinent.¹²⁶ Surveyed material could be remapped into the imperial state order; the reverse occurred in Japan, where the careful surveying and drafting involved in creating maps of village land ownership were concealed beneath the broad brushstrokes overlaying them to bring the material into line with the prevailing cartographic consciousness.¹²⁷

That the maps of European Imperialism could be based on information largely gleaned from native sources rather than any utilization of “scientific fieldwork and instrumentation” strongly suggests that the development of particular forms of mapping has more to do with the power of the institutions that the cartography is embedded in rather than the knowledge content of

¹²⁴ See for example Gong *The Standard of Civilization in International Society*.

¹²⁵ Works that consider the issue of linear borders from a European perspective consistently fail to provide sufficient reflection on this issue, for a recent example see Branch *The Cartographic State*.

¹²⁶ This claim to accuracy served as one of a battery of legitimating devices that functioned as the nineteenth-century standard of civilization. On its emergence see in particular Edney *Mapping an empire*.

¹²⁷ Narumi “Kinsei sanron e-zu to mawari kenchihō”; and Narumi “Fukugen’ sareta sokuryō to Kinsei sanron e-zu”.

the cartography itself.¹²⁸ The triumph of a particular perception of space, one supposedly homogenized and abstracted, is a consequence rather than a cause of the expansion of peculiarly European spatial regime around the globe through its forceful imposition. Yet while this explains the reason for the adoption of a particularly genre of map, it does not explain the role of such cartographic materials in the creation of territory. In order to do this, we need to examine such maps within the context in which they are received and used, rather than merely examining them as static representations of the world. It is the presence of maps as a process, one of enabling the possibility of continuously remapping and remaking the world, that is most significant with regards the emergence of territory.

Mapping practices

The diffusion of certain types of cartography could have an effect on the manner in which the world was viewed and conceptualized.¹²⁹ However, what still remains unclear, and requires more thorough demonstration, are the effects of such maps on the actual political concepts and practices utilized by states. This is because states had always worked to know and map themselves within their political space. The provincial lists of the Safavids, like the agglomeration of titles in the composite monarchies of early modern Europe, served to represent the territorial body over which the monarch reigned. Yet the relation between the state and its maps shall never be mimesis, as the oft-quoted stories of Borges and Carroll make clear¹³⁰. Maps must be understood as graphical representations of aspects of reality, rather than reality itself. It is this process of selection and representation that allows us to contextualize the production of maps and understand the state they are representing.

Examining only the map encourages a deontologic history, in which the map floats autonomously within a sea of cultural representations. Attention must be paid to what is being mapped, to the production and reproduction of territorial image able to occur on the map, and how that image is able to open "up a direction back from the documents to the world they

¹²⁸ It also reflects the absence of a clear distinction between 'imperial' forms of mapping and other associated with the state.

¹²⁹ Bartelson "The Social Construction of Globality".

¹³⁰ Lewis Carroll, in *Sylvie and Bruno Concluded* (1893), described a fictional map with "the scale of a mile to the mile" and had a character note that due to difficulties in using it, "we now use the country itself, as its own map, and I assure you it does nearly as well." Borges developed this idea in his one paragraph short story, "On Exactitude in Science", initially published in 1946.

portray”.¹³¹ Otherwise, excessive authority, or ‘hegemonic license’, is inevitably granted to the gaze of the observer, one which pays no attention to the slippage and tension between the ‘yearning’ about and for territory and the ‘grim material circumstances’ within which such desires must be realized.¹³² The territory being mapped must be rehistoricized, allowing us to understand the cultural and material constraints under which it operated. It is through such an endeavour that the possibility of a critical history of cartographic practice emerges, one which analyses mapping, and the ‘truth’ of its representations, not teleologically but as contingent on material, social, cultural and technical relations at particular times and places, operating within a “certain horizon of possibilities”.¹³³

Such horizons are themselves continuously altering in response to the map. While appearing to attempt to ‘fix’ relationships within the world, in reality maps work to provide the framework through which to comprehend it. While “in the cartographic world” it appears that “all is still and silent”,¹³⁴ this is the result of the way in which the map is used. As we have seen, such mapping should be perceived as part of a process, through which maps serve as a means of explicating change in the world, of ‘reflexively monitoring’ activities within it, rather than merely a picture. Maps are never solely static images because they serve to as “devices to classify data”,¹³⁵ which itself is in the process of constant flux. In the Tokugawa case, although “ruled as if it were altogether static, gradually became a society of movement and variety”.¹³⁶ Facilitating knowledge of that society was the map, through its provision of a grid within which, not space, but the movement of things within it, was able to be comprehended. As devices that sought to capture this, maps “helped create the very possibility of a Tokugawa public by converting ... local experiences into uniform categories embracing a total population”,¹³⁷ and through them collated “on the same plane heterogeneous places” able to

¹³¹ Häkli “In the territory of knowledge”, p. 414.

¹³² Mark Bassin also astutely notes the “inclination in the literature to grant the ‘gaze’ of the observer sort of hegemonic license in regard to the object-region, a licence which suggests a kind of absolute power or control”. In his own work, he points to how “Russians sought to ‘invent’ the Amur in their quest for a national utopia, but they were manifestly unable to do so”, Bassin *Imperial Visions*, p. 277.

¹³³ Crampton *The Political Mapping of Cyberspace*, p. 51.

¹³⁴ Ingold *Lines*, p.242.

¹³⁵ Fabian *Time and the other*, p. 55.

¹³⁶ Jansen *The Making of Modern Japan*, p. 141.

¹³⁷ Berry “Was Early Modern Japan Culturally Integrated?”, p. 573.

be granted significance with and through one another and the state.¹³⁸ The state's territory is defined by this process of collation, asserted and made comprehensible through the map.

To examine this relationship, it is necessary to comprehend both map and territory together, not read one into the other, and thus go beyond, "traditional theories and histories of maps and mapping [which] have tended to either reduce maps to one or another interest – the progressive evolution of representation of the earth, the tools of power, or the material form of a universal 'instinct' or 'drive'". It is vital to avoid "reducing the map to a single narrative and giving it a single history".¹³⁹ What is required is, as Denis Cosgrove has argued, the rehistoricization of maps by firstly examining "the complex accretion of cultural engagements with the world that surround and underpin the authoring of a map" and secondly looking "at the insertion of the map, once produced, into various circuits of use, exchange and meaning". This is to treat the map as both "a determined cultural outcome" and as "an element of material culture".¹⁴⁰ It is as material culture that the map is once again reinserted in the conditions of its own creation.¹⁴¹ In doing so, the world that the map describes becomes one not merely "in the making, but one ready-made for life to occupy".¹⁴²

¹³⁸ de Certeau *The Practice of Everyday Life*, p. 121.

¹³⁹ Pickles *A History of Spaces*, p. 89.

¹⁴⁰ Cosgrove *Mappings*, p. 9.

¹⁴¹ Mukerji "Printing, Cartography and Conceptions of Place in Renaissance Europe".

¹⁴² Ingold *Lines*, p. 235.

3. BORDERING INSIDE AND OUT

"The question of boundaries is the first to be encountered. From it all others flow. To draw a border around anything is to define, analyse and reconstruct it..."¹

In Chapter 1, this study made the case for reconsidering the notion of territory which we apply in political practice, arguing for territory to be understood as a demarcated portion of the material world granted some sort of conceptual unity. This separates the notion of territory from European claims to have uncovered a putatively homogenous and abstract space able to constitute modern notions of territory. Rather, in order to achieve an understanding of how territory functions, it is necessary to focus attention on the political practices from which it is constituted. Chapter 2 focused its attention on one of these practices, that of mapping, which aids in the constitution of territory through granting meaning to a given section of the material world. This meaning is created through not simply mapping the reality of a given spatial expanse but by the deployment of a map as a framework through which to understand the world. This was empirically examined by tracing the mapping conducted within early modern Japan, and offering a comparison with that done by other states across Eurasia. This demonstrated that the 'grid' created by the deployment of this framework allows for the capture of movement as well as the assertion of fixity, providing a device able to comprehend change.

This chapter will develop this notion of the grid through a particular focus on the second practice from which territory is constituted, which is that of borders. The importance of borders themselves for territory has long been recognized, and indeed it is borders of a particular type which are commonly held to define the modern state, as the material instantiations of their linear representations on the map. This border is held to be a marker of an absolute distinction between different sovereign authorities, and thus a particularly crucial site for the constitution of the territorial state. Indeed, it is concerns regarding the state's inability to materially enforce this linear boundary account for much recent political turmoil,

¹ Braudel *The Mediterranean*, p. 18.

which are indicative of a search for ‘fixity’ and concerns for the dissolution of the current state order. In doing so, however, contemporary politics is itself indicative of the confusion between map and reality, which has been developed over the previous two chapters. The reduction of the notion of borders to the linear markers representing the division between sovereign authorities on the map works to trap *thinking* about and acting in the world in territorial terms, as this understanding of borders comes to “limit the exercise of intellect, imagination, and political will”.²

Recent border studies have instead focused their attention on the border as a *process* of division, rather than its instantiation. Here, the complex material and conceptual assemblages³ that come together to constitute the border are now understood as not “lines in the sand”,⁴ but rather as multiscalar social constructions that serve to constitute territory from the space of society.⁵ Borders are not themselves reducible to space, coming to be widely recognized as processes, the material technology of social division together with the institutions and symbols necessary to grant it coherence. Rather than operating within limited spatial areas around the border itself, borders should instead be understood as occurring throughout and beyond the social space these symbolic and institutional manifestations themselves produce.⁶ This production occurs because borders do have real effects, limiting, but also permitting, the movement of people and things within and between given areas of social space. In doing so, they also crucially have the ability to tie social spaces together.

This somewhat abstract discussion will be fleshed out in the remainder of this chapter, by building upon the empirical discussion of mapping out early modern Japan in order to highlight the role of borders as social process helping to constitute the territory of the state. As will be obvious, this does not depend upon an absolute notion of borders, which instead emerge through the process of circulation of peoples and things, which through the institutional and symbolic constitution of the border are either “redirected” by the border’s presence, or “leak” through its claims.⁷ It is through the interaction of the institutional and symbolic

² Agnew “Borders on the mind: re-framing border thinking”, p. 176.

³ Sohn “Navigating borders’ multiplicity”.

⁴ Parker & Vaughan-Williams. “Lines in the sand?”; Parker & Vaughan-Williams. “Critical border studies”.

⁵ Laine “The Multiscalar Production of Borders”.

⁶ Johnson et al. “Interventions on rethinking ‘the border’ in border studies”; Paasi. “Border studies reanimated”.

⁷ Nail *Theory of the Border*, pp. 5-8.

manifestations of the border with a society in motion that the border process is “reproduced”, and notions of the border come to find their existence.

Bordering the early modern state

The previous chapter has pointed to the importance of an East Asian tradition of statehood, stemming from the Chinese exemplar, which provided for a number of practices through which the state was constituted. The Tokugawa state succeeded, by at least the late 1630’s, in representing itself on the traditional map of Japan, by reinscribing its own authority onto existing images of Japan’s lands. These had been represented consistently for several hundred years on the *gyoki* maps as being in the form of the five inner provinces and seven Imperial circuits, or 68 provinces that made up the lands of Japan. As the maps themselves show, however, the actual geographical and political spaces indicated by these provinces were largely irrelevant, represented as mere claims of control. Tying these abstract provincial spaces together as a single political realm was the demarcation of boundaries between them, appearing to provide these represented borders with a singular political importance. Accompanying the desire for the submission of maps was the related concern of the government with ordering “provincial borders to be surveyed, described and mapped”.⁸ As with map submission, this practice of demarcating and administering provincial boundaries served an important legitimating function within ideas of statehood.

Reading descriptions of these administrative orders today, or looking at the maps which represented them, and it is apparent that “nested hierarchies” of governance that was represented upon such maps constituted a spatial order that in terms of bureaucratic rationality differed little from that of the modern territorial state.⁹ In Japan’s case, the effectiveness of this as a legitimating device is obvious in the reaction of contemporaries. The early Jesuits noted that Japan was “a country of various islands, divided into 66 kingdoms”,¹⁰

⁸ In 646 a proclamation specifically indicated to provincial governors that “the boundaries of the provinces should be examined and a description or map prepared, which should be brought here and produced for our inspection.” Aston *Nihongi* p. 225. The *Nihongi* also records the submission of maps of Tanegashima and Shinano provinces in 691 and 694, respectively. Aston *Nihongi* p. 352. See also Unno *Chizu no Bunkashi*.

⁹ Sahlins great work on the Pyrenees is much quoted, but too little attention is paid to the fact that “the concept and practice of a linear boundary is an ancient - perhaps the most ancient - part of the frontier” Sahlins *Boundaries*, p. 5.

¹⁰ Valignano (1583) in McOmie *Foreign Images and Experiences of Japan*, p. 146.

and made efforts to make this distant geography commensurable with what they were familiar with back home.¹¹ Even once a much more sophisticated understanding of the political situation had been acquired, this means of understanding the space of the state, and how its administrative boundaries served to tie it together, was maintained. Japan continued to be described as “divided into seven great Tracts of Land, which were again sub-divided into 68 considerable Provinces, and these into 604 smaller Districts, or Counties”.¹² These borders were not only codified upon “layer upon layer of lines drawn on paper” but were also frequently “inscribed, literally written on the surface of the earth”.¹³ The late seventeenth century visitor to Japan, Engelbert Kaempfer, records how, “At the end of every tract, province, or smaller district, a wooden, or stone-post, or pillar, is set up in the highway, with characters upon it, shewing what province, or lands they are, which there bound upon one another, and to whom they belong”.¹⁴

The performance of borders, then, was central to the authoritative claims of the state, of stating itself into existence. This was the case whether such performances were enacted on the ground, or solely through the “geo-coded” lines of the map. In this respect, the manner in which the Tokugawa came to adopt and adapt a particular vision of state space was also largely a largely familiar strategy, visible amongst its Asian peers. In all of these realms, both the component units of local governance and the national whole found their definition through administrative division. This is clearly necessary for their designation as states, as “this dividing and demarcating of the territory, regulation of the waters and division of the lands was one of the main political, economic and culturally significant and symbolic acts of government”.¹⁵ While the Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal empires seem not to have graphically represented these boundaries as Chinese and Japanese maps did, they did similarly note the administrative borders within which their network of state officials supposedly acted.¹⁶

¹¹ “All Japan, which is divided into sixty-six kingdoms, would be comprehended into no more than three kingdoms of medium size, if the standard according to which European kingdoms are measured were applied.” De missione 1590, colloquy 8, 83, in Elisonas “Journey to the West”, p. 33, n. 7.

¹² Kaempfer *The history of Japan*, Vol. 1, p. 70.

¹³ Pickles *A History of Spaces*, p. 5.

¹⁴ Kaempfer *The history of Japan*, Vol. 2, p. 291

¹⁵ Yates “Body, Space, Time and Bureaucracy”, p. 62.

¹⁶ For example, in the Mughal case, “This Súbah [Bengal] is situated in the second climate. Its length from Chittagong to Garhi is four hundred kós. Its breadth from the northern range of mountains to the southern frontier of the Sarkár of Madáran, is two hundred kos, and when the country of Orissa was added to this Súbah, the additional length was forty-three kos and the breadth twenty-three. It is bounded on the east by the sea, on the

Representation of such borders served to legitimize the state by emphasizing the role of superior authority in maintaining them, with the result that the Ottoman sultans, Japanese Shoguns and the Great Mughal were responsible for adjudicating between the competing claims of their subordinate administrators, as appropriate to their role of upholding, as well as embodying, peace and universal order.

In the previous chapter, it was noted how the histories of such states focus their attention upon the discrepancies existing between these representations of spatial order, and a reality of political administration and contestation whose contours appear to owe very little to the supposed shape of the system. Similarly, state legitimization depended upon the production of such borders, even if in practical terms there was never any intention that such boundaries be managed “reflexively”, or when it proved impossible for them to be so. This is clear when we consider the two components that make up the ‘grid’ of Tokugawa mapping, those of villages and provinces. As both refer to areas of bounded space that would find representation upon the regime’s official map, any dispute over questions regarding the extent or meaning of such spaces would fall within the competence of a hegemonic Tokugawa state, given their role in upholding Public Order.¹⁷ Nevertheless, while the Tokugawa appeared to retain the right to rule on the question of such borders, in both cases it sought as far as possible to encourage negotiation between contending parties, an attitude that was reflected further down the administrative hierarchy. Neither the state as a whole, nor its constituent domains, had much interest in the boundaries of villages they controlled.¹⁸ Disputes within the villages were settled there, while disputes between villages most frequently involved issues of access to marginal lands that to the state remained unmeasured and unassessed.

That this was the case is clear from those rare cases in which instances of border contestation overlapped, and therefore rather than being open to negotiation under the aegis of a higher authority, pitched these authorities against one another.¹⁹ This occurred because of the manner in which domainal authorities had their authority defined in reference to the linear boundaries of the province, providing an incentive for two domains to dispute those

north and south by mountains and on the west by the Súbah of Behár”. Fazal *The Ain-i-Akbari*, Volume II, Book 3, p. 115.

¹⁷ *Kōgi* 公儀.

¹⁸ Brown “Corporate Land Tenure in Nineteenth-Century Japan”, p. 111, and n. 11.

¹⁹ See particularly Kawamura *Edo bakufu-sen kuniezu no kenkyū*, p. 462-498.

boundaries. Sugimoto Fumiko analyses two cases in detail, both of which incorporated maritime as well as terrestrial boundaries to local authority claims.²⁰ The state was here forced to adjudicate between the parties, although as Sugimoto argues, this may have strengthened the Tokugawa's position as final arbiter over the distribution of land.²¹ Nevertheless, the comparative rarity of such cases and the length of time which it frequently took for them to wind through the courts,²² indicates that the Tokugawa seemingly lacked either authority to compel domainal obedience, or confidence in their ability to do the same.²³ Given the seemingly restricted formalization of law experienced in Tokugawa Japan, it was not only the Tokugawa government, but local rulers too, who sought the settlement of disputes rather than offering judgement.²⁴ Within this context, there is no significant distinction between disputes between the spaces associated with specific villages and those concerned with provinces; in both cases authority was frequently preserved by deferring judgement over the rights and wrongs of a case.

Doing so is indicative of a form of governance that sought to manage disputes between defined social bodies. This is also apparent from the “geography of status, which placed social groups in Tokugawa Japan in specific relations of power and obligation vis-à-vis the state and, by extension, other groups”.²⁵ The borders of such status groups similarly offer a grid within which movement, and the relative position of those within the system, was able to be contained. As Howell notes, this enabled “the separation of occupation and livelihood, for political institutions could remain stable so long as people continued to fulfill the obligations

²⁰ Daimyo located on the coast claimed the sea as part of their fiefs, just as they did land within their boundaries. In effect, they created sea tenure as well as land tenure. Fishing villages could obtain access to the sea only by paying their lord with products from the sea or with corvée. Coastal waters around Japan therefore became closed territories., see also Richards *The Unending Frontier*, p. 182. Chapter 2 of Sugimoto *Ryōiki Shihai no Tenkai to Kinsei* details the effects of a provincial border on disputes over fishing grounds. Chapter 3, on a dispute in south-western Shikoku, overlaps with the material in Chapter 4 “Territorial Border Disputes” of Roberts *Performing the Great Peace*, although Sugimoto is not cited as a source.

²¹ Disputed land itself was marked on the maps, see Kawamura *Edo bakufu-sen kuniezu no kenkyū*, pp. 127-8.

²² One dispute over a ten-kilometer stretch of the boundary that divided both Chikuzen and Chikugo provinces and Akitsuki and Kurumae domains; it proved so intractable that it took the Bakufu courts until 1854 to finally resolve it, Kawamura “Ezu ni egakareta kyōkai no fukei”, p. 41. In the end, however, no trace of these conflicts appears on the Genroku kuniezu map. The surveying standards introduced by the government for this mapping project had given rise to the conflict in the first place.

²³ This refers back to the question of Tokugawa authority and the greatest areas of agreement between domainal and national governments noted in the last chapter.

²⁴ Ooms *Tokugawa Village Practice*.

²⁵ Howell *Geographies of Identity in Nineteenth Century Japan*, p. 3.

attendant on their occupations, while in the meantime society and economy could express considerable dynamism in the realm of livelihood".²⁶ These social borders were not generally represented upon the state's map,²⁷ but their existence is no surprise given the fact that our understanding of the state incorporates its role as both a territorial and personal order.²⁸ In either case, the state asserted its authority through mediating between groups, rather than imposing homogeneous rule over them.

The Tokugawa state was in no sense unusual in this regard, for "it is misleading to describe the forms of rule typically found in non-modern states as 'government' if 'government' means a concern of the state with the regularized administration of the overall territory claimed as its own. *Traditional states did not govern in this sense ...*".²⁹ This was reflected in how the Tokugawa state was administered through a confused mass of lordly holdings, of a range of sizes and shapes that covered both large, compact and territorially contiguous domains through to the 'intermixture' of the entirely theoretical holdings of minor retainers, a confusion repeated at various scales throughout the land.³⁰ Yet this had no bearing on the state's assertion of authority, which was represented upon the maps that proclaimed its rule of space. In this it mirrored other Asian empires, where administrative organizations mapping neatly hierarchical Ottoman or Mughal authority descending down to local patterns of revenue extraction failed to bring actual practice into line. The Mughal state seems not to have utilized administrative cartography but in the *Ain-i Akbari* had a textual means of achieving the same ends, with its "meticulously outlined...boundaries of the internal divisions of the Mughal empire".³¹ As Raj notes, this and other Mughal gazetteers, "provided systematic descriptions of provinces and

²⁶ Howell *Geographies of Identity in Nineteenth Century Japan*, p. 77.

²⁷ This does not imply that they had no spatial component, as the management of such spaces was crucial to state's claim to authority. These spaces were open to representation, or in the case of the *eta*, non-representation, on the map. This is also evident in the process of administration in the Matsumae's relations with the Ainu, as subsequent chapters will show. Nevertheless, in that the concern of this study is the territorialisation of the region to Japan's north, issues of this alternative form of governance will not be dealt with here.

²⁸ Kratochwil "Of Maps, Law, and Politics", p. 11. As Jones notes, "I want to argue in this book that state *territoriality*, conceived of as an ongoing process or state project, is something that is inherently produced, transformed and contested by a variety of state personnel. People within the state apparatus shape the territorial extent of policies, organizations and areas of jurisdiction and, in doing so, illustrate the social production of state territories. The practices and identities of state personnel are, equally, influenced by the territorial fabric of the state, which conditions their work." Jones *People-States-Territories*, p. 3-4.

²⁹ Giddens *The Nation-State and Violence*, p. 57.

³⁰ Morisu *Kinsei Nihon chigyōsei no kenkyū*.

³¹ Baber *The Science of Empire*, p. 138.

their subdivisions, noting their general location and territorial extent" and therefore effectively "meeting the function of countrywide maps today".³²

From the modern perspective, there appears an obvious discrepancy existing between the state's claims to authority and the manner in which it was actually administered. Indeed, it is for this reason, Japan and other Asian states were subsequently criticized by European observers for the "frequent intermixture of their respective territories, and indeed, the intentional indefiniteness which prevails among them in respect to boundaries".³³ While earlier arrivals were seduced by the claims of the state's maps, greater familiarity with the states in question drew attention to this seeming disjunction. Nevertheless, attention to such indefiniteness reflected European concerns with imposing a special order, which again had to be repeatedly represented and asserted. In England, Saxton and Speed's sixteenth and seventeenth century representations of neatly-delimited, territorially-compact English counties did not begin to approach reality until the Counties (Detached Parts) Act of 1844.³⁴ Similarly, for eighteenth-century France, but no map could never fully represent French political space while "the province was a purely jurisdictional notion", and "Frenchmen divided the kingdom into anywhere from thirteen to ninety-one 'provinces'".³⁵ The relation between the manner the state represented itself and the reality of its administration were never 'isomorphic fit' suggested by the maps themselves, which aided in the state's assertion of authority. The slippage between the state's represented borders and the actual administration conducted allowed for the continued assertion of its authority.

The Tokugawa's self-presentation made no mention of most disputes on the map, and the actual pattern of territorial administration was never mapped precisely because of its 'frequent intermixture' and 'intentional indefiniteness'. Yet the cartography produced certainly had an "inescapable part in creating the cultural entity they pretended only to represent".³⁶ Europeans created visual representations of such entities on maps as they sought to understand Asian states, where the descriptions given in the *Ain-i Akbari* formed the basis of

³² Raj *Relocating Modern Science*, p. 71.

³³ "A Military Secretary to his superiors", quoted in Michael "Making territory visible", p. 88.

³⁴ This abolished the majority of county exclaves, though several remained. This trend towards compact administrative territories was pursued down to a lower level of administration in the 1892 Divided Parishes Act.

³⁵ "The Old Regime monarchy was divided into as many 'provinces' as there were 'political governments,' 'regimes,' and 'powers,' to use the contemporary terms", Sahlins "Natural Frontiers Revisited", pp. 1437-8.

³⁶ See Chapter 2, n. 30.

the Mughal ‘atlases’ of both Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon d’Anville and James Rennell.³⁷ These maps represented India as clearly divided into provinces, despite recognition of the ‘frequent intermixture’ and ‘intentional indefiniteness’ of territorial jurisdiction. Rennell acknowledged there had been a “new division of [the empire’s] provinces” since the *Ain-i Akbari* but positioned “the modern divisions...in the fore ground and the ancient ones in the background”,³⁸ because “the ideas of the [Ain-i Akbari’s] boundaries are...impressed on the minds of the natives by tradition”.³⁹ Despite the absence of fixed graphical representation, or its reflection in actual administration, these borders were recognized as existing.

This was shown in the re-adoption of this Imperial geography by the post-Meiji government after 1868, as a “model for” the state’s administration and consequently forming the basis of Japan’s provincial administration even today. However, the Meiji state’s efforts to organize its territory exactly along these provincial boundaries was rejected within seven years of assuming power⁴⁰ because, despite consistently serving as the representation of Japan, the Tokugawa had made no attempt to bring the administration of territory into line with the model. That is, this normative representation of national geography reprinted and reproduced over an extended period of time did not cause the Tokugawa state to attempt to bring administrative reality into line with this representation, to the extent that its successor was also unable to achieve this feat.

What these states sought to do is make aspects of their existence ‘legible’.⁴¹ While the Ottomans, for instance, made extensive use of larger-scale maps, they rarely represented the entirety of state lands, characterized by “parallel systems” of administration,⁴² until the nineteenth century.⁴³ In Tokugawa Japan, by contrast, the state graphically represented their legitimacy through their rule of imperial territory, not their command of a hierarchy of

³⁷ The only Mughal map that represents this territorial structure does not position different levels of territorial administration within one another, instead marking the relative locations of their administrative centers and representing hierarchy with the words ‘belonging to’, see Michael *Statemaking and Territory in South Asia*, p. 88, fig. 6.1.

³⁸ Sinha *Communication and Colonialism in Eastern India*, p. 99.

³⁹ Rennell *Memoir of a map of Hindoostan*, p. iii.

⁴⁰ For one example see Wigen *A Malleable Map*.

⁴¹ From Scott *Seeing Like a State*, p. 2.

⁴² “Provinces and sanjaks were not, however, the only administrative divisions of the Empire...the judge, unlike the sanjak governor, had authority throughout his area, with judgeships forming what has been called ‘a parallel system’ of administration”. Imber *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 191.

⁴³ Fortna “Change in the School Maps of the Late Ottoman Empire”.

territorial lordships. Consequently, the borders on such maps should be seen as ascriptions rather than descriptions, ones which served as both a claim regarding Tokugawa authority and the framework within which they made sense of the spatial extent of their rule. Such borderlines as were visible on the map did not unfailingly come to exist as material borders, unless there were specific reasons demanding the necessity of such a boundary. This indicates how borders, too, must be understood in conjunction with what was claimed for maps, as both a framework for understanding reality and a series of claims made in relation to reality. The enforcement of borders was conducted in line with the priorities of domestic order. This also applies to those borders that served to define the domestic.

The state and its limits

While both the borders represented upon the Tokugawa's map of their lands, and the boundaries present within their social and political structures that distinguished spheres of authority authorized by the state, served to tie together the space of the nation, this is not the way in which borders are generally understood to constitute the space of the state. It is more common to focus upon the question of external borders, seen as providing the edge of the nation. In the contemporary world, such geographical borders function as the physical manifestations of state power while also serving as the symbolic and mental markers of state space for both inhabitants of the state and elsewhere.⁴⁴ Again, however, it is widely understood that the reduction of the edge of a modern nation-state characterized by homogenous control over its entire territorial expanse is a product of modern nationalism, and that earlier invocations of state edges will of necessity be both less stable and messier. The subsequent section seeks to consider how we might reflect on this notion of the edge of the state by, again, offering an empirical examination of a number of Asian states. It will then consider the role of Japan's border spaces in the constitution of the early modern state.

It is therefore worth considering how it was that other early modern states came to define their own extent. In early modern imperial states characterized by heterogeneity, this could be a complex process. In the late-seventeenth century maps of Semyon Remezov, for instance, the new Siberian imperial space of an expanding Russian empire was represented as lands

⁴⁴ On the various roles which the modern border performs, see Paasi "Bounded spaces in a 'borderless world'"; and Newman "The lines that continue to separate us".

from which tribute would be offered to the center. The various Siberian ethnicities were mapped as homogenous groups inhabiting specific, demarcated areas of land separated by linear boundaries. Such a map succeeded in creating the image of an Imperial Russian world “chopped up into distinctively colored Russian and non-Russian spaces”,⁴⁵ which “given most of the people were nomadic or seminomadic...must have proceeded more from his mental image of how the spatial politics of the steppe *should have* worked than from any actual partitioning of land and people”.⁴⁶ This image drew upon a specific conception of that state’s relationship with its lands, one characterized by separate and distinct (or ‘bounded’) ethnicities, religions and classes united in fundamental loyalty to the person of the Tsar.⁴⁷ However, the understanding of Remezov’s atlas as forming an ‘ethnographic map’ elides the fact that he “augmented the new data of Siberian explorers with the traditional, archaic names of lands along the Volga (the land of the Golden Horde and the land of the Bulgars)” while showing Great Scythia with the Slavs and the Hyperboreans.⁴⁸ This relates the current lands of the Russian empire with those familiar from both Russian and Classical history. Remezov’s maps revealed the state’s conception of its realm rather than its actual relationship to the lands and peoples within it.

Although Remezov used linear boundaries to tie tributary Siberian peoples to specific, demarcated lands, “nowhere do we find indications of national or imperial boundaries on a Muscovite map”.⁴⁹ Rather the map depicted the “lands of China” along with those of the Manchus and various Mongol groupings towards the south-east in the same manner as those groups within Siberia. Therefore, the borders between ethnicities, which could be interpreted as tying together the space of the imperial Russian state, appear to extend over these lands as well. Maps like these suggest that the universal nature of the legitimization claimed by these early modern empires means that, unlike the ‘bordered power container’ of the nation-state,

⁴⁵ Kivelson “Exalted and Glorified”, p 90.

⁴⁶ Kivelson “Exalted and Glorified”, p. 81 (italics mine). The contrast that Kivelson seeks to draw here is between a ‘flexible’ indigenous notion of empire in this period and the more totalizing western imperial perspectives introduced into the Russian Empire over the course of the eighteenth century.

⁴⁷ Slezkin *Arctic Mirrors*. This description has clear parallels to the recent attention being granted to early modern Japan’s status order, which also appears to provide another way in which to envisage the space of the state, see Howell *Geographies of Identity in Nineteenth Century Japan* in particular.

⁴⁸ Chekin “Russian ‘Ethnographic Maps’ from Remezov to Koeppen”, p. 35.

⁴⁹ Kivelson *Cartographies of Tsardom*, p. 188.

no clear distinction was or could be drawn between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of the state.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, such images cannot be taken as conclusive evidence regarding the relations of such states with their limits. For example, between the drawing of Remezov’s first ethnographic map in 1673 and the inclusion of a later copy in the *Chertezhnaia kniga Sibiri* (Siberian Atlas), dated 1701, Russia and the Qing negotiated the Treaty of Nerchinsk of 1689. This, along with the subsequent Treaty of Kiakhta of 1727, succeeded in designating the border between these two states, and dividing control over subject peoples until well into the nineteenth century, despite both sides “believing strongly in subordination of others as vassals, subjects, or tributaries”.⁵¹ In Peter Perdue’s description, the treaty clearly incorporated notions of a linear boundary, with the border “drawn north of the Amur River along the nearest mountain range, determined by stone markers. A stele at the mouth of the Argun gave the text of the treaty inscribed in Russian, Chinese, Manchu, Mongol, and Latin. Other parts of the border would be delimited later”.⁵² This linear border did not require agreement over its graphical representation in order to be brought into existence, as such a line would be inscribed directly upon the earth.⁵³

This is not the only example of states demarcating their territorial extent in extra-European contexts. Both the Safavid and Ottoman empires emerged within an Islamic geographical tradition that appears to have held that “boundaries were constituted not as sharply defined boundary lines but rather as transition zones of uncertain sovereignty between two states”.⁵⁴ This geographical understanding was shown in, for instance, Matrakci Nasuh’s commemoration of Suleiman’s campaign against the Safavids which, “despite the claims of his sovereign reflected in his text, does not draw a border between Ottoman and Safavid space” although the narrative did, however, characterize lands as “occupied by either enemies or supporters of the sultan”.⁵⁵ However, the successive rounds of conflict between the Ottomans and Safavids, continuing throughout the sixteenth century and lasting until 1639, would always

⁵⁰ This understanding is of course prompted and defined by the modern normative ideal of the nation-state system and its associated vision of global political space as characterized by territorially-homogenous jigsaw pieces of state territory, which differentiates a European-derived territorial order from that which preceded it.

⁵¹ Perdue “Boundaries and Trade in the Early Modern World”, p. 342.

⁵² Perdue *China Marches West*, p. 169.

⁵³ Anderson dismisses such practices in Siam, but the point is that such a demarcation showed there was no conceptual issue in the notion of a boundary being linear, Anderson *Imagined Communities*, p. 172.

⁵⁴ Brauer “Boundaries and Frontiers in Medieval Muslim Geography”, p. 5.

⁵⁵ Brummett “Imagining the early modern Ottoman space”, p. 54.

conclude with agreements to appoint plenipotentiaries in order to delimit the boundaries of disputed districts. The Nusuh Pasha, or Istanbul Treaty of 1612, for instance, required “the delimitation of the frontiers and the prevention of interference in internal affairs”.⁵⁶ While the issue of where this boundary was located was continually revisited in successive conflicts, there was no conceptual difficulty with the notion of a boundary line running between the two imperial formations. The traditional geographies mentioned above may have represented knowledge of the wider world for the Ottoman, and presumably Safavid, empires, but this did not prevent efforts to demarcate a border clearly conceived of as a line on the ground to divide either side’s claims to people, land and resources.⁵⁷ This was also visible in other regions, for example, “In 1681 a joint commission of Ottomans and representatives of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth delineated a set of borders...Mounds were employed to indicate borders where natural features did not make them evident”.⁵⁸

In many cases it does appear that this divide between the empire’s interior and exterior was not sharply delimited, which is why, for instance, “the precision of boundaries of the internal divisions of the Mughal empire, meticulously outlined and described in Abul Fazl’s *Ain-i-Akbari* contrasted starkly with the vagueness and ambiguity of the external frontiers”.⁵⁹ This also remained the case on the map for the examples noted above, where the ongoing border negotiations between the Ottomans and Safavids or stone pillars running between Russian and Qing lands remained similarly unrepresented. This applied to not only Remezov’s maps but also those of the Qing, whether these were the constantly updated representations of “complete maps of all under Heaven” (*Tianxia quantu*), or the famous Jesuit maps of Kangxi and Qianlong’s reign. While new editions of the *Tianxia quantu* would proudly announce that “The land ruled by the present dynasty is unprecedented in its extent” and pay close attention to China’s provincial boundaries, this ‘unprecedented’ extent would remain undefined on the map.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ Ateş *Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands*, p. 21.

⁵⁷ Ates *Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands* specifically invoking Westphalian analogies, although this is based on an outdated understanding of what the Treaty of Westphalia was, see Chapter 1, n. 74.

⁵⁸ Brummett “Imagining the early modern Ottoman space”, p. 26.

⁵⁹ Baber *Science of Empire*, p. 138.

⁶⁰ Smith “Mapping China’s world: cultural cartography in late imperial China” in Smith *Mapping China and Managing the World*, pp. 48-88. Note especially the famous Kangxi map image in which only the western half of Taiwan is represented, the *Kangxi Tushu Jichen Taiwan Futu* 康熙圖書集成台灣府圖, see Hsia & Yorgason “*Hou Shan* in Maps”, p. 8-9.

This did not, however, mean there was no concept of a border, though. In Kangxi's Imperial warrant for the mapping of Manchuria, this is made explicit:

"The Sungari River flows north from the Changbai Mountains... where it joins the Heilongjiang and flows to the sea. All of this is the territory of China. The Yalu River flows southeast from the Changbai Mountains, then to the southwest between Fenghuangcheng and Yizhou, on the Korean border, to the sea. Northwest of the Yalu River is all the territory of China; to its southeast is the territory of Korea, and the river is the boundary. The Tumen River flows east along the perimeter of the Changbai Mountains, then southeast to the ocean. Southwest of the Tumen is the territory of Korea, while to its northeast is the territory of China, and the river is the boundary. All of these places are already known, but the area between the Yalu and the Tumen is still unknown".⁶¹

Such instructions clearly note that the two rivers served as the boundary between the two political formations, and that it was the area between them not bisected by the rivers that required demarcation. This adoption of environmental features as 'natural' borders is characteristic of all of these states during the period, for borders both internal and external. It ultimately suggests that while such states may not have felt the need to formally demarcate their external limits, they were nevertheless well aware of where they ran.

The examples provided by these early modern state show that these states were, indeed, defined by their limits. Irrespective of these state's claims to embody universal order, there did exist an understanding of the extent of their authority. However, it was possible for these limits to be understood in different ways. These could utilize natural geographic features as a means of demarcating political authority, or could come to be delimited upon the ground. In many instances, of course, in the absence of disputes over demarcation, an absence of contestation meant that there was little need to precisely define where these limits lay. What this suggests is that the practice of the border differed in different areas of the state, a practice that was determined by the geographical and political contexts within which the border was ascribed. This suggests, of course, that the differentiated understanding regarding the relations of different social groups with the political center should also be extended spatially, drawing upon an understanding of the state in which different areas related to the center of authority differently. This has clear implications for how we try and understand the bordering

⁶¹ *Shengzu Shilu* 246: 9a-10b, quoted in Elliott "The Limits of Tartary", pp. 622-23.

process through which these state's attempt to define themselves, for it would suggest that, as with maps, such practices need to be comprehended in the context of the particular times and places in which they operate.

Demarcating the Tokugawa state

While the Tokugawa's management of internal borders served as both a powerful legitimating tool and means of social control, generally considered of greater importance to the reconstitution of state authority in the early seventeenth century are the steps it took to manage those borders that marked out the limits of Japan, and thus Tokugawa authority. Although commonly glossed as '*sakoku*', the impression once given of early modern Japan as forming a uniquely 'closed' society, which sought to actively prevent foreign exchange, has long since been undermined. This has been through reinterpreting the promulgation of the maritime prohibitions⁶² in the early seventeenth-century as being positive policy by the Tokugawa seeking to construct "itself as the Central Kingdom" and ideologically assert its own world view.⁶³ Rather than merely a negative reaction, then, moves to control and restrict the entry and limit the departure of men and material should rather be understood as a positive policy of attempting to construct a 'universal order' centered on the Tokugawa. In so doing, it followed a pattern visible in the establishment of states across Asia, whose states commonly sought legitimacy in centering all domestic and foreign relations upon itself while asserting their rule through the "layered legitimacy" and "composite beliefs" that characterized such systems of rule.⁶⁴ Through their claim to be a "universal ruler regulating all relations",⁶⁵ the outer borders of such states become one component of their rule.⁶⁶

As an "island nation", of course, such natural borders are particularly pertinent in the Japanese case, which made the actual demarcation of the state's early modern borders one which would seemingly involve less contestation over the location of the border. Nevertheless, the land's terrestrial limits did not settle the question of how they were to be administered. This is

⁶² *Kaikin*, analogous to what had occurring in the late-Ming period in China.

⁶³ *Toby State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan*, p. xvi.

⁶⁴ Bang & Kolodziejczyk *Universal Empire*, pp. 242, 307.

⁶⁵ Bang & Kolodziejczyk *Universal Empire*, p. 198.

⁶⁶ Although with the proviso that such orders are often perceived as being ones in which "boundaries are less important to define these entities than our accustomed ways of thinking about the state" Bang & Kolodziejczyk *Universal Empire*, p. 12.

clearly visible, for instance, in the manner in which the Dutch East India Company (VOC), as the only group of Europeans permitted to trade with Japan from the mid seventeenth to mid nineteenth centuries “was domesticated, confined within a self-designated role as vassal, and saddled with a raft of attached responsibilities”.⁶⁷ The Tokugawa’s claims on the Dutch evolved from the protection of ships carrying Japanese passes to general on the VOC using force within a demarcated area of Japanese influence. Rather than a fixed border, this was a region of Japanese control that expanded out from Nagasaki, yet which remained unrepresented on the map.⁶⁸

The restriction of overseas trade with Dutch and, later, Chinese vessels to the port of Nagasaki, and the confinement of these merchants to restricted areas set aside for them within the city, indicates one particular means through which the border between the interior and exterior of the realm was able to be policed, one which transformed over time. In this instance, however, the assertion of spatial control on land was limited to one Edo-controlled city. There were, however, other spaces in which the state’s prohibition on overseas travel were subverted by tributary and trade relations. These are the “ragged edges”,⁶⁹ the “fuzzy zone”⁷⁰ of Japanese control, the areas that did not neatly meld with the knowledge structure upon which it based its rule, the areas where *kaikin* did not hold sway, where the centrality of agricultural production was subverted, and where its claim to control foreign relations was complicated.

In addition to that of Matsumae and Ezo, these areas were the Sō’s relations with Korea and the Shimazu’s with Ryūkyū. The Sō’s domain was based upon Tsushima, a *ritsuryō* province that despite being situated closer to Korea than Japan was incorporated into the Tokugawa order. The Sō maintained a ‘Japan House’ at Pusan to manage its trade with Korea into the Meiji era, and depended on Korea for around two-thirds of its grains.⁷¹ Despite considerable evidence of institutional borrowings from the peninsula,⁷² its people were Japanese and recognized as such both in Japan and Korea. However, the Korean Court considered the Sō’s relations with the Korean Court as tributary, and Korean discourse sometimes laid claim to the

⁶⁷ Clulow *The Company and the Shogun*, p. 261.

⁶⁸ On this see also Chapter 6.

⁶⁹ Toby “Kinseiki no ‘Nihonzu’ to ‘Nihon’ no Kyōkai”, pp. 86-87.

⁷⁰ Fujimoto Tsuyoshi, *Mō futatsu no Nihon bunka: Hokkaido to Nantō no bunka*. Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1988, p. 112, quoted in Batten *To the Ends of the Japan*.

⁷¹ Lewis *Frontier Contact*, p. 29.

⁷² For example, its *kanshaku* 間尺 system of taxation and in the institution of house slavery, or *nuhi* 奴婢.

islands themselves.⁷³ The Sō's primary importance were to manage the 'diplomatic relations' of the Korean Court with the Tokugawa, with Chōsen sending eleven missions of congratulation on the occasion of Shogunal accession.⁷⁴ By contrast, the Kingdom of the Ryukyu's had not been a part of any Japanese state until the Shimazu, rulers of a domain encompassing Satsuma province, invaded in 1609 and forced the submission of the Shō king. The Shimazu subsequently granted the majority of the Ryūkyū kingdom's land back to the king as his fief,⁷⁵ having conducted a land survey and assessed tax to be paid to the Shimazu.⁷⁶ Iemitsu had recognized both Satsuma's incorporation of Ryukyu's *kokudaka* and Ryukyu's tributary relationship with China simultaneously;⁷⁷ it was because of the latter accounting for Satsuma's insistence that the Ryukyu's minimize as far as possible any outward signs of Japanese control.⁷⁸ Anachronistically, we might describe this arrangement as a foreign court resident on and dependent on Tokugawa land,⁷⁹ and one which dispatched sixteen choreographed missions to Edo over the course of the Tokugawa period.⁸⁰

In both cases, it is common to understand these relations from Edo, as representing Tokugawa relations with foreign states. This is an understanding that would come to be formalized at the end of the eighteenth century.⁸¹ Yet understanding them as 'foreign' relations implies our "familiar world of territorially disjoint, mutually exclusive, functionally similar, sovereign states"⁸² and ignores the manner in which these relations were mediated through local authorities granted responsibility for managing the relationship. In a similar way to the other boundaries between social bodies that made up the body of the state, the Tokugawa polity was far more interested and capable of bolstering its legitimacy through asserting an authority to manage relations than it was able to introduce a uniform administrative rationality into

⁷³ Lewis *Frontier Contact*, p. 45.

⁷⁴ Missions interpreted by the Japanese as tributary.

⁷⁵ Although the Amami Islands were incorporated into the assessed yield of the Shimazu.

⁷⁶ Mitsugu *The Government of the Kingdom of Ryukyu*, p. 32. As with much of Japan, this 1610-11 survey was the sole one conducted in the Tokugawa period.

⁷⁷ Kamiya *Bakuhansei kokka no Ryūkyū Shihai*, p. 34.

⁷⁸ Smits *Visions of Ryukyu*, pp. 19-20

⁷⁹ This is important and under-emphasized. The notion of Ryukyu being under the 'dual sovereignty' of Japan and China in this period can only really refer to the Shō court, not to the islands, which didn't appear on any Qing maps.

⁸⁰ With the structure of the missions powerfully shaped by either Shimazu or Tokugawa requirements, see also Chapter 6 below.

⁸¹ When Matsudaira Sadanobu responded to the request of the Russian expedition under Adam Laxman for trade relations between the countries to be established by arguing that the 'Ancestral Laws' of the Tokugawa had restricted diplomatic ties to these two states, see Chapter 8.

⁸² Ruggie *Constructing the World Polity*, p. 180.

these relations. Understanding these two relations as being with foreign courts offered a means of making sense of them, one which was not brought into line elsewhere. On the map, for example, Tsushima appears on official maps stretching back to the Kan’ei maps.⁸³ While the Sō were assessed at 10,000 koku due to their holdings in northern Kyushu, Tsushima itself was agriculturally poor.⁸⁴ Villages were not assessed, so while Tsushima appears scattered with villages on the *kuniezu*, divided by color into two districts, they do not contain *kokudaka* values. The accompanying *Gochō*⁸⁵ also merely lists villages by name, with no *kokudaka* values. In the case of the Shimazu, in addition to maps made for the other areas under their rule, they produced a map of the Ryūkyūs, reflecting the Shimazu’s self-presentation as ‘Lords of four provinces’.⁸⁶ Despite the differences in traditional Ryukyuan administration,⁸⁷ in appearance the *kuniezu* maps are essentially identical to those from the rest of Japan,⁸⁸ although importantly the Shimazu maintained both the traditional Ryūkyūan administration and the integrity of the Shō Kingdom on the map, despite having incorporated the Amami Island’s directly as their fief.

These official maps resemble those of other parts of the country, appearing to bring all of these lands onto the map. Nevertheless, the image thereby created of a uniform administrative rationality is solely a product of the map, the result of a vision of the realm in which its provincial components were made up of a number of homogenous and essentially interchangeable villages, became the spatial ordering required of the maps, and thus a spatial ordering which created its own authority. Yet the manner in which the border management being conducted by these two authorities found expression was very different. In order to

⁸³ See the sequence of maps, Kan’ei to Kyoho, in Kuniezu Kenkyukai *Kuniezu No Sekai*, pp. 14-23.

⁸⁴ Or 13,000 *koku*. In 1700, for instance, about half the population depended upon food grown on the island, a quarter on the Sō lands on Kyūshū, and the final quarter on rice shipments from Korea, see Hellyer *Defining Engagement*, p. 40. It was treated as, or at least comported itself as a 100,000 *koku* domain. It is unclear whether this reflects profits from the Korean trade, or whether this was a means of granting Tsushima the status necessary to negotiate with the Korean Court.

⁸⁵ Tax register.

⁸⁶ Those of Satsuma, Osumi and Hyōga as well as Ryukyu. For the Ryukyus, maps were first made during the Shōhō round of surveys, on three separate sheets, focused on the Amami Islands, Okinawa, and finally the Yaeyama Islands respectively.

⁸⁷ Unlike the rest of Japan, *kokudaka* was assessed by *magiri* 間切 (a Ryukyuan unit of administration consisting of multiple villages) rather than by each village.

⁸⁸ The islands were divided on the map for administrative purposes, with the villages colour-coded by which *magiri* they are attached to, as villages in Japan were colour-coded by district. While villages are indicated, most merely refer to the head-village of the *magiri*, which notes the *kokudaka* allocation of the entire *magiri*.

assert their own authority over the space of the Ryūkyūs, the Shimazu submitted a map of these lands, while the Sō mapped themselves as managing the province of Tsushima and its trade with Korea.⁸⁹ In both cases, these responses are the result of local exigencies and circumstances, the results of such management being conducted over distinct frontier spaces, rather than across mutually-recognized borders.

It is precisely this role of the border in linking territories together for the state, both conceptually and on the map, which we need to be more aware of. Boundaries not only serve to divide two objects but link them together, as shown in the manner in which all these states were stitched together from provincial territorial components. This is why boundaries were materialized through practices of border demarcation between states, which served to both link and divide these states. As so often in history, there is a more recent parallel, where a post-Berlin Wall focus on the disappearance of nation-state boundaries in the face of cross-border flows mutated into a renewed interest in the manner in which boundaries function, including in their most material way as walls and fences. This research has highlighted that boundaries do not solely exist at the edge of social formations, that boundaries can serve to both facilitate rather than impede movement and circulation, and that it is in fact this increased circulation that brings the materialization of the boundary to the fore. That is, the need for the enforcement and materialization of a border is the product of an increase in the quantity of men and material flowing through a certain space, which appears to necessitate the imposition of a border in order to seek to control this movement. The need for border management, therefore, is created in relation to what is perceived to be occurring in spaces beyond the border, and ultimately indicates how the space of the state should be understood in relational terms.

⁸⁹ Trade with Korea is noted on both the Genroku and Tenpo maps. The Genroku map goes as far as to place the Japan House, Pusan and its surroundings on the map, but this was a common trope of commercially-produced maps dating from the late-sixteenth century, such as those of Ishikawa Ryusen. Ronald Toby goes as far as to argue that this Genroku map confirms a view of Japan's expanding and hardening borders, but it remains unclear in that case why Pusan should suddenly disappear again from the Kyōto map or why the Tenpo map fails to note the Japan House. Toby "Kinseiki no 'Nihonzu' to 'Nihon' no Kyōkai".

Relational territory

The reason for focusing on the role of practices within the constitution of territory as a political technology is to escape the practice of taking territory for granted and reducing it to the sovereign state. In order to do this, we need to grant serious attention to the question of how the *status ascription* of parts of the world as territory intersects with practices of mapping and bordering. Escaping the territorial trap requires that we do not assume the bounded territorial character of the units under discussion. It is for this reason that it is necessary to engage in a deeper examination of how borders are produced, one able to take in what is occurring at such sites with what is being thought about them within the same frame of analysis.⁹⁰ The approach being offered here seeks to be more inflected by notions of transnational history. As Middell and Naumann have noted, transnational history does not deny the importance of the state. On the contrary, “it emphasizes its capacity to control and channel border-transcending movements. In this sense, transnational history bridges the national, the sub-national (local, regional), and the global by exploring actors, movements, and forces that cross boundaries and penetrate the fabric of nations”.⁹¹ However, while the state retains its importance in its ability to channel relations, the objective here is to seek the means to comprehend the state in situated terms. The state emerges out of the relations themselves, as an effect constituted out of these relations, and “needs to be analyzed as a structural effect. That is to say, it should be examined not as an actual structure, but as the powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist”.⁹² We need to analyse these practices in such a way that they are not solely contained by a state defined by its boundaries and thus forming a preconstituted, nationalized and unchanging scale of analysis.⁹³

Therefore, the model offered up here is one in which the relational structure out of which the state is constituted is not solely one that emerges from within the territorial or jurisdictional limits claimed by the state, that is, is internal to the state, but incorporates such ‘transnational’ relations that extend beyond its borders. The aim is to retain the state as an analytic category while decentering its claims to existing as both a unified social actor and the bounds within which social processes occur. As Kratochwil has it, “Such a research program would not have to

⁹⁰ In the same manner that Cole Harris has pointed to the difficulties of bringing both the imperial mind and the particularities of local colonial circumstances into focus, see Harris “How did Colonialism Dispossess?”, p.166.

⁹¹ Middell & Naumann “Global History and the Spatial Turn”, p. 160.

⁹² Mitchell “The Limits of the State”, p. 94.

⁹³ Brenner “Beyond State-centrism?”

look only at the global processes and their abstract logic of reproduction. It would have to look also close to the ground, at the laboratory where the local and the global, the concrete and the abstract meet and enable the center to mold its environment, as the center understands itself to be superior, while the environment is not made up of organizations of equal status".⁹⁴

It is not fruitful to deny the existence of states or territories, or argue that the image of linear borders is merely that. These sorts of constituted objects give rise to all kinds of real, observable results within both the social system within which they are constituted. However, the aim is not to merely create and perpetrate typologies of 'European' or 'Japanese' or 'modern' epistemologies/mental maps as static frameworks within which all cultural processes and actions can be explained. As Charles Tilly has noted, actors whose behaviour can be explained based upon the imperative of a single social identity can only be found amongst the ranks of the 'brainwashed'.⁹⁵ The theoretical conceit common to both IR and comparative political and historical studies, that there is one overriding epistemological framework from within which actors draw and construct meaning is just that, conceited.⁹⁶ No matter how hard to effectively model, we need to take seriously the notions which inform theories like structuration, in which agent and structure are co-constituted, else we risk merely reifying cultural structures.

Instead of the traditional Weberian 'bureaucratic organization', or the unitary understanding of the state as a 'cultural body', the perspective on the state adopted here emphasizes it as a peopled organization granted coherence through its claims. This is in accordance with recent perspectives on the Europe, where an understanding of the 'official mind' of the state is drawn from the "coordinated network of territorially bound offices exercising political power" that define the abstract idea of the early modern state in Europe. It is knowledge of the state in the minds of its officials that enabled the early modern state to function as "a mind without a body".⁹⁷ This accords well with historiography on the Tokugawa state, where the initial focus on either "Tokugawa absolutism" or the "small-country thesis" has been synthesized through a situated focus on the places in which governmental and local interests aligned, and where they

⁹⁴ Kratochwil "Of Maps, Law, and Politics", p. 24.

⁹⁵ Tilly & Stinchcombe. *Roads from Past to Future*, pp. 400-401.

⁹⁶ Hence the continued obsession with contrasting Chinese 'Tributary models' with the Western sovereign state system as static-a historical patterns of interaction, despite the fact that both of these models are obviously historically-produced.

⁹⁷ Braddick *State formation in early modern England*.

diverged. As we shall detail over the next two parts, political power in Japan was territorially-shaped, but did not map onto its own cartographic representation, with a distinct mismatch between the representation of this authority on the map, and how it was constituted in practice.

In its attention to the question of territory within a specific national context, this study overlaps with that of Rhys Jones, who sought to examine state *territoriality* “conceived of as an ongoing process or state project, is something that is inherently produced, transformed and contested by a variety of state personnel. People within the state apparatus shape the territorial extent of policies, organizations and areas of jurisdiction and, in doing so, illustrate the social production of state territories. The practices and identities of state personnel are, equally, influenced by the territorial fabric of the state, which conditions their work”.⁹⁸ Nevertheless, while his attention was largely drawn to the position of individuals within these territorial processes associated with the state, here the focus is on those practices associated with territory, by means of which state authority is institutionalized and through which authority is constituted. As Kratochwil has pointed out, we must focus on the state as *both* a “territorial and personal order”, rather than one or the other.⁹⁹

This study examines the processes and relations out of which territory is constituted. The aim is to avoid granting too much fixity to units used in this analysis, while at the same time taking their claims to be real seriously. It is this political technology of territory that both results from and dictates connections between states, territory and the globe. It is these connections, reinserted within wider relational and processual patterns, which shape this study. These connections will be examined through the medium of Japan’s relation with the area to its north, the area known as the *ezochi*, which today is roughly conterminous with the islands of Hokkaido, Sakhalin and the Kurils. The adoption of this area as a site, and particularly its history of being competed over by, and currently divided between, the states of Russia and Japan is noteworthy. The region forms a border between these situated entities, providing fertile grounds for an examination of the processes of its making and unmaking. It is therefore an extremely valuable ‘Laboratory of local and global, abstract and concrete’ in allowing us to trace out the processes through which territory was constituted and the relations that enabled

⁹⁸ Jones *People-States-Territories*, pp. 3-4.

⁹⁹ “Of Maps, Law, and Politics”, p. 11.

its constitution. In doing so, my aim is also to “clarify that an in-depth investigation into an historical evolution of the ‘territory’ in pre-modern and modern Japan is absolutely necessary, when we would like to really and correctly understand the meaning of” territory today.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ Yanagihara “The Law of Nations in Europe and East Asia”, p. 359.

PART 2 – Sketching Japan’s Ezo

At the outset of the Tokugawa-era, the area inhabited by the Ezo was little known to most Japanese, and was primarily inhabited by a foreign people. By its end, it was a mapped and demarcated region inhabited by a people made part of Japan, and viewed as central to the future of Japan itself. The transformation in this region occurred through a shift in the status of the territory of the *ezochi*. This transformation was made visible at the end of the period when the region was renamed Hokkaido and incorporated into the *ritsuryō* geography of the Japanese state,¹ but this change in designation set the seal on a historical process of territorial transformation that occurred across the early modern period. This process was achieved through a series of incorporations: of trade with this foreign people within the authority structure of the Matsumae, of the Matsumae into the Tokugawa’s hierarchy of rule, and finally of the land inhabited by this foreign people into the territory of the state.

This means that while it is tempting to assume that we know the place of Ezo as existing in Japan’s tributary order, and as its uncivilized mirror, this does not determine the practices through which this Ezo space came to be bordered and mapped. As the previous chapter has shown, at the “ragged edges”² of the Japanese order, in that “fuzzy zone” of Japanese control,³ it was impossible to simply reduce practices to the knowledge structure upon which the Tokugawa based their rule of Japan. In these areas, where the *kaikin* did not hold sway, where the centrality of agricultural tribute was subverted, and where state’s claim to control foreign

¹ For further details on this process, see Boyle “Imperial Practice and the making of modern Japan’s territory”.

² Toby “Kinseiki no ‘Nihonzu’ to ‘Nihon’ no Kyōkai”.

³ Fujimoto Mō *Futatsu no Nihon Bunka*, p. 112, see also Batten *To the Ends of Japan*.

relations was complicated,⁴ it would appear expected that the state would not only not map this space, but be fundamentally uninterested in doing so. Yet the incorporation of the Matsumae within the Tokugawa order demanded the submission of maps, and these came to be represented on the Tokugawa's understanding of the extent of their territorial rule, bringing the entire space of Ezo within their sphere of government.

It is argued here that an understanding of how territory as a political technology came to be applied by the Japanese state in the early modern era is important for us in understanding the comparative role of territory in not only past empires, but the world today, by allowing us to develop a theory of territory that is applicable outside of a specific political genealogy associated with European state development. This is through a focus on its 'relational' nature, in which the practices held to constitute territory, like those of mapping and bordering, are placed within shifting patterns of material and cultural representation that offer definition to particular places. In the modern era, the notion of territory represents itself as being an objective and scientific practice, one reducible to the technical means of calculating the location of things within space. Nevertheless, the actual location of something does not map onto what it means, as is clear in the presence of territorial disputes. The location of something does not settle its political disposition, even as everyone recognizes that it exists.

This bears comparison with the early modern era, where it has become common to reduce understanding of Japan's worldview to a 'civilized-barbarian' worldview, derived from China but slowly coming to re-center the world upon Japan. Certainly, a consciousness of it being the world that surrounded Japan, with Japan located at the center, did exist, while the impression of Japan being surrounded by areas of greater and greater barbarism was a clear trope in maps of the early modern world.⁵ As Toby has it, "Edo-period Japanese, whether of neo-Confucian or Nativist persuasion, to a greater or lesser extent accepted the idea of a normative hierarchy of peoples, and this normative mapping to a Japan-centred perception of the world".⁶ Yet while this was the case for many individuals, as Ikeuchi Satoshi has noted, not only did the period see a Japan-centered civilized-barbarian consciousness, but also the nativist studies associated with the likes of Motoori Norinaga, which focused on emperor and court, and there were examples of both so-called Dutch scholars and of individuals glossed

⁴ Osamu "The kokudaka system: A device for unification"; Asao Sakoku.

⁵ See for instance Kawamura *Kinsei Nihon no Sekaizō*; Toby, "Contesting the Centre"

⁶ Toby *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan*, p. 211

today as Confucians who understood Japan as other than the center. It is important to recognize that “in Japan in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there were a plurality of worldviews that coexisted, and a Japan-centered civilized-barbarian consciousness was simply one among them”.⁷ Indeed, given the tendency of most people and cultures to assert their own position of centrality, it is far from clear that this supposed Japanese adoption of a Japanese worldview works to tell us anything significant about Japan itself. In order to this, we need to examine how such worldviews were brought into practice and seek to contextualize their operation.

The Nagasaki translator Shizuki Tadao wrote in the early nineteenth century of how “our imperial country with its countless islands corresponds to the world with its myriad of countries, it is one globe in miniature”. While the “people of these islands” are able to “entertain friendly relations and trade with each other”, though, “this does definitely not imply the principle that all countries should communicate with each other, nor do we need to maintain that it goes against reason for them not to entertain [friendly] relations (*tsukō*)”.⁸ Shizuki was the originator of the term ‘sakoku’ in his translation of the appendix to Kaempfer’s *History of Japan*, from an appended note of which the above quotations are drawn. In it, he sought to set out the reason why, despite the myriad internal borders within Japan facilitating an abundance of movement, those with the outside world should serve to restrict connections between Japan and the world. In doing so, of course, he offers two visions of borders, those between the “myriad of countries” within the Japan, across which people are able to circulate and trade, and those between Japan and the rest of the world, over which no “relations” should be maintained.

While in civilizational terms, Ezo would appear to serve as a barbarian country with whom Japan should have little contact, it had clearly come within this circle of trade and circulation. This was not an incorporation that had been determined through a specific worldview, but by worldviews being drawn upon to legitimate practices, many of which had been introduced in response to local exigencies that bore little resemblance to the practices they were allegedly legitimated by. It was ultimately these practices, however, that determined Ezo’s place in the world.

⁷ Ikeuchi *Taikun Gaikō to 'Bui'*, p. 201.

⁸ Boot “Shizuki Tadao’s Sakoku-ron”, p. 98-99.

4. DEMARCATING LINES OF ADMINISTRATION

The previous section has provided the theoretical, conceptual and contextual background for engaging with the notion of territory and its application to the space of early modern Ezo. In this chapter, we will begin to bring those concepts to bear on the history of the mapping and bounding of Ezo lands. The notion of Ezo possessed a historical identity that came to be spatialized during this period. This was the result of the incorporation of the notion of Ezo into the Tokugawa polity's governing structure, through the recognition of the Matsumae's right to control trade between Japan and Ezo. In order for the Matsumae to be able to manage this trade, they required some means of controlling and managing the access of people moving between what came to be two defined political spaces. One of these, immediately across the Tsugaru Strait from Honshu, came to be known as Matsumae, and came to be administered in a manner that conformed to the rest of the Japan in how it was represented. The remainder of the land, however, was represented as belonging to the Ezo, trade with which served as the fount of Matsumae authority.

The twin requirements of managing trade and legitimating authority served as justification for administering a geographical divide between these two populations. Such a split has frequently been interpreted from a perspective that has presumed some form of 'sakoku' as underpinning policy. However, the actual operation of a barrier between two areas, known as Matsumae and Ezo, was the outcome of local administrative requirements. These partially stemmed from the wider political structure within which the Matsumae were incorporated, but also reflected the specifics of their frontier situation. While this was later said to have initially involved a concern with affairs beyond Ezo's borders, in reality the Matsumae's notion of Ezo emerged solely in relation to its status as a 'membrane', controlling the movement of people and goods across this frontier. As such, the priority was to work out a means of peacefully managing this frontier.

The method adopted by the Matsumae would come to grant some geographic definition to this boundary between the two political communities. In times of political tension, this

boundary was able to be mobilized in order to aid in the Matsumae's assertion of authority. In general however, the barriers and checkpoints with which this border between Matsumae and Ezo came to be associated were neither rigorously policed, not particularly concerned with the notion of territorially-defining this space. Such boundaries functioned solely along the coast, around which most traffic passed, and were thus a strictly localized means of population management. Nevertheless, this border aided Matsumae claims to both authority and knowledge of its lands, but also came to be reflected back within Edo, from where Matsumae authority was legitimated in the first place.

The development of this practice of separation between Matsumae and Ezo shows the importance of a multiscalar perspective upon these borders. In reality, the boundary that was being asserted was a strictly functional one, differentiated by who and what was moving through its space of operation. On the map and in the mind, however, the boundary became a means of comprehending space, through which the Matsumae's role in serving as a border between the Ezo and Japan could be made to make sense. This remained the case even after the expansion of Japanese influence resulted in the center of trade and economic gravity shifting from around Matsumae to far out into Ezo itself, as this form of economic activity was still able to be comprehended from within the structure established by the boundary between Matsumae and Ezo.

As has long been argued, this border came to function as a strictly demarcated indication of status in the domain. However, while the ascription of status was not really based upon geography, the structure of rule necessitated the assertion of a geographic division. Although the border did not function as an effective means of separating or controlling the movement of population, this was nevertheless how it came to be represented on the map. In doing so, it found its existence naturalized, constantly confirmed in its presence.

Ezo origins

The space of Ezo would, over the course of the early modern period, be incorporated within the political and spatial context set out in the previous section. Ezo was not, however, merely a blank referent, amenable to being filled with any content, for it had been partially defined by

the term's existence in earlier periods of Japanese history.⁹ It is a term connected to the Emishi, a label applied by the Yamato court to the barbarians located beyond the bounds of the state to the (north)east.¹⁰ The status of these barbarians was not fixed as being beyond the state's purview, as they could be incorporated into it through the advance of the latter. As Hudson notes, Emishi "was primarily a political category" that referred to the relations of these peoples residing in what is now Kanto and Tohoku with the central court.¹¹ The importance of these relations is clear through the ascription of categories to the Emishi people that indicated their degree of cooperation with the court, with different groups referred to as "rough" and "soft", or "mountain" and "field" respectively.¹² In addition to these two designations, there was a third group, the "most distant", referred to as the "Tsugaru" or "Watarishima" Emishi.¹³ With the agricultural-pastoral frontier being pushed further into Tohoku, the early Medieval period continues to note the presence of barbarians in the north, with that "Watarishima" group generally presumed to be related to the people called Ainu today.¹⁴ This name, as well as their bringing of animal furs as trade goods, implies they were a people residing on the northern tip of Honshu and across the Tsugaru Strait, and sailing down to trade with the Japanese further south.¹⁵

This concept of barbarism embodied in the name Emishi, though, continues to refer to the relation of peoples with the central court during this period, and is almost certainly one imposed on them from outside as a means of ascribing them status in relation to it. It is for this

⁹ Kikuchi provides the following list of synonyms, 毛人・俘囚・夷俘・蝦狄・東夷・夷・狄, see Kikuchi *Ainu minzoku to Nihonjin*, p. 23. The use of the term Ezo is today obviously pejorative, but it will be used here both because it reflects contemporary accounts and, more importantly, connects with references to the same geographical area in other languages.

¹⁰ While in later period Ezo was understood as the far north, in the Medieval period it was considered to be the eastern part of the country, with Sado Island forming the realms most northerly point, see Kikuchi "Kyokai to etonosu", and n. 18 below.

¹¹ Hudson *Ruins of Identity*, p. 198; Kikuchi *Ainu minzoku to Nihonjin*, p. 24.

¹² These terms, together with "raw" and "cooked", originate in Chinese accounts, and are all variations used to indicate 'those loosely under our authority' as opposed to 'those who refuse to accept our authority'.

¹³ Aston *Nihongi*, pp. 261, 264; Walker notes the latter group as being mentioned from the 10th century, but the break is not so clear.

¹⁴ See Howell "Ainu ethnicity and the boundaries of the early modern Japanese state"; Kikuchi *Ainu to Matsumae no Seiji-Bunkaron*, p. 21. The question of ethnicity is of course complicated. There are large gaps in the historical record for instance, between the mention of the Watari-shima Emishi in a document of 893 and the reappearance of a barbarian people living across the Tsugaru Strait known as the 'Ezo' in the twelfth, with little in between. Kikuchi *Ainu minzoku to Nihonjin*, p. 41. For a more detailed discussion on the complicated relationship between Ezo and Ainu, see the opening chapters of Oishi, *Chusei Hoppo no Seiji to Shakai*.

¹⁵ Walker *The Conquest of Ainu Lands*, p. 22.

reason that the location of these ‘barbarians’ was for a long time within Honshu, and thus within the geography associated with the *ritsuryō* state, rather than outside of it. This is the reason for the presence of “Ezo land” on a sixteenth century version of the *Shūgaisho*, an encyclopedia based on a fourteenth century original, which provided a familiar *gyoki*-inspired image representing the provincial spaces of Japan. The land of these barbarians is located at the northern tip of Honshu, rather than beyond its boundaries (Figure 4). Indeed, there continued to be people identified by variations of such designations in this region into the nineteenth century, and during the early modern period such Ezo were effectively treated as a status group within the domain, with distinct labour and tribute obligations to the domain’s ruler from the surrounding peasants. These Ezo continued to be granted marginal representation on the map, being visible in five villages at two places on the *Shōhō* map of Tsugaru.¹⁶ This distinct ethnic (and/or status) group were apparently absorbed into the peasant population (‘human’ population) of the domain in two separate attempts prior to the nineteenth century,¹⁷ although during the Tenpo-era survey, there were still two *Ainu* villages marked on the Tenpo map.¹⁸ These territories were now those of the state and subject to Tokugawa rule, despite the presence of Ezo settlements present within them until the late-eighteenth century.¹⁹

The previous paragraph highlights both the slippage that occurred within these designations, with the characters that used to write Emishi coming to designate Ezo,²⁰ and the increasing attention granted towards seeking to place these peoples. The change in signifier at the outset of the medieval period indicates this shift in the notion of what the barbarians represented, with the term appearing to move from defining a people through relation with the imperial court to one which paid greater attention to where it was that these people came from or resided. In other words, the concept of barbarism within which the Emishi/Ezo were

¹⁶ See the maps accompanying Aomori Kenshi Hensan Kinsei Bukai, *Aomori-kenshi, shiryōhen, Kinsei*, Vol. 3. 2001. For more details on their construction, see Ozaki “Tenpo Mutsu-no-kuni Tsugaru-ryō ezu no hyōgennaiyō to Gōchō”.

¹⁷ See Namikawa *Kinsei nihon to hoppo shakai* and Emori *Ainu Minzoku no Rekishi* on this.

¹⁸ As we shall detail when discussing this project in the context of the Matsumae’s map, this was likely because the previous Genroku map was used as the basis on which the Tenpo one was drawn.

¹⁹ Kuniezu kenkyukai *Kuniezu No Sekai*. In the case of Hirosaki, these Ezo settlements seem to have been converted into standard villages and their tribute obligations commuted to rice tax in Hirosaki’s great and ultimately futile efforts at agrarian reform in the eighteenth century, which encompassed both samurai and *eta* as well, see Ravina *Land and Lordship in Early Modern Japan*, Chapter 3.

²⁰ For reasons that remain unclear, the characters that had been used to write Emishi are later being pronounced “Ezo”, possibly via “Ebisu” as a corruption of the former.

enmeshed slides from serving more as an ethonym, or at least a political designation, to one closer to a toponym. The reason for this appears to have been the greater success of the Kamakura shogunate in bringing the largely autonomous northern areas of Tohoku under the state's control.²¹ The limited extent of the authority that had been enjoyed by the Heian court in the region is visible in the disproportionate sizes of the two north-eastern provinces of Dewa and Mutsu. The *Azuma Kagami* specifically notes that with the founding of the shogunate at Kamakura, these two provinces were ordered to present maps to the court as signs of submission.²² Apparently as a result of the success of the Kamakura regime in bringing the inhabitants of Honshu within the political and cultural orbit of the state's administration, the barbarous characteristics which had been associated with the Emishi were transferred to the population predominantly residing on the far side of the Tsugaru Strait, while the term Emishi fades from view.

It is from around 1150 that we start to see the appearance of Ezogachishima as a geographical designation, loosely referencing the 'Thousand isles' of Ezo associated with this barbarian people. Its emergence is indicative of a new geographical reality, as while the understanding of an island nation had been strong in earlier periods, these lands to the north of Honshu had not been included within this understanding of the realm.²³ The term begins to appear within Japanese poetry of the period,²⁴ and it is this region, loosely tied together with Tsugaru, comes to form the limits of the known world in the Medieval period.²⁵ Ezogachishima, or sometimes Sotogahama, on the northern tip of Honshu, served as the easternmost extent of Japan,²⁶ with the island of Sado, off the coast of Niigata, considered to be the northernmost point of the realm. Both of these island locations, together with Iojima, off the southern point of Satsuma, were utilized as places of exile during the medieval period.²⁷ The adoption of these islands as places of banishment speaks to their ambiguous status, as outside the realm and therefore

²¹ Yiengpruksawan "The House of Gold".

²² Kimura *Edojidai no chizu ni kan suru kenkyū*, p.8.

²³ In the *Kojiki* (712) the term *Oyashimaguni* ("The great country of eight islands") is used. These are Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu, Awaji, Iki, Tsushima, Oki, and Sado islands, while the characters used to write this term are 大八州 国 and not the characters 島国 more common today.

²⁴ See the examples at Kaiho *Ezo no Rekishi*, p. 69-70.

²⁵ Sotogahama, on the northern tip of Honshu, served the same role, as the boundary of the known world. Batten *To the Ends of Japan*, p. 35; Kaiho *Ezo no Rekishi*, p. 81.

²⁶ Though not in a consistent fashion, see the sources cited in Amino "Deconstructing 'Japan'", p. 139.

²⁷ Kikuchi *Ainu minzoku to Nihonjin*, p. 46.

unable to “pollute” the Japan they surrounded, but as loosely under the control of the authorities within Japan. As Murai has noted, this concern with pollution was characteristic of the medieval era, and is seen in the explicit links frequently made between the people of Ezo and various demons and outcastes throughout the period, in both texts and illustrations.²⁸

This spatial understanding of foreignness co-existed with the notion of Ezo as a place to the north of Honshu. The overlap between these two perspectives is shown by the Suwa Shrine Scroll of 1356, which states that the Islands of the Ezo are situated in the middle of the ocean to the Northeast of Japan, mentioning three types of Ezo resident there.²⁹ These were the Karako, the Watarito and the Hinomoto, who lived on the 333 islands of Ezo.³⁰ It is assumed that the term Karako almost certainly derives from a word for China (Kara = Tang China) and, by extension, with the more general meaning of “foreign”.³¹ It is argued that the Karako should be understood as Ainu in western Hokkaido influenced by the Chinese and other peoples to the north,³² with the name stemming from the Chinese ceremonial brocade robes and other goods brought by them to Honshu to trade.³³ This trade association probably accounts for the Japanese belief, held as late as the seventeenth century, that Hokkaido was connected to Manchuria by land.³⁴ The Hinomoto referred to other Ainu groups in eastern Hokkaido; it was asserted that this group also had connections with foreign countries.³⁵ By contrast, the Watarito are noted as sharing one island with the other two groups, and probably referred to both Japanese and Ainu inhabiting the Ōshima peninsula immediately across the Tsugaru strait. While they are described as similar to the “men of the land of Wa”, speaking a semi-comprehensible language, they grew hair all over their bodies. The other two groups residing

²⁸ Including the *Shotoku taishi eden* 聖德太子繪伝 (Pictorial Biography of Prince Shotoku), see Siddle *Race, Resistance, and the Ainu of Japan*, p. 30.

²⁹ The *Suwa Daimyōjin Ekotoba* 諏訪大明神繪詞 (Illustrated Record of the Suwa Daimyōjin Shrine), see Marra *Representations of power*, p. 71; Bialock *Eccentric Spaces, Hidden Histories*, p. 256.

³⁰ Karako 唐子, Watarito 渡党, and Hinomoto 日の本, see Irimoto “Northern Studies in Japan”, p. 60.

³¹ As is also likely with the later designations of Sakhalin as *Karato* and *Karafuto* later in the Tokugawa period, which will be discussed in a later chapter, Kaiho *Chūsei no Ezochi*, 161, also Irimoto “Northern Studies in Japan”.

³² Kaiho *Chūsei no Ezochi*, pp. 160, 162.

³³ Though prestige goods worn only by chiefs, brocade robes became so closely associated with the Ainu that in the early seventeenth century the founder of the Matsumae domain, Kakizaki Yoshihiro, wore one to a meeting with Tokugawa Ieyasu in order to represent himself as suzerain of the Ainu, Howell “Ainu ethnicity and the boundaries of the early modern Japanese state”, p. 79.

³⁴ Kamiya “Japanese Control of Ezochi and the Role of Northern Koryo”, Kaiho *Ezo no Rekishi*, pp. 191-195.

³⁵ Kaiho argues that Ezo should be understood in the medieval era as being within Japan, as ‘lands connected to foreign realms’, and that this distinguishes it from the Tokugawa era, see Kaiho *Ezo no Rekishi*, p. 123.

further from the boundaries of Japan are far more foreign still, having the appearance of demons, eating flesh, and speaking a strange language.³⁶

The information contained in the scroll captures a number of threads that come together to define the notion of Ezo at the start of the Tokugawa period. These are the uncivilized nature of the population and its spatial separation from Japan proper, their participation in trade with the Japanese and position as middlemen in wider trade networks, and the lack of a clear distinction in designations of people as being Ezo or otherwise. As a consequence, Ezo comes to be understood as a foreign place in relation to the rest of Japan, as well as serving as its boundaries, as shown by the map in the archives of Myōhonji, a Nichiren temple in Chiba. Recently discovered, the map is a 1560 copy by the head priest of a map made by either Nikkō or Nichijun in the early-fourteenth century, contemporaneous with the *gyoki* maps we noted in the previous chapter.³⁷ On this map, the entirety of Japan is compressed into one elongated island identified as the “Country of Japan, sixty-six provinces”, while to the east are 35 smalls islands labelled as “Esu no Chishima”.³⁸ Their appearance on this document is within the context of Japan’s relations with the rest of Asia, and indicate that these islands stood outside a compact, unified entity of Japan, even though this latter body existed solely upon the map.

With these “thousand islands of Ezo” coming to be recognized as a foreign yet actual place, though, they also became open to political claims.³⁹ Already in the early fifteenth century, the Andō ruling northern Tohoku were proclaiming themselves as *Ezo no kanrei* (governor of Ezo), as well as shoguns of Hinomoto, seeking to draw upon the prestige of ruling over a foreign land in order to bolster their own political position.⁴⁰ While those ‘Japanese’ aligned with the

³⁶ Kikuchi *Ainu minzoku to Nihonjin*, p. 48.

³⁷ Two short attached documents discussing the status of Korea and the Mongols empire are included with the map, which are the notes of lectures given by Nikkō 日興 (1246-1333), one of Nichiren’s six direct disciples, transcribed and amended by his disciple Nichijun 日順 (1294-?). It is not clear whether the map itself was drawn by Nikkō or Nichijun.

³⁸ Dolce “Mapping the ‘Divine Country’”, pp. 306, 307.

³⁹ That the understanding of Ezo as constituted by a Thousand Isles was retained well into the seventeenth century is shown by a map at Hokkaido University’s Northern Studies Collection, thought to be the oldest private map of Ezo itself, see *Ezo-zu* 「蝦夷図」, Hokkaido University Northern Studies Collection, Item 622. Available online: <http://www2.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/cgi-bin/hoppodb/record.cgi?id=0D0002100000000000>. It shows two trade routes from Nambu heading to Matsumae while representing Ezo itself as a collection of islands, see Akitsuki *Nihon Hoppen Tanken to Chizu no Rekishi*, pp. 23-25. A reference to the ‘Inspection Tours’ being 35 years earlier dates the map at 1668, see below.

⁴⁰ In a document from 1436. As Howell notes, they assumed titles “that placed them within the central institutional hierarchy or outside it as political or economic conditions warranted”. Howell “Ainu ethnicity and the boundaries of

mainland were apparently almost expelled from the Oshima peninsula following a conflict with an Ainu grouping led by a Koshamain in 1457, by the mid-sixteenth century there existed agreements between Japanese residents inhabiting the southern end of the island, opposite northern Honshu, and the Ezo chiefs who ruled lands further up the coast. Meanwhile the Kakizaki family had come to be recognized as collecting shipping dues on behalf of the Ando, entrenching themselves as the leaders of this community.

More remarkably, the history of the Korean Yi dynasty (*Yijo Shillok*) records the 1482 visit of an envoy from the “King of Ezo-ga-Chishima”. While the actual identity of this envoy is disputed, with it argued that they originated from the Ando in Tsugaru, imposters from Tsushima, or elsewhere,⁴¹ it shows how the identity of Ezo as a place was coming to be fixed beyond the boundaries of Japan itself. It seems reasonable to assume that the emergence of this embassy was not unconnected with the appearance of the “barbarian island” to Japan’s north on the principle map accompanying the Korean *Kaitō Shokokuki*, printed in 1471, which had been compiled following the 1443 Korean Embassy to Japan (Figure 5).⁴² Knowledge of Ezo as a particular place had come to be comparatively widespread, as shown by the way a Japanese from Kagoshima, who travelled to Goa, reported to the Jesuits there the existence of a ‘Gsoo’ (Yezo) north of Japan that was inhabited by huge bearded natives. Ezo consequently became a place mentioned in European reports of Japan even before Europeans had actually set foot on Japan itself.⁴³

At the outset of the Early Modern period, then, the notion of Ezo represented both the barbarian people to Japan’s north and a section of the material world, which was located to the north of Honshu on the map and largely inhabited by these same barbarians. The majority of work that has been done on Ezo in the early modern period understandably focuses on the question of relations between this people and the Japanese. As this study is on territory, it will not focus on this relationship as such, but is nevertheless based upon a vast body of work that

the early modern Japanese state”, p. 78. Their fort at Tosaminato in Tsugaru has been excavated to reveal a large quantity of old Chinese coins and ceramics, indicative of the larger trade networks within which they were situated Kaiho “Hoppō Kōeki to Chūsei Ezo Shakai,”, pp. 266-7.

⁴¹ Kaiho Mineo and Endō Iwao consider the embassy to have been sent by the Ando themselves, Murai Shōsuke argues it was an “impostor envoy”, with Osa Setsuko viewing them as imposters from Tsushima.

⁴² 海東諸国紀 (Record of the Eastern Countries). The map is known as the *Kaitō Shokoku Zenzu* 海東諸国全図 (Maritime Map of the Eastern Countries).

⁴³ Boscaro & Walter “Ezo and Its Surroundings through the Eyes of European Cartographers”, p. 84.

has been produced on the history of Matsumae and the Ezochi. Although Ezo was by this time a geographical location, situated to the north of Japan and associated with both barbarity and trade, it did not yet constitute a territory, as its boundaries remained indistinct, uncontrolled and were not institutionalized in any form. This geographic designation had come into being through a classic process of 'othering', or of the Japanese state (however problematic that term is) demarcating itself off as civilized in opposition to people who refused to accept or not under its authority. By the sixteenth century, these peoples were largely, although not entirely, viewed as inhabiting a space outside of Japan, and in this case gave rise to an ill-defined land considered as politically, culturally and geographically distinct from the rest of the archipelago. Through the establishment of the Tokugawa state, or Japan's early modern period, this land of the Ezo continued to be constituted in relation to Japan.

Bordering authority

The narrative of the establishment of the Tokugawa state offered in Chapters 2 and 3 emphasized how the coherence of the notion of early modern Japan is associated with the re-establishment of central authority over the nation. It is generally understood that an outgrowth of the same process also manifested itself across the Tsugaru Strait. Over the sixteenth century the Japanese settlements across the water from Honshu on the Oshima peninsula had slipped under the control of the Kakizaki family. The Kakizaki were confirmed in their position in the Ezochi in the late-sixteenth century; having previously collected shipping dues on behalf of the Andō, they were now directly allocated the right to collect them on trade with the Ezo by Hideyoshi.⁴⁴ Following Hideyoshi's death, and during the protracted struggle out of which Tokugawa Ieyasu emerged victorious, the Kakizaki travelled to Osaka to meet Ieyasu, changing their name to that of their principle settlement of Matsumae and proclaiming their loyalty to the new ruler. In early 1604, following the victory at Sekigahara that had confirmed Ieyasu as ruler, the Matsumae were granted his black-sealed order, which specified the Matsumae's authority over other Japanese seeking to trade with the inhabitants of the Ezo, the Ainu.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ For more details see Walker *The Conquest of Ainu Lands*, pp. 27-35; Kaiho *Ezo no Rekishi*, pp. 181-184

⁴⁵ Kaiho *Ezo no Rekishi*, pp. 185-187. For the sake of convenience, this study will adopt the moniker 'Ainu' when referring to the population of the Ezochi, and retain the term Ezo for when it is being referred to as a geographical

Matsumae authority came to be justified through their role managing the trade of Japanese with the Ainu. This management role was premised upon the Matsumae's incorporation into the Tokugawa polity in a number of important ways. Being brought within the structure of Tokugawa rule necessitated certain obligations in exchange for recognition, and the Matsumae were no different in this regard. As previous chapters have noted, together these obligations largely serve to constitute what is understood as the Tokugawa state and worked to define early modern Japan, and included attendance on the Shogun, the provision of both staple and exotic goods, mobilizing on his orders for military and other duties, and, perhaps most importantly, the maintenance of order. Maintaining order for the Matsumae implied the effective management of this trade.

The right to do so was legitimated through the recognition provided by the central authority. Hideyoshi had granted the Matsumae rights to levy duties on all shipping in Ezo,⁴⁶ confirmed and formalized by the Tokugawa. The resulting black-seal delegated to the Matsumae authority and responsibility over those coming from other parts of Japan and entering Matsumae in order to undertake trade with the Ainu.⁴⁷ It therefore related solely to people who also fell under the authority of the Tokugawa, rather than being a claim of authority over the Ainu themselves, who are specifically noted as permitted to go where they please and to not be subject to interference.⁴⁸ The contents of this document are comparatively

entity. It is worth noting that this is largely an anachronous distinction. The term Ainu only came into regular use in Japanese documents in the 1780s (*Kikuchi Ainu minzoku to Nihonjin*, p. 197), and its use was superseded in the Meiji era by *kyūdojin* (旧土人), former native, which emphasized the assimilationist aims of the state. Official use of the term 'Wajin' (Japanese) in opposition to the Ainu, dates from just after this, in 1799 (*Kaiho Ezo no Rekishi*, p. 142). In earlier periods, the use of terms like Ezo for both people and land indicated how the two worked to define each other, with the essential character of one (as 'wild', 'uncivilized', 'uncultivated', etc.) reflected in the other. With regards the connection with cultivation, see Chapter 6. For more on this merging of ethno- and toponyms, see for example Osiander *Before the State*, pp. 250-53.

⁴⁶ Walker *The Conquest of Ainu Lands*, pp. 33-34

⁴⁷ The original document is kept at the Historical Museum of Hokkaido in Sapporo, and its contents are noted in the Matsumae's records. This is as follows:

- [1] It shall be unlawful for people from outside provinces to enter or exit Matsumae to trade with the Ainu without the consent of Matsumae Shima-no-kami.
- [2] It shall be unlawful for [Japanese] people to cross over and trade without permission; Ainu should be considered free to go where they please.
- [3] It is strictly prohibited to inflict injustices or crimes upon the Ainu.

Acts to the contrary will result in severe punishment. Carefully observe the above.

See *Kaiho Ezo no Rekishi*, p. 184, and adapted from Walker *The Conquest of Ainu Lands*, p. 37.

⁴⁸ The *Shinra no Kiroku*, the Matsumae clan history composed in 1646, notes that when the head of the Matsumae, Yoshihiro, returned to Matsumae following his meeting with Hideyoshi, in the summer of 1593, he gathered all the

unconcerned with land, in contrast to the seals issued to other lords, who had their area of authority specified through villages, district and province. This was because of the Matsumae's location beyond the geography of the realm associated with the court at Kyoto, which continued to provide a grid within which the extent of an individual lords control could be demarcated. On the far side of the Tsugaru Strait, though, this grid had no meaning, and so the Matsumae were granted authority in relation to the land associated with Ezo, but without any delimitation of what this referred to.

In practice, the first and second items under the seal, of Matsumae permission being required to enter Matsumae and trade with the Ainu, and Matsumae permission being necessary in order to cross over and trade with the Ainu, pointed to the presence of two distinguishable areas, which we can term Matsumae and Ezo respectively.⁴⁹ The authority of the Matsumae was entirely defined in respect to these two areas. Nevertheless, there was no explanation within the document with regards to what these areas *meant*. Given their authority over people varied depending on identity ascribed to an individual, Matsumae rule was based upon an extremely vague geography. This designation of authority would suggest two things with regards Edo's understanding of the Matsumae realm. The first is the perception that Matsumae served as an area that controlled access to the rest of the lands of the Ezo, with trade between Japan and the Ainu already passing through this place of Matsumae.⁵⁰ However, there is evidence to suggest that the monopolization of the Ainu trade by the Matsumae should be understood as resulting from this designation by the Tokugawa.⁵¹ Therefore, the Tokugawa grant of authority to manage this trade both reflected the structure of the trade that existed to Japan's north while also providing an important structuring role.⁵² It also reflected an assumption by the Tokugawa that the rule of lords under their command

Ainu, read them the order, and threatened they would be crushed if it was not obeyed. However, the actual contents of the order appear to have had little to do with the *ainu*. Kikuchi *Ainu minzoku to Nihonjin*, pp. 70-72.

⁴⁹ In this respect it is interesting that in the interpretation provided by the Tokugawa Jikki, a specific mention is made of the "lands of the Matsumae" 松前の地, see the entry for Keichō 9, 1st month, 27th day, also at Kaiho *Bakuseishiryō to Ezochi*, p.101. This appears to clarify that Matsumae referred to a distinct area, whereas what exactly Matsumae had meant in the original document would appear an open question, but it was quite possibly just the town itself.

⁵⁰ This understanding, of course, was one pushed by the Matsumae in order to accentuate their importance, and thus ability to be recognized within the Tokugawa system.

⁵¹ For instance, in 1670, Ainu in Ishikari reportedly lamented how their ancestors had been allowed to trade directly with the Hirosaki castle town of Takaoka, see the *Tsugaru Ittōshi*, p. 185.

⁵² Giddens *The Constitution of Society*.

would occur over a demarcated area. The contents of a seal therefore created the requirement for the designation of an area of land to be marked out as being that of Matsumae.

Secondly, the black seal pointed to a clear distinction existing between Japanese and Ainu, the inhabitants of Ezo. Considered the “Lord of Ezo Isle”, this political role positioned the Matsumae as themselves constituting the border between the Ezo and Japanese political authority and legitimated in their position as an interface between the two constituted communities. As with the use of the term Emishi in an earlier era, this constitution should be understood as one being conducted from one side, reflecting the perceptions of those identifying as Japanese towards the Ainu. From this perspective, the Matsumae represent a process of social division that is not reducible to a spatial boundary, being instead constituted through their responsibility for managing relations between the two communities. That is, the Matsumae themselves form the border mediating between these twin identities of Japanese and Ainu. In effect, Ieyasu’s black seal positioned the Matsumae in relation to two politicized social bodies. The first was the Tokugawa polity coalescing over lands legitimated by tradition as being Japan, to which the Matsumae formed an unwieldy appendage. The second was the Ainu, a group of people with whom trade relations had long existed, but who were considered politically independent from Japan. The Matsumae established their authority within the space between these two groupings, authorized by the former to manage its relations with the latter.

These specific identities provided the authority that legitimated the separate treatment of the Ainu by the Matsumae.⁵³ The possibility of ascribing such identities, however, necessitated a geographical demarcation in order to mark out where Matsumae ended and the land of the Ezo began, allowing for the regulation of exchange between this land of the Matsumae, serving as the border of both the Japanese state and its ethnicity, and that of the Ainu beyond. While the Matsumae, therefore, were designated a “membrane” regulating contact between the interior and exterior of the state,⁵⁴ the necessity of distinguishing how individuals coming into contact with it would be filtered required the performance of some boundary upon the

⁵³ Kolossov & O’Loughlin “New Borders for New World Orders”, p. 270.

⁵⁴ Raffestin “Autour de la fonction sociale de la frontière”.

ground. This performance depended upon the reproduction of understandings of this line through the lived experiences of the participants involved in its creation.

This is exactly what we see in the early-seventeenth century, where the Matsumae turn to history in order to justify the presence of this border as constituting two distinct social bodies. An early Matsumae history presents the emergence of a distinct area under their authority as having certainly occurred by the mid-sixteenth century, through an agreement with two Ainu chieftains named Hashitain and Chikomotain.⁵⁵ What seems to have been a peace treaty between the Kakizaki and these two is said to have resulted in the establishment of an area of Kakizaki authority running from Kaminokuni to Shiranai; this is the 1550 agreement on trade and residence.⁵⁶ While in substance this agreement appears to focus more upon relations of the Matsumae with Ainu chiefs and the trading rituals to be conducted under Matsumae aegis than a strict division of land, it does provide for the expected behaviour of the Ainu when visiting Matsumae.⁵⁷ It is also noted in this history that even prior to this there had been a process of ethnic distinction between those groups subsequently identified as Japanese and Ainu, with the area of Japanese habitation being concentrated in the south of the Oshima peninsula, and a decree issued against mixed residence in 1525.⁵⁸ Of course, it is likely that the presentation of this decree in the *Shinra-no-kiroku* better reflects concerns of the mid-seventeenth century, rather than those of the mid-sixteenth. Nevertheless, it appears that a sphere of Matsumae control was coming to be reflected in how these groups related to one another, such as regulations for Ezo vessels from 1590 that requested ships approaching from either East or West heave to at a designated point, before proceeding after this show of respect.⁵⁹

The invocation of a division between Japanese and Ainu in the *shinra-no-kiroku* shows that by the 1640s at the latest there was some effort to demarcate an area under the direct authority of the Matsumae able to be distinguished from that under the control of the Ezo. Subsequently, we find the institutionalization of this division through a number of barriers, which came to be presented as a means of regulating access between areas largely inhabited

⁵⁵ 波志多尹, 波志多院 or 波志多犬 and 知古茂多尹, 知古茂多院, 知蒋多犬, or 「チコモモッタケン」.

⁵⁶ According to the *Shinra-no-Kiroku*, pp. 28-29. Kaiho Mineo argues that these two chiefs should be seen as ruling what became the west and east ezochi respectively.

⁵⁷ Tanimoto "Kinsei no Ezo", p. 76.

⁵⁸ See Kaiho *Ezo no Rekishi*, p. 166.

⁵⁹ Takakura "The Ainu of Northern Japan", p. 25.

by Japanese and Ezo. Superficially, this appears to mimic their role in the rest of Japan, where the early seventeenth century saw the establishment of checkpoints in the rest of the country, as the Tokugawa sought to institute their own system of national barrier stations in place of the ad hoc barriers controlled by local lords. In the case of the Tokugawa, this was initially clear inspired by security concerns.⁶⁰ However, the guardhouses associated with the Matsumae that subsequently came to be associated with this policy often emerged during an earlier period, and for reasons other than security considerations.

For example, at Kaminokuni to the west of Matsumae itself, the locating of a guard house here appears to reflect the fact that Kaminokuni had been the base for the Kakizaki family before their move to Matsumae, in 1514. Similarly, in the east, the *Ezoshimakikan*, a famous illustrated description of Ezo customs produced around 1800, mentions a guard house (*bansho*) being established at Kameda village, north of Hakodate. This was done in 1613, apparently by a Nanbu retainer,⁶¹ although it had certainly came under Matsumae control later in the century, with the presence of a magistrate at this Kameda guardhouse confirmed by a list of commands dating from Genroku 4 (1691).⁶² By this time, the local administration were also based here. In both of these instances, the motive for the establishment of such guardhouses appears to be financial, which is why one is found at the Matsumae family's old base, and the other is established by a domain on Honshu: shipping dues, rather than restricting the movements of population, is the motivation behind these structures. Indeed, and despite the concerns of the government, in the rest of Japan too, Tokugawa barriers "were largely inspired by economic concerns",⁶³ a concern that was perhaps even more pressing for the Matsumae than elsewhere of the country. Collecting the dues from such trade was, after all, its reason for existing.

This suggests that the area marked out by the two guardhouses above, running along the coast of the base of the Oshima peninsula with Matsumae as its approximate center, should be

⁶⁰ "Encapsulated in the prohibition phrased as *de onna-iri teppo*, or 'women leaving, guns entering', Edo. Either phenomenon could indicate an incipient plot against the shogunate; daimyo might be removing their hostages, or smuggling guns", Jansen *The Making of Modern Japan*, p. 139. On barriers in general see Jansen "Japan in the Early Nineteenth Century", pp. 62–65; Nenzi, *Excursions in Identity*, pp. 2, 46–55.

⁶¹ Hata Awagimaru [Murakami Shimanojō], *Ezoshimakikan*; also see Takagi Kinsei *Nihon no Hoppōzu Kenkyū*, p. 73.

⁶² *Hakodate-shi, Kameda-hen*, pp. 95–98, see <https://trc-adeac.trc.co.jp/WJ11E0/WJJS06U/0120205100/0120205100100030?hid=ht000700>; also Edmonds *Northern*

Frontiers of Qing China and Tokugawa Japan, p. 90–91.

⁶³ Vaporis *Breaking barriers*, p. 257.

understood as a sphere of influence rather than a demarcated political space, rather like those held by a number of major Ainu chieftains.⁶⁴ These guardhouses are on the coast in order to manage the trade of both Ainu coming to Matsumae and Japanese going out into distant Ezo lands, rather than on the basis of a demarcated boundary between two groups of people. At this stage, any division between the Ezochi and the area under Matsumae authority does not correlate with or map onto an ethnic distinction in the population, and there is a lack of obvious division between areas of Japanese settlement and those of the Ezo. On one of the Shōhō maps,⁶⁵ which is thought to have been made in 1669 on the basis of information submitted during the Shōhō era (1644-48), toponyms over much of the island are given the suffix 'ezo',⁶⁶ but so also are long-established settlements much closer to Matsumae. On the west coast, for instance, both Kaminokuni, the original base of the Kakizaki and location of that early guardhouse, and Tomari, are granted the suffix of 'ezo'. Proceeding clockwise around the coast away from Matsumae, however, and neighbouring Otobe is not, and neither is Monai.⁶⁷ Emori Susumu has shown that there were still a number of Ainu settlements within this area up until the period of the Shakushain uprising at least. This indicates that whatever division is being demarcated between the two peoples, it is not yet one functioning geographically (*Figure 6*).

Nevertheless, the sense of two distinct lands under the responsibility of the Matsumae, as implied by the black seal document, does come into existence. There is evidence for this in how a number of practices come together in order to represent the demarcation of this zone of Japanese residence. This is a process that occurs in something of a piecemeal fashion, as can be traced by noting how these guardhouses function in the Shogunal inspection of 1633. This 1633 Touring Inspection in the reign of Tokugawa Iemitsu was the first of what were grand feudal processions that "advertised the *kubo*'s interest in implementing good government" and asserted Tokugawa authority over both its own lands and those of its subordinate

⁶⁴ See below for more details on Ainu concepts of political control and attitudes to land.

⁶⁵ This is referring to the map that has been long considered the Shōhō Map of All Japan. On the variations, see details in Takagi *Kinsei Nihon no Hoppōzu Kenkyū*, pp. 20-24.

⁶⁶ Although not on the first of the maps of Japan produced using this survey, where black circles next to place names appear to serve the same purpose, although there are far fewer names than on other maps, see Takagi *Kinsei Nihon no Hoppōzu Kenkyū*.

⁶⁷ It can only be speculated that perhaps the latter two towns did not have Ainu inhabitants whereas the former did, hence the designation. However, the map given in Emori *Ainu Minzoku no Rekishi*, p. 167, does not list Tomari, but the other three locations are all marked as having Ainu inhabitants in 1669.

domains.⁶⁸ That these Touring Inspector's made the trip across the Tsugaru Strait is significant in indicating how the Matsumae themselves were envisaged as forming the border with the outside world, and offered one more means through which they were incorporated into the structure of the Tokugawa order. In that sense, it has been seen as significant that the tour limited itself to what is understood as the future Wajinchi.⁶⁹ According to the record of this tour, the Matsumae took the inspectors as far west (north) as Monai and as far east as Ishizaki, a few kilometres beyond Kameda, and in doing so, indicated to the Tokugawa that this was the extent of the area of land under their direct authority, and therefore open to habitation by the Japanese.

While this could be seen as the Matsumae staking out the extent of land over which they felt they exercised control, the representation of these boundaries is not entirely consistent when we examine them in the context of the Shōhō map, made, it seems, on the basis of data from about a decade later. In the west, the position of Monai is noted on the west coast of the island, northwest of Matsumae itself, and it is specifically indicated that beyond this "There is no road, you must go by boat".⁷⁰ The map therefore appears to confirm the reported extent of the Bakufu inspection. However, by the time the map was drawn in 1669, the barrier may have shifted further away from Matsumae. Following the Shakushain Uprising, the report on the conflict produced by the Tsugaru domain noted that West Matsumae now extended as far as Kumaishi;⁷¹ while Kaiho Mineo argues that the advance of the barrier was the result of the

⁶⁸ Roberts *Performing the Great Peace*, p. 56. These were highly formalized and ritualized tours that were authorized at nearly every change of ruler until the final tour of 1838. *Kubō* is one of the terms used by the Tokugawa to refer to their authority as 'deputies of the emperor', and was widely used during the period. Roberts argues that the use of terms such as shogun serves to conceal how politics actually functioned during the period, by artificially separating us from the language within which politics was understood and conducted at the time. This point is entirely valid, but the current study is concerned with understanding how Ezo was territorialized in the world, and therefore seeks to use terms commensurable within different political contexts. While shogun is now an English term, this study largely uses terms such as state and government in its stead.

⁶⁹ This area of Japanese habitation under Japanese control is frequently known as the "Wajinchi" (land of the Japanese), but the word itself is anachronistic, being generally a nineteenth century appellation. Domain documents usually refer to the area as the *zaigo*, meaning domain territories outside a castle town. Later visitors used terms like "Shamochi" (from the Ainu word for Japanese), "Nipponchi," or simply "Matsumaechi" or "Matsumaeryō", see Emori *Hokkaido kinseishi no kenkyū*, pp. 75-81; Howell *Capitalism from Within*, p. 30, n. 17. In accord with this practice, this study will use 'Wajinchi' from this point forward in order to distinguish the area under direct Matsumae authority from both the domain, embodied in its ruling clan, and the town. As this chapter demonstrates, however, the degree of fixity implied by the notion "Japanese land" does not correspond to how it existed in practice.

⁷⁰ See the reproduction in Hatano "Matsumae-han to Tokugawa Bakufu no Hoppō Ninshiki", p. 31.

⁷¹ *Tsugaru Ittōshi*, p. 142.

Henauke Conflict of 1643.⁷² If that is indeed the case, it suggests that the guardhouse may now have come to serve some sort of security function as well, by analogy with their role within Tokugawa understandings. In the same Tsugaru report, the Matsumae's control in the east was noted as extending to Kameda,⁷³ although the Shogun's inspectorate is recorded as proceeding beyond here to Ishizaki. Ishizaki does not appear to be marked upon variants of the Shōhō map, but Shinori, located five kilometers west of Ishizaki, is clearly visible, although the road marked upon the map appears to terminate prior to this point. In the west the road is drawn as though it finishes at the same point the inspection did, at Monai.

The discrepancies visible in the various means the Matsumae possessed for representing the location of this boundary shows that to think of it as a border, meaning as some sort of line representing an absolute division between two groups of people, would be mistaken. The halting of the Shogunal Tour at the eastern and western extremes of what would come to be thought of as the 'Wajinchi' may well have initially reflected the absence of passable roads beyond this point, considering how these Tours were along routes chosen by the domains and conducted to show them in the best light.⁷⁴ If the absence of roads was the original justification for the domain not escorting the Tour further, it would have been obliged to maintain this claim on the maps which it subsequently submitted to the Shogunate a decade later. These claims seem to have been largely reproduced on the Shōhō Japan maps.⁷⁵ Certainly the Tsugaru domain's investigations after the Shakushain uprising appear to indicate that at neither end of this 'Wajinchi' did understandings of boundary match those that had been represented by the domain to the Tour. While all of these markers are in the same general area, then, it is clear that what they are delimiting does not take the form of a linear boundary that is being marked out on the land. The shifting locations of these guardhouses suggests the absence of a fixed understanding of the area under the direct jurisdiction of the Matsumae, even as this juridical distinction became the basis for Matsumae authority.

⁷² Kaiho, Matsumae-han no Seiritsu, p. 23, for a description of the conflict see Emori *Ainu Minzoku no Rekishi*, p. 180-182

⁷³ These guardhouses being at Kumaishi and Kameda was an understanding that found reflection on a number of maps made in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, such as the *Ezokoku Matsumae Zentō no kozu* 蝦夷國松前全嶋之古図, see Takagi *Kinsei Nihon no Hoppōzu Kenkyū*, p. 76.

⁷⁴ Roberts *Performing the Great Peace*, p. 57.

⁷⁵ Propriety forced Tokugawa domains to be consistent in the information they supplied to the government, even when both sides were aware that this was not accurate.

Disputing early modern Ezo

While the *Shōhō kuniezu* maps submitted by other domains were largely scaled to a uniform standard,⁷⁶ that submitted by the Matsumae was not. Nor did the subsequent cadastre detail tax obligations for the villages under Matsumae control, as the Matsumae remained the only domain without an assessed agricultural tax base.⁷⁷ Therefore, the lack of a tax survey should not be taken to indicate that agriculture was irrelevant for the Matsumae. Conversely, it was the absence of agriculture that was crucial to the proclamation of their authority, which nevertheless was on a different basis from other domains in Japan. Responsibility for managing trade with the Ainu was sufficient to grant the Matsumae a place within the Tokugawa polity, and by extension bring the lands of these Ezo within it as well. In the event, the content of these sealed orders to the Matsumae remained unchanged until the end of the seventeenth century, and the structure of rule that it outlined was still in place at the end of the eighteenth century.⁷⁸ As the previous section has indicated, though, this structure was one that was fundamentally uninterested in the demarcation of things within space. As can be seen from the manner in which the barriers that supposedly bordered off the lands of the Matsumae from those of the Ezo were actually administered on the ground, their function was not to enforce a strict demarcation of political space.

The financial imperatives behind the system are clear in the histories of the two activities which fuelled the Matsumae domain's initial wealth, hawk trading and gold mining. The supply of hawk feathers, in particular, proved an important source of early wealth and legitimacy, and by the 1660s, around 300 hawking posts had been established in the Wajinchi. However, the

⁷⁶ Inoue Masashige, who had been involved in the earlier mapping projects of the state, made use of his experience in order to set the production standards for the detailed provincial maps at a scale of 1:21,600, *Kawamura Kuniezu*. The representation of Matsumae on the resulting maps shows that they failed to make any effort to meet this standard (*Figure 6*).

⁷⁷ Although this *kokudaka* system remained significant in other ways, see the next chapter. As the previous chapter has shown, the *Sō* lacked an assessed tax base for Tsushima, but held other lands in Kyushu.

⁷⁸ Fujino *Kinseikokkashi no kenkyū*, p. 7. While Brett Walker has sought to argue that the ill-defined nature of the authority granted the Matsumae resembled that granted to English companies in North America, there was a clear distinction in the way that the extent of land over which authority was granted to these companies became more and more tightly circumscribed in the latter case. See Tomlins, Christopher. "The legal cartography of colonization, the legal polyphony of settlement"; Macmillan *Sovereignty and Possession in the English New World*. What is remarkable in the case of the Matsumae is that this grant of authority was able to be continuously reissued.

hunters themselves, the *takamachi*, were expanding their operations across the Ezochi.⁷⁹ The numbers of both miners and hawkers killed in the Shakushain Disturbance is testimony to their disruptive impact upon Ezo society. This shows that these guardhouses did not serve as a border is understood today, and that any boundary existing between areas of Japanese and Ainu habitation operated in a functionally-differentiated fashion. The guardhouses must have predominantly sought to monitor and tax the passage of trade, rather than serve a means of restricting the movement of people in the manner in which a modern border is perceived to operate.

The increasing circulation of Japanese within the land of the Ezo is seen as a crucial step towards the transformation of the land of the Ezo into an “exploited colony”,⁸⁰ in which traditional patterns of Ainu life broke down under the impact of Japanese economic penetration and rendered them dependent and thus exploitable by those coming from Matsumae and further afield. This change has been traditionally understood through a three-stage model, in which the relatively free exchange largely taking place at the town of Matsumae began to alter around the 1640s, with a stricter imposition of residential separation between Japanese and Ainu after the Henauke conflict.⁸¹ From the turn of the seventeenth century, the Matsumae had begun to allocate trade fiefs in the lands of the Ezo to its retainers. These were sanctioned trade posts to which the retainer would send a boat to trade with the Ainu living in that region, and have generally been seen as equivalent to the, increasingly nominal, fiefs held by samurai in other domains in Japan.⁸² It is understood that with the move towards residential separation, those who held these fiefs then sought to restrict the trade

⁷⁹ Takakura *Ainu Seisaku- shi*, p. 59, see also the next chapter.

⁸⁰ Takakura *Ainu Seisaku- shi*, following P. Leroy-Beaulieu, *La colonisation chez les peuples modernes*, Paris, Alcan, 1908. While he notes that “I have merely borrowed the words”, the comparison is interesting for emphasizing the far greater attention paid to Ezochi as a Japanese colony prior to 1945, which has only recently come to be re-emphasized in histories of the region. The subsequent post-Meiji stage was Hokkaido as “a settled colony”. The recent explosion of interest in “settler colonialism”, particularly marked in studies of the new world reframes much of this literature by focusing on the way the ‘native’ was eliminated from the land in order to allow for the colonizers to access territory. See for instance Denoon “Understanding settler societies”; Wolfe “Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native”.

⁸¹ The *Shinra no Kiroku* is a 1646 reworking of an earlier text, three years after this Henauke conflict, when it was perhaps necessary to (re)legitimize a policy of residential separation. In his stage theory for the emergence of the Ezochi, Kaiho Mineo notes this 1551 agreement as being the first stage, see Kaiho “Wajinchi’ seiritsu no shodankai” in Kaiho *Kinsei Ezochi Seiritsushi no Kenkyū*.

⁸² Chapter 3, n. 30.

able to be conducted by those Ainu who fell under the ‘jurisdiction’ of these trading posts, limiting it to the official trading boats sent by them from Matsumae.⁸³

The lack of interest from these boundaries established by the Matsumae in preventing the circulation of men or material between the two areas is clear in domains failure to halt competition between different groups of Ainu for control over more extensive areas of resource production and a greater quantity of trade with the Japanese. This ultimately resulted in the war with Shakushain that broke out in 1669. Leader of a powerful grouping around the Saru River in eastern Ezo, Shakushain’s power was dependent upon “good land” and “many utensils,” as well as upon charisma and physical strength.⁸⁴ An intra-Ainu conflict between Shakushain and Onibishi, leader of a neighbouring Ainu group, resulted in the defeat of the latter, and the attempt to restrict both his access to land and trade opportunities in its aftermath that appears to have brought about the conflict.⁸⁵ While this event, known as the ‘Shakushain Disturbance’ or ‘Kanbun-era Ezo Disturbance’, began as a localized affair, fuelled by resentment against Matsumae restrictions on the *ainu*’s trade, unfair trade practices and discrimination, and the actions of these Japanese adventurers, it appears to have garnered a great deal of support from among various Ainu groups. Consequently, it simmered on long after Shakushain’s death in the tenth month of 1669, and was not considered fully put down until three years later. The deaths of 273 Japanese, with two-thirds of them originating from outside of Matsumae, shows the extent of Japanese penetration of the area supposedly reserved for Ainu habitation, as do their occupations: hawk trappers, miners, sailors and merchants.⁸⁶

The Shakushain conflict is significant for understandings of Ezo because the Matsumae reported the conflict to the central government in Edo, with the result the northern domains of Nanbu and Tsugaru were ordered to mobilize in response, although ultimately the revolt was largely put down by the Matsumae themselves. However, interest in the conflict and Ezo

⁸³ This is the shift from ‘castle trade’ *jōka koeki* to ‘trade fiefs’ *akinaiba chigyosei*, with the first relating to trade being predominantly conducted under the castle at Matsumae (Fukuyama). The second was a system in which, rather than the fiefs (*chigyo*) allocated (theoretically at least) to other retainers in the rest of Japan, retainers of the Matsumae were instead allocated trade posts within Ezo at which to trade, in order to manage exchange with the Ezo. The final stage, the ‘contract fishery system’ *basho ukeioisei* that developed from around 1720, was the exploitative fishery system under which Ainu chiefs contracted out Ainu labour in exchange for subsistence goods.

⁸⁴ Matsumae Yasuhiro, *Ezo hōki gairyakuki* [1669–72], from Walker, *The Conquest of Ainu Lands* p. 58.

⁸⁵ Emori *Ainu Minzoku no Rekishi*, Chapter 5.

⁸⁶ The *Tsugaru Ittōshi* gives 355 Japanese casualties, although the manuscript doesn’t emerge until the 1720s.

in general is shown by a number of maps which appear to have emerged in response. These maps are noticeable for the way in which the main island of Ezo is dominated by three political markings indicating the respective 'castles' or bases of Matsumae, Onibishi and Shakushain, suggestive of the fact that the political superiority that came to characterize Matsumae's relations with the Ainu was not yet fully in place, or at least had been shaken by the conflict.⁸⁷ These maps, created on the basis of information from Ezo and used to explain the conflict, showed that the complexity of Matsumae relations with the Ezo, and of the Ainu amongst themselves, could be reduced to simplistic representations of bounded political spaces, in order to make sense of the conflict (*Figure 7*).

The representation of borders between two Ainu political groupings reflected the control claimed by certain groups over specific places, although these did not function in the manner of the modern border. Ainu political authorities claimed some form of control over their areas of authority, which as far as can be reconstructed tended to coalesce into chiefdoms around particular rivers or watersheds. Although "various types of territory were held by the Ainu, all were concerned with the exploitation of natural resources found thereon" and therefore the "spatial structure of their community that had direct relevance to their adaptation to habitat".⁸⁸ This was later expressed through the notion of *iwor*, which, although largely on the basis nineteenth- and twentieth-century ethnographical studies, appeared to indicate an "area to be exploited for hunting, fishing and gathering", with space classified in relation to "specific subsistence activities".⁸⁹ From the perspective of the Japanese, however, what appear as spatially-differentiated layers of political authority tended to be reduced to one spatial marker of authority, such as when it was recorded that Onibishi told the Japanese they were "strictly

⁸⁷ See for example Hokkaido University's *Ezo Matsumae Nihon no zu* エゾ松前日本ノ図 (図類 871) <http://www2.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/hoppodb/contents/map/I/0D0002300000000000.jpg> and *Ezo no zu* エゾノ図 (図類 648) <http://www2.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/hoppodb/contents/map/I/0D0002500000000000.jpg>, also maps 7 & 8 in

Takakura *Hokkaido Kochizu Shūsei*, one is reproduced in Akitsuki *Nihon Hoppen Tanken to Chizu no Rekishi*, p. 26; a further variation is reproduced in Takagi *Hokkaido no Kochizu*, pl. 3.

⁸⁸ Watanabe *The Ainu Ecosystem*.

⁸⁹ Irimoto "Ainu Territoriality", p. 69. By the mid-nineteenth century, in certain parts of Ezo this understanding had hardened into a territorialized understanding of the extent of village control, but to what extent this reflected the situation in earlier periods is impossible to say, *ibid.* p. 67-8. In modern terms this could be understood as property rights inhering on a "functional rather than a geographical basis", although it is anachronistic to express the situation as such. The situation resembles that seen elsewhere in the world, see eg. Banner *How the Indians Lost Their Land and Banner Possessing the Pacific*.

forbidden" to hunt within "his borders".⁹⁰ The Japanese recording of borders between Ainu groupings in fact reflects a simplification of the actual way in which boundaries were negotiated between them.

This is clearly visible within a later development, as Matsumae relations with the Ainu came to be characterized by the final stage of trade development in Ezo, the 'contract fishery system'. This was a system in which the Matsumae's retainers, and later the Matsumae itself, would contract out their trade fiefs to merchants, who provided the capital required to transform these trade posts into spaces of proto-industrial production, with the latter associated with rapacious Japanese merchants and exploited misery for their Ainu employees by the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.⁹¹ Recent historiography has come to qualify this view to some extent, seeking to grant greater historical agency to the Ainu, rather than leave them as oppressed, and largely voiceless, victims of either proto-industrialization or proto-imperialism.⁹² This has involved a re-emphasis on the fact that the spatial extent of such trade fiefs was defined by the Ainu political grouping with which the trade post had been established in the first place. However, as noted, it appears that the boundaries between Ainu groupings did not reduce themselves to one specific point.

This indicates that, firstly, that the Japanese grafted their own understanding of borders onto what had previously been the negotiated boundaries existing between Ainu groups. The origins of the Shakushain conflict, indeed, emerge from within this process of negotiation, as conflict provided one means of settling questions of access to land and resources.⁹³ The Matsumae's response to such conflicts is analogous to that of landed rulers elsewhere in Japan, where political authorities tended not to involve themselves in local disputes.⁹⁴ It was for this reason that the Matsumae had initially refused to involve itself in the conflict between Shakushain and Onibishi,⁹⁵ and why subsequently it would not become involved in disputes relating to trade posts, which frequently found themselves divided according to the hunting and fishing territories of the Ainu. A judgment rendered in 1767 over a dispute regarding the

⁹⁰ *Tsugaru Ittōshi*, p. 127.

⁹¹ A state-centric and broadly anti-capitalist message that reflected the attitude of not only the Bakufu officials who wrote much of the documentation upon which this view is based, but the immediate pre-war society in which scholars like Takakura Shinichiro came of age and produced their most famous work.

⁹² Iwasaki "Zenkindai Ainu Shakai no Kōzō".

⁹³ Kikuchi *Bakuhantaisei to Ezochi*.

⁹⁴ As noted in Chapter 3.

⁹⁵ Despite being allegedly requested to do so by Onibishi.

boundaries of two trade posts ruled that, “Affairs in Ezo shall be settled according to the custom of the Ezo”.⁹⁶ This should not be taken as evidence that “the domain actively manipulated the Ainu leadership through the *uimam* and *umsa* rituals, yet refrained from intervening directly into decision-making processes within the Ainu community, for fear of revealing the Ainu’s lack of meaningful autonomy”.⁹⁷ Rather, it indicates how the Matsumae operated in a political environment in which landed authorities consistently “faced the task of extracting tribute from the villages without direct use of coercive force”,⁹⁸ which encouraged domains to interfere as little as possible within internal governance.

Matsumae control over Ezo lands reflected the fact that it formed part of a ‘traditional’ state that was ultimately not concerned with “the regularized administration of the overall territory claimed as its own”.⁹⁹ This did not contradict the notion of the lands of the Ezo as having been placed under the authority of the Matsumae, but indicated the limits of their competence. With the outbreak of the Kunashiri-Menashi Revolt in 1789, the Matsumae noted that “the barbarians resident at a place called Kunashiri within our lands (*shiryo*) of the ezochi” had revolted,¹⁰⁰ defining this distant area of the land inhabited by the Ainu through the term used by domainal rulers in the rest of Japan to represent the land they held authority over. While its identification with Kunashiri and Menashi referred to the trade posts the Matsumae had recently contracted out to the Hidaya, though, what such trade posts referred to were not demarcated, bounded spaces. Instead, reference to these posts provided a means of identifying areas associated with Ainu chiefs, that both Matsumae and merchants negotiated with in order to gain access to resources and labour.¹⁰¹ Questions regarding the boundaries of such posts were left to be negotiated at the local level. This lack of concern extended to the very end of the period of Matsumae rule, where Tanimoto Akihisa’s research into Ainu non-bonded workers shows individuals moving between different *bashos* to sell their goods and labor to the highest bidder. Despite the impression given by maps that divide the entirety of

⁹⁶ Matsumae Hironaga “Fukuyama Hifu Kokon Sojo-bu (Section on Petitions, Fukuyama archives)”, see Takakura *Ainu Seisakushi*, p. 34.

⁹⁷ Howell “Ainu ethnicity and the boundaries of the early modern Japanese state”, p. 87.

⁹⁸ Ooms *Tokugawa Village Practice*, p. 89.

⁹⁹ Giddens *The Nation-State and Violence*, p. 57, and see Chapter 3,

¹⁰⁰ “Kansei Ezoran torishirabe Nikki” quoted in Emori *Ainu Minzoku no Rekishi*, p. 270.

¹⁰¹ Iwasaki summarizes her argument in *Nihon kinsei no Ainu shakai*, pp.233-237 see also Tajima “Basho ukeoisei kōki no Ainu no gyōgyō to sono tokushitsu”.

early modern Ezo up into neat *basho* territories,¹⁰² this image of either Ainu groups or the Japanese trade posts which overlay them as being clearly bounded territories is a product of the map. Although such borders could be marked along the coast, along which the bulk of Japanese travelled, they had little meaning elsewhere.

In this, they were no different from the broader spaces of Ezo and Matsumae, which had been brought into existence without a clear process of demarcation. These two different layers of spatial governance, the Ezo and the bashos which constituted them, were understood to exist as political spaces without their limits being “reflexively monitored”. In this, they are little different from the contemporary situation, in which “the world political map showing the lines separating ‘container boxes’ is only a representation”, with many people not recognizing or associating themselves “with these ossified and fixed lines”. Indeed, the absence of such lines to contain the represented spaces of Matsumae and Ezo is shown in how these barriers continued to be administered.

Shaping early modern Matsumae

In the aftermath of Shakushain’s revolt of 1669-72, this “watershed” moment in Ezo history,¹⁰³ the Matsumae’s subsequent ban on the Japanese residing in the Ezochi year-round was held to have formalized a “Wajin-Ezo” distinction. The divide in areas of residence between the two communities moved towards becoming a reality with the disappearance of the Ainu population from the Wajinchi, which Emori Susumu has calculated declined from 152 in 1717 to 97 in 1761 and 12 in 1788.¹⁰⁴ In 1758, the *Tsugaru Kikan* was reporting that it was only the villages of Shukkari and Kennichi within the Wajinchi that still had Ezo inhabitants. The border also came to have greater resonance back in Edo as well, as the black seal of investiture issued to the Matsumae in 1682, on the accession of the fifth shogun, Tsunayoshi, now guaranteed Ainu mobility only within the Ezochi, rather than in general, as had been formerly the case.¹⁰⁵ This increasing formalization in the border between the two communities appears to be shown

¹⁰² See for example Tanimoto, “Kinsei Ezochi ‘Basho’ Kyōdōtai wo megutte.”, p. 5; Tanimoto “Ainu no ‘Jibun Kasegi’”, pp. 202, 213; this latter text clearly notes how the inland borders are approximate (*suitei*).

¹⁰³ Walker, see below for details.

¹⁰⁴ On the Ainu in the Wajinchi, see Emori, *Hokkaido kinseishi no kenkyū*, pp. 74-139. See also Edmonds *Northern Frontiers of Qing China and Tokugawa Japan*, pp. 85-112, 122-33.

¹⁰⁵ Matsumae Hironaga, “Fukuyama hifu,” in *Shinra-no-kiroku*, see the discussion of the significance of these documents in Kaiho *Chusei no Ezochi*, pp. 254-69, 282-300.

in the next mapping project, that of the Genroku era. The previous Shōhō-era maps appear to have merely noted the absence of roads in the area outside of direct Matsumae jurisdiction, itself associated loosely with the extent of territory displayed to the Bakufu's inspectors. However, the map of "Matsumae Island" submitted by the Matsumae in 1697 clearly demarcates in both the east and west the point where "From here on is the Ezochi".¹⁰⁶ This suggests that the boundary represented by this division had become much more fundamental in everyday life (*Figure 8*).

Nevertheless, the indeterminacy on the ground with regards the border between Matsumae and the Ainu was maintained into the eighteenth century. The village of Kennichi, noted above, was the home of Iwanosuke, the shape-shifting Ainu frequently invoked to illustrate the importance of status to Matsumae rule. As the story about Iwanosuke suggests, though, the recording of members of the population as being either Ainu or Japanese was an arbitrary process, in which the domain's interests tended towards entering the population of the area under its direct authority as being Japanese, except for ceremonial purposes like those Iwanosuke highlights.¹⁰⁷ This division continued to not have any stable representation, but to function in an ad hoc manner. An early eighteenth century map lists the boundary with Ezo being located at Kameda, and noted that those seeking eagle and hawk feathers would head out to the Tokachi region in search of them.¹⁰⁸ Other maps of the period also note the guardhouse, which continued to serve as a marker of the extent of Matsumae control on the map, even though contemporary records indicate the border as having shifted a considerable distance up the coast.¹⁰⁹ These constant shifts occurring in the administrative geographies at the edge of the area under the Matsumae's direct jurisdiction is emphasized by the fact that

¹⁰⁶ This relates to the Matsumae's incorporation of their villages within the general Tokugawa order, see Tanimoto "Kinsei no Ezo", p. 82.

¹⁰⁷ "To the west of Matsumae is a village called Kennichi where a farmer by the name of Iwanosuke (formerly an Ezo chief by the name of Iwanoshike) has been living for many years. Ordinarily he dresses his hair in the Japanese manner but, when winter comes he follows the custom of the Ezo and does not cut his hair. On January 7 he would visit the lord at the castle where, seating himself on a new mat laid out in the yard in front of the study, he would receive crude sake. This was an old custom of the Ezo". As detailed in the *Ezo Sōshi*, Takakura, "The Ainu of Northern Japan".

¹⁰⁸ A copy of the map is at Hokkaido Library, see <http://www2.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/hoppodb/contents/map/I/0D0003500000000000.jpg>. Note that both a Karafuto Island and an 'Inner Karafuto', represented as part of the continent, are marked, with the inhabitants of the latter coming to Soya and 'Rebunshiri' (presumably Rishiri and Rebun) to trade, connected to both Koryu and Tartary. For the map's contents, Takagi *Kinsei Nihon no Hoppōzu Kenkyū*, p. 75-6.

¹⁰⁹ See n. 65.

the silting up of the harbor at Kameda resulted in the boats heading instead to Hakodate, to which the *bansho* was subsequently transferred. It continued to be referred to as the Kameda guardhouse, however, despite its new location.

Therefore, there is no one moment at which the border between Matsumae and Ezo comes into existence on the gorund. The various means which the Matsumae had at its disposal for representing this boundary continued not to fall into line. On the west coast, in the Genroku village register the last village noted as being in the Wajinchi is that of Horumui. On the Genroku map, the boundary is marked beyond the same village, labelled here as Horumu, next to the village of Kumaishi. Almost 30 years later, Sekinai, in the village of Horomui was being noted as the boundary, with Tanneshiri being the first location in the Ezochi,¹¹⁰ although prior to 1800, Sekinai was regularly noted in other documents as being itself a part of the Ezochi. Here as well, the record of the 1717 Bakufu inspection noted the guard post as being in Kumaishi, but then noted the village itself as being located within the West Ezochi, emphasizing that the location of the guard post did not serve as the marker of a linear border. A decree issued at Kumaishi in 1691 had stated that boats after herring could proceed as far as Sekinai, whereas those after Abalone were allowed up the coast as far as a place called Ota. Almost a century later, when Kondō Jūzō recorded a survey of the West Wajinchi probably conducted in 1785, he identified that of the thirty-nine villages there, at least sixteen relied upon entering the *ezochi* to gather the marine products that the villagers' livelihoods depended upon.¹¹¹ Eight years after this, the domain finally legalized herring expeditions as far as the Ishikari River.¹¹² The boundary is therefore operating in a functionally differentiated fashion during this period.

In the east, the boundary was marked on the Genroku map at Shiokubi-no-saki, beyond the villages of Ishizaki and Oyasu, although the road seems to extend beyond this to Muraki (Figure 8). In the accompanying *Gōcho* (village register), ordered after the completion of the

¹¹⁰ See the *Matsumae Nishi Higashi Zaigō narabi Ezo tokorozuke* 『松前西東在郷並蝦夷地所附』, 1727, at:

<http://www2.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/cgi-bin/hoppodb/record.cgi?id=0A001920000000000>

¹¹¹ Walker *The Conquest of Ainu Lands*, p. 46. Walker mistakenly notes the survey as conducted by Kondō himself, but Kondō didn't go to Ezo until 1798 (for more on Kondō and his relation to Ezo, see Chapter 8). The text, held by the Historiographical Institute at the University of Tokyo, is apparently in Kondō's hand and dated 1792, which is prior to his known interest in Ezo. 1792 may represent the production of those documents later copied by Kondō, documents which presumably also published the results of the earlier Tempo-era Ezo exploration.

¹¹² Howell *Capitalism from Within*.

Genroku mapping project and submitted three years later in 1700, it was noted how the direct administration of the Matsumae was now considered to extend further than this, being located beyond the villages of Ukagawamura and Shiokubimura. Subsequently, on the occasion of the next Shogunal Inspection Tour, of 1717, the party went only as far as Kuroishi, and therefore stopping before not just the boundary with the Ezochi shown on the Genroku map, but also before the village of Ishizaki that the Tour had reached on the 1633 inspection. Accounts from later in the eighteenth century indicate that while the 1788 Bakufu inspection was also escorted as far as Kuroishi, so the boundary itself was mostly seen as being beyond this, although seemingly without a definite designation. The *Matsumaeshi*, written in 1780-1, noted that from Shiokubi onwards was the Ezochi, as did Furukawa Koshokan later in that decade.¹¹³ The *Matusmae Zuishōroku*, written in either 1783-84 or 1801, notes the village of Oyasu as being the boundary between Japanese and Ezo and that there was a *yakusho* (administration office) in the village.¹¹⁴ Other documents from this period also note Oyasu as serving as the boundary between the Wajinchi and Ezochi, although it appears that whatever institutional expression this boundary found was not significant, and that the boundary administration remained at Oyasu even as the area inhabited by Japanese shifted further east. These guardhouses continued to serve functionally-differentiated roles.

This was also the case on the eastern coast of the Oshima Peninsula, where previously the limits of activity had been the gathering of konbu up to Tokoro, according to the *Matsumaeshi*.¹¹⁵ Permanent rather than seasonal immigration, further driven by the Tenmei famine in the Tohoku region, saw more Japanese moving to the area by the late-eighteenth century. Following their takeover of the East Ezochi in 1799, the Bakufu decreed the absorption of the so-called ‘Six Estates’ running between Yamakoshinai, on Uchiura Bay, and the Wajinchi. However, this seems to have been largely a fait accompli, as a combination of Ainu depopulation and the increasing demand for konbu meant that most of the inhabitants of this area were Japanese before this absorption was decreed.¹¹⁶ The record of the Bakufu’s inspection in 1798 had noted that the houses in the area were more Japanese than “elsewhere

¹¹³ Matsumae *Matsumae-shi*, p. 143-44. Furukawa *Tōyūzakki*.

¹¹⁴ A similar 1799 document, the *Ezochi Annai Kiroku*, 1799, notes the office as a *bansho*.

¹¹⁵ Matsumae *Matsumae-shi*, p. 143-44.

¹¹⁶ Namikawa has emphasised how seasonal, and presumably permanent migration from northern Honshu seems to have begun and become formalised earlier than historians previously thought. See the Introduction by Namikawa to Namikawa, Howell & Kawanishi *Shūhenshi kara Zentaishi e*; already in 1791, Sugae Masumi had noted there were no Ainu living in Sawara, one of the six estates.

in Matsumaechi".¹¹⁷ Even after being incorporated, though, the population remained mixed, for the Tenpo-era *Gōchō* notes eight Ainu settlements located in this area, but we do not learn their names.¹¹⁸ It seems that a guard post and inspectorate were established at or near Yamakoshinai shortly afterwards.¹¹⁹ However, this boundary appears as ephemeral as its earlier iterations, and it appears that after the Bakufu had administered the entire territory on the Matsumae's behalf and then returned it to them, the actual role of the boundary was reduced rather than increased, and is even less prominent in the records after 1821.¹²⁰

This account of the confused and piecemeal operation of various means for regulating a distinction between areas of Japanese and Ainu habitation indicates a border finding consistent representation, despite the methods of monitoring and maintaining it. This was because the specific identities of Japanese or Ainu had come to reference a border running between the two communities, one which was not dependent upon its material realization on the ground. This border served to "tie together" the different scales of governance being implemented by the Matsumae and the larger Tokugawa realm, as for the government in Edo it was the Matsumae themselves who served as the "membrane", having been granted responsibility for regulating contact between the interior and exterior of the realm. This was a reflection of the "Frontier Policy" of the state, which found reflection in other areas of foreign contact. Nevertheless, the border here remained open to materialization, and in different circumstances was one that would come to have particular significance for Edo, rather than in Matsumae.¹²¹

An understanding of the imposition of restrictions on Japanese entering and living within the *ezochi* and the controlled nature of the trade being the 'completion of the *sakoku* system',¹²² with the implication being that the area of *ezo* habitation lay outside of 'Japan' proper, is mistaken, and particularly if this is understood as a formal policy directed from Edo. The long and convoluted history of attempting to manage contacts between Japanese and Ainu political

¹¹⁷ "Ezoshima Jyūnkōki, quoted in Edmonds, "Wajinchi/Ezochi no Kyōkai to sono henyō", p. 199.

¹¹⁸ See the *Matumae Shima Gōchō* at the National Archives of Japan Digital Archive. Accessed 17 December 2017: https://www.digital.archives.go.jp/DAS/pickup/view/detail/detailArchives/0304000000_1/0000000323/00

¹¹⁹ In the *Higashi Ezochi kara Kunashiri e Rikuchi Dōchū ezu* 東蝦夷地から國後へ陸地道中絵図, from 1789, there appears to be a guardhouse located at Otoshibe, a little down the coast from Yamakoshinai itself, see <http://archives.c.fun.ac.jp/fronts/detail/reservoir/516fb5791a55724270001b59>.

¹²⁰ Edmonds *Northern Frontiers of Qing China and Tokugawa Japan*, p. 119-122.

¹²¹ See Chapter 8 for details.

¹²² "Sakoku-Taisei no Kanketsu", Kaiho Mineo quoted in Brett L Walker *The Conquest of Ainu Lands*, p. 44.

authorities shows priorities were always local, and this was never more so than in the aftermath of the Shakushain conflict. The Tokugawa placed a premium on the maintenance of peace, which accounts for why, in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, the Matsumae represented itself as partially restricting access to the lands of the Ezo.¹²³ Clearly, such restrictions were never effective, and the domain's economy remained premised upon crossing this border that it claims to have established and policed. Vaporis argues that in the rest of Japan the maintenance of barriers long after any immediate security imperatives had dissipated is indicative of a desire to 'fix' the population to the land, shown in the succession of barriers established by both the shogunate (*sekisho*) and domains (*bansho*) that appeared in the Keicho and Genwa eras.¹²⁴ It can certainly be argued that this was part of the motivation for such barriers, but as in the rest of Japan, there is very little evidence for these guardhouses working. Rather, the aim was to find a means by which Matsumae control could be maintained.

In this instance, rather than literally fixing the population, it served to fix understandings about the domain. The maintenance of the boundary continued to legitimate the Matsumae's roll in managing it, which is why these barriers and checkpoints formed the extent of the territory that would be shown to the state's inspectors on their Official Tours. Paasi has argued that while it is "continually vital to examine how borders and bordering practices come about, it is also critical to reflect on the political rationalities and state-based ideologies embedded in these practices".¹²⁵ That rationality was one which demanded, above all else, an absence of reasons for the government to get involved in the area's administration. This was a project of not just the general terms of the 'Pax Tokugawa', which held all of its territorial rulers responsible for the maintenance of order within their domains, but also stemmed from the Matsumae's frontier situation. This guaranteed both the domain's marginal situation, and the possibility of defining its own area of authority. This it did through the creation of a boundary between Matsumae and Ezo in order to facilitate its administration of the territory and prevent a re-enactment of the Shakushain conflict. However, it was also able to extend and

¹²³ See also the following chapter.

¹²⁴ Vaporis *Breaking barriers*, although as already shown this did not find much reflection in actual policy and would likely have proved unenforceable in any case, see Wigen "The Geographic Imagination in Early Modern Japanese History", p. 17-20; Roberts *Mercantilism in a Japanese Domain*.

¹²⁵ Paasi "Border studies reanimated", p. 2307.

expand its authority out into this Ezo, in the absence of other claims. The Matsumae, then, both served as the border of the realm, and were free to expand that realm upon the map.

5. THE EZO FRONTIER

While the divide between Matsumae and Ezo was able to be represented as a border, it instead served as a means of managing this ill-defined space of Ezo. The Matsumae's political role required that Ezo be retained as a space of exchange, from which resources were able to be extracted. Although the origins of the domain's influence had seen the appearance of the Ainu themselves at their base of Matsumae, coming to trade from distant corners of this mysterious Ezo land, gradually their role in the carry-trade coming into the domain was overtaken by that of Japanese merchants heading out into Ezo. This partially reflected the transformation in the nature of the goods being extracted from the Ezo region, but also was indicative of how Matsumae authority inverted that of the state itself. Matsumae rule should be seen as an example of Frontier Policy by the Tokugawa, one which was perfectly able to outsource responsibility for managing difficult outside areas to subordinate political authorities.¹ The centrality of trade to the Matsumae domain, however, meant that control of distant areas, both within the lands of the Matsumae themselves and out into the vast expanse of Ezo, was retained, as allowing for access to the greatest amount of valuable goods. The ongoing expansion of the state's reach, ill-documented but nevertheless very noticeable, offers an excellent example of Peter Taylor's maxim, in which the "state as power container tends to preserve existing boundaries; the state as wealth container tends towards larger territories; and the state as cultural container tends towards smaller territories".²

In the case of the Matsumae, of course, while life was shaped by connections with the rest of Ezo, the boundary also functioned in a scalar fashion. Therefore, while the economic demands of the Matsumae economy encouraged an expansion of trade over larger and larger portions of Ezo, the domain continued to be represented as the edge of the nation in the minds of those in Edo. This understanding of the Matsumae as a border could come to incorporate the entirety of Matsumae and Ezo, with the whole serving as a means of buffering the Tokugawa

¹ Frontier Policy in line with that understood by Mosca *Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy*.

² Taylor "The state as container", p. 160.

state. Nevertheless, this buffering role provided the Matsumae with a number of other means through which they could seek to assert their place within the Tokugawa order, including through their ranking within this scheme. It was on the map, though, upon which the Matsumae were able to have their original claim to authority over trade come to be represented as control of land. While standing outside the normative framework used for mapping the rest of Tokugawa Japan, as detailed in Chapter 2, the domain's representation of the Ezo came to be assimilated onto the map of the state. This meant that despite the Ezo being presented as being an *i-iki*³ or distinct space, this was within an institutionalized mapping structure that would continue to represent Japan as covering this Ezo land allocated to the Matsumae. However, such land was only made commensurable with that of elsewhere in Japan following the return of Matsumae and Ezo to the family after 1821, when the extent of their lands had been reauthorized by its return to them from the state. This sanction allowed for the incorporation of this different space within the institutionalized map of Japan.

The appearance of this map showed the importance of that incorporation, in the creation of the map for an area which failed to make tax contributions as part of a project justified by ongoing financial weakness. However, it would ultimately signify the irrelevance of having been commensurable upon this map, as the world represented by it would soon be rendered irrelevant by the disappearance of the institutions within which its representation was bound up with. Nevertheless, it shows that Ezo was able to be considered as part of the territory of Japan, although an Ezo that was less expansive than earlier claims.

Permeable frontiers

The association of these checkpoints and barriers constructed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with a policy that sought to divide the island into separate areas of Japanese and Ainu habitation is a post facto interpretation of their function. Trade between these areas was the basis for the recognition of the Matsumae by Hideyoshi and the Tokugawa, and remained central to the domain's existence until the end of its role in Ezo, with the second government takeover of the management of Ezo in 1855.⁴ The black seal of

³ Tanimoto, "On 'Basho' Territory as a Community", p. 4.

⁴ This followed on from a first period of direct rule between 1799/1807 and 1821. This will be dealt with more fully in Chapters 8 and 9.

investiture provided by the Tokugawa looked to maintain the supply of goods coming from this barbarian region into Honshu, and required an area of Ainu inhabitation in order to do so. While the barriers established to regulate access between these areas of habitation bears a superficial resemblance to the mid-seventeenth controls on Japanese heading overseas, the previous chapter has proved that these barriers did not function in a sense analogous to material borders today. Established in response to the domestic priority of maintaining order, this border is best understood within a scaled governing context, in which responsibility for maintaining peace in the land of the Ezo was outsourced to the Matsumae. The domain's existence was predicated on successfully managing trade with the Ainu, and such barriers as were established were with a view to achieving that goal.

As in the rest of Japan, the presence of such barriers does not indicate the existence of the kind of "reflexive monitoring" associated with Giddens' modern state. This matters with regards our understanding for their significance, as in the contemporary era, even claims for globalization's "overwhelming" of state borders are largely made on the basis of data collected at those same borders.⁵ That is, the significance of the border is largely constituted on the basis of statistics collected at it. This is not the case in the early modern period, where as Chapter 3 indicated, such data collection did not occur. Borders instead existed as spatial areas in which different authoritative claims rubbed up against once another, with the exact composition of these spaces open for negotiation. The history of the border between the Wajinchi and the rest of Ezo indicates this same process of negotiation, with the gradual expansion in the spatial area under direct Matsumae control being accompanied by a constant renegotiation of exactly what this border meant in practice. Although it seems at times to have functioned as quite a restrictive membrane for Ainu living on its far side,⁶ its role in regulating the trade meant its border effects are temporally as well as spatially-delimited. Nevertheless, our understanding of its exact nature is hampered by the lack of statistical data that might allow us to build up a picture of how the border functioned, as a modern one might, and therefore mapping the border necessitates drawing upon a broader body of evidence.

⁵ Jackson *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations*, p. 28.

⁶ Such as the in the post-Shakushain orders given to the commissioner at Kumaishi that "Should the Ezo bring goods to trade for rice the goods shall be examined and confiscated and the Ezo sent back. Under no circumstances should they be allowed to trade", or Ainu reporting that "We are strictly forbidden to go to Matsumae and we are starving", see Takakura *The Ainu of Northern Japan*, p. 27.

The Matsumae had incorporated themselves into the authority structure of the Tokugawa in exchange for receiving authority over the conduct of Japanese in the lands of Matsumae and Ezo. However, rather than being assessed as required to provide tax revenue, they instead justified their trading rights through the provision of gifts by these local rulers to the center, gifts which themselves traded on the exotic nature of the land under their authority. This reflected the Matsumae as having become, over the course of the sixteenth century, a trade entrepot between Japanese (and Ainu) in northern Honshu, Japanese settlers on the Oshima Peninsula and Ainu from Ezo.⁷ From the south came rice, salt, tobacco, cloth, sake and metalwork, in exchange for maritime products, precious metals, feathers, skins and exotic fabrics.⁸ This latter three in particular were crucial to the Matsumae family positioning themselves as the rulers of Ezo, and thus able to offer up such exotic items of tribute in order to show their obeisance to the political authorities on Honshu.⁹

While these trade routes that brought skins and Chinese-style silks, in particular, to Matsumae were extensive ones, it seems they were not widely understood prior to the late eighteenth century. It was at this point that the Tokugawa government was made aware of these two trade routes running via Sakhalin and the Kurils respectively, as reported in the *Ezochi Ikken* of 1785.¹⁰ It is clear that these routes were operating from much earlier, however. A mention of "Ezo brocade" in a Japanese document of 1143 suggests a basic pattern of trade dating back to at least the twelfth century,¹¹ whereby Chinese-derived fabrics and textiles were traded across to Sakhalin and came from there down to the Japan.¹² The Italian Jesuit Jerome de Angelis, who was in Matsumae in 1618, noted that "the ships of the Ainu also come to Matsumae from the western part of Ezo, Teshio, carrying Chinese silk fabrics in addition to various goods. It seems that Teshio is not far from Korea. But the Ainu told me they do not know what China and Korea were like".¹³ These silks were almost certainly traded from the continent with Ezo

⁷ The labels of Japanese and Ainu are convenient markers of political allegiance rather than strictly ethnic markers. The separation of the two into two distinct societies was a product of the early modern era and its territorialisation of an Ezochi, not a cause, as we will detail below.

⁸ Tezuka "Long Distance Trade Networks", p. 352; and see the list in Table 1 on p. 356.

⁹ In Bolitho's words, gifts were "statements of symbolic authority by which the leaders of each han government had been forced to recognize the supremacy of Edo", Bolitho "The Han", p. 197.

¹⁰ Chapter 8 will return to this point.

¹¹ See Kaiho "Hoppō Kōeki to Chūsei Ezo Shakai", p. 270

¹² Later on, such textiles also seem to have been sourced in the Kuril Islands, having been traded round the Okhotsk Sea by the Russians.

¹³ Tezuka "Long Distance Trade Networks", p. 353-4

on Sakhalin and then either brought or traded down Sakhalin and the west coast of Hokkaido.¹⁴ De Angelis's confusion with regards Ezo's relation to the continent also reflects that of Japanese, including apparently that of Hideyoshi and Ieyasu.¹⁵ Meanwhile, the 'Yezojin' from Menasi in the East each year arrive "with 100 ships filled with salmon and herring. They also bring many pelts of an animal called the *rakko* (sea otter), which is similar to the sable. The *rakko* are found around Rakkōjima, not Yezo, and the Yezojin of Menasi travel to Rakkōjima to buy the pelts. There are many other islands in the vicinity of Rakkōjima", referring to Ezo coming from the Kuril Islands, as well as perhaps Kamchadals all the way down from the Kamchatka peninsula, coming to Matsumae to trade.¹⁶

This trade described by de Angelis, characterized by the Ainu as coming to Matsumae in order to conduct exchange, is widely considered as the first of three stages in the Matsumae-Ainu trade relationship, and is known as the 'castle trade'.¹⁷ It is this trade which appears to adhere most closely to the spirit of the Black Seal order, with the Ainu able to freely travel to Matsumae, who were responsible for the management of the trade being conducted there. These seals placed the onus of controlling the entry of Japanese from other areas coming to participate in this trade, or to continue on into the Ainu's lands, on the Matsumae as well. Almost as soon as this trade was being reflected in the authority granted to the Matsume from Edo, though, it seems to have been overtaken by the rapid growth in the number of people heading out into the Ezochi. While goods like Chinese silks and otter pelts originated from deep into the unknown interior of Ezo (or, indeed, from well beyond, in the case of the former), there were other resources which were more accessible to Japanese adventurers. The growth in their presence occurred despite the Matsumae's claims to manage access into the Ezochi, and stemmed from a number of factors, including rapid population growth, anti-Christian edicts, and the anticipation of great wealth to be acquired in this mysterious northern realm. The economic efflorescence occurring during the opening years of Tokugawa

¹⁴ The Mongol Yuan dynasty received the submission of the Gilyak inhabitants of Sakhalin and that the Ming made efforts to incorporate them into their tributary network through the construction of the Yongningsi Buddhist monastery, close to contemporary Tyr near the Amur's mouth, in 1413.

¹⁵ As noted in the previous chapter, see Chapter 4, note 26. As Cieslik recounts, following his first visit de Angelis also believed that "northern Hokkaido was connected with Korea and Tartary and it must, therefore, be a peninsular jutting out from the Asiatic mainland", but concluded in 1621 that "Hokkaido really was an island". Cieslik "Jerome de Angelis", p. 9-10.

¹⁶ De Angelis reported that from eastern Ezo, "Last year, two of these islanders came to Matsumae, but no one here could understand their language".

¹⁷ See Chapter 4, note 75.

rule thus came to find reflection in Matsumae and Ezo, with the appearance and spread of merchants, hawkers, hunters, and gold miners and prospectors across the Tsugaru strait and subsequently deep into the interior of the main island of Ezo itself.

In each case, what were originally exotic items of ‘tributary’ trade that appear to have been largely brought by the Ainu and traded with the Japanese in Matsumae, as shown in the maps and reports that the Jesuit Jerome de Angelis sent back to Europe in 1622,¹⁸ ultimately resulted in Ainu supply was unable to keep pace with demand. This created a space for Japanese suppliers to attempt to make up the shortfall. In order to do so, they sought access to these resources beyond the supposed borders of the area under direct Matsumae rule. As Kikuchi Isao has shown, the provision of hawks was a crucial part of the Matsumae’s initial incorporation into the centralizing political structures of the Toyotomi and Tokugawa, with hawks being presented to each of the first four Tokugawa shoguns.¹⁹ With the institutionalization of *sankin kōtai* and stabilization of Tokugawa elite society at Edo, the demand for hawks among lords increased over the first half of the seventeenth century. The result was an enormous expansion in the industry, which by the 1660s had seen the establishment of 300 hawk trading posts in the Wajinchi, many of them under the direct control of the Matsumae. The physical location of these camps reflected their operation occurring under Matsumae authority, while the actual capture of hawks largely took place in the Ezochi. By 1669, domain profits on the sale of hawks were equivalent to those from trade.²⁰

Gold was another industry which boomed in the early seventeenth century. Ezo’s reputation as a source for gold was long-established, with Ieyasu himself has allegedly suggesting to Matsumae Yoshihiro that the latter should manage the “mountains of gold” that were in Ezo.²¹ This was a reputation that had extended beyond Japan, and already in 1609, Sebastian Vizcaino, the ambassador sent by the viceroy of New Spain to thank the shogunate for aiding the shipwrecked governor of the Phillipines, had been charged with finding the truth with

¹⁸ On de Angelis’ map, see Kitagawa “The Map of Hokkaido of G. de Angelis, ca 1621”; Schütte “Map of Japan by father Girolamo de Angelis”; Kudo “A summary of my studies of Girolamo de Angelis’ Yezo map”.

¹⁹ Kikuchi *Ainu minzoku to Nihonjin*, pp. 72–3; Kikuchi *Bakuhantaisei to Ezochi*. pp. 27–30; Kikuchi “Taka no Hokaku Gijutsu ni tsuite”.

²⁰ Takakura *Ainu Seisakushi*, p. 59. In 1669, the profit on hawks was calculated at being either 1000–2000 *ryō* or 2400–2500 *ryō*, according to the *Tsugaru Ittōshi* or the *Kanbun Jūnen Ezo Hōki Shūsho* respectively.

²¹ *Shinra-no-kiroku*, p.47.

regards Ezo's rich gold and silver reserves.²² In 1613, John Saris, head of the English factory at Hirado, was writing "... this island of *Jedso* hath Gold, Silver and other riches".²³ The expansion of the industry was also encouraged by the use of precious metals for foreign trade, and another Jesuit, Diego Carvalho, has left an account of these placer mining operations, in which the rights to sections of the river were effectively rented from the Matsumae.²⁴ By 1635, a gold rush, which had begun in 1617 with the licensing of mining at two sites in the Wajinchi,²⁵ had expanded to include at least ten locations in the Ezochi, with miners from all over Japan involved in the mining and panning for gold.²⁶ The rights to engage in such activities, like those for hawking, were theoretically monopolized by the Matsumae themselves.

The centrality of gold and other resources to the understanding of this Ezo space is visible in some of the earliest maps that we possess of the Ezochi, which clearly marks the presence of gold and silver mountains.²⁷ Ezo is divided into two by the Ishikari River, the Kuril islands are again reduced to one island of 'Rakko', while the island of 'Karato' (Karafuto) partially visible in one corner is noted as being near to the Northern Koryō (Goryeo, associated with modern Korea) on the continent. In other words, the entire expanse of this mysterious northern land is understood as the source of great wealth, represented as a space of extraction, of precious metals, furs and skins, and goods from the continent. These early maps, about which little is known for certain, also point to the success of the Matsumae in channelling all Ezo trade through Matsumae.²⁸ Those maps produced around this time or incorporating the information that appeared on the Shōhō map of Matsumae and Ezo mark shipping lanes as running between Matsumae and one or two places on Honshu, emphasizing the role of Matsumae as the access point to Ezo's interior.²⁹ These emphasized both how the Ainu were now forbidden

²² Oka "Elusive Islands of Silver", p. 23.

²³ Samuel Purchas, *Hakluyt Posthumous or Pure has His Pilgrims Containing A History of the World in Sea Voyages and Land Travels by Englishmen and others* (New York, 1905-1907), I: Book 4: 384. Later, Caron, senior Dutch factor in Japan, reported in 1636 that Japan was rich in gold, silver, and copper, and that Jesso, twenty-seven days to the north of Edo, abounded in furs. John Pinkerton, *General Collection of Voyages and Travels* (London, 1811), VII: 609, 639. Both quotations from Harrison "Notes on the Discovery of Yezo", p. 257-258.

²⁴ Cooper *They Came to Japan*, p. 235-6.

²⁵ At Sokko and Ozawa.

²⁶ Kikuchi "Ezoshima no Kaihatsu to Kankyo," in Kikuchi (ed.). *Ezo-ga-chishima to Hoppō Sekai*, 234-238.

²⁷ This is a map known as the *Matsumae Ezo chi ezu* 松前蝦夷地絵図, in the Hokkaido Library Northern Studies Collection, see <http://www2.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/hoppodb/contents/map/I/0D0001200000000000.jpg>. The dating is uncertain but presumed to be a copy from the seventeenth century.

²⁸ See Kikuchi *Ainu minzoku to Nihonjin*, pp. 77-78.

²⁹ Takagi *Kinsei Nihon no Hoppōzu Kenkyū*, pp. 19-28.

from independently trading with northern Honshu, as they had in the past, and how in certain areas Ainu life seemed totally dependent upon such a trade.³⁰ While often reproducing the road that appeared on the Shōhō map, associated with the Inspection Tour of 1633, none of these maps show a distinct border between lands directly under Matsumae control and those of Ezo. This means that while the barriers between the two may have existed as a means of local administration for the Matsumae, they remained marginal in general understandings of the region.

That this began to change is shown in those maps produced to illustrate to Shakushain disturbance of 1669.³¹ In their understanding of the space of Ezo, these maps similarly represented the land in terms of various resources. The presence of gold was noted. In the east, the islands claimed by the Matsumae as under their authority is reduced to one, a 'Roka Island' noted as 60 days journey from Matsumae,³² while to the west or northwest is 'Karato Island', inhabited by Ezo who are 'half-Chinese' and 'half-savage', and residents of a country near to Koryō or Tartary (Figure 7).³³ While the mysterious land of Ezo to a large extent remains that way on these maps, its representation emerges on the basis of a geographical identity defined in terms of the items of trade being brought from there to Honshu, with furs, gold and Chinese goods particularly prominent. It is on top of this basic spatial representation that the political demarcation of the conflict is able to be shown. Particularly significant is the way in which the lands of these Ainu groups are positioned on the far side of a group mountains from the Matsumae, creating a natural boundary between the two groups, which is marked as watched over by a guardhouse controlling access to the Ezochi.³⁴ This representation of mountains as indicating the border between Matsumae and Ainu areas of residence is significant in showing the desire to naturalize this boundary in the aftermath of Shakushain.

³⁰ See for example Takakura "The Ainu of Northern Japan", p. 27-29; Walker *The Conquest of Ainu Lands*, p. 67-71.

³¹ See Chapter 4, n. 87. In addition to the maps mentioned here, see also maps 8, 9 and 10 in Kinsei Ezu Chizu Shiryō Kenkyūkaihen. *Chishima / Karafuto / Ezo* (3).

³² Rakko Island, although on another map in this genre it is noted as "also known as Rasetsu", connecting this area supplying skins to the Matsumae with the mythical land of Buddhist female demons, although this was generally located in the south of the country. See Moerman "Demonology and Eroticism".

³³ This latter variation is noted by Takagi *Kinsei Nihon no Hoppōzu Kenkyū*, p. 61.

³⁴ Interestingly, of the two maps in Hokkaido Library, one of them marks a distinct boundary as present between the domains of Nanbu and Tsugaru on Honshu, while the other tries to delimit a distinction between the lands of Onibishi and Shakushain on Ezo itself. In neither case, however, were geographical features drawn upon to justify the presence of a border.

This association with trade is accentuated in another late-seventeenth century map, which incorporated the homelands of Onibishi and Shakushain into the system of trade stations that had been established by the Matsumae and their vassals by this time. Retaining the mountains as a natural border between areas of Japanese and Ainu control, the maps provided a list of trade posts in East Ezo out to Akkeshi, and located the Ainu chieftains on this map instead.³⁵ West Ezo was barely represented, having only three toponyms, including Soya, but both 'Karato Shima' and 'Rakko shima' were once again to be found at the edges of the map. Although the focus of the map is clearly on the position of Shakushain in East Ezo, this is defined in relation to the trade posts listed along the coast. Indeed, the only geographical feature shown on the island itself is those mountains that divide this trade route between those settlements under the direct control of the Matsumae, and those out beyond them in the Ezochi.³⁶

The early understandings of the Ezochi displayed upon these maps retained a strong sense of continuity with the prior association that the area had with a trade in exotic items. Shifts and new sources of production were able to find reflection on the maps produced during this early period of Matsumae control, with gold in particular coming to be emphasized on many of these early maps. Other trade goods commonly bought to Matsumae have their presence represented on the map through geographical placeholders, with the island of Rakko standing in for ill-known expanse of eastern Ezo from which the Ezo and others brought a variety of skins, while the Chinese goods from the continent found their expression through the island or partially-represented land of 'Karato', often noted as being close to, or under the control of, continental states. These places referenced as conduits for goods to Matsumae came to represent the outer limits of Ezo as shown on the map. Ezo continued to be mapped entirely on the basis of its relations with Japan, as a land from which exotic goods came.

As the previous chapter has demonstrated, the notion of a border between the two areas did not find institutional expression as a sharp material boundary on the ground. Nevertheless, these barriers serving as a means of locally managing trade between the area under direct Matsumae authority and the rest of Ezo came to be re-presented on the map as an absolute

³⁵ See Takagi *Kinsei Nihon no Hoppōzu Kenkyū*, p. 59, for a reproduction of the map held at the Morioka Citizens Hall, but there are other variations.

³⁶ Indeed, we see the expansion in these trade routes in later editions of the 'Thousand Isles of Ezo' map, noted above (n. 27). Later versions add a number of place names in West and East Ezo, out to Soya for the former and Akkeshi the latter, that shows the increasing range of the trading missions despatched by the Matsumae.

divide between Matsumae and Ezo lands in the aftermath of the Shakushain conflict. This is particularly clear on one early eighteenth century map. While Honshu was divided up into separate political authorities, across the Tsugaru Strait the area of direct Matsumae control is colored a deep red, while the land of the Ezo remains yellow, with the two predominantly separated by a distinctively-colored mountain chain.³⁷

Other maps of this type, though, do not attempt to color a political divide, indicating that this form of representation was not considered essential.³⁸ Nevertheless, such maps are crucial for indicating a number of other things. One is their possible resemblance to the famous map de Angelis sent back to Europe, with their vast expanse running from east to west contrasting with most other maps of the Ezochi. Following his second visit in 1621, de Angelis dispatched his report on “Matsumae in the Kingdom of Yezo” back to Manilla with a “little map”, and it is a copy of this map that we possess today as the earliest map by a European of Ezo.³⁹ As the text on the map reveals, however, de Angelis had little confidence in his representation,⁴⁰ much of which, including the river running east-west through the center of the island, was probably based upon both existing Japanese sources as well as Ezo accounts.⁴¹ That the map failed to reflect de Angelis’ own earlier report on Rakkōjima to the east also perhaps suggests it was a copy of pre-existing material. As Takakura argued, the resemblance with these Japanese maps suggests that de Angelis had copied a map in the possession of the Matsumae, which provided a representation later updated in the Japanese maps as well.⁴²

More interesting is the discrepancy in the level of information between these maps and the ones submitted to the Matsumae to the government. While the reproduction of these maps submitted by the Matsumae⁴³ lists place names all over the main Ezo Island and on up to *Karato* (Karafuto) Island, these maps list toponyms and provide detailed notes only on places

³⁷ Except in the west, see <http://www2.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/hopodb/contents/map/I/0D000140000000000.jpg>, in Akitsuki *Nihon Hoppen Tanken to Chizu no Rekishi*, p. 44. The map is also in *Ezo Kochizu*, p. 53.

³⁸ See the map at Takagi *Kinsei Nihon no Hoppōzu Kenkyū*, p. 73, also map 15 at *Kinsei Ezu Chizu Shiryo Kenkyūkaihen. Chishima / Karafuto / Ezo* (3).

³⁹ Schutte “Map of Japan by father Girolamo de Angelis”.

⁴⁰ “Though I paint Ezo so wide from north to south, I do not know if the northern part extends as far as it is painted, for the Ezoe do not know how far it extends...”. See Kitagawa “The Map of Hokkaido of G. de Angelis, ca 1621”, p. 114.

⁴¹ Takakura Shinichirō, “Hokkaido Hondo Chizu no Henyō 1”, p. 6.

⁴² Takakura Shinichirō, “Hokkaido Hondo Chizu no Henyō 1”, p. 7.

⁴³ On the two versions of the maps of the entire country made on the basis of these surveys, see Chapter 4 and Kawamura “The National Map of Japan in the Tokugawa Shogunate (1633-1725)”.

actually known to the Japanese. This reflects the expansion in the system of trade fiefs to more of the Ezochi, but also reveals the limits of geographical knowledge at the time. In that respect, such maps reflect the different way in which geographical knowledge was institutionalized at this more local level, as opposed to how it was presented by the state. Indeed, it was through Ezo's geography being presented at the national scale that the border represented on these maps came to be upscaled, moving from a mere local division within the area under Matsumae rule to an institution understood as representing the ends of Japan.⁴⁴ However, evidence of this border continued to be limited to the map. The next section will examine how this structure found reflection in Matsumae rule, before returning to examine the mapping of their space of authority over the course of the Tokugawa era.

Fixing fluid spaces

In Chapter 3, the importance of agriculture in the state's mapping of its frontier spaces was emphasized. In Ryūkyū, the presence of agriculture allowed for the land to be made comprehensible to the state, even as its exotic nature was highlighted through the use of the Ryūkyūan *magiri* system in representing administrative hierarchies on the map. In Tsushima, meanwhile, the land was represented as though made up of the rice-assessed homogenous villages found throughout the rest of Japan, although in reality these villages were so agriculturally poor they were not actually assessed for tax. Mapping the presence of agriculture allowed for these spaces to be fixed upon the state's map. It is often noted that, by contrast, the Matsumae were not incorporated into this system of *kokudaka* assessment, which is reflected in the maps of their area of rule that were produced. While this is true, by being incorporated into the Tokugawa's governing structure, the Matsumae were made part of the *kokudaka* system, despite the absence of assessed agriculture.

This was because the *kokudaka* system, that highly notional measure of worth by rice production, came to function in three distinct registers, those of actual tax obligations, military commitments, and prestige. While rice was brought to both Matsumae and on into the lands of the Ezo in considerable quantities,⁴⁵ it was not grown to any extent on the far side of the Tsugaru Strait. This was not in itself a barrier to having agricultural production assessed in

⁴⁴ See Chapter 8 in particular.

⁴⁵ See Stephan *Ezo under the Tokugawa bakufu*.

terms of rice, as villages in many parts of Japan had their assessed contributions to the state expressed in bales of rice, although it actually took the form of other produce.⁴⁶ Distinct about the Matsumae was that the production of its villages was never assessed, because its authority was legitimated on the grounds of managing trade with the Ainu, rather than collecting tribute from the land. Instead, it was the question of attendance on the Shogun that defined the importance of the *kokudaka* system for the Matsumae, and specifically the rank which they were adjudged to hold, which in turn indicated their status within the Tokugawa system. The system functioned by rechanneling competition between subordinate lords away from overt military competition and towards a shared devotion to conspicuous display and vying for the favour of the Shogun.⁴⁷ As a small domain in an exceptional situation, the Matsumae were not required to wait upon the Shogun as often as other domains. They nevertheless felt the competition for rank as keenly as any other family within the Tokugawa polity.

When writing the history of the clan in the late-eighteenth century, for example, Matsumae Hironaga would assert that the clan had been treated as a Daimyo from the Kanei era (1624-43).⁴⁸ This assertion of their status as Daimyo from early on was clearly important to the Matsumae's ability to place themselves within this order, mapping their own status in relation to families ruling other domains in the rest of Japan. The strength of this competitive urge is apparent in the fact that it appears that these dates claimed by Hironaga are too early. The 1675 *bukan* (directories of Bakufu officials) had noted the Matsumae as ranked with a 7000 koku *yoriai* with privileges of attendance on the shogun. Furthermore, in his *Hankanpu* (Genealogy of the Protectors of the Shogunate), originally written in 1702, the Confucian official and shogunal advisor Arai Hakuseki⁴⁹ failed to list the Matsumae. However, by 1719 the Matsumae appear to have been officially recognized as possessing a "10,000 koku" rank, despite their lands never being assessed until they were transferred away from the Ezochi in 1807.⁵⁰ The mid-eighteenth century *Ezokokushiki* specifically noted how the ruler of Matsumae had no assessed production but was ranked at 10,000 koku,⁵¹ indicating that this apparent contradiction was worth the comment, but not more, of contemporaries. The 1732 *bukan* had

⁴⁶ Gotō, "Taichi no Riyō to Hyakusho no kurashi".

⁴⁷ Pitelka *Spectacular Accumulation*.

⁴⁸ Matsumae Hironaga, *Fukuyama Hifu* in *Shinsei Hokkaidoshi*, p. 98.

⁴⁹ See Chapter 6.

⁵⁰ During the first period of shogunal direct rule, in which they were transferred to Hitachi.

⁵¹ According to the *Ezokokushiki* 蝦夷国私記.

ranked them with the daimyo and noted that they had “held the lands of Matsumae and Ezo together since ancient times”. By that date, certainly, the Matsumae’s rule over the Ezo was generally considered to grant them the status of daimyo, which was dependent upon their management of these lands.⁵² The Matsumae managed to maintain this status into the nineteenth century, despite being transferred away from the island in 1807 in order that Edo could take over the direct management of the entire land of Matsumae and Ezo. Upon their restoration in 1821, the Matsumae petitioned that they be allowed to retain the status of daimyo, in order to enable them to better defend the lands of the Ezo against foreigners; this was eventually recognized by the government in the 1830s.⁵³

This concern with their ‘status’ within the domainal hierarchy not only reflects the Tokugawa’s governing structure, but is indicative of the way in which the Matsumae sought to map themselves into the Tokugawa order. One means of doing so was through the presentation of the villages under their direct authority as being within the traditional geography of provinces and districts, through such phrases as the ‘villages of Matsumae in Mutsu Province’. As with their daimyo status, this offered a means of representing themselves as being part of the *ritsuryo* administrative structure, even as the lands they ruled over remained unincorporated onto that map.⁵⁴ It was for this reason that villages within Matsumae administratively resembled those in the rest of Japan, in terms of their organization, the use of temple registration, and so forth, even in the absence of agriculture. Nevertheless, as the previous chapter noted, while other domains were granted authority specifically in terms of the assessed production from villages, in Matsumae their remained no connection between this system of villages and their incorporation into the Tokugawa polity. Matsumae authority and, more importantly, resources, were based not upon the villages under their direct authority, but trade with the Ainu, who remained loosely ‘under their reins’. This remained a vision of Matsumae authority open to being mapped (*Figure 9*).⁵⁵

⁵² Kaiho, *Kinsei Ezochi seiritsushi no kenkyū*, p. 178.

⁵³ Tabata *Shinpan Hokkaido no rekishi I*, p. 365.

⁵⁴ Tanimoto “Kinsei no Ezo”, p. 82. They also frequently referred to themselves as Matsumae of Ōshū or Ōkoku, again seeking legitimacy within this system.

⁵⁵ The title of this map, the *Tōsando Mutsu Matsumae Chishima oyobi Hōshū Kyoran no zu*, indicates a map of the thousand islands and other lands of the Matsume, part of the province of Mutsu on the Tōsando circuit, see Takakura *Hokkaido Kochizu Shūsei*, p. 49-50.

This centrality of trade also makes itself visible in their management of these villages, as well. The villages were divided between those under direct Matsumae control and those allocated to vassals.⁵⁶ However, direct authority was maintained over villages near to Matsumae itself, and those furthest away, keeping Matsumae control over those villages able to easily access the lands of the Ezo, and therefore with the largest opportunities for both gaining access to resources in the Ezochi, and for being able to collect duty on goods crossing into and out of there. It also, of course, reflected that fact that administration of villages closest to the lands of Ezo was potentially the most sensitive, given the emergence of a formal division between Matsumae and Ainu areas on the administrative map as reflecting the outcome of conflicts. Significant here, though, is that this spatial arrangement of areas of direct and indirect authority came to be repeated in the Ezochi itself.

As with the arrangement of rule within the Matsumaechi, this order came into being by the early eighteenth century, as a result of a shift in patterns of exchange after the Shakushain conflict. Although in its aftermath, groups of miners and hunters rapidly resumed their travels to the Ezochi, the importance of both activities to the domain's economy waned rapidly. The Matsumae's privileges as suppliers of hawks were halted in 1682, and even after a revival in 1716, the industry never recovered to its former level,⁵⁷ while most of the gold appears to have been largely worked out by the end of the century.⁵⁸ As an early eighteenth century observer noted, "The products of this country and of Ezo are decreasing every year. Previously there was an annual sale of some 3,000 ryō in hawks but hawks are scarce, mining has been stopped and the financial condition is becoming worse". Takakura comments that, "After 1672 the proceeds from hawk sales and the gold-mine taxes fell off so that the continually prospering Ezo trade became the main source of Matsumae income". This may partially reflect the Matsumae's attempt to ban Japanese residence in the Ezochi in the revolt's aftermath, but more likely reflects the exhaustion of easily-available resources. This would come to affect other traditional goods too, as in the early seventeenth century it was reported that "Recently

⁵⁶ Suzue *Hokkaido Chōson Seidoshi no Kenkyū*.

⁵⁷ Kikuchi *Bakuhantaisei to Ezochi*, pp. 43-44.

⁵⁸ Large-scale mining seems to have halted around this time, although some of the sites were still being sifted, or had been reopened, in the 1860s, according to Pumphrey, see *My Reminiscences*, p. 325, and more generally Kikuchi *Ezo-ga-chishima to Hoppō Sekai*, p. 235.

no deerskins are being produced. There are still some deer left but fearing that if these few are caught there would then be none they are left alone".⁵⁹

Such reports reflect the shift in the nature of Ezo trade noted in the previous chapter, as the system of 'trade fiefs' began to be contracted out to merchant operators under the 'contract fishery system'. This is generally held to reflect a transformation in which the purpose of these fiefs moved from granting an opportunity to trade with local Ainu for goods they had acquired for the purpose, in the former, to permanent operations established in order to extract as much of given commodities as possible: lumber, salmon, trout, and herring. These were not new industries. De Angelis had already noted the Matsumae selling the rights to fish for Salmon in a river near to Matsumae in his 1620 report,⁶⁰ while the administrative center of West Matsumae had been moved from Kaminokuni to Esashi in 1678, in order to facilitate control over the lumber industry that had developed there.⁶¹ However, these industries were now expanding into areas of Ezo habitation and the expansion in their production seemingly compensating for the supply of other, higher value goods being unable to keep pace with demand. The *Hokkai Zuihitsu* records lumber, salmon and herring forming the three largest sources of Matsumae revenue in the 1730s.⁶² In 1739, the *Ezo shoko kikigaki* listed a total of fifty-three trade fiefs present in the Ezochi.⁶³ Already, by this time, most of the Matsumae's retainers had contracted out their trade posts to merchants, resulting in the first stages in the development of Ainu immiserization and 'proto-industrial' production.⁶⁴ However, and in contrast to interpretations of the Ezochi that view it as a homogenous, undifferentiated Middle Ground of Japanese-Ainu negotiation,⁶⁵ this development of new economic structures

⁵⁹ Also reflected in other remarks from the same period, such as "In recent years the deer in this region have been almost wiped out and it is said that what few remain have crossed the sea from East Ezo to lands in the South. Consequently very few are left in East Ezo", or that "The Ezo hunt and fish for eagle feathers, bearskin, seal-skin, male and female seals, herring, salmon, codfish, whale and abalone. All of these are extremely rare these days". Quotations from Takakura *The Ainu of Northern Japan*, p. 32.

⁶⁰ Tanimoto "Kinsei no Ezo", p. 79.

⁶¹ Kikuchi, *Ezo-ga-chishima to Hoppō Sekai*, p. 238.

⁶² Kikuchi *Ezo-ga-chishima to Hoppō Sekai*, p. 244.

⁶³ *Ezo shoko kikigaki* [1739], in MCS, 3:5-12. Walker, p. 45

⁶⁴ As noted in Chapter 4, this narrative has been criticized in recent years but has yet to be adequately replaced. 'Proto-industrial' refers specifically to the contentions of David Howell, *Capitalism from Within*, although the bulk of his data primarily references a later period.

⁶⁵ This refers particularly to Walker's assertions in his otherwise excellent *The Conquest of Ainu Lands*, where his desire to utilize the framework offered by Richard White's landmark study overrides the actual material he utilizes, which clearly demonstrates a process of an expanding Japanese presence. This is shown by his focus on the Shakushain of the seventeenth century in Chapter 3, located much closer to the Matsumae-chi, and then trade

out of trade agreements with Ainu chiefs retained a clear spatial component, expanding out from the area of direct Matsumae rule.⁶⁶

This is shown by the fact that the outermost of these trade posts had been kept under the authority of the Matsumae domain itself. This presumably reflected the fact that the domain did not trust their management to retainer's due to the sensitivity of relations with powerful Ainu chiefs in the area and the supply of exotic foreign goods through these fiefs. It was only the domain's financial problems which eventually forced it to contract these posts out in the An'ei period (1764-1780), with Kunashiri being leased to the Hidaya in 1773, together with those of Akkeshi and Kiitappu. They were also granted Soya the following year, placing both of the areas through which trade from foreign lands arrived into merchant hands.⁶⁷ The contracting out of these distant posts would result in the Kunashiri-Menashi Disturbance fifteen years later,⁶⁸ and ultimately contributed to the Matsumae being gradually stripped of their control over both Ezo and Matsumae itself.⁶⁹ The trade post system itself would continue to exist until 1822, when, following the Matsumae's return, they commuted these fiefs into direct payments for retainers.⁷⁰ However, the contract fishery system continued to function under this, but with its administration now handled solely though the Matsumae themselves.⁷¹ As the previous chapter noted, though, the domain continued to see the lands associated with such trade posts as falling under its authority, irrespective of whether they were contracted out, or indeed located at the known edge of Ezo.

It is the development of these trade posts, and of communications between them, came to link the space of Ezo together. This is particularly visible in a series of nineteenth century maps of the region, in which the lands of the Ezo are tied together by the presence of administrative

relations in the Kurils and Karafuto in the late-eighteenth century in Chapters 5 and 6. He seeks to flatten out these examples of Ainu autonomy and agency over the years of his study, 1591-1800, while failing to geographically differentiate them.

⁶⁶ Oba "Kinsei Ezochi no Naikoku Shokumin Keizai to Basho Ukeoisei".

⁶⁷ This appears to have been forced through by a court case involving the Hidaya necessitating them getting out of the lumber business elsewhere in Ezo. The amount of debt owed to them by the Matsumae domain meant that the domain was forced to grant them another opportunity to make money.

⁶⁸ Because of the larger labour force required by the Hidaya for the processing of fish oil and fertilizer, and the tensions that developed between this new immigrant population and the Ainu workers, with the abuse of the latter.

⁶⁹ In 1799, 1802 and then 1807.

⁷⁰ Known as the *Kuramai* system, and reflected how retainers in many domains were stripped of their rights to land they hypothetically controlled, through it being commuted into a rice payment from the domainal storehouse.

⁷¹ Tanimoto "Kinsei no Ezo", p. 81.

office, trade posts, and port facilities located in all parts of the land (*Figure 10*).⁷² These maps, which appear to date from the period after the Ezochi was returned to Matsumae, emphasize the linkages existing between these various points of control. Noticeably, none of them appear to note the existence of a border between the lands of Matsumae and Ezo. While there are variations of such maps that seek to claim a degree of cartographic accuracy, through the addition of a grid for latitude and longitude,⁷³ the way in which the space of Ezo was understood is revealed in the listings of places around the edge of the map. Beginning with Matsumae, these lists give the distance of places in succession, moving towards either west or east, and so listing toponyms in either a clockwise or anticlockwise direction away from Matsumae itself. This shows the primary way in which Ezo had come to be understood by this time, as a series of places on the coast, linked by trade routes running from Matsumae out into the interior of Ezo. This understanding was also reflected in how the space of Ezo came to be mapped and constituted by the state, too.

Different maps

As the previous section demonstrated, the fact that the domain and its lands were beyond the margins of what was generally understood as Japan was ultimately no barrier to the Matsumae's incorporation within the Tokugawa order. This also applied to one of the most striking means by which the Tokugawa sought to ensure acceptance of its legitimacy and authority to rule the nation, which was through demanding the submission of tax registers and maps by the subordinate lords responsible for administering their portions of the Tenka. Chapter 2 pointed to how these mapping projects were undertaken on the basis of the provincial spaces associated with the seventh-century *ritsuryō* regime, and justified with reference to traditional Chinese ideals of rule that understood mapping undertaken by subordinates as 'offering up' of the land under their control to the political centre. At the same time, its immediate antecedents were the provincial surveys of village tax dues ordered by Toyotomi Hideyoshi on the occasion of the invasion of Korea. This combination of *ritsuryō*

⁷² There are numerous variations of such maps, see for instance

<http://www2.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/hoppodb/contents/map/l/0D001430000000000.jpg>, or a higher resolution image at <http://www2.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/hoppodb/zoomify/d/0D001460000000000/index.html>. Akitsuki *Nihon Hoppen*

Tanken to Chizu no Rekishi, pp. 326-329, Takagi *Kinsei Nihon no Hoppōzu Kenkyū*, pp. 216-219.

⁷³ Such as the <http://www2.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/hoppodb/contents/map/l/0D001390000000000.jpg>.

provinces with village tax revenues generally provided the coordinates through which the state mapped itself through the successive surveys that it ordered its subordinates to perform, although as noted, there were indeed areas of the country where both of these markers did not apply. However, in contrast to the examples of the Ryukyu's and Tsushima, noted earlier, in the case of the Matsumae, neither of them did. This made the mapping undertaken by the Matsumae a unique challenge in terms of the intermittently institutionalized mode of mapping adopted.

The 'offering up' of Matsumae lands began as soon as the leaders of the clan were required to pay their respects to the new unifiers. The records of the Matsumae consistently make note of maps being submitted, from the earliest occasion upon which Kakizaki Yoshihiro went to pay his respects to Tokugawa Ieyasu in 1599.⁷⁴ Subsequent years see the records note the submission of maps on multiple occasions.⁷⁵ Unfortunately, none of these have come down to us, so while it may be that they bore a resemblance to other early maps, it is impossible to say, as these lands of the Matsumae found no expression on the earliest examples of 'national' maps produced by the regime.⁷⁶ While its non-appearance is often used to highlight the 'foreign' nature of the Ezochi, as the previous chapter has demonstrated, the Matsumae had little difficulty being incorporated into many of the institutional markers of Tokugawa rule, including apparently that of submitting maps and charts. The fact of the Matsumae's non-appearance on these early maps, created to show the entirety of the *Tenka* across which the 'Pax Tokugawa' had been instituted, highlights the importance of pre-existing understandings of Japan's *ritsuryo* provincial geography in serving to define the realm being re-assembled by the Tokugawa.

As was noted above, the lands of the Matsumae first appear on the *Shōhō Map of All Japan*, which refers to the national maps assembled from the provincial maps ordered in 1644 and completed by 1649.⁷⁷ While the representation of the Ezochi differs substantially on the two

⁷⁴ While apparently discussing the relation of Ezo with the continent.

⁷⁵ See Takagi Kinsei *Nihon no Hoppōzu Kenkyū*, pp. 13-16.

⁷⁶ These maps are the Kan'ei maps of Japan, reproduced in Kuniezu Kenkyukai *Kuniezu no Sekai*, pp. 14-15 and 16-17. The latter can also be found as Plate 26 in the Gallery of Harley & Woodward (eds.) *History of Cartography. Vol. 2, Book 2*, where it is labelled as the 'Keichō Map of Japan'. See Chapter 2 for more details regarding the national mapping project. The Keichō era ran from 1596-1615 and the Kan'ei from 1624-1644.

⁷⁷ The national map appears to have been assembled on two separate occasions, in 1651 and 1670, giving us two slightly different images of the state's territory, see Kawamura "The National Map of Japan in the Tokugawa Shogunate", p. 53. For the former, see Kuniezu Kenkyukai *Kuniezu no Sekai*, pp. 18-19, for the latter Fig. 11.34 in

maps, there are still a number of points able to be made. The most obvious is the discrepancy between it and maps of today in the size at which these lands are represented. The appearance of Ezo on this map is noteworthy not only because it was the first occasion it was represented here, but due to the attempt that had been made to scale the provincial maps from which they were constructed. Having already been responsible for the earlier mapping conducted in the Kan'ei period, the Tokugawa's Inspector General, Inoue Masashige also directed this national mapping project.⁷⁸ In this, the third project to be undertaken during the reign of Shogun Iemitsu, Inoue sought to standardize the scale at which the detailed provincial maps would be made, ordering that they be made at 1: 21,600.⁷⁹ The size of the Ezochi on the national map, however, would suggest that the Matsumae family either ignored or were seemingly exempt from such requirements. The comparatively accurate rendition of the lower end of the Oshima peninsula, the route for the Tour a decade earlier, on the map quickly gives way to a speculative and severely truncated representation of the vast expanse of what is now Hokkaido, Sakhalin (*Karato*) and the Kuril Islands (*Kurumise*).⁸⁰

It is often suggested that the map is evidence for the Matsumae seeking to conceal the extent of the area under their control.⁸¹ However, textual evidence, although predominantly from the eighteenth century, would appear to reveal continuing uncertainty about the size of these lands.⁸² It is perfectly possible that the Matsumae were not aware of the territory's size, and as 'there are no roads from south to north'⁸³ most of the territory would have been surveyed from the water, if at all.⁸⁴ Well over a century later, Matsumae Hironaga was reporting in 1781's *Matsumae-shi* that the clan did dispatch retainers in order to survey the *ezochi* following the Shogunal tour of 1633. For example, a retainer named Murakami Kamonzaemon

Unno "Cartography in Japan", pp. 400-01. The Shōhō era was from 1644-1648, the map is so named because the provincial maps from which these national maps were assembled was ordered during this period.

⁷⁸ The *Matsumae nennen-ki* records that a Matsumae map was submitted to Inoue Chikuzen-no-kami (Masashige) when attending Edo as part of the domains alternative attendance obligations.

⁷⁹ For the standardization of the *kuniezu* generally over the course of the Shogunate, see particularly Kawamura *Kuniezu*. He notes that the 1 *ri* to 6 *sun* (or 1: 21,600) scale had become standard by the Shōhō era.

⁸⁰ Japanese historians consistently argue that the deviation in scale is evidence that the Matsumae were seeking to conceal the extent of the area under their control. While this is possible, it is worth noting that the area of Japanese habitation is rendered comparatively accurately.

⁸¹ Akizuki *Nihon Hoppen Tanken to Chizu no Rekishi*, p. 19, Unno *Chizu ni miru Nihon*, p. 163.

⁸² The textual evidence gathered by Takagi indicates continuing uncertainty about the size of the territory, although he comes to the same conclusion, see Takagi "Edo Bakufu no Kuniezu Sakusei to Matsumae-han no Taiō", p. 144.

⁸³ According to a note on the Shōhō Map.

⁸⁴ For European explorers, too, this consistently led to an underestimating of distance, see Fernández-Armesto "Maps and Exploration in the Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries", p. 741.

is supposed to have circumnavigated Hokkaido in 1635, while Sakhalin was allegedly first visited by Sato Kamozaemon and Kakizaki Kurando that same year, while in 1636 another retainer, Kodo Shozaemon, is supposed to have crossed over again to Sakhalin, and having spent the winter there explored as far as Taraika.⁸⁵ Whether these expeditions actually occurred is impossible to discern, however, and it may be that this account tells us far more about the Matsumae's relation to the land of the Ezochi at the end of the eighteenth century than the first half of the seventeenth.

As we have already seen in the previous chapter, however, the representation of the Ezochi both implied by this reported survey and actually represented upon the map was one that remained remarkably consistent, made up of a main island of Ezo, with an island (Karato, the future Karafuto) to its north and a collection of islands (Kurumise) to the east. Toponyms on Karafuto include those found on the continent, while the names of many of the islands among the latter are recognizable. Much of the information necessary for these maps is presumed to have been derived from the Ainu, rather than actually being surveyed. As was noted in Chapter 4, there appears to be some attempt to differentiate between Japanese and Ezo settlements, but it remains inconsistent, with the suffix 'ezo' also appearing within what would later be considered the 'Wajinchi'. The map does not mark any border, merely noting the end of the road both west and east of Matsumae.

The subsequent provincial map, ordered in 1697 (Genroku 10), was drawn in much the same manner, and again found representation on the Genroku Map of All Japan assembled in 1701.⁸⁶ In this case, however, Hokkaido University possesses a 1/10 reproduction of the map submitted by the Matsumae to the shogunate.⁸⁷ Like the Shōhō map, the Genroku map also lays claims to 36 Kurumise islands and to Karato as part of its lands, with the text of the map indicating the presence of 81 (Japanese) villages, 140 Ezo settlements and 48 islands. This time the boundary between the area under direct Matsumae rule and the Ezochi is clearly marked on the map (*Figure 8*). Yet the map again displays no evidence of either the territory as having

⁸⁵ Akizuki *Nihon Hoppen Tanken to Chizu no Rekishi*, p. 15.

⁸⁶ The Genroku era was from 1688-1704. Reproductions are available in Kuniezu Kenkyukai *Kuniezu no Sekai*, pp. 20-21, or through the website of Meiji University Library, where the map is held as part of the Ashida Collection, see http://www.lib.meiji.ac.jp/perl/exhibit/ex_search_detail?detail_sea_param=9,110,0,b.

⁸⁷ The Hokkaido University Northern Studies Collection hosts a high-definition image at <http://www2.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/hoppodb/zoomify/d/0D00029000001000/index.html>. This is a later copy of a 1918 scaled reproduction of the original map. The original map was lost in the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, and the original reproduction appears to have been subsequently lost as well.

been surveyed or its representation on the map as having been standardized, as was required of maps from elsewhere in Japan. The reported surveying expedition undertaken by a Matsumae retainer named Yoshida Sakuheiei in 1661 has left no impression on the geographical representation adopted by the Genroku *kuniezu*.⁸⁸ This suggests either that the mapping missions in earlier reports may have been similarly ineffective, or that the records of all of these expeditions reflected Matsumae claims in the late-eighteenth century better than they did the realities of the seventeenth.⁸⁹

The fact that the Matsumae ruled a region beyond the boundaries of a pre-existing *ritsuryō* geography allowed them to largely define the extent of their own authority, as the extent of the area under their authority remained defined the relation between the Matsumae themselves and the Ezo, with whom they traded.⁹⁰ This is a point emphasized by the Matsumae submitting the map themselves. In the Genroku survey, it was only the larger Daimyo domains that submitted their own maps, yet despite being not yet considered a Daimyo for most purposes, the Matsumae were responsible for their own mapmaking and submission.⁹¹ Once again, this map was not scaled in accordance with the putative standard, a map produced on that scale would have been about about 20 metres squared in size. More significant is that the apparent size of the Genroku map actually submitted by the Matsumae, 8.18 metres lengthways and 6.36 metres widthways,⁹² is proportional to its reproduction on the Genroku Japan. That is, it appears that the Matsumae's map was accepted by the compilers of the national map, which was done under Kano Yoshinobu, *as though* it had been scaled.

These three initial *kuniezu*, then, illustrate that the maps submitted to the Shogunate of their territory were based more upon their territorial claim than upon accurate knowledge of the territory. Both Hokkaido and *Karato Island* (Karafuto) are essentially amoeba-shaped blobs, although there is some effort to note prominent geographic features, such as Shiretoko Peninsula and the Ishikari River on Hokkaido and Cape Aniwa on southern Sakhalin. The distortion is most apparent with the Chishima Shotō, which are essentially an undifferentiated

⁸⁸ Akitsuki *Nihon Hoppen Tanken to Chizu no Rekishi*, p. 19.

⁸⁹ Hironaga himself claims that all the records of these expeditions were lost in a castle fire, *Matsumae-shi*, p. 104.

⁹⁰ And by this time, were officially noted as exercising some sort of authority over, see above.

⁹¹ Sugimoto, *Ryōiki Shihai no Tenkai to Kinsei*, pp. 170-174; Takagi Takayoshi “Edo Bakufu no Kuniezu Sakusei”, p. 146.

⁹² Presuming that the reproduction is actually at a 1/10 scale.

group of islands off the east coast of Hokkaido scattered in an archipelago. The longevity of this representation is shown in Matsumae Hironaga's clan history of 1781, where the map is reproduced as the "old outline map" of the area under Matsumae control.⁹³

The Matsumae's participation in these two mapping projects indicates the domain's position within the realm. That is, while it was not being held to the same standards of mapping as required from other domains, this reflected its position as managing the frontier, by definition a little-known place over which the Matsumae merely "held the reins". This was nevertheless a place represented upon the maps of the Matsumae, for it was trade with this Ezo space that legitimated its rule. By the end of the eighteenth century, the actual basis upon which Matsumae authority was mapped had shifted significantly, with the earlier maps that appeared to predominantly represent the arrival of Ainu in Matsumae to trade being replaced by the expansion of trading posts to out into the interior of Ezo. Even during this period, however, the question of the outer limits of Matsumae authority had not been resolved. As Hironaga noted, there had never been any reports of a clear border existing between the Matsumae's fief of Ezo and the lands of Northern Tartary.⁹⁴ The border that continued to matter for the Matsumae was that loosely administered line between their lands and Ezo, which justified by their management of trade and claim to the latter's lands. It was this marker of difference that allowed for the representation of the entire expanse of Ezo as Matsumae land on the map.

Mapping difference

In the twelfth month of 1831, 130 years after the gathering of the Genroku provincial maps, the Tokugawa ordered the submission of *gōchō* (tax registers) from its subordinates. Following a long period of largely fruitless negotiations with local territorial rulers, a unified series of 85 provincial tax registers were produced by the twelfth month of 1834.⁹⁵ That of the *Matsumae-no-shima* was merely a list of places over which it held jurisdiction. It was similar to the register which had been submitted by the Matsumae in the Genroku era, elucidating all of the villages,

⁹³ This text will be examined again in Chapter 7.

⁹⁴ *Matsumae-shi*, p. 107.

⁹⁵ Fruitless because many of the Tokugawa's nominal subordinates refused to cooperate with the former's demands that changes in agricultural yields, the amount of land under cultivation, and the amount of taxes being collected were reflected in the figures submitted to the Bakufu.

then all of the *Ezo* settlements located in either direction from the castle-town of Matsumae itself. While the previous Genroku register had appended ‘village’ to all settlements under the direct control of the Matsumae, but written place names in a mixture of characters and syllabary throughout, there is now an absolute divide in naming practices between these two administrative areas, with settlements in the *Ezo* written solely in katakana, while villages under the direct jurisdiction of the Matsumae were written in Chinese characters. Clearly, it was deemed appropriate to further emphasize this distinction, although this was an administrative one rather than strictly ethnic, as the eight *Ezo* villages noted as being jurisdictionally under the Matsumae’s direct administration were also written in characters.

This difference between the Genroku and Tempo registers once again highlighted the unique position of the Matsumae, and would be subsequently mirrored in the production of the Tenpo maps. In the Genroku survey, the majority of the province maps and tax registers were collated at the provincial level in accordance with guidelines issued by the Tokugawa, before being submitted to the central government.⁹⁶ However, during the Tenpo period, the demand for tax registers was issued first, along with copies of the Genroku registers to be updated. The data submitted was then tidied up and collated by the state. Only once this process was completed did mapping begin, which again was a more centralized process than previously, with maps traced from those of the previous Genroku survey being issued to officials responsible for each province in order to mark any changes, and the final maps being produced by the central government based upon these resubmissions. The result was an image of the territory of Japan as being uniformly mapped as under the control of the state, one largely unchanged since the previous mapping project. It was the maps produced of the Matsumae’s territory that would deviate from this process in important ways.

The *Matsumae-no-shima* map is part of the two sets of 83 maps produced by the state at some point between 1836 and 1838, under the authority of three individuals: Akera Hida-no-kami (*Kanjo bugyo* [Finance Officer]), Taguchi Gorozaemon (*Kanjo-Ginmi-Yaku* [Financial Auditor]) and Osawa Shume (*Metsuke* [Inspector]). As with all of the other maps, it was dated the fifth month of Tenpo 9 (1838). In the northwest corner of the map is a key and details of its

⁹⁶ The most important territorial authorities, such as the Tokugawa’s collateral houses, had been allowed to submit their own maps and tax registers, see Kawamura *Edo Bakufu-sen Kuniezu no Kenkyū*, p. 186-199. The Matsumae had also submitted their own data.

production. Unlike other provinces, however, a map that merely reprised the information collected by the state during the production of the previous Genroku map was not feasible. One reason for this was the extension of Japanese influence in the Ezo region that had taken place in the years since the Genroku map's production. However, the central state's knowledge of this territory expanded immeasurably, particularly during the twenty years in which the Matsumae were shunted aside and Edo took direct control of the Ezo's administration.⁹⁷ These twin expansions in both presence and knowledge are visible in the increase in villages and settlements listed in the Genroku and Tenpo registers (from 81 to 128 villages, and 140 to 394/391 *Ezo* settlements).⁹⁸ Clearly then, and unlike what occurred in other areas, both the state and the Matsumae were forced to do more than merely update their Genroku records in order to create a Tenpo-era map.

The distinctive Tenpo map of the region are from the Matsumae themselves (*Figure 11*),⁹⁹ as is clear from the *Ezo-chizu* (Map of Ezo), presumed a rejected draft because of the errors on the map.¹⁰⁰ The text on this map specifically notes the return of the territory of Matsumae, East and West Ezo and the surrounding islands in Bunsei 4 (1821), when control was returned to the Matsumae family in the aftermath of the period of Bakufu direct rule. Although both the shape of the land and its orientation are not accurately represented, the territory is recognisable as Hokkaido and its surroundings. The distinction between the area under the Matsumae's direct rule and that of Ezo is shown by color marked upon the land itself, and indications of the barriers beyond which the Ezochi began. These were at 'Yamukushinai' in the east and the settlement of 'Sansauma' in the west, just beyond the village of Kumaishi, serving to confirm the Matsumae's maintenance of this border between the two administrations, which nevertheless proved no barrier to movement. This differentiated administration is also

⁹⁷ This will be developed in Chapter 8.

⁹⁸ Three inhabited islands noted as having *Ezo* settlements in the *Gochō*, those of Rishiri, Rebunshiri and Yankeshiri, do not have settlements marked upon them on the map, accounting for the difference in numbers.

⁹⁹ The distinctive territorial representation adopted by the *Matsumae-no-shima* map is an almost exact copy of this map at Hakodate Library. As there is no mention of the Tenpo mapping project within the Matsumae's own records, however, it is not entirely clear how this map, the one of the Bakufu, and the tax register relate, but it seems reasonable to surmise that this is a rejected draft of the map eventually utilized by the Bakufu to draw their own.

¹⁰⁰ For example, along the Tokachi River, a 'Toshibetsubuto' listed in the register and on the Bakufu map is missing, while at the mouth of the same river 'Tokachi' is listed on the south, rather than north, bank, with the result that the next two settlements (in an anti-clockwise direction) are both labelled "Shabetsu". For more details on the map itself, please see Boyle "The Tenpo-era map of Matsumae-no-shima: Institutionalisation and expansion in Tokugawa cartography".

displayed upon the Tenpo map, but in a different way. As the key notes, the Tenpo map separates out the population into 'villages', indicated by yellow oblongs, and 'Ezo settlements', shown by purple rectangles. The character of this split, of control as mapped over two distinct populations, is shown in the different shapes utilized, which coded administrative difference as being based upon the 'ethnicity' of the people being administered.¹⁰¹ This allowed for the actual representation of the land to be brought into line with other areas of the state. The map also highlights the location of guard posts and trading stations set amongst these *Ezo* settlements, as well as land and sea transportation routes and a number of hawk nesting sites located close to the Japanese villages. Conversely, its key notes the absence of village productivity figures and 1-ri (approximately 4 km) distance markers along roads, which were characteristic of other province maps (*Figure 12*).

While these minor differences from the representations of the rest of Japan's provinces emphasize the distinctiveness of the Matsumae within the Tokugawa polity, it has come to be rendered commensurable with elsewhere in the state. The presence of such differences on the map does not prevent its incorporation within a uniform vision of state territory, as is obvious if that map is compared to any others from the project. This is the result of the institutionalization of a particular mapping process, which again resulted in the Matsumae needing to be mapped differently. Despite the state's guidelines being issued on how these maps were to be surveyed and produced, the Matsumae had remained an outlier within the institutional mapping undertaken by the Tokugawa political order, in many ways mirroring its ambiguous position at the frontier. The coordinates being utilized within this mapping, being based upon provincial boundaries and indicating the tax allocations of villages, provided neither the means nor the motivation for making the maps of the Matsumae commensurable with those from elsewhere in the state. Nevertheless, the territory depicted upon the map came to be incorporated within an institutional process of state mapping. With the state reproducing the Genroku maps and registers for other areas of the country in order to make the maps, it was only the Matsumae who were again tasked with representing the territorial limits of their own authority to the central state.

One key difference between this map and that of the Genroku era is the converse of the expansion in both the Japanese knowledge of and presence in the region, the contraction in

¹⁰¹ While other provincial maps utilized different colours on village symbols to indicate which district they belonged.

the geographical extent of the area to be mapped. While the Genroku map could lay claim to 48 islands, its Tenpo successor was only able to manage 31/2.¹⁰² The representation of Sakhalin/Karafuto also bears witness to a similar process of increasing knowledge resulting in less expansive territorial claims, as previous maps had claimed the entirety of Karafuto, as well as the Kuril Islands. This contraction in the area represented as the state's territory left only those areas firmly under its control on the Matsumae's map. Questions of the border, then, remained undefined, particular in relation to Karafuto. This, however, confirms the self-referential nature of the mapping undertaken within a Tokugawa institutional context. Formerly, the representation of the entirety of the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin on earlier maps of the region had justified those late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth agents of state authority in this northern region, men like Mogami Tokunai, arguing that all the islands up to Kamchatka, despite having been long under Russian control and perhaps never yet seen by any Japanese, were "a part of our august country",¹⁰³ although Japanese knowledge of such places was frequently limited to their representation on the map. A half-century later, and the map by the Matsumae upon which the Tenpo *Matsumae-no-shima* map was based specifically identifies the extent of the territory under their authority as that which had been returned to them in 1821, with the ending of Bakufu direct rule. In the event, this map did not serve to demarcate the territory of Japan with any more finality than its more expansive predecessors had.¹⁰⁴

The Tenpo mapping project was an institutional response to a pressing crisis, and its prioritization of tax registers and granting responsibility for the project to the Finance Office shows that its chief motivation was financial.¹⁰⁵ It must therefore be questioned why it was deemed necessary to undertake the production of a tax register and map for a region which had no tax obligations and was of such marginal concern to the state. The reason was because while the mapping of the Matsumae region was ultimately irrelevant for the state's financial issues, it had been institutionally incorporated into the area mapped by the state. The map produced by the state was based upon one provided by the Matsumae, and served to both

¹⁰² Again, the map and *gōchō* differ on this, for reasons that are not clear.

¹⁰³ Mogami Tokunai, *Beppon Aka-Ezo Fūsetsu Kō*, in Koller (2007), p. 15

¹⁰⁴ With the entirety of the Ezochi continuing to be claimed on maps until the end of the Tokugawa era, such as in those of the man responsible for the redesignation of the territory of Matsumae and the ezochi as Hokkaido after 1869, Matsuura Takeshiro. See for instance multiple variations of maps like the 'Hokkaido Koku Gun Zenzu [Complete Map of Hokkaido's Provinces and Districts]'

<http://www2.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/hoppodb/contents/map/I/0D0020900000000000.jpg>.

¹⁰⁵ Kawamura *Kuniezu*, p. 160; Kawamura *Edo Bakufu no Nihon Chizu*, p. 142.

render the difference of the Ezochi commensurable on the map and homogenize the territory with that of the rest of the state, providing a comforting sense of control for the regime. This mapping of Matsumae territory was undertaken despite the inability of the Matsumae's territory to fulfil the Bakufu's own requirements for its maps. While the obvious insufficiency in the previous Genroku survey necessitated a new map, the Tenpo map of the region was remarkably inaccurate by contemporary standards.¹⁰⁶ Even discounting Hayashi Shihei's 1821 map of the region, which completed Ino Tadataka's famous project mapping Japan's coastline, there were other maps being produced around this time by commercial publishers that showed a far closer affinity with the territory itself.¹⁰⁷

The creation of this Tenpo map occurs contemporaneously with the definition of 'cartography' as mapping in the service of the state in Europe.¹⁰⁸ In a study on the institutionalization of mapmaking in France, Josef Konvitz pointed to the early-nineteenth century "paradox of so highly centralized a state as France, with so long a tradition of state patronage of science, choosing a decentralized and unscientific approach to the cadastre as an expedient means of reforming the tax system, itself a principle support of the centralized state!".¹⁰⁹ This Tokugawa mapping project demonstrates a similar paradox, both in the quixotic effort to reform its tax base, and on the map itself. The state sought to institutionalize its mapping and render it increasingly impersonal and bureaucratic over the course of its rule by separating the creation of maps from their origins as the symbolic offering up of territory to the emperor by administrators. The result was the creation of an institutional framework which enabled a homogenized vision of national territory, but one that proved unable to reflect changes in local circumstances or respond to the state's requirements.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ As Takagi summarizes it, most notably the Oshima peninsula is now too small, a large bay is produced near Soya, southern Karafuto is very inaccurate and the area in the east between Shiretoko Peninsula and Nemuro was severely compressed, while the courses of the main rivers and position of lakes and marshes appears to be little more than guesswork. Takagi *Kinsei Nihon no Hoppōzu Kenkyū*, p. 228.

¹⁰⁷ Hayashi's map is reproduced as a supplement in Akitsuki *Hokuhen No Tanken*. For examples of commercial maps offering considerably more faithful representations, see Narita *Ezo Chizushō*, pls. 132-148; Akitsuki: *Hokuhen No Tanken*: 326-330.

¹⁰⁸ On the origins of the word cartography in Europe, itself representative of the growing utilization of maps by the state, see Skelton, *A Historical Survey of their Study and Collecting*, p. 77; Brotton *A History of the World in 12 Maps*, p. 409; van der Krogt, Peter, "The Origins of the word 'Cartography'".

¹⁰⁹ Konvitz *Cartography in France*, p. 57.

¹¹⁰ The Tokugawa did attempt to bypass its subordinates and communicate directly with villages, but this failed to materially impact on the maps eventually produced, Sugimoto *Ryōiki Shihai no Tenkai to Kinsei*, pp. 157-158.

Nevertheless, this paradoxical process proved capable of mapping the previously amorphous northern territory of Ezo into the Tokugawa “geo-body”.¹¹¹ This was achieved through a form of institutionalized mapping that had served to represent state rule in Japan for several centuries; that the Tokugawa state failed to utilize alternative, more ‘accurate’, forms of mapping available shows the importance of the institutions within which such mapping is undertaken. This was emphasized in this instance by the way in which territory of the *Matsumae-no-shima* always sat somewhat awkwardly within this framework, and the mapping process struggled to account for the anomalous character of Matsumae and the Ezo. This stemmed not only from the territory’s location outside of Japan’s traditional imperial geography, but also because the authority of the Matsumae was founded upon a monopoly of trade with the *Ezo* rather than the control of agricultural land, unlike that of the shogun’s subordinate rulers elsewhere in Japan. While this allowed the Matsumae to largely define the extent of the territorial authority, it also undermined the purpose of the map, which in other areas was connected to the submission of tax registers and detailed the obligations owed by each village. By contrast, the registers submitted by the Matsumae were merely lists of settlements over which the Matsumae possessed jurisdiction.

The Tenpo map forms the final ‘official’ image of Ezo before the appearance of the Black Ships in 1854. Drafted by the Bakufu’s administrators and modelled on a map submitted by the Matsumae, Ezo was represented as Japanese space, but only through the map’s recognition of the region’s diversity and the incorporation of that diversity under the state. In a project that centred on increasing the amount of taxable income the Bakufu could call upon, that the finance office took the trouble to create a map of a domain that had no taxable value at all demonstrates the symbolic power possessed by these provincial maps within the institutions that created them. It is often argued, and not just in a Japanese context, that European cartography served as an avatar of national or imperial modernity, imposing an abstracted spatial vision upon the world. It is nevertheless clear that the mapping conducted by the Tokugawa, who’s very lack of interest in spatial accuracy was shown by the map of Ezo it adopted, was nevertheless perfectly capable of rationalizing the incorporation of the Ezo as

¹¹¹ Thongchai *Siam Mapped*.

Japanese space with as little concern for the territory's local inhabitants as maps associated with European imperialism.¹¹²

Although the boundary between these two areas was given greater definition through the application of territory as a means of control, therefore, this was not in itself dependent upon a clear demarcation along a linear boundary. Inspection and guard houses were located near, but not on, the border, and the actual location of the boundary continued to be interpreted differently by different individuals, presumably because there was nothing to actually indicate its location on the ground. This is because the definition of territory required here was not dependent upon linear demarcation, as it primarily involved the management of maritime trade flows. There was never any possibility of their being a 'hard' border between the two areas of Matsumae jurisdiction, as the economic life of the Wajinchi remained premised upon access to the Ezochi, and such a border would have proved impossible to police in any case, existing as it did solely around the coast. Rather than serving as any absolute barrier, therefore, this boundary between the Matsumae and the Ezochi indicated the limits of Wajin residence, beyond which was open to resource extraction, although also in a spatially-differentiated manner. Therefore, not only did the domain seek to retain for itself the rights to permit access to specific products, but this was an access that would itself be defined spatially.

¹¹² This is also reflected in a general inability to distinguish between the two forms. Matthew Edney ties himself in knots trying to distinguish between 'Imperial' and 'State' mapping in "The Irony of Imperial Mapping". As Dane Kennedy notes, it does not appear be possible to distinguish between imperial and national cartography, given the similarity in methods, timing and the benefit to the state from maps of both nation and colony, see Kennedy *The Last Blank Spaces*, p. 276, n.10. Such a distinction does not appear a productive one in the case of Ezo, where there was a clear and obvious distinction in who was 'benefiting' from such a mapping. Whether that distinction was more marked in the case of Ezo than elsewhere, however, does not appear a question to which an appropriate answer would be able to be given, see Ooms *Tokugawa Village Practice* on the entirety of early modern Japan as an armed, colonized camp.

6. MAPPING A JAPANESE EZO

In the previous chapter, we have seen how the map of the lands administered by the Matsumae that was undertaken during the Tenpo era, in the course of the final official Tokugawa project seeking the submission of maps and tax registers from its subordinate lords, finally succeeded in incorporating this Ezo region within its own image of the nation. The acceptance of the map submitted by the Matsumae and its representation by the state in this project confirms the presence of this land within the body of the Tokugawa state. The lands of both Matsumae and Ezo had been made perfectly commensurable with those from elsewhere in the realm, with the particular characteristics of the latter both acknowledged and incorporated into an understanding of national space. While previous mapping projects had represented the lands of the Matsumae as a loose and disorderly appendage to the rest of the nation, through the map's production within an institutionalized means of mapping the state, this space had come to be made commensurable with that elsewhere in Japan. The depiction adopted succeeded in homogenizing these lands on the map, in a similar manner to that ascribed to the scientific mapping of European empires. Nevertheless, what was depicted was not merely a claim to the similarity and familiarity of the land over which its rule was asserted, but a notion of authority being asserted over difference. This was indicated on the map submitted by the Matsumae as a color split between the Wajinchi and its Ezo equivalent, and which found representation on the *kuniezu* as the distinct manner in which Ezo settlements were depicted. The Tenpo map provides a picture-perfect representation of the Matsumae's frontier management.

This chapter examines how the invocation of this border was incorporated into understandings about Japan's place in the world. Seen from Edo, and although ruled by the Matsumae, Ezo represented an exotic and distant land, about which little was understood. As such, however, over the course of the eighteenth century, the lands of the Ezo would come to be familiarized as demarcating the edges of Japan, providing the uncivilized other against which Japan was

able to map itself. This was able to be achieved through emphasizing not only the Ezo's distance from Japan, but links with them, through a reinterpretation of China's tributary system to explain trade being conducted at Japan's frontiers. While this allowed for the incorporation of Ezo land on the map, however, it maintained a civilizational distance from the rest of Japan. This would only be overcome through the introduction of agriculture in Ezo, which was a project that only came to fruition after the Meiji Restoration. The understanding of Ezo that came to circulate within Japan came to be reflected back in Ezo itself, and ultimately how it was that the space of Ezo came to be delineated and incorporated into Japan in the nineteenth century as Hokkaido.

There seems to be little connection between this representational incorporation of Ezo achieved by the Tenpo map, and that conducted 50 years later, which self-consciously adopted the means and methods of modern colonial governance. In both cases, however, the land is able to be understood as a frontier, albeit in a fashion that indicates the slippage between different notions of the term. From a distant location to be managed, as Hokkaido this land of the Ezo as to be forcibly made Japanese, both on the map, and on the ground too. Nevertheless, both means of incorporating this land into the map of the state depended upon the land being interpreted through the lens provided by a Japanese terrestrial standard, against which this space of Ezo was both adjudged and found wanting, and incorporated into through the medium of the border that existed between itself and Japan. Ezo, then, had been constituted as a space of difference, one open to being reinterpreted and redeployed as a means of solidifying Japan's territory. This constitution was achieved relationally, through connecting this space of Ezo to that elsewhere in Japan, in order to define the civilized character of the latter and its lack in the former.

Staging Ezo

As we have already seen, Ezo gave birth to a thriving manuscript map tradition, with maps seemingly created by those with some connection to the region. It also, however, came to be incorporated into the explosion of printed map material that came to circulate within early modern Japan from the end of the seventeenth century. By the Genroku era, this increase in the availability of representations, together with interest engendered by the Shakushain conflict, worked to bring this space of Ezo into a more general consciousness.

Just over a decade after the conflict's conclusion, the Ezo had made their appearance on the Edo stage,¹ appearing in a 1685 production penned by the era's foremost playwright, Chikamatsu Monzaemon. Entitled "Wise Woman's Penmanship and the New Calendar", the play noted that:

"This so-called Ezo island is located more than one thousand *ri* away. Whoever is born on this island possesses a great natural power. Their hair grows upward and the light of the eyes is like a golden morning sun. Their angry shouting frightens the animals. They hunt and eat animals of the mountains and fields as well as fish. They indulge in fine wines and beautiful women and live lavishly. It is a strange country of no law and dissolute habits."²

As this quotation indicates, Chikamatsu's Ezo was in many respects a very distant place, existing not only 'more than one thousand *ri* away', but inhabited by a strange, barbarian population. Nevertheless, in the emergence within popular culture during this era, the Ezo and its population was being brought within early modern Japan's world. The population of *Ezo* came to serve as one of Japan's "familiar foreigners",³ and the land they inhabited came to "enframe"⁴ the core of Japan associated with representation of the traditional notion of 66 provinces and 2 islands as being Japan's natural boundaries. By marking out the borders of this realm, the Ezo came to serve an important function within the mental maps of the period.

In doing so, they are indicative of the bordering function that the production of such material had. This accords with the attention of contemporary border studies to questions of process, in which attention is focused upon the nation-state as not an actually-existing entity, but as one that is constantly reproduced within the mind. It has been argued recently that in modern nation states, borders are not "located" merely in border areas but exist throughout societies,⁵ through various forms of "banal flagging" which reproduce and assert the national in everyday life.⁶ The question of whether to refer to the object of such flagging as a national one in the early modern era is more controversial, but it is clear that the notion of Ezo and their lands come to serve as the boundaries of Japan over the course of the early modern era. Mary

¹ For details of the connection between stage and nation, although from a later period, see Zwicker "Stage and Spectacle in an Age of Maps".

² Chikamatsu "Kenjō no tenarai narabi ni Shin goyomi", p. 55.

³ This is from Toby, see "Carnival of the Aliens".

⁴ "Enframing" is from Heidegger, and is an excellent description of how these foreign spaces functioned on maps of Japan during this period. For this use of "enframing", see Mitchell *Colonising Egypt*.

⁵ Balibar *Politics and the Other Scene*; Rumford "Towards a multiperspectival study of borders".

⁶ Billig *Banal Nationalism*.

Elizabeth Berry has emphasized how the commercial cartographers of the 17th and 18th centuries, in effectively following Shogunal mapping conventions to represent a Japan divided by imperial provinces, worked to reify the state's vision of Japan's political space.⁷ As we have seen, however, this tended to focus on the traditional notion of the state's extent shown on the *gyōki* maps, of Japan as consisting of a collection of provincial spaces whose total expanse incorporated the island of Tsushima, but not those of either the Ryukyu's or Ezo.

Initially, the framing produced by such maps is indicative of a lack of knowledge regarding the region, even as they highlight the growing standardization of representational rhetoric through the incorporation of the results of the Tokugawa state's mapping and surveys onto material produced for the market.⁸ In one of the earliest examples of these, the "Fusō kuni no zu",⁹ the lack of geographic fixity that attached itself to such places as Matsumae and Ezo is readily apparent, with the partial representation of two entities of 'Matsumae' and 'Ezo-ga-chishima' appearing on the edge of the map, but separated off from one another. Produced prior to the interest seemingly inspired by Shakushain, this positioning of Matsumae and Ezo as distinct geographical entities reflects how such places existed only as names on the map during this period. The interest generated in Ezo following the Shakushain disturbance, though, is reflected in an increase in the names able to be located in the region. This is shown by the "New outline map of Great Japan" of 1678, which was the first map of Japan to note individual place names on 'Ezogashima' (Ezo Island), offering 30 geographic designations as well as some extraneous notes.¹⁰ On the rest of the map, the provincial representation associated with

⁷ Berry *Japan in Print*, p. 26, Berry views this union of the state's vision with commercial publishing as creating the notion of a 'public', see p. 18

⁸ On this see Yonemoto "The 'Spatial Vernacular' in Tokugawa Maps". This actual process is disputed and remains opaque, but that this "leakage" of cartographic information from state institutions into wider society occurred appears indisputable.

⁹ "Fusō" refers to the lands east of China, implicitly positioning this map of Japan within a wider geographical context. Nevertheless, upon the map itself, Japan comes to be abstracted from this position, see the *Fusō kuni no zu* 扶桑國之圖 (1662) held by the National Diet Library, at <http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/2542558>. Another edition of this map was entitled the *Shinkai Nihon Ōezu* 新改日本大絵図 (Revised Map of Japan), see Komeie "Chizu kara miru Nihon Ishiki no Henyō to 'Ezochi'" ; Komeie "Kinsei Nihon ni okeru shōmin no 'ezochi' zō", p. 133. These maps depict Matsumae and 'Teshiofuro' on one land and 'Menashifuro' and Ezonochishima seemingly on another, all at the northeastern edge of the map. A further two editions were printed in 1665 and 1666, see Akioka *Nihon Chizushi*.

¹⁰ The *Shinsen dai Nihon zukan* 新選大日本図鑑, see Unno, Oda & Muroga *Nihon Kochizu Taisei*, pp. 56-57, on the representation of Ezo see Takagi *Kinsei Nihon no Hoppōzu Kenkyū*, p. 47. This map also appeared on Kaempfer's as a cartouche, see Chapter 7.

gyoki maps is maintained, with each provincial space listing the names of the daimyo as well as their stipends in *koku*, indicating how these provincial spaces have been abstracted by their representation on the nation's cartography.¹¹ Across the Tsugaru Strait, however, and on Ezo the fact that this space has not been similarly abstracted is shown by the way in which these toponyms are instead located in what is believed to be their actual location, along the coast either west or east from Matsumae. Rather than forming a political border like those on Honshu, the boundary between Matsumae and Ezo is represented again through the naturalized motif of mountains between them. While differentiated from the imperial geography of the rest of the country, though, the Ezo is tied to the rest of the nation by the shipping lanes that run between the main body of Japan and these lands enframing it.¹²

This is also clearly the case for the maps that served to define Japan in this Genroku era, those of Ishikawa Tomonobu, better known as Ryūsen.¹³ On the first of his 'Detailed Maps of the Realm',¹⁴ Ryūsen noted a small island of Matsumae as separated from the main body of the land of the Ezo, with this island of Matsumae positioned between Honshu and Ezo itself.¹⁵ That this was perceived as an error by Ryūsen appears to be shown in how this was altered on subsequent maps, beginning in 1689.¹⁶ More importantly, these maps begin the process of tying both Matsumae and the Ezo lands into the state of Japan represented upon the map. Although on the earlier map, which represented the Matsumae and Ezo as separate islands, the body of water separating the Matsumae domain from the rest of the Ezochi an effective

¹¹ Cortazzi *Isles of Gold*, pl. 34.

¹² More information is noted on this map, that "the length of the island of Ezo is 300 ri", konbu was harvestable around Shiokubi, or mountains that were good for capturing hawks, see also Takakura & Shibata "Wagakuni ni okeru Hokkaido Hondo Chizu no Henyō 1", pp. 50-51.

¹³ See Uesugi *Chizu kara yomu Edo-jidai*.

¹⁴ The *Honchō zukan kōmoku* 本朝図鑑綱目, see <http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/1286174>.

¹⁵ This representation would also become famous in Europe through its reproduction in Kaempfer *The History of Japan*, see Chapter 7.

¹⁶ Ryūsen revised the map as the *Nihon Ōezu* 日本大絵図 (Great map of Japan) of 1689 http://www.wul.waseda.ac.jp/kotenseki/html/ru11/ru11_00872/index.html, and the *Nihon kaisan chōrikuzu* 日本海山潮陸図 (Map of the seas and lands of Japan), in 1691, see <http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/1286173>. See also the *Nihon Sankaizu Dō Taizen* 日本山海図道大全

http://www.wul.waseda.ac.jp/kotenseki/html/ru11/ru11_00631/index.html. In total, Ryūsen issued six different versions of the map between 1687 and 1713, with each revision "an entirely new production requiring a new drawing to be made and new blocks to be carved", Moerman "Demonology and Eroticism", p. 368. However, in the *Dainihonkoku Seitūzu* of 1708, 大日本国正統図 (Accurate map of Great Japan), see

<http://aterui.i.hosei.ac.jp:8080/acv/1001/>, Ryūsen appears to return to his original representation of the Matsumae as an island, but in form this map is a reissue of his original.

visual metaphor for the boundary now understood as existing between the two political entities.¹⁷ While these maps appear to flip-flop in their understandings of whether Matsumae constituted a separate island or not (and even when not, is represented as at the end of a peninsula jutting out from the main body of Ezo land), more significant is how on the later maps Ezo come to join the Ryukyu's and Pusan in being connected to Japan through shipping lanes. In joining these two entities together, and then drawing them as connected through the maritime trade running between them, Ryūsen's maps represent something important regarding the society he was seeking to represent on the map.

As already noted, this was a society seemingly characterized by a general economic efflorescence, in which Ryūsen's maps, and the "New outline map of Great Japan", serve as the perfect framework within which to interpret the flurry of movement being generated by the expanding economy. The extension of such routes to the border spaces of Chōsen, Ryūkyū and Ezo, clearly indicates that a notion of 'sakoku' which understands it in terms of Japan separating itself off from the world does not provide an effective means of understanding Tokugawa state and society. Japan was connected to these spaces, rather than separated off from them. Indeed, it is the presence of these connections which differentiate such spaces from others also represented on these maps, which are easier to designate as 'spaces of the imagination'.¹⁸ While the latter represent aspects of the world within which Japan was understood as existing, they were not thought of as places with which regular communication was maintained. Ezo's incorporation into this list of places in the latter half of the seventeenth century indicates how it was coming onto the map of significant parts of the population, as its invocation by Chikamatsu shows.

¹⁷ There is clearly a natural isomorphism between islands and political entities; on this more generally see Steinberg, "Insularity, sovereignty and statehood". Nevertheless, the origins of such representations in an earlier period would seem to suggest that it instead reflects a more general confusion with regards to these northern lands, rather than necessarily reflecting a general political framework. On this, however, see Chapter 9 below. For further examples of such maps, see Namba, Muroga & Unno *Nihon no kochizu*, pl. 22, 27.

¹⁸ These imaginary places included the 'Land of female gods' (羅刹国), the 'Isles of Women' (女島) or the 'Route of Geese' (雁道), and were features which continued to be represented on maps of both Japan, such as those of Ryūsen, and of the Ezo itself. However, the absence of communication routes to such places does raise the question over how such 'imaginary' places were in the constitution of ideas about Japan (with 'imaginary' in quotes to indicate that all these places were indeed constituted in the imagination). See Komeie "Hitobito ni totte no Kinsei Nihon no katachi" and Moerman "Demonology and Eroticism".

The ‘foreignness’ of the Ezo invoked by him is in accordance with both the longer history of ‘othering’ through which the notion of Ezo was constituted, and the requirements of the ‘tributary order’ through which the early Tokugawa rulers sought to assert their authority. As Chapter 2 briefly noted, research into this order has sought to re-embed the Tokugawa within a wider East Asian context, by reformulating Tokugawa foreign consciousness as a Japanese version of the Chinese tributary order and managed trade as better characterizing the state’s “foreign policy” than the blanket term ‘sakoku’.¹⁹ Almost all of the documents from this era that historians have termed “seclusion edicts” were administrative directives addressed by shogunal ministers to the Nagasaki *bugyō*. Rather than a nationwide ban on travel overseas,²⁰ such orders related to the area under the jurisdiction of the Nagasaki *bugyō*, which was the overseas trade with China and Southeast Asia. This is shown by the upwards of 500 Japanese could be found residing in the *wakan* at Busan at any given time during the Edo period, as well as the considerable numbers in Ezo and Ryūkyū, which in the Ezo’s case far exceeded this number by the end of the eighteenth century, despite the official prohibition on residence there. The maps of Ryūsen and others, then, provided a framework in which the presence of these Japanese residing beyond the shores of the realm could be made sense of. It also, though, could be seen as reflecting the ‘Japanocentric’ world order that the Tokugawa sought to construct around themselves.²¹ This was an order in which borderland spaces, such as Tsushima, the Ryūkyūs and Ezo, served “as buffers that allowed Japan to officially ignore China while as the same time enabling it to keep an eye on developments on the continent”.²² Relations with these buffers was maintained through the use of trade, which would come to be interpreted as reflecting the central position of Japan within a constructed ‘tributary order’ centered upon themselves.²³

¹⁹ Toby *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan* offers an excellent analysis of this process, although one that could perhaps be argued to be too accepting of, particularly, Tsushima’s self-presentation of their role as reflecting the reality of their situation. Notions of this as a ‘foreign policy’ over-systematize a number of ad hoc measures, see for example Oishi *Edo no Gaikō Senryaku*.

²⁰ Although the prohibition on constructing ocean-going ships did, as in the case of the Ming, serve as an effective check on overseas adventures. Again, however, the aim of this order was in relation to Japanese travelling to Southeast Asia.

²¹ Arano. “The Formation of a Japanocentric World Order”.

²² Hesselink *Prisoners from Nambu* , p. 167.

²³ In Toby’s hands, this order provided a means through which the regime could legitimate its own isolation while utilizing this representation of its supremacy overseas in order to justify its position at home, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan*. Hesselink has argued that such “paper realities...should not be taken at their face value”, Hesselink *Prisoners from Nambu* , p. 166, but does so on the basis of an absolute division between discourse and

As it had developed in China, the tributary order more broadly reflected a worldview characterized by an understanding of relations as being constituted between the civilized and surrounding barbarians. Historically, therefore, the immediate political reasons necessitating the establishment of such an order, in which the Tokugawa sought the resumption of envoys from the Korean court that they could present as recognition of their military supremacy,²⁴ and then utilizing envoys from the Ryukyu court for the same purpose. As the urgent need to demonstrate military hegemony waned, such envoys came to be understood within this broader Chinese-inspired framework, in which tributary envoys dispatched by surrounding barbarians worked to show the superior civilization of the central state. A figure like Arai Hakuseki clearly indicates such a reinterpretation in the symbolic significance of these envoys.

In doing so, however, he is reflecting and responding to broader cultural concerns. In 1695, there had appeared what is said to be the first Japanese gazetteer of foreign lands, Nishikawa Jōken's *Ka-I Tsūshō kō*.²⁵ Although the countries that appear within it are theoretically arranged according to their trade relations with Japan, Jōken's work was largely based upon Ming-era Chinese encyclopedias, which had mapped out this Chinese-centered order. These divided up the world into China, its surrounding 'foreign countries', who use the three teachings and Chinese language, and are thus within the Chinese cultural sphere, and then the 'outer barbarians' who may conduct exchange with China but are outside their sphere of cultural influence, and includes distant places like Cambodia, Holland and the Land of Dwarves.²⁶ While paying lip-service to the notion of the centrality of Japan, therefore, the sources used by Nishikawa guaranteed that China would retain its central position in the world.

This implicit adoption of a China-centered vision of the world within the cultural sphere would be reworked over the next few years, through an incorporation of greater knowledge regarding Japan's own peripheries into the framework provided by Ming Chinese material. This

the material world that is insupportable in the context of an Asian diplomatic practice, which was largely constituted through discourse. The constructivist turn within IR has proved valuable in arguing how states come to construct their own interest, more attention to such scholarship within history would be welcome, see Wendt *Social Theory of International Politics*.

²⁴ Arano "The Formation of a Japanocentric World Order, p. 207-8.

²⁵ 華夷通商考 (Thoughts on trade and intercourse between civilized and barbarians), which was first published in two volumes in 1695, then revised and reissued in five volumes in 1709, see Yonemoto *Mapping Early Modern Japan*, p. 106.

²⁶ 外国 and 外夷.

remapping of Japan's place in the world is visible in Terajima Ryoan's *Wakan Sanzai Zue* of 1712.²⁷ The text is structured in imitation of another Chinese encyclopaedia, called the *Sancai tuhui*.²⁸ However, Terajima not only adapted the text to a Japanese audience, but incorporated information gleaned from other sources, so that Ezo, which was unknown to the Chinese, was positioned here in relation to Japan (Figure 13). The resulting map is thought to be the first printed map of Ezo, and strongly resembles that which accompanies the report issued by the Tsugaru domain into the Shakushain disturbance.²⁹ On both of these maps, the barriers controlling the divide between the Matsumae and Ezo sides of the land are indicated, but the island itself is represented as a series of places running around the coast, with the continued political authority of the Ezo reflected on the *Ezo-no-zu* map with the presence of three local Ezo authorities labelled as 'kuni'.³⁰ The 'Ezo Map' contained in the *Wakan Sanzai Zue* largely conforms to the description of the Ezo and their land in the text.³¹ Here, the Ezo population was granted the the status of 'different peoples' rather than 'foreign peoples',³² with Fukuyama castle serving as the gateway to a barbarian realm in a manner analogous to that of Tsushima with Korea and Satsuma with Ryukyu.³³ Rather than Ezo lands being defined in

²⁷ Terajima *Wakan Sanzai Zue*. Publication began in 1712 and the text was published in successive sections for over 30 years.

²⁸ The *Sancai tuhui* (Pictorial Encyclopedia of the Three Elements) was compiled in 1607 by the father and son team of Wang Qi and Wang Siyi, and first published in 1609. On its appearance in the context of early modern Chinese visual culture, see Clunas *Pictures and Visuality in Early Modern China*, pp. 77–101.

²⁹ The text itself was based upon the report that was conducted the Tsugaru domain into the Shakushain Disturbance, the manuscript for it appears to have been produced in around 1730. It is presumed that the map circulated in manuscript before this, as a comparison of the map reveals the *Tsugaru Ittōshi* one to be the older of the two. Takakura *Hokkaido Kochizu Shūsei*, pp. 29, 31.

³⁰ As Takakura notes, their presence almost certainly reflects the situation around the time of Shakushain, rather than the 1710s in which Terajima was writing.

³¹ The *Ezo-no-zu* 蝦夷之図 in Book 64 of Terajima *Wakan Sanzai Zue*. Renditions of the map are available at Akitsuki *Nihon Hoppen Tanken to Chizu no Rekishi*, p. 7, in addition to Takakura above.

³² The other peoples within this classification have been copied straight from Terajima's source, as they are peoples with no relation to Japan but ones with a tributary relation to China in the period that the atlas was written, during the Ming dynasty. This explains why the Jurchen's are noted as a tributary people, although they had ruled China for seventy years as the Qing dynasty by the time Terajima was writing.

³³ That is, as *ikokujinbutsu* 異國人物 rather than the *gaijinbutsu* 外異人物 of such places as Spain, Java and the Land of the Bird People. The requirements for being characterized as the former were to write in the Chinese fashion (top-to-bottom) and eat with chopsticks, but the entry on Ezo in the encyclopedia notes how the Ezo "do not know Chinese letters", and there is no mention of their eating habits being as being particularly civilized. Nevertheless, it is this lack of consistency between *ikokujinbutsu* as originally referring to a places relation to China, through being incorporated within a wider Chinese cultural sphere, and its imperfect mapping onto the relations of Japan with its neighboring peoples that allows for the incorporation of the *ezo* within Japan's tributary order by the backdoor.

relation to the rest of Japan, as had been the case previously, the region came to be granted its own coherent representation on a commercial map.³⁴ Nevertheless, there was little effort to make this representation commensurable with others within this text, and on the map of Japan, the Ezo resumed its traditional function of being located outside of the frame of the map when positioned in relation to Japan itself (*Figure 14*).³⁵ While mapping Ezo as a land inhabited by a peoples both culturally differentiated from and subordinated to Japan, it was defined it solely in relation to the latter.

As seen from Edo, the map of Japan has begun to incorporate Matsumae and the lands of the Ezo by the end of the seventeenth century. With the vast increase in printed and published materials of all kinds and general cultural efflorescence associated with the Genroku era, Ezo had come to exist within the mental maps of contemporary Japanese. Yet it still remained a distant and very different place, as shown by its presentation in Chikamatsu's play. Ezo was still largely understood as a place that served to define Japan, rather than the other way round, and the Matsumae was a border through which movement between Japan and Ezo was controlled. This was recognized even when the actual spatial relations of these places was poorly understood. In such a perspective, the actual geography of Ezo was largely irrelevant, as it was less an actually-existing space and more of a described entity that nevertheless culturally "enframed" the Japanese nation.

Framing Ezo

In "enframing" Japan, it is clear that the Ezo could be perceived as serving a similar role as other borderland spaces appearing at the edges of these maps of Japan. This was as another component of a tributary order which centered upon Edo. This appears to make a great deal of sense in that, as much research upon the Ezochi has shown, the trade conducted by the Matsumae with Ezo also came to take on a tributary character. In Matsumae itself, an earlier form of trade, in which the Ainu appeared at Matsumae in order to conduct exchanges there, came to re-mapped by the Matsumae as indicative of their control over the Ezo. What were

³⁴ The *ezo* are subsumed under one entry, yet three *ku* are marked within the 'Ezo map', one of three maps of Ezo we have that appear to do this, the others are detailed in Takagi *Hokkaido no Kochizou*, p. 21.

³⁵ On the significance of the description of the *Ezo* given in this encyclopedia, see Morris-Suzuki *Re-Inventing Japan*, pp. 13-23.

initially understood as trading ceremonies, which came to be termed *uimamu*, came to be reinterpreted in the aftermath of the Shakusahin Disturbance and utilized as a form of control by the Matsumae. Under this *uimamu* system, in which Ezo chiefs presented themselves at Matsumae, was understood by the Japanese as a marker of Ezo submission, and therefore demanded of the Ainu. The *Hokkai Zuihitsu* noted by 1739 that:

“Each spring they came in a boat loaded with goods to Matsumae to pay respects to the lord. Their attitude was most respectful. After landing at Matsumae they would go to a cabin to rest but never would they go out without seeing the lord. Only after having been received in his presence would they go into town for business. The Ezo of remote areas did not come each year but those living near Matsumae showed themselves every spring”³⁶

As the above quotation indicates, there was a great deal of scope under such a system for trade to be the main motivation for its barbarian participants, and indeed, while from the Japanese perspective such ceremonies were presented as indicative of Ainu submission to Matsumae rule, how they were actually perceived by the Ainu themselves remains a question impossible to answer. What is clear, though, is how such a system came to be formalized over time, and in the nineteenth century served as a means through which the Matsumae associated their rule with that of the state’s, which as the previous chapter noted had been forced to take over its management of Ezo between 1799/1807 and 1821.

The significance of the tributary system to questions of borders and maps in early modern Japan is the connections of this system with questions of the demarcation and control of space. As has been noted, both maps and borders offer an epistemological framework and a series of ontological claims about the world. Through an understanding of its borderland spaces as managing trade with other entities, the Tokugawa provided a framework within which movement through these spaces could be understood. This concern with managing movement was intimately connected to the demarcation of specific spaces, a demarcation which was connected to the assertion and enforcement of Tokugawa authority. At the same time, such a management was conducted through recognition of these borderland spaces as frontiers, and thus allocating responsibility for their peaceful management to subordinate authorities. These authorities then became responsible for the management of trade within the context of this frontier control.

³⁶ Takakura “The Ainu of Northern Japan”, p. 35.

This was what occurred with both Tsushima and Satsuma. As Chapter 3 detailed, while both Tsushima and the Ryūkyūs could be considered as borderland spaces that deviated from the formal requirements of the Tokugawa map, it was only the latter which retained its distinctiveness upon it. This was because the Ryūkyūs were recognized as a foreign state in order that be used to legitimate both the Satsuma's own authority and that of the Tokugawa, and therefore its distinct administrative system was retained, while Tsushima was a province within the *ritsuryō* order atop which Tokugawa authority was proclaimed. That this distinctiveness should be seen as a mere representation of difference is shown by its application to the Amami Islands, which had long been officially incorporated into the Satsuma's own holdings, although they remained formally separate upon the Tokugawa's maps.

While the frontier authorities of Tsushima and Satsuma were responsible for managing relations with the foreign spaces of Ryūkyū and Chōsen, which like Ezo came to be depicted on both Ryūsen's maps and within Chinese-style encyclopaedias like those of Nishikawa and Terajima, the priority with regards the Tokugawa's relations with other states was those subject to the so-called 'sakoku' edicts. The result of these edicts was the control of foreign trade with other nations through the narrow window provided by Nagasaki, a city which had been developed under Tokugawa control and remained under its direct authority for the entirety of its period of rule. Trade originating from China and Southeast Asia came to be officially concentrated through this city. The Tokugawa originally constructed the artificial island of Dejima in Nagasaki Bay in order to segregate the Portuguese in 1634. Following the ousting of the Portuguese from Japan, in 1641 the Tokugawa ordered for the Dutch Factory at Hirado to be transferred to the segregated island, which became the sole location at which trade between Japan and Europeans was permitted for the next two centuries. The majority of trade, however, remained within the hands of Chinese merchants, who were permitted to freely reside within Nagasaki until 1689. Then, due to an increase in concerns over smuggling, it constructed the settlement and segregated the Chinese in the *Tōjin yashiki*, or Chinese compound, which sought to mimic the spatial control functions of Dejima.

The concern with smuggling reflected the manner in which there emerged a greater understanding within Japan of how such a trade worked. This was driven by domestic factors, which in the latter half of the seventeenth century focussed on retaining precious metals. This concern was first demonstrated by the 1668 prohibition on silver exports by the Chinese and

Dutch, which was followed by a ban on the export of minted currency in 1672.³⁷ Nevertheless, such prohibitions, like the *sakoku* edicts before them, focussed on the trade with China and Southeast Asia that officially occurred only in Nagasaki. Continued concerns regarding the outflow of silver, however, required that control be exercised over other spaces of exchange, and particularly the “silver road” that running between Japan and China through Tsushima and Korea.³⁸ This need to exercise control over foreign exchange would be formalized by Arai Hakuseki, who famously conceived of “national production in terms of the body” in which agricultural products were like hair that would continue “to grow no matter how we cut it”, but mineral wealth formed the skeleton which “once gone, cannot be replaced ... To exchange mineral wealth that we ourselves need for useless trifles from other lands is to ignore the far-reaching interests of our country”.³⁹

Hakuseki’s determination to preserve the supply of precious metals found reflection in his arguments that the state should encourage the domestic production of items like ginseng, silk and other imported products, in order to substitute for their import and thus prevent the outflow of metals to pay for them.⁴⁰ This determination to encourage domestic production found full expression after Hakuseki’s fall, in the policies of Shogun Yoshimune.⁴¹ In order to forcibly restrict the export of metals, however, further methods were taken, most noticeably the though the “New Regulations of the Shōtoku Era”, which in 1715 imposed the system of tallies on Chinese traders in Nagasaki.⁴² These regulations would to both restrict trade, limiting the Nagasaki trade to thirty Chinese ships a year, and to restrict the export of copper, which had largely come to replace silver in that trade. However, the outflow of silver through Japan’s other borderland regions of Tsushima and the Ryūkyūs was still a major concern, as shown by the fact that one year prior to the “New Regulations”, Hakuseki had informed Tsushima that the minting of silver for export would be banned and limitations set on its export.⁴³ In seeking to control domainal exports of silver, as well as those through Nagasaki, Hakuseki understood

³⁷ Fujita Kayako “Metal Exports and Textile Imports of Tokugawa Japan in the 17th Century”, p. 270.

³⁸ Tashiro “Foreign Relations during the Edo period”, p. 296.

³⁹ *Oritaku Shiba no ki*, Hakuseki Zenshu III pp. 118-119, quoted in Tashiro “Foreign Relations during the Edo period”, p. 299.

⁴⁰ Nakai *Shogunal Politics*, pp. 111-113.

⁴¹ Marcon *The Knowledge of Nature and the Nature of Knowledge in Early Modern Japan*.

⁴² The *Shōtoku Shinrei*, also called the *Kaihaku goshi shinrei* (The New Shipping Act). See Jansen *China in the Tokugawa World*, pp. 33–34.

⁴³ Tashiro “Foreign Relations during the Edo period”, p. 300; Hellyer *Defining Engagement*, p. 63.

the Japanese economy as one system, and also promoted such an understanding in others. The Confucian Advisor to the Tsushima domain, Amenomori Hōshū, responded to Hakuseki's demands by arguing that "Silver is being exported to Ryukyu and Tsushima ... Through its commercial exports, Tsushima defends a border of the realm with a foreign country. This is because the export of silver ingots to Ryukyu and Korea provides a means for collecting information about the outside world".⁴⁴ Amenomori sought to justify his domain's obvious interest in preserving the silver trade with Korea by linking it with the security of the realm as a whole. This was to prove a successful strategy, as ultimately the perceived need to preserve relations with Korea through Tsushima saw silver exports continue.

Although he sought to restrict exports, though, Hakuseki should in no sense be seen as trying to restrict foreign contacts. It was Hakuseki who, in 1709, sought to manage the tributary missions sent by the Ryukyus to Edo in order that they serve as evidence for the centrality of Japan within a tributary order.⁴⁵ While the government had previously not granted the missions much attention,⁴⁶ the size of the expedition expanded, and a decree of that year ordered Ryukyu officials to dress and equip themselves so that "they cannot be mistaken for Japanese".⁴⁷ The necessity of undertaking this management was caused by the Satsuma's own request that these missions be maintained, as the embassies served to enhance the Shimazu families own standing as against those of other lords,⁴⁸ but the emphasis subsequently placed on the mission was within the wider context provided by Tokugawa authority. Hakuseki's concern with this was also shown in 1711, as he famously reformed the protocols for the Korean embassy to the sixth shogun Ienobu, replacing *Taikun* with "King of Japan".⁴⁹ Finally, it emerged in the "New Regulations" of 1715, which also necessitated Chinese merchants to obey Japanese law when trading in Japan, to communicate only with low-ranking administrators rather than Tokugawa officials,⁵⁰ and to acquire licenses similar to the tallies

⁴⁴ Amenomori Hōshū, "Kōeki ryōgin genshō no gi osaedasararesōrō nit suite onegai no suji kikiawase no kiroku", 1714, in Hellyer *Defining Engagement*, p. 64.

⁴⁵ Kamiya *Bakuhansei kokka no Ryūkyū Shihai*, pp. 249-251.

⁴⁶ Ronald Toby points to the contrast in the treatment of the Korean and Ryūkyūan missions during the seventeenth century, Toby *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan*, pp. 188-189.

⁴⁷ Kamiya *Bakuhansei kokka no Ryūkyū Shihai*, p. 255.

⁴⁸ Kamiya, *Taikun gaikō to higashi Ajia*, pp. 137-143.

⁴⁹ Mizuno *Japan and its East Asian neighbors*, p. 103.

⁵⁰ Toby, "Contesting the Centre," pp. 360-61.

that China had required during the Ming period.⁵¹ These tallies also reflect Hakuseki's desire to position Japan in relation to its neighbours by referring to these traders as "Tang", and thus divorcing them from the Qing state.⁵²

The connections being drawn between these trade restrictions and investiture missions point to the emergence of a tributary "system". Hakuseki is often seen as utilizing such a system in order to define early modern Japan's relations with the outside world. It would be more accurate, however, to understand Hakuseki as seeking to systematize a series of ad-hoc responses to manage foreign lands and affairs, the responsibility for which had fallen upon Tsushima, Satsuma, and the state itself, as well as the Matsumae. The relations conducted through these domains, indeed, had come to find reflection upon the maps of Japan circulating during this period, such as those of Ryūsen, as well as in the geographical works through which sense was made of the world. Nevertheless, if we consider the place of Ezo within this system, it appears to barely be present. This was not because Hakuseki was unfamiliar with Ezo itself, which he similarly interpreted within a framework that emphasized Japan as forming the civilized center. In his *Ezo-shi*, which seems to have been the first text published specifically on the Ezo, Hakuseki used Chinese accounts of northern barbarians to argue for the Ezo as "descended from the Northern Wa" and basically human like the Japanese, but as clearly uncivilized in manners and customs.⁵³ Ezo was mapped as a space that conformed with a civilizational discourse that emphasized the presence of barbarian peoples around a civilized core. In accordance with his concern with Confucian ritual, or what we might call the appearance of order, Hakuseki emphasized how the "Men have tangled, unbound hair and a long beard and wear silver rings in their ears. They wear but one layer of clothing, and fold the left side over the right ... Men and women alike go barefoot".⁵⁴ The importance of hair and clothing in the marking of rank and status has been well-studied for both Japan as a whole,⁵⁵

⁵¹ "Doubtless inspired by the methods traditionally used by Chinese rulers to regulate foreign access to Chinese Wealth" Nakai *Shogunal Politics*, p. 110.

⁵² This intention was recognized by the Qing, where it resulted in a dispute over whether to accept the tallies, which concluded with the emperor determining that the tallies represented a contract between the interpreters involved in the trade, and thus could be ignored. Mizuno "Qing China's Reaction to the 1874 Japanese Expedition to the Taiwanese Aboriginal Territories", pp. 142-144.

⁵³ Hudson *Ruins of Identity*, p. 30. The same strategy would be subsequently used by both Matsumae Hironaga in the *Matsumae-shi*, and Hayashi Shihei in the *Sangoku Tsūran Zusetsu*, see Chapter 7.

⁵⁴ For a detailed discussion of these ideas and their impact on Japanese perceptions of the Ainu, see Kikuchi *Hoppōshi no naka no Kinsei Nihon*, pp.35-51.

⁵⁵ Kikuchi *Ainu to Matsumae no Seiji-Bunkaron*.

and was also crucial to how authority was represented for the Matsumae domain itself, as the oft-recounted story of Iwanosuke shows.⁵⁶

Despite the trade which occurred in Ezo, and the supply of goods to the Matsumae, the space of the Ezo remained separate from Hakuseki's understanding of the tributary system. As such, Ezo was merely seen as a region of barbarity bordering Japan itself. The later incorporation of what was originally an ad hoc response to the exigencies of the post-Shakushain political situation, in which there was an obvious need for the assertion of Matsumae control, as being part of the deliberate imposition of nested tributary order⁵⁷ overstates the extent to which the tributary system existed as an order able to be imposed. The scope to do so is restricted by the obvious fact that the Ainu themselves, unlike the courts of Chōsen and Ryūkyū, never dispatched envoys to the Tokugawa. Indeed, as Chapter 4 has also noted, the development of trade relations between Matsumae and Ezo was driven by the immediate local priorities of the Matsumae themselves, which then received the sanction of the state through the latter's recognition of the former's authority.

Research into the adaptation of a Chinese-style tributary system⁵⁸ to the Japanese context requires that greater attention be paid to how notions of a tributary system are being understood within Chinese historiography. For the Qing period, it has been belatedly recognized that to reduce all these practices to one tributary 'system' makes little sense, for "it was not properly a system, but rather a political, ritual, and economic environment that enabled the Qing to interact" with other groups.⁵⁹ As a consequence, interpretations of Qing foreign relations as being constituted through tributary relations can serve to disguise the fact such notions "could and did have different meanings at different times and in different contexts".⁶⁰ With regards to Ezo, despite the obvious role of trade in the constitution of this political space, which was also recognized by Hakuseki, any understanding of Ezo as serving as

⁵⁶ Chapter 4, n. 107.

⁵⁷ Kikuchi *Hoppōshi no naka no Kinsei Nihon*.

⁵⁸ While an earlier generation of scholars, exemplified by Fairbank, accepted the system *a-priori*, and so understood all practices as parts of this one system, more recent research has come to emphasize the sheer variety of practices that underpinned Qing domestic and foreign relations. These included political marriages, religious patronage, commerce, diplomacy, and war, see for instance Hevia *Cherishing Men from Afar*; Millward "Coming onto the Map"; Di Cosmo "New Directions in Inner Asian History"; Hostetler *Qing Colonial Enterprise*; Di Cosmo "Kirghiz Nomads on the Qing Frontier", Perdue *China Marches West*.

⁵⁹ Di Cosmo "Kirghiz Nomads on the Qing Frontier", p. 355.

⁶⁰ Hostetler *Qing Colonial Enterprise*, p. 43

one component in a wider tributary system was minimal, irrespective of the seeming similarity between Korea, the Ryukyus and itself on the general map of Japan. This was because the Ezo frontier being managed by the Matsumae appeared a very different place from those Hakuseki was seeking to manage through Satsuma, Nagasaki and Tsushima, attention to which focused on the export of specie, on the one hand, and their ritual role in the legitimization of Tokugawa authority, on the other. In being constituted solely through its lack of civilization, Ezo served as a cultural border for the authorities in Edo, without it being necessary to define it as a political one. Nevertheless, this was a frontier granted a spatial representation, as to illustrate his work, Hakuseki attached a version of the Genroku map of Japan, which consequently emphasized the space of Matsumae and Ezo as forming an uncivilized perimeter to the Tokugawa state.⁶¹

Civilizing Ezo

In being constituted as an uncivilized perimeter, the place of Ezo within the Tokugawa order was one that emerged relationally. For Hakuseki, while the Ezo served a role in defining the cultural boundaries of Japan, it remained significant in how the state constituted its authority in relation to other states. This was contrary to the impression that had been given in Terajima's *Wakan Sanzai Zue*, which had appeared to domesticate the lands of the Ezo as forming a tributary space subservient to Japan. This role was rendered irrelevant for Hakuseki. Nevertheless, questions of geography were central to his understanding of Ezo as a space, with much of his work consisting of the list of places he understood as making up Ezo, those of its main island, North Ezo (Karafuto) and East Ezo (the Kurils). His adoption of these monikers, and particularly that of North Ezo, were to be influential in subsequent understandings of Ezo space, even as the map attached to his text was a version of the Genroku map submitted a number of years earlier by the Matsumae. As it was for the state in its mapping projects, Hakuseki's Ezo was primarily understood as a list of places located in relation to one another out from Matsumae.

Whether these places were considered part of Japan or not continued to be determined by the framework adopted for the map. In general, however, these were not generally considered to connect with places in Japan. Nagakubo Sekisui, the Mito domain Confucian scholar and

⁶¹ Arai Hakuseki *Ezo-shi*, different dates are given for the work's completion, but it is generally agreed to be after his loss of influence in 1716.

geographer whose maps ultimately replaced those of Ryūsen, like the latter represented Japan as a networked space. Unlike Ryūsen, Sekisui sought to position this network in its proper position in space, placing all these places that made up the space of Japan onto a latitudinal grid (Figure 15). This network, however, was restricted to terrestrial roads, with the result that while Chōsen and Matsumae appeared on the maps edges, they remained unconnected with the remainder of Japan. The Ezo space associated with the Matsumae continued to serve to “enframe” Japan, although this time by serving as the map’s edge, in the same manner that it had for the map of the nation in Terajima’s *Wakan Sanzai Zue* (Figure 14).

Nevertheless, it was possible to envisage the incorporation of these barbarian Ezo lands through their civilization. As already mentioned, in neither the areas under direct Matsumae authority, nor those of the Ezo themselves, was agriculture central to the practice of the economy. However, the expansion of agriculture, and bringing of new fields under cultivation, offered an obvious means of expanding economic activity. In the case of Ezo, this question of the introduction of agriculture became associated with the civilization of the land itself. This was because, in an area like Ezo, characterized by its wild and disordered state, agriculture served not only as a means of resource extraction but also as a ceremonial practice, one which would serve to bring order to the land and thus incorporate it within civilization. As Patricia Seed has remarked, this claim for the importance of agriculture made sense in a context in which people were seeking to incorporate Ezo space through means which were “fundamentally and self-interestedly following familiar rules for appropriating assets”.⁶²

The space represented by Ezo, therefore, was open to being appropriated in just such a manner. As the previous chapter has pointed out, the spatial or territorial definition of political authority was available to the Tokugawa when ruling over areas that had already been defined by a pre-existing political geography based upon the *ritsuryō* system and amenable to calculation on the basis of agricultural production. Grants to other local rulers defined their area of authority by designating villages, counties, and provinces over which they held authority and the assessed production of those areas. In the absence of either of these conditions, defining the Matsumae’s area of landed authority was beyond the early-modern Tokugawa state, as neither of these means of demarcation applied. However, it was at the same time unnecessary, given the nature of the authority that was being legitimated. Although

⁶² Seed, *American Pentimento*, p. 6.

the initial grant of authority to the Matsumae was unconcerned with land as such, though, the area which came under its authority did come to be influenced by this perception of what constituted the land of Japan. The reference back to the importance of rice is visible in maps like those of Ryūsen, which represent the *kokudaka* values of each province on the map (Figure 3). This is of course in contrast to Matsumae, as seen on the Genroku Map of Japan, for example, which continued to note the absence of assessed production in their lands.⁶³

This influence was felt through the political application of knowledge undertaken with respect to this land falling under the authority of the state. One aspect of the knowledge structure within which Matsumae authority was embedded was clearly that of the primacy and importance of agriculture. As a result, the issue of the absence of assessed agriculture consistently exercised officials and commentators, who advocated for the introduction of agriculture as having the ability to transform the territory of the region. During the Shakushain Uprising of 1669, for instance, Kakizaki Hiroshige, commanding the Matsumae forces against those under Shakushain, is alleged to have said that the shogunate would encourage the development of agriculture in order to pacify the region, while “destroying all the Ainu”.⁶⁴ Writing in the 1730s, Sakakura Genjiro examined the lands of the Matsumae and the Ezo in turn, and argued that it was the importance of the fishing season which did not allow the inhabitants of the Matsumae to engage in the sort of intensive agriculture associated with the rest of Japan. The wealth that was available in the fisheries meant that the “people have long since ceased to attempt farming”.⁶⁵ This also applied to the Ezochi too, where “there were no cereal products in Ezo was not because they could not be grown there but simply because they were not grown”.⁶⁶ A few years prior to Sakakura’s work, two Confucian scholars Namikawa Tenmin and Fukami Genyū, had also equated questions of developing the Ezochi with the introduction of agriculture.⁶⁷

The appearance of such proposals reflected a more widespread concern at the time with increasing productivity and self-sufficiency in the realm, associated with Tokugawa Yoshimune, in which there was a definite focus upon raising the output acquirable from the land.⁶⁸ While

⁶³ While failing to do so for Tsushima.

⁶⁴ Matsumae Yasuhiro, *Ezo hōki gairyakuki* [1669–72], quoted in Walker *The Conquest of Ainu Lands*, p. 51.

⁶⁵ Sakakura *Ezo Zuihitsu*, p. 69.

⁶⁶ Takakura *Ainu Seisaku-shi*, p. 51.

⁶⁷ Allegedly in the latter’s case.

⁶⁸ Takakura “Tenmei Izen no Ezochi Kaitaku Iken II”, p. 205.

Fukami was allegedly arrested for his improper submission of a memorial for the introduction of agriculture by way of Yoshimune's petition box, it is clear that Namikawa, at least, viewed the northern regions as being both an outlet for surplus population and as offering relief from both food shortages and rising prices by allowing for an increase in the production of rice.⁶⁹ At the same time, this significance was most pronounced beyond the lands directly administered by the Matsumae, because of the manner in which cultivation (and specifically of rice) was connected with the cultivation of something rather more indefinable, civilization. The lauding of its cultivation neatly justified the superiority of the Japanese, as trade with the Ezo had always involved the supply of grains. Even in the 1620s, it was being reported how in Ezo the natives were trading gold and silver for imports of rice.⁷⁰ This remained the situation throughout the early modern period; Matsumae Norihiro, for example, informed councillors in Edo in 1715 that the Ezo consumed substantial amounts of rice which was gained solely through trade with the Japanese.⁷¹ Indeed, the extension and formalization of the Matsumae's licensed trading system through the entirety of Ezo land is generally held to have increased the population's dependency on the import of grains, although that this process may have been occurring anyway is suggested by the way in which efforts to encourage cultivation in the area under Matsumae authority also came to little.⁷²

What was crucial for the land's development was putting it under cultivation, consistently a concern for both national and local authorities in the rest of Japan and a process which, during the course of government's investigations of the Ezochi, came to be seen as being actively hindered by the Matsumae themselves. Satō Genrokurō reported that Ezo in the upper reaches of the Ishikari River had succeeded in cultivating a plot of rice, but that the domain's officials had destroyed the field when they caught wind of it.⁷³ A few years later, Mogami Tokunai noted how the Matsumae prohibited the import of seeds and consequently the "Ainu do not understand the way to cultivate grains, and would not even know a rice field if they saw one".⁷⁴ While the inhabitants may indeed not have understood paddy agriculture,

⁶⁹ Iwasaki "Shiryō Shokai – Namikawa Tenmin 'Hekikyōroku'".

⁷⁰ Saris, Early Voyages of the English East India Company, p. 70.

⁷¹ Matsumae Norihiro, "Shōtoku gonen Matsumae Shima-no-kami sashidashi sóró kakitsuke [1715]", in *Shinsen Hokkaidō shi, Volume 5*, p. 134.

⁷² See for example Kikuchi *Ezo-ga-chishima to Hoppō Sekai*, p. 255. The *Matsu-I Zuihitsu* reports efforts at growing rice near Oyobe and Kameda in the late-seventeenth century, which ended in failure.

⁷³ *Ezochi ikken* [1784–90], in *Shin-Hokkaidōshi*, p. 333.

⁷⁴ Mogami Tokunai, *Ezokoku fúzoku ninjō no sata* [1791], in *Tanken, kiko, chishi: hokuhenben*, p. 444.

there seems to have been plenty of evidence that various grains were being grown, although with some inevitable geographic variation.⁷⁵ By the nineteenth century, though, what farming there was taking place was being forced into increasingly inaccessible locations because, as a sympathetic observer in Edo noted, “when the Japanese come to trade they complain that [crop growing] prevents fishing and suppress it”.⁷⁶ While there is some dispute over the extent to which this was Matsumae policy as opposed to *ad hoc* restrictions developed by merchants out in the out in the *ezochi* itself, scholars broadly accept the notion that this reflected the Matsumae's desire to prevent the Ainu from taking up agriculture or other industries that would free them from their economic dependence on the Japanese.⁷⁷

For the land itself to be made part of Japan, it would have to be subject to a fundamental transformation, so that it would become land identifiable as ‘Japanese’⁷⁸. If this was achieved, advocates for developing Ezo agreed, then there would be no reason why the land would not become Japan. Such claims for political intervention all drew upon history to justify their conviction in such a transformation. Namikawa had noted that while doubts existed over whether Ezo customs could be transformed, the example of the region around Edo, which had been known as the ‘Azuma Ebisu’, showed that this transformation was possible, as the formerly barbarian region now prospered ‘more than Kyoto’ since the Tokugawa had come to power.⁷⁹ Sakakura similarly drew upon the history of the Mutsu and Dewa regions as demonstrating that such a transformation in land was possible, and would occur if the Ezo were protected from their current exploitation and “encouraged to take up rice-farming and become grain-eaters,”⁸⁰ which would enable the territory of Japan to expand even beyond the limits of the Ezo.⁸¹ Sakakura states that “when the Ezo came to acquire the habit of living on cereals they would be turned into people of our country”, and that consequently it would be necessary to educate and retrain them in order that the land itself be civilized.⁸²

⁷⁵ Takakura *Ainu kenkyū*.

⁷⁶ Hayashi *Ainu no Nōkō Bunka*, p. 26.

⁷⁷ Mogami, “Watarishima hikki”, p. 523, see Howell “Ainu ethnicity”, p. 86.

⁷⁸ As the previous chapter has already noted, the image of the Tokugawa village as consisting of rice-growing peasants was only ever in image, but this validation of agriculture became more pronounced the further at variation with reality it became, in a manner that relates to how nationalism is understood.

⁷⁹ Iwasaki “Shiryō Shokai – Namikawa Tenmin ‘Hekikyoroku’”.

⁸⁰ Sakakura *Ezo Zuihitsu*, p.77

⁸¹ Takakura *Ainu Seisaku- shi*, p. 51.

⁸² Sakakura *Ezo Zuihitsu*, p. 77.

The slippage in Sakakura's text between the importance of rice-farming and grain-eating is revealing, because his interest in assimilating the Ainu and incorporating the land are able to be reduced to one another through this conflation. In doing so, Sakakura may be considered representative of many explorers, who arrive "with preconceived notions of spatial, economic and social organization, assumptions about order ... the two processes of exploring the land and planning for its future settlement cannot be separated; they were intricately, and often, explicitly, connected in the maps and writings of the explorers".⁸³ This was consistently visible in the calculations of subsequent Japanese adventurers, who came to calculate just how much of Japan Ezo could become. To give just one example, a large mission was dispatched to the Ezochi in April 29 1798, ordered once again to survey the territory and make it legible for the centre.⁸⁴ The results of this mission were again painted in optimistic colors, and Kondō Jūzō, on his 'Map of Ezo'⁸⁵ envisaged for the state a full program of colonization. This detailed those areas of potential agriculture, including over a million *koku* of good fields to be developed towards the upper reaches of the Ishikari River, while at the same time noting the appropriate locations for such structures as watchtowers and guard outposts and the location to lay roads.⁸⁶ Kondō continued to submit versions of this proposal until around 1807, indicating the importance which some Japanese ascribed to bringing this barbarian space with Japan's control.

The question of agriculture came to be bound up with the calculated importance of Ezo. Kondō's proposal was originally submitted before he had even been to the Ezochi, reflecting a persistent refrain in writings about the Ezo since the emergence of "Ezo boom" in the early 1780s.⁸⁷ This is particularly clear from the famous order subsequently issued by Matsumoto, on Tanuma's behalf, to Danzaemon, the head of the Kanto Eta.⁸⁸ This demanded that the latter round up 70,000 *Eta* and *Hinin* and send them to the Ezo in order to cultivate 10% of the

⁸³ Nobles "Straight Lines and Stability", p. 13.

⁸⁴ *Zoku Tokugawa Jikki I*, p. 685; or Kyūmei Kōki, *Shinsen Hokkaidō shi*, p. 322.

⁸⁵ This is the *Ezochi ezu* 蝦夷地絵図 held by Tokyo University and reproduced in the *ShinAsahikawashi-shi* (新旭川市史), vol. 7. Within the same collection, the voluminous writings on the map are printed out in full, see also Takagi Kinsei *Nihon no Hoppōzu Kenkyū*, p. 152-155.

⁸⁶ Kondo's map <http://bunka.nii.ac.jp/heritages/heritagebig/169055/1/1>

⁸⁷ This is the "Ezo literature boom" discussed by Wada Toshiaki in his introduction to Hirasawa, *Keiho Gūhitsu*. For more on this, see Chapters 7 & 8.

⁸⁸ For more on Danzaemon's role and relations with the state, see Howell *Geographies of Identity in Nineteenth Century Japan*.

1,166,400 *chō* of potential fields that was available there.⁸⁹ According to one variant, this forced colonization was to be aided by a mass purification ceremony of the *Eta* at Ise jingū, after which they would presumably advance to the margins of Japan as civilized beings, able to bring order to the territory through “agriculture or cattle breeding”.⁹⁰ This space of Ezo, then, would not only become civilized by being cultivated, but the process of cultivation would itself have a civilizing effect upon the ‘barbaric’ elements of the population present within Japan itself. Such an understanding was related to the medieval worldview perceiving the land at the edges of the Japanese world as a place of pollution and exile, but emphasized the transformative potential inherent within it, which promised to both alter the character of the land and those working it. Unsurprisingly, such a view would carry over into the Meiji era. In 1879, for instance, Itō Hirobumi would inform the Grand Council of his “belief that criminals should be transported to Hokkaido. Hokkaido’s climate and natural features are not like the other islands [of Japan], but there are hundreds of miles of land there and in that vast territory criminals could be put to work clearing land or working in mines...”.⁹¹

These potentially restorative benefits of introducing agriculture, and particularly rice, to areas in which, whether by accident or design, it failed to grow,⁹² were also clearly freighted with a symbolism often associated with more explicitly colonial situations.⁹³ As Patricia Seed ably demonstrated, colonial rule frequently manifested itself in “largely ceremonial practices – planting crosses, standards, banners and coats of arms, marching in processions, picking up dirt, measuring the stars, drawing maps, speaking certain words or remaining silent”.⁹⁴ When seen from Edo, evidence of Japanese possession would ideally be represented by the introduction of cultivation, marking and ordering the surface of the land itself as a part of Japan’s territory. As Habuto Masayasu argued in the early-nineteenth century, although this

⁸⁹ “Ezochinogitsukemōshiagesōrōshozuke” in Kobayashi *Kinsei Hisabetsu buraku kankei hōreishū*, p. 176.

⁹⁰ Ooms *Tokugawa Village Practice*, p. 297, quoting the plan of Hoashi Banri. This would be through the efforts of a marginalized and despised part of the population whose lack of civilization was frequently compared to the Ainu themselves.

⁹¹ Ito Hirobumi to the Dajokan in 1879 (approved early 1880), in Shigematsu (1970) *Hokkaido gyōkei shi*, p. 122, quoted in Botsman *Punishment and Power*, p. 176.

⁹² In 1796, the English captain William Broughton observed in Ainu villages that “in no part did we see any cultivation”, and “There were some trifling plantations of Indian corn and millet, but few other signs of cultivation. This we the more wondered at, as their diet seemed very scanty and precarious; and the ground produced an abundance of vegetables, as we observed in the gardens belonging to the Japanese”. Broughton, *Voyage of Discovery*, p. 99, 108. See also Chapter 8.

⁹³ On the symbolism associated with rice itself, see the previous chapter and Ohnuki-Tierney *Rice as Self*.

⁹⁴ Seed *Ceremonies of Possession*, p. 2.

process of transformation would take time, it would be worth achieving so that "after a hundred years, all of Ezo will have been completely transformed to be just like our Country", with the result that it would be "just as if a whole province had bubbled forth anew on the land of Japan".⁹⁵

The role of ceremony was central to the eventual incorporation of this province into the administrative structure of the state, which happened in the immediate aftermath of the Meiji Restoration. Overcoming the Shogunate's quarter-millenia grip on political authority, the new Restoration government immediately wished to make its territory legible, and before 1868 was out, ordered all the provinces to submit *kuniezu*.⁹⁶ Despite the change in political leadership, the state's need for an overview of the area under its territorial control was as great as ever.⁹⁷ It was the *ezochi*, however, which underwent initially the most dramatic change. Already on 2 April, 1868, the Meiji Emperor was presiding over what one British diplomat noted as the "first parliament of Japan" at Nijō Castle in Kyoto, where the development of the region was discussed.⁹⁸ The Iwakura proposal of the second month of 1869 announced the emperor's government would, "entrust the governor to perform admirable service to this development enterprise and to spread civilization widely, making Ezo into a small Japan".⁹⁹

Hokkaido was formally brought into existence on the 15th day of the 8th month of the Second Year of Meiji (September 20, 1869), when the new Meiji state decreed the *Ezochi* renamed and administratively divided into 11 provinces (12 with Karafuto) and 86 administrative districts. The name Hokkaido was adapted from six suggestions offered by Matsuura Takeshiro, with its designation as a *dō*, or circuit, serving to incorporate the region into the geography of the *ritsuryō* imperial state, which ordered the territory of the Japan around the imperial center of Yamashiro province and the city of Kyoto. The former *Ezochi* became the 8th circuit of the Imperial government, the 'North Sea Circuit',¹⁰⁰ a redesignation that served to mark Ezo as now being within the realm of direct imperial rule. The incorporation of the region into the *ritsuryō* administrative order occurred in the context of this familiar geography being officially

⁹⁵ Kyūmei Kōki, *Shinsen Hokkaidō shi*, pp. 324-327; Toby "Rescuing the Nation from History".

⁹⁶ With the new division of Mutsu and Dewa, this was 73 provinces.

⁹⁷ The lack of progress in this direction by 1869 saw the state distribute reduced copies of the Tenpo *kuniezu* in order to speed up the process, although ultimately the project was abandoned, see below.

⁹⁸ Breen "The Imperial Oath of 1868", p. 415.

⁹⁹ Iwakura Proposal (1869), in Tanaka *Hokkaido to Meiji Isshin*, p. 26. The proposal is dated February 28, 1869.

¹⁰⁰ From a selection of six suggestions prepared by Saga Daimyo Nabeshima Naomasa, in consultation with Matsuura.

adopted by the post-Meiji government after 1868 as the “model for” the state’s administration.¹⁰¹ On the map, at least, a whole new province of Japan had indeed bubbled forth. Although this particular effort to ‘remap’ the region may be considered more of a rhetorical success than a practical one,¹⁰² it served to symbolically incorporate what had been the uncivilized space of Ezo into the developmental mission of the Meiji state (*Figure 16*).

Mapping civilization

In 1909, in that valedictory celebration of Japanese progress, *Fifty Years of New Japan*, Sato Shōsuke explained to the world how it was that the territory of Yezo had been transformed into Hokkaido under the rule of the Meiji state. According to Sato, “The Government was restored to the Imperial House in 1867, and Yezo thereupon became a part of the realm under direct Imperial rule. In accordance with the policy, laid down centuries before by the Emperor Jimmu, of extending Imperial influence and dominions northward, a meeting was called in March 1868, to discuss, in the Imperial presence, how to reclaim the island, with the result that soon afterwards a Colonial Government was established at Hakodate”.¹⁰³ Possession, history, and modernity all came together to justify this singular achievement of the new government, the ultimate success of which is shown by the fact that unlike “our new possessions of Saghalien”, it remains Japanese today, with its possession permitting that most convenient shorthand when describing Japan, as consisting of four main islands.

Sato’s claim was made with reference to the recent history of the area. A ‘Development Agency’ was founded in 1869 in order to promote its agricultural and industrial development.¹⁰⁴ Bureaucrats were dispatched to Hokkaido with admonishments that “The flourishing condition of the Imperial Power is dependent upon the colonization and exploitation of Hokkaido”.¹⁰⁵ Areas of Japan that were already under cultivation underwent the Land Tax Reform during the years 1873-1881. In Hokkaido, however, where the land had to

¹⁰¹ Thongchai Siam Mapped, p. 310.

¹⁰² Ultimately, within the rest of Japan, the Meiji state’s efforts to organize its territory exactly along these provincial boundaries was rejected within seven years of assuming power, and Hokkaido too would eventually come to be administered as a ‘circuit’ rather than through the prefectures from which it was, on the map at least, formed, remaining to this day the only one within Japan.

¹⁰³ Okuma *Fifty Years of New Japan II*, p. 516. The Japanese version had been published the previous year.

¹⁰⁴ This is *kaitakushi*, also translated as Colonial Office, Colonization Department, etc.

¹⁰⁵ Harrison *Japan’s Northern Frontier*, p. 64.

be surveyed in order to be opened to agriculture, this provided not only the techniques but also the pattern of institutional arrangements that would subsequently be utilized in the cadastral surveys that were later undertaken in Okinawa (1898-1903), Taiwan (1898-1905), Korea (1910-1918) and Kwantung (1914-1924).¹⁰⁶ While subsequent cadastral surveys undertaken within 'Japan proper' relied on local officials and the inhabitants themselves, those occurring in the colonies of the Empire were all carried out by a specialized staff as part of the local administration. Other areas of the Japanese empire, then, came to be defined territorially in relation to the experience of Hokkaido.

In the inaugural issue of the Development Agency's magazine, the *Hokkaido Development Journal*, in 1880, the head of the Agency, Kuroda Kiyotaka, offered an overview of the situation in Hokkaido. While not matching the achievement of California, the new circuit nevertheless boasts 11 counties with 223 towns and 574 villages containing 37,579 households. A total population is 189,411 people is serviced by 49 government hospitals and 74 state schools. 237,405 acres is under cultivation, with a further 21,070 acres being cleared. Annual revenue is 1,403,452 *koku*, generating 625,000 *koku* of taxes.¹⁰⁷ Kuroda repeatedly emphasizes, in numerous variations on a single refrain, that "Today's Hokkaido is not yesterday's Ezo!" In so doing, Kuroda was bordering off contemporary Hokkaido on the map, contrasting the modern area's developed status with the wild and uncultivated past as Ezo. Although hardly a policy of centuries before, though, Ezo had long been incorporated into Japan's map, and it was this that saw the territory of Hokkaido recognized as that of Japan when the latter was drawn into a web of imperial recognition and civilizational standards in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

¹⁰⁶ Fedman "Triangulating Chōsen"; Kobayashi "Japanese Mapping of Asia-Pacific Areas".

¹⁰⁷ Kuroda "Kaitaku zasshi hakkō no shushi"; Mason *Dominant Narratives of Colonial Hokkaido and Imperial Japan*, p. 27.

PART 3 – Global Ezo

In 1781, the Matsumae official and archivist Matsumae Hironaga produced a gazetteer regarding the domain he served. Produced in accordance with Chinese practice, such gazetteers became extremely popular within the Tokugawa period, providing detailed overviews of the local area. The *Matsumae-shi* followed the conventions of such texts, beginning with a genealogy of the domainal family, discussing the area's geography, before moving onto provide details of the grains, trees, medicinal products, and other plants available in the area. In contrast to Qing China, in Tokugawa Japan it was rather unusual for such gazetteers to include maps, which were presumably not seen as necessary to outline the area. However, the case of Matsumae was a slightly different, given its rule incorporated not only the area under direct domainal administration at the southern end of the Ōshima peninsula, but also the entire vast expanse of Ezo beyond it. Possibly for this reason, Hironaga felt justified in attaching maps to his gazetteer, in order his readers were able to comprehend the geography about which he was talking.

Hironaga spends a little time discussing the maps with which he illustrates his text, seeking to justify the somewhat parlous state of mapping in Matsumae. As he notes, while there are records of circuits being made of all the lands falling within Ezo, these are not reflected on maps today due to a fire which burnt the material. As such, the domain is left with the representation of its territory that it submitted to the government during the Genroku era, some eighty years before Hironaga is writing. This map provides a very familiar image of the domain, consisting of a main island of Ezo, split in half by a river, with a 'Karato-shima' to its north and a collection of islands to the east, with the largest of these labelled as 'Rakko-shima'. While the shape of the territories differed greatly from map to map, this understanding of the

Ezo region had possessed a remarkable stability for a long period. Indeed, the map is noted as an old outline.¹

Nevertheless, although geographic knowledge remains shaky, there have been some changes to the mental map of the region. As a result of some new geographic information, Hironaga offers his new speculative map of the region. The center of the map, however, is essentially unchanged from the Genroku-era one with which he began, with the main island of Ezo orientated northeast to southwest, and divided in the middle by a river. It is towards the edges of the map, though, that the geography of the Matsumae is changing. Now, instead of the small island of 'Karato', there is a perspective representation of hills stretching off into the distance. These hills serve to keep the question of whether this north edge of Ezo forms an island or not open, for as Hironaga remarks in the text, no one has yet found the borders between the edges of "our land of Ezo" and that of northern Tartary. The change in perspective offers the possibility that that Karato stretches out forever into an unknown north.

In the east, too, there have been changes. The islands at the end of Cape Nosappu are no longer scattered across the sea, but branch out in two clusters away from this main Ezo island. One of these clusters ends in the middle of the ocean, but the second, heading off to the northeast, runs into the looming bulk of the country of 'Oroshia' at the eastern edge of the map. Rather than merely a scattered appendage to Ezo, these islands have now become stepping stones, connecting the lands held by the Matsumae with this foreign land.²

Captured by Hironaga in his gazetteer is the changing geography of Ezo, which was about to affect how this territory was understood. The first map provided by Hironaga shows a decidedly insular vision for the space over which the Matsumae ruled, with both Karafuto and the Kuril Islands existing as appendages to the main body of Matsumae. As the previous Part has amply shown, this structured the way in which this territory was understood. The Matsumae retained control for themselves over the outer limits of both their spaces of rule, retaining direct control of both those areas of Matsumae closest to the Ezochi, and then those areas of the Ezochi furthest from there. Such places were not only the most lucrative, but also the ones which required the most careful management. Nevertheless, the emphasis was also upon control, of what came across the borders of their political spaces.

¹ Matsumae *Matsumae-shi*, p. 105.

² Matsumae *Matsumae-shi*, p. 106.

The way in which the space of Ezo had been abstracted across the map reveals that the furthest reaches of this map had not been a concern. While there was an awareness of some trade being done by the Ezo, notwithstanding the accounts Hironaga gives for the exploration of Karafuto, there does not appear to have been much sustained interest in finding out how this trade operated. As long as this trade was carried by the Ezo, it fell under the seal with which Matsumae authority had been legitimated. Now, though, we see this sense of control begin to slip, as it becomes clear that it was not possible to abstract this political space entirely from its surroundings. The reinsertion of Ezo into the wider world that resulted would profoundly alter both it and Japan's place on the map.

This Part will seek to examine, firstly, the transformation in the informational order that was driven by an understanding of Ezo held elsewhere in the world. These speculative maps of Ezo came to be known in Japan, where they came to affect Japan's own speculations as to the shape of Ezo's territory. The concern created by such speculations saw efforts to border off the space of Ezo to the outside world, in order to maintain Japan's ability to control access to this territory. Nevertheless, this alteration to its frontier geography of Ezo could not but help affect Japan's own place in the world. Finally, it shall trace the efforts that were undertaken in order to once again seek to fix this space, which sought to bring back knowledge of Ezo to the center, and thus achieve control over territory through mastery of its space.

7. BRINGING EZO BACK

The creation of the Tenpo kuni-ezu in the mid-nineteenth century saw the territory of Ezo having been made commensurable with that elsewhere in the Tokugawa polity. Produced as part of a nationwide project, the map represented a means of incorporating the difference of Ezo within the prevailing cartographic order, indicating the territory's institutional submission to the Tokugawa on the map. The previous Genroku map submitted by the Matsumae appeared as little more than a sketch by comparison, a vague claim to an Ezo land primarily associated with a string of islands and coastal settlements, with parts of the interior remaining largely unintelligible until well into the latter half of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, this map was not merely an update on previous geographies, but a retraction in claims, for whereas the entirety of Karafuto and a whole archipelago of Rakko Islands had been the Matsumae's demesne, now the domain was limited to a small section of the former and a mere four of the latter.

This scaling back in cartographic ambitions was, as the map submitted by the Matsumae noted, a result of this being the land returned to them by the state in 1821, around 15 years before the map was made. The reason for the state's involvement was because of how this space of Ezo has come to represent a place of threat for Japan, one which needed to be responded to. The reason for this threat was because others came to be aware of Ezo, curious as to its situation, and anxious to map it. These European investigations in turn engendered a Japanese response, creating a cycle of territorial speculation and creation that ultimately resulted in the return of a much diminished Ezo to the Matsumae.

Chapter 7 traces out how the region of Ezo came to be represented and demarcated on European maps and within geographical texts of the period, and how these materials were subsequently reincorporated within Japan's own map of Ezo space. European accounts of the sixteenth and seventeenth century relied on a limited body of information about the region. Nevertheless, while Japanese were able to abstract Ezo space in order to position it solely in relation to its own national body, in Europe the extent location of Ezo was an issue bound up with other

places, relations between which had to be adjusted and represented on the map. European speculation about Ezo's place in the world would find its way back to Japan, where it would come to unsettle the formerly fixed place of Ezo on the map. This destabilization occurred in the context of fears of the threat from Russia, whose presence came to be known around the same time. As a result, Ezo came to be reinterpreted within a wider geopolitical context within Japan, a context that unsettled the actual shape of the land represented upon the map.

Ezo abroad

The geography of Ezo instead became a point of contention on the other side of the world, as this was where its position was less secure, not anchored in place by its surroundings.

However, this was a land held to possess some connection to Japan, with reports of a place to the north of Japan, inhabited by barbarians and with lots of gold, mentioned in European reports even prior to Japan their arrival in Japan.¹ The earliest European map of Japan that we possess, a Portuguese copy of a late-sixteenth century Japanese Gyoki-type map showing 68 fish scale provinces, does not represent the land of Yezo, but does note its presence to the north of Japan, off the map. This lack of representation indicates the amorphous character of Ezo in Japan at the time, when it was largely still not represented on maps of Japan (see Chapter 4). Nevertheless, information about Ezo had already found reflection in one earlier map, with Bartolomeu Velho's "General Chart of the Globe", shows Japan as three islands of Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku and situates to the north of them a large island described as abundant in gold and silver.² A later map by Abraham Ortelius from 1589, called the Pacific Ocean, also indicates the presence of an island to Japan's north, identified on this map as an "Island of Silver".³ As has already been noted, this accords with the information that Europeans were receiving about this mysterious region.

Maps of Japan made in Europe did come to feature an island with designations referring to Ezo ('Jezo', 'Jedso', 'Yesso', and so forth), with the earliest extant being the 1617 map of Christophorus Blancus, which was in turn almost certainly based upon an original map by

¹ Boscaro & Walter "Ezo and Its Surroundings through the Eyes of European Cartographers", p. 84.

² The *Carta General do Orbe* is conserved at the Accademia di Belle Arti in Florence, see Oka "Elusive Islands of Silver".

³ Isla de Plata, on Ortelius' *Maris Pacifici*.

Ignacio Moreira.⁴ The expulsion of most Europeans by the mid-seventeenth century maintained a general paucity of information regarding the nation, and most European maps of Japan continued to be indebted to Japanese originals. As a result, it was also common for European maps to represent Yezo as “enframing” the rest of Japan in the style of Japanese maps of the period.⁵ This is obvious in maps that were produced on the basis of Ishikawa Ryusen’s, including those of Adrien Reland, which represented Japan in accordance with its imperial provincial geography while placing it within a context shaped by Korea, the Ryukyus, and Ezo.⁶ It was on the basis of another of Ishikawa’s maps transported to Europe that the young Swiss scholar Johann Caspar Scheuchzer would produce the map of Japan accompanying his translation of Engelbert Kaempfer’s famous work on Japan in 1727.⁷ The map that Scheuchzer produced was a composite, but its representation of the area to Japan’s north showed a small island of Matsumae off the coast of the larger island.⁸ This was not the map that Kaempfer had prepared to illustrate his work,⁹ but it does accord with his description of Ezo in the text. Here, the island of Jezo “was invaded and conquer’d...by Joritomo, the first Cubo, or secular monarch, who left it to the Prince of Matsumai, (a neighboring Island belonging to the great Province Osiu) to be by him govern’d and taken care of”.¹⁰

This mixture of accuracy and error in Kaempfer’s description of Ezo is indicative of the limited information circulating within Japan itself, as acknowledged by the author. Kaempfer admitted

⁴ Schütte “Ignacio Moreira of Lisbon, Cartographer in Japan 1590–1592”; Hubbard “The Map of Japan Engraved by Christopher Blancus, Rome, 1617”. Plate 27 in Walter *Japan, A Cartographic Vision*, appears to be an earlier manuscript map, evincing considerable similarities with Blancus’ version. The same representation of Yezo appears on maps by Ginnaro (pl. 29), Cardim (pl. 30), Briet (pl. 32), Bouttats (pl. 33), Sanson (pl. 34), and Tavernier (pl. 35).

⁵ See also the *Wakan Sanzai Zusetsu* in Chapter 6.

⁶ Yonemoto “The European Career of Ishikawa Ryusen’s Map of Japan”. Reland is far from the only European mapmaker of significance, see Walter *Japan, A Cartographic Vision*, Hubbard *Japoniæ insulæ*.

⁷ The map in Kaempfer upon which Scheuchzer bases the representation of Japan’s north was from a map that was first published in 1687, entitled the *Honchō zukan kōmoku* 本朝図鑑綱目 (Detailed map of our country), see <http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/1286174>. Ryūsen revised this map as the *Nihon Ōezu* 日本大絵図 (Great map of Japan) of 1689 http://www.wul.waseda.ac.jp/kotenseki/html/ru11/ru11_00872/index.html, and the *Nihon kaisan chōrikuzu* 日本海山潮陸図 (Map of the seas and lands of Japan), in 1691, see <http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/1286173>. Reland’s map was based upon this latter map.

⁸ The map that Kaempfer presumably intended for publication, based upon a separate 1678 woodblock print map of Japan, the *Shinsen Dai Nihon Zukan* 新撰大日本図鑑 延宝 (Revised map of Great Japan), is reproduced in Walter *Japan, A Cartographic Vision*, pl. 72.

⁹ Massarella “A History of The History”; Walter *Japan, A Cartographic Vision*.

¹⁰ Kaempfer *The History of Japan*, p. 106. The Introduction notes that this accords with “the map of Kamschatka, published some years ago by J. B. Homann”, showing a large island of Matmanska above Japan, which was “sufficient to shew, for what reasons I have in the map of Japan, annexed to this History, made an island of it”. Kaempfer *The History of Japan*, p. xxii.

on the page following the description above, “As to [Jeso’s] figure, I could not gather anything positive, neither from the accounts I had from the Japanese, nor from the Maps, I met with in the country, they differing much from each other”.¹¹ This absence of definitive geographic information justified Scheuchzer’s addition to the map which he drew to accompany Kaempfer’s work two alternative representations for the geography of northern Japan. A representation based upon the 1678 map which Kaempfer had intended to use to illustrate his work was also shown, in a cartouche that provided an alternative representation of the relation between Japan and ‘Jesogashima’ (Jeso island(s)) to its north.¹² A second cartouche represented Yezo as being an extension of Kamchatka and was taken “From a recent map of the Russian Empire”.¹³ This second cartouche is particularly significant in the context of this study, as it indicates the necessity that existed in Europe to begin to incorporate maps of both Ezo and Japan into more expansive geographies of the world.

Early European speculation about the relation between Japan, Ezo and the continent was the same as that occurring in Japan, with the lack of knowledge in Japan on this question being reflected back on the other side of the world. As we have seen, this lack of knowledge resulted in Ezo retaining a distinctly marginal position upon maps produced in Japan, and this was reflected in maps of Japan made in the seventeenth century.¹⁴ While one of the earliest maps of Ezo, that by the Jesuit Girolamo de Angelis,¹⁵ has subsequently become famous as an early representation of this island immediately to Japan’s north, it was unusual in attempting to show the entire area of the island. De Angelis had visited Matsumae in 1618 and 1621, sending reports and map back to Europe, and his understanding of Yezo as an enormous island between Japan and the Asian continent had a considerable influence upon later drawings of this region. It is not clear if copies of his map circulated particularly widely, but his reports were certainly an influence upon the atlas of Robert Dudley, published in 1647. Dudley retained both the vast expanse of Ezo to the north of Japan, although utilizing it to “enframe”

¹¹ Kaempfer *The History of Japan*, p. 107. Scheuchzer’s decision to adopt this mode of representation speaks to the naturally insular nature of the political imagination, where the perceived separation between an area of direct Japanese rule and that of the native Ezo inhabitants came to be literally represented on this map of Ryusen’s. In doing so, it adopted an understanding also present within Japan itself, as Kaempfer’s description highlighted.

¹² See Walter Japan, *A Cartographic Vision*, plates 74-76a.

¹³ “Ex recentissima Russici Imperii Mappa”. In his introduction to Kaempfer, Scheuchzer describes this as “a large Map of the Russian Empire, made according to the latest information” which had been recently published in Holland and also acquired by Hans Sloane, under whose aegis Scheuchzer prepared Kaempfer’s papers.

¹⁴ See note 7 above.

¹⁵ An Italian Jesuit, also Jerome, Hieronymous, etc.

the top of the map, and the Cape of Tesso as demarcating the western extent of the island with a narrow channel existing there between Ezo and the Asian continent.¹⁶

The reports of de Angelis formed part of the limited stock of European knowledge regarding the Ezo region. This is shown through its incorporation in the encyclopedic work of the Amsterdam Mayor, Nicholas Witsen. The book was written to accompany a new map of Asia that was drawn on the basis of his research and correspondence with many people, notably in the VOC, as well as Russian statesman and foreign scholars in Russian service. First made in 1687, the map represented northern and eastern Eurasia, and in 1689 Witsen dedicated the map to Peter the Great.¹⁷ *Noord en Oost Tartarie* (*N&E Tartary* hereafter) was intended to accompany and explain this map, and was first published in 1692, and in an enlarged edition in 1705; a third revision emerged in 1785, and was to prove the most significant in Japan itself.¹⁸ The work was largely a compilation of various sources. De Angelis' reports formed part of a chapter devoted to 'Eso',¹⁹ together with others, like the long-term Jesuit resident of Japan, Louis Frois.²⁰ Witsen's sources of information were widely separated in time, with one letter, written by a VOC-official in Japan, mentioning the revolt of these 'Eso' against their 'arrogant' Japanese overlords, presumably referring to the Shakushain disturbance of 1669.²¹ This showed both the breadth of his contacts, and the narrowness of sources available on the region.

Witsen was skeptical of Japanese maps of the region, noting that:

The Japanese maps, which can be found in large manors, and also in *Symmi* or other temples in these regions, show *Jeso* bordering on *Daats*, and show its eastern shores lying more than fifteen degrees further east than *Japan*. They also show, between this land and *America*, a sea strait (*Fretum Anian* or *Strait de Vries*), but –

¹⁶ Schütte "Japanese cartography at the court of Florence; Robert Dudley's maps of Japan, 1606–1636". See also Sanson's 1652 variation (pl. 58) and later copies (plate 59-60). Martini's 1655 map of China, Japan and Korea also displays this influence (pl. 36).

¹⁷ Regarding this map, see Keuning "Nicolaas Witsen as a Cartographer". The map in question was later published by Pieter van der Aa, official printer to Leiden University from 1694, the version seen here is from Aa's atlas. Witsen's work was influential; "The President of the Royal British Society compared the publication of this map to the discovery of America by Columbus", De Graaf & Naarden. "Description of the Border Areas of Russia with Japan", p. 207.

¹⁸ See Chapter 9.

¹⁹ The chapter on 'Eso' is from pages 128-157 of the 1705 edition, with de Angelis' report at 143-5. The preceding sections on the Niuche (Jurchens, later Manchus) and Dauria (the Amur region) also contain references to region, see De Graaf & Naarden. "Description of the Border Areas of Russia with Japan", p. 209.

²⁰ A Portuguese missionary whose *História do Japão* [*The History of Japan*] (1585) also mentions the people of Ezo.

²¹ Naarden, "Witsen's Studies of Inner Eurasia", 229.

as is the case with all other maps – this was done carelessly and without the mention of degrees. Thus, these maps cannot be relied on: especially those in which the names have been written only on the basis of their sound and in *Canna*, based on the alphabet, and drawn up in such a way that the entire work reflects only oral descriptions.²²

While it is not clear exactly which maps Witsen was referring to,²³ the previous section has shown that, in essence, his description of such maps as being based on “only oral descriptions” was correct, and as we have seen, the Japanese were indeed “unsure about precise conditions in this land and about its size and shape”.²⁴ Witsen’s work made little effort to make the information he received from various written sources commensurable, merely reproducing it without comment. As a result, the information he provided offered a number of possible Ezos, and perhaps for this reason, his original map had only represented continental Asia, including Korea and an ‘Amoers Eiland’ at the mouth of that river. His struggle to make sense of these conflicting reports about Ezo is shown in two maps not included in the first two editions of the book, and therefore are considered to have been drawn up between 1705 and Witsen’s death in 1717; they were posthumously published in the 1785 version.²⁵

The “mention of degrees” which were lacking on Japanese maps became available to Witsen through the various reports by those involved in the VOC expedition of *Castricum* and *Breskens* under the command of Maerten Gerritsz. Vries was ordered to explore the coast of Tartary to the North of Japan and the nearby ‘Yezo’, that mysterious group of islands reputedly rich in silver and gold. The expedition was a failure on those terms, with the ships separated, no precious metals found and Tartary beyond reach, while ten unfortunate crewmembers of the *Breskens* were captured after landing in Nambu, northeastern Japan, where they witnessed the brutal torture and apostasy of Portuguese Catholics before being repatriated via Nagasaki.²⁶ But the *Castricum*, Vries’s flagship, discovered and charted eastern Ezo, three Kurile islands and southeastern Sakhalin, although without being aware of what they were. Vries’ official chart remained undisturbed in the Hague until 1858, when the journal of the first

²² Witsen 1705, 63, in De Graaf & Naarden. “Description of the Border Areas of Russia with Japan”, p. 212. ‘Daats’ seems to have been another name for Tartary, see Kaempfer *The History of Japan*, pp. 63, 149.

²³ He notes that they are numerous and made by a variety of mapmakers, at 1705, Keuning “Nicolaas Witsen as a cartographer”, p. 130.

²⁴ 1705, Keuning “Nicolaas Witsen as a cartographer”, p. 63

²⁵ These are the *De nieuwe Lant-kaarte der Tartars van Niuche* (New map of the Tartars of Manchuria) and *LantKaarte van ‘t Oost-Tartarie* (Map of Eastern Tartary). We will mention these maps again in Chapter 9.

²⁶ Hesselink *Prisoners from Nambu*.

navigating officer, Cornelis Jansz. Coen, was discovered by chance and published.²⁷ For years substantial information about the expedition could only be found in *North and East Tartary*, as the reports of various members of the crew disappeared into Witsen's study to be incorporated in this work. However, the surveying conducted by Vries also came to be rapidly reflected on maps published of north-eastern Asia.²⁸

The various means of understanding and representing the geography of Ezo that were present in Witsen continued to be deployed and recombined in the eighteenth century. Particularly prominent in this were Vries' sightings of both the Kuril Islands, and the Capes of Aniwa and Patience, located by Vries on Ezo itself. In the early 1730's, when Jean Baptiste d'Anville was producing the maps for du Halde's volume on the Jesuit's work in China, he attempted to incorporate other European geographical knowledge regarding Japan and Northeast Asia into the representation provided by the Kangxi Jesuit map, including knowledge from Vries's survey (Figure 17).²⁹ Another possible interpretation of Vries' sightings was provided by this 1744 map of Johann Matthias Haas, which retained Sakhalin represented in the "arrowhead" form characteristic of its appearance in the Kangxi atlas, and Vries's two capes, but with the latter combined on a large 'Terra Ezo' that was loosely connected to the continent. Further to the east, it retained the uncertain discoveries by Vries of a Staaten and vast Compagnie Land.³⁰

The uncertainty regarding what existed to the east of Ezo, where Vries had speculated existed two islands of Staaten and Compagnie, was slowly transformed through Russian exploration. This began to receive a wider audience following publications associated with the Bering Expeditions, such as the 1745 map produced by the Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg. Russian maps of the area around Kamchatka had begun to appear in the early-eighteenth century with the beginnings of its exploration marked by the toponym's appearance on

²⁷ Robert *Voyage to Cathay, Tartary and the Gold- and Silver-Rich Islands East of Japan*.

²⁸ For instance, the map of Jansonius, *Nova Et Accurata Iaponiae Terrae Esonis Ac Insularum...*, initially 1650, https://www.raremaps.com/gallery/detail/1206/Nova_Et_Accurata_Iaponiae_Terrae_Esonis_Ac_Insularum/Jansso_n.html, or Frederick de Wit's *Magna Tartariae, Magni Mogolis Imperii, Japoniae & Chinae, Nova Descriptio*, first made in 1659, <http://oshermaps.org/browse-maps?id=12713>. These details were also appended to the empty left hemisphere of Bleau's map; see his *Nova Totius Terranum Orbis Tabula*, in the Tokyo Museum, <http://webarchives.tnm.jp/imgsearch/show/C0075402>. Kawamura (2003), p. 120, dates this to 1648.

²⁹ Jean Baptiste Bourguignon D'Anville, *Carte Generale De La Tartarie Chinoise Dressee sur les Cartes Particulieres Faits Sur Les Lieux Par Les R.R. P.P. Jesuites...MDCCXXXII*, see https://www.raremaps.com/gallery/detail/39062/Carte_Generale_De_La_Tartarie_Chinoise_Dressee_sur_les_Cartes_Particulieres/D%27Anville.html. We will return to this survey in Chapter 9.

³⁰ J.M. Haas & Gottlieb Boehm, *Carte de l'Asie, projettée stereographiquement, tirée des relations et observations Atlas compendiarius quinquaginta tabularum geographicarum Homannianarum*, 1744.

Semyon Remezov's *Atlas of Siberia* in 1697. In 1713, Ivan Kozyrevskii was charged with "reconnoitring these islands and the Japanese archipelago", and produced a description of the Kurils as fifteen islands, with the last being named Matsumae, beyond which was Japan.³¹ The Japanese were noted as coming to the sixth island to obtain metals. The Kurils were cautiously mapped by Ivan levrenov and Feodor Luzhin, sent by Peter I in 1719 to collect detailed information on Japan.³² Shestakov's chart of 1726 represented the Kurils as a series of stepping stones down towards Japan, but this was impressions was foreshortened on the first Russian Atlas, *Imperii Russici Tabla Generali*, assembled by Kirilov in 1734, which placed Kamchatka too close together.³³ These early examples of Russian maps were also struggling to make geographic information gathered in the region commensurable with existing maps of this area at the end of Asia.

It was through the results of two expeditions associated with Vitus Bering that Russia's discoveries were slowly incorporated into Europe's stock of geographical knowledge. A member of the Second Kamchatka Expedition, Martin Spangberg, had been charged with discovering a route to Japan, and visited the southern Kurils and eastern coast of Hokkaido, as well as northwestern Honshu, in 1739.³⁴ However, on his chart, Spangberg represented the Kurils and Jezo as a number of small islands located to the north of the main island of Japan,³⁵ and probably due to the weather appeared to mis-map the main island of Ezo itself as three separate islands.³⁶ Nevertheless, the "Complete Map of the Russian Empire", produced in Russian, French and Latin in 1745 and intended to showcase Russia's exploratory

³¹ Lensen "Early Russo-Japanese Relations", p. 4; Stephan *The Kuril Islands*, p. 42-45. Kozyrevskii's report was seemingly recovered from the archives at Yakutsk by Gerhard Friedrich Müller in 1734, and incorporated by the latter into his materials on Russian history, and from which he apparently excised mention of the Japanese coming to the sixth island on the grounds that it contradicted other reports of them not moving north of Matsumae, see Akitsuki *Nihon Hoppen Tanken to Chizu no Rekishi*, p. 72-75

³² Their map is at Akitsuki *Nihon Hoppen Tanken to Chizu no Rekishi*, p. 81.

³³ This was published and sold by the Russian Naval Academy, but withdrawn in 1745. The map of Asia represented a string of Kuril Islands running between Kamchatka and a vast Ezo, based on Vries' survey, but also maintained the islands that Vries discovered to Ezo's east. See Yamada-Komeie, Fig. 2. Kirilov inherited this composition from Strahlenberg's 1730 map, *Nova Descriptio Tartariae Magnae...*, and it was also retained on Bellin and Charlevoix's 1735 map. Here, "Kamchatka and Yezo were represented as forming a great continent separated by narrow sounds from Japan, which was continued on the meridian of Kamchatka and Yezo, and from an eastern chain of islands—Staaten Eiland and Kompagniland—that seemed to project into the Pacific in the form of a continent." Lauridsen, *Vitus Bering*, p. 118

³⁴ Lensen "Early Russo-Japanese Relations", pp. 50-55.

³⁵ For details of his expedition see Chapter 15 of Burney, *A Chronological History*, pp. 152-161; Gerard Fridrikh Mueller, *Voyages from Asia to America, for Completing the Discoveries of the North*, pp. 25-36

³⁶ Lauridsen, *Vitus Bering*, pp. 122-126

achievements to Europe, incorporated material from Bering's expeditions on a general map, together with a representation of Sakhalin based upon that adopted by the Qing in the so-called Kangxi atlases.³⁷ The Complete Map amended the representations of these islands, with the Kuril Islands leading up to Kamchatka being located some distance from an island of "Matuszma" immediately to the north of the main island of Japan (*Figure 18*). This publication, and the material shipped back to Paris by Joseph Nicolas de L'Isle, resulted in a lively debate over the status of Sakhalin, the Kurils, and the American continent.³⁸

The material was incorporated in an enormously influential map from, once again, d'Anville in 1753, which sought to bring these new Russian discoveries in the east into line with the sightings of Vries into line. In order to do so, d'Anville extended the bottom of the island of Saghalien-ula Hata south so that it accorded with Vries's Cape Patience, while he located Cape Aniwa on the continent. He also tried to maintain Vries's rendition of State and Company land in the Kurils, while noting that the Russians had referred to the latter as Nadezda and shown the former as a number of islands (*Figure 19*). The three maps of Witsen, the Russian Academy of Science, and D'Anville would subsequently be reproduced in Delisle's 'Atlas Nouveau', providing competing representations of this area to the north of Japan.³⁹ Sometime towards the end of the nineteenth century, versions of this atlas, including one that is now in the Shizuoka Central Library, arrived in Japan, in time to be drawn into another discussion over the geography of Ezo that was taking place in Japan.⁴⁰ These European maps of Japan's north would later come to be redeployed in a debate on Japan's own boundaries.⁴¹

³⁷ The distinctive representation of Sakhalin was already present on the map of Strahlenberg, above. We will return to the question of Sakhalin later in this chapter, and again in Chapter 9.

³⁸ Breitfuss, "Early Maps of North-Eastern Asia and of the Lands around the North Pacific". In the context of Japan specifically, see also Yamada-Komeie, "Mapping the Russian Far East"; Koller, "An'ei nenkan no Roshia jin Ezochi Torai no rekishiteki haikai".

³⁹ This was an atlas assembled by the Amsterdam publishers Covens and Mortier, initially in 1730, which included maps from Sanson, Jaillot and others, and expanded rapidly from 43 maps in its original 1730 format to 138 by 1774. The continuing indeterminacy of Ezo in Europe is indicated by Buache's map of 1754.

⁴⁰ The atlas is introduced here, http://www.tosyokan.pref.shizuoka.jp/aoi/2_history/an_284.htm, and is available from: <http://multi.tosyokan.pref.shizuoka.jp/digital-library/detail?tilcod=0000000031-SZK0000912>.

⁴¹ This will be developed in Chapter 9.

Defining Ezo

While these representations of Ezo were fixed on the pages the *Atlas Nouveau*, the part of the world that they represented was being continuously rewritten. As the results of these expeditions returned they provided the material with which to flesh out the geographical speculations presented on these maps. An early example of this is Bellin's map of the Kuril Islands from 1750, which notes that Kunashir and the other four islands closest to Matsumae were referred to by the Japanese as Jeso. This stemmed from the Russian reports presumably taken back to Paris by Joseph d'Isle. The publication of a history of Kamchatka and the Kuril Islands by another member of this Second Kamchatka Expedition, Stepan Petrovich Krasheninnikov, in 1755, and the rapid dissemination of this translation and accompanying maps throughout Europe (there was an English translation by 1764 and one into French by 1767) saw the results of these Russian explorations widely circulated. Krasheninnikov's map differed from the one drawn up in 1745, positioning the island of "Matma" or "Matsumay Island" much closer to both that of "Kunasir" and the Asian mainland, while noting that Kunasir and also noted that the islands immediately adjacent were referred to as "Jeso" by the inhabitants. In his text, Krasheninnikov noted that the natives of "Eturpu" and "Urupe" are also included by the Japanese as part of "Jeso", together with those of Kunasir and Matsumay.⁴² A similar representation was adopted by Gerhard Friedrich Müller, who like the former had been on the Expedition and apparently provided much of the information recounted by the latter regarding the Kurils. Muller's map, initially published in the same year of 1755, offered the same description and representation as on Krasheninnikov's maps. Müller's map was also widely known in the West, being published by the Academy in French in 1758 and affixed to his "Voyages et découvertes faites par les Russes" of 1765.

The expansion of knowledge with regards to Japan and Yezo is visible in general geographical texts circulating within Europe, such as in Hübner's *Geography*.⁴³ This was a work initially written by Johann Hübner in the late-seventeenth century, and became a standard geographical text in many parts of Europe over the eighteenth, with the work being updated

⁴² Krasheninnikov *History of Kamchatka and the Kurilsky Islands*.

⁴³ Johann Hübner (17 March 1668 – 21 May 1731) was a German geographer and scholar, primarily known for his *Kurtze Fragen aus der alten und neuen Geographie* (Leipzig 1693), which was a pedagogic primer for children, offering information on the world based on a question and answer method. It was later augmented by his son of the same name (1703-1753). This work is occasionally misidentified as the source of *Geographie*, as in Kawamura Kinsei *Nihon no Sekaizō*.

and added to, first by Hübner's son after his death, and repeatedly republished throughout the century in multiple languages. By the 1769 edition,⁴⁴ it incorporated not only Kaempfer's work on Japan but also material gathered in the course of the Russia's expeditions. Japan was detailed in Volume 5, with the "Japansche Eilanden" introduced as 3 large and 35 small islands, including Matsuma.⁴⁵ Jedso was noted as separated from Japan by a Strait 11 miles wide, called Sangar, and readers directed to the section on Russian exploration in Book 4. Further on, "Matma, or Matsumay" is the northernmost point of Japan, at North 41°, a quite large island belonging to the Kurils in a line stretching up to Kamchatka. Matsumay belongs to the Japanese province of Oshiu, and "the inhabitants of this island and the three islands of Kunashir, Etrorofu and Urup are called Jeso by the Japanese".⁴⁶ In the corresponding section on Russia, it notes the Kurils stretch in a line southwest from Kamchatka towards Japan, and that there are at least 25 of them.⁴⁷ "The great island of Matma, which is the last of the islands, and only isolated by a narrow strait from Japan, has long been in the empire of Japan", and "the inhabitants of the island of KUNATIR and the three abovementioned islands [of UTURPE, URUPE and MATMA] are called Jeso by the Japanese". Therefore, "while previous writings noted the existence of a large country to the northeast of Japan, known as the land of Jeso or Jedso, we now know it to refer solely to these islands".⁴⁸

This work does not only show the increasing volume and quality of information available in Europe, but it also begins to bring together information from two sources, hailing independently from Russian explorations and the contacts of the Dutch and others within Japan, placing them within the same framework. Consequently, notions of Jeso as a large island were rejected, with the term returned to its origins as an ethnonym used by the Japanese to describe a foreign people. In the process, the extent of land to which 'Jeso' applies begins to become bounded on the map, through creating commensurability between

⁴⁴ *Algemeene geographie of beschryving des geheelen aardryks*, [General geography or description of the whole geography], translated by Willem Albert Bachiene, published by Pieter Meijer, op dem Dam, 1769. [In Amsterdam, in 6 volumes]. This book is the Dutch translation of the 1761-66 edition, translated by W. A. Bachiene and E. W. Cramerus.

⁴⁵ *Algemeene geographie* Book 5, p. 353.

⁴⁶ "de Bewoners vann dit Eiland, en van de drie Eilanden KUNATIR, ETURPU en URUPE die Noordöostwaards van daar liggen, door de Japanners met eenen algemeenen naam JESO genoemd worden.", *Algemeene geographie* Book 5, p. 378.

⁴⁷ "De Kurilsche Eilanden. Deze beginnen aan den zuihoek van kamschatka, en strekken zich, in een reeks, zuidwestwaards naar japan uit, daar zyn meer dan 25; doch het nette getal kan men nog niet bepalen", *Algemeene geographie* Book 4, p. 411

⁴⁸ *Algemeene geographie* Book 4, p. 412

knowledge acquired in relation to both Japan and to Russia. Designating 'Jeso' as an ethnonym in Hübner's *Geographie* conversely represents a territorialization of the notion, through its defined association with the islands of Matsumae, Kunashiri, Etorofu and Urup.

However, Hübner's *Geographie* is not only significant for representing the state of European knowledge regarding Ezo in the latter-half of the nineteenth century, but for how it too became incorporated into Japan's understanding of the region. This was can be ascribed to two events which occurred in Russia's Far East. The first was the famous incident involving the escape of the Hungarian/Polish adventurer Maurice Benyovsky (or Beniowski, Hanbengoro in Japan). A participant in the Polish Armies of the Bar Confederation, he was captured by the Russians and ordered into exile in Kamchatka by Empress Catherine II. There, he escaped with a group of other exiles from the peninsula in 1771, through the seizure of the vessel *Saints Peter and Paul*. Landing on Simushir in the Kuril Islands, he quelled a potential mutiny by abandoning Gerasim Gregorievich Izmailov and two others on the island, before sailing south and calling at Tosa, Awa and Amami Oshima,⁴⁹ before moving on to Formosa and Macau.⁵⁰ The fantastic account of this voyage, published posthumously as his *Memoirs and Travels of Mauritius Augustus Count de Benyowsky* in 1790, makes clear that Benyovsky was a man with a flexible relationship with the truth.⁵¹

The significance of his journey for Ezo⁵² lies in the letters he left behind for the Japanese, the last of which alluded to plans for a Russian invasion of Ezo, and led to the incident being termed "Hanbengoro's warning".⁵³ Keene's rendition of the original letter reports that "in accordance with a Russian order, two galliots and a frigate from Kamchatka sailed around Japan and set down all their findings in a plan, in which an attack on Matsma [Hokkaido] and

⁴⁹ For details of his stops in Japan, see Roberts, "Shipwrecks and Flotsam", pp. 97-102.

⁵⁰ See Lensen *The Russian Push toward Japan*, pp. 71-78.

⁵¹ The book met with significant criticism, but was a great publishing success, and was translated from English into a number of languages (German 1790, 1791, 1796, 1797; Dutch 1791; French 1791; Swedish 1791; Polish 1797; Slovak 1808; Hungarian 1888). The original publisher, William Nicholson, in his forward mentioned a map depicting Benyovsky's journey from Kamchatka to the Chinese port of which was to accompany the book, but had since disappeared. A possible version of this map has been recently unearthed in Warsaw, and awaits further study, see Bandzo-Antkowiak, "Maurycy August Beniowski – Confabulator or Discoverer?". With thanks to Szymon Gredzuk of the University of the Ryukyus for details regarding the map and further information on the enigmatic Count himself.

⁵² His perceived significance is visible in the Bellin map of the Kurils gracing the cover of Andrew Drummond's recent *The Intriguing Life and Ignominious Death of Maurice Benyovszky*, London: Routledge, 2017.

⁵³ As Roberts notes, "There is a great deal of inconsistency in how these letters have been dealt with by scholars". "Shipwrecks and Flotsam", p. 102, n. 68.

the neighboring islands lying under 41°38' N. Lat. has been fixed for next year".⁵⁴ In the Japanese version of this report, however, it was Benyovsky himself who had been ordered by the Russians to survey Japan's coasts in preparation for an invasion.⁵⁵

While the immediate impact of these reports is disputed, they were ultimately significant in sparking a great deal of interest among scholars and others with regards to Russia.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, this interest also seems to have been occurring in the context of another event to arouse Japan's interest in, and concern over, the north, which was the resumption of Russian efforts to contact Japan in the 1770s.⁵⁷ This was connected to the first in that, in the wake of Benyovsky's uprising and escape, Catherine the Great appointed Matvei Bem (Markus Karl von Behm) as commander of Kamchatka, whom the Irkutsk Governor Adam Bril' instructed to establish commercial relations with Japan.⁵⁸ Involved in a competition with commandant Zubov of Okhotsk, who was petitioning to take possession of the Kurils, Bem sanctioned the 'Secret Voyage' of Lebedev-Lastochkin that would definitively bring Japanese and Russians into contact with one another. Landing first on Kunashiri in the summer of 1778, the expedition led by Dimitrii Shabalin saw the Russians arrive in two vessels to Nokkamappu, at the far eastern end of the main Ezo Island. There they met a Matsumae official named Niida Daihachi, who promised to pass on their formal trade request to the Matsumae while urging

⁵⁴ Keene *The Japanese Discovery of Europe*, p. 34, which he claims draws on copies of the originals, from document 40 / 11488 in the Rijksarchief at The Hague, see p. 231, endnote 3.

⁵⁵ "Having received orders from Russia to reconnoiter [Japanese] strongholds, I sailed this year with two galiots and one frigate from Kamchatka to the Japanese shores and cruised along them. We were supposed to assemble in one place. I have heard the notion expressed with certainty that next year raids will be made on the territories of Matsumae and on neighboring islands. We made a survey of these regions in latitude 41°38' N", following Lensen's translation of the rendition given in Kondō Jūzō's *Henyo Bunkai Zuko*, at both p. 70 and p. 142 in the version in *Kondō Seisai Zenshu* (Keene references the former and Lensen the latter). That this was the official translation is suggested by the likes of Kudō Heisuke and Hayashi Shihei recording the same (below).

⁵⁶ It is customary to credit his arrival as marking the beginning of Russian studies in Japan, see for instance, Kisaki 1965, where pp. 30–33 list over eighty significant works of Russian studies written in Japan between 1781 and 1817, by scholars including Kudō Heisuke, Maeno Ryōtaku, Katsuragawa Hoshū, Hayashi Shihei, Honda Toshiaki, and many others. Iwasaki Naoko has recently argued that its immediate impact was restricted as the Japanese wouldn't have been familiar with the terms used in the report. This would seem to ignore the role of the Dutch in its translation, who would surely have communicated what terms like Kamchatka and Russia referred to. It is certainly the case, though, as Iwasaki states, that much of Kudo's work was an attempt to define the correct names of things, seeking to bring consistency to a confusing morass of geographical terms like Russia, Rus, Orosia, etc. See Iwasaki "Jūhasseiki kōki ni okeru Hokuhen-ninshiki no tenkai", pp. 180-181.

⁵⁷ Lensen has Governor Soimonov concerned about a lack of Kuril Islands tribute and learning of Japan's absence of control over any of the islands from Japanese in Irkutsk in 1761, which led to the expedition later that decade of the Cossack Chernyi and two Kuril elders. This penetrated as far as Etorofu, Lensen *The Russian Push toward Japan*, p. 66. A couple of years later, the Ainu living on Etorofu killed a number of Russians who were on Urup.

⁵⁸ Koller "An'ei nenkan no Roshia jin Ezochi Torai no rekishiteki haikei".

the Russians to leave.⁵⁹ When Shabalin returned the following year, officials informed him that the Matsumae had requested the Russians retreat to Urup, to not return to Etorofu or Kunashiri, and to in future confine any commercial relations to the Ainu, who would act as intermediaries.⁶⁰

Although this first trade request from the Russian side ended in a rebuff, it confirmed for the Matsumae a decade or more of rumours regarding the mysterious people with whom the Ainu of the Kuril Islands were trading and fighting. It was this new understanding of the Matsumae regarding the presence of the Russians that was reflected on the map that Matsumae Hironaga drew to illustrate his *Matsumae-shi*.⁶¹ Now the lands of the Ezo, over whom the Matsumae held authority, and which had for so long served to “enframe” Japan as a whole, themselves came to be framed by the stepping stones of the Kuril Islands stretching out to the looming bulk of ‘Orosia’ at the east of the map.⁶²

While the symbolic importance of Shabalin’s approach is being once again re-emphasized today,⁶³ his significance at the time was to transform the wider geography within which Ezo existed. While the Ezo had formed a frontier of Japan, it had been possible to interpret it solely from Japan’s perspective. There had been no effort to map out what might exist beyond this frontier zone, which consequently had only been bordered on the map. It was this awareness of the lack of an institutionalized border of this Ezo region, and how the region slotted into the emerging space of the globe, that became the subject of much debate in Japan.

⁵⁹ *Ezochi ikken* [1784–90], in *Shin HokkaidoShi* 7, p. 339.

⁶⁰ According to Lensen *The Russian Push toward Japan*, pp. 85–95, Stephan *The Kuril Islands*, pp. 61–63. For the subsequent Shogunal investigation that took place in Eastern Ezo itself, see Walker *The Conquest of Ainu Lands*, pp. 165–172.

⁶¹ As noted in the introduction of this chapter, see above.

⁶² It is possible that they were placed within a broader framework still. The copy of the *Matsumae-shi* at Hokkaido Library has a few pages later a map of Berings Northern Explorations.

⁶³ Shabalin’s arrival in Kunashiri has come to be locally-celebrated in recent years. In 2010, a ceremony was held for the unveiling of a granite slab in the village of Golovnin on Kunashir Island. Carved into the granite were words that a Sakhalin-based historian, Igor Samarin, had unearthed on a map made by the expedition of Shabalin in 1778, words written close to present-day Golovnin, “In 1778, Russians came here in two kayaks”. The sculpture was to commemorate the beginning of the Russian settlement of Kunashir Island, 230 years on. S. Kiselev, “Otkryvatelyam Zemel’ Posvyashchaetsya,” *Sovietskii Sakhalin*, 8th Sept 2010. This should be seen in the context of Russo-Japanese negotiations over the Northern Territories, and works to remap Russia’s claims to the region. Recently, Russian politicians and, since his December 2016 summit with Abe, Putin himself, have been claiming these disputed islands as having been always Russian, a position that has shifted from the joint communiques on history in the 1990s and early 2000s.

Bringing a global Ezo home

While the Russian missions coming down the Kuril Islands towards Matsumae were seeking to acquire both knowledge about Japan and the opportunity to trade there, the Russians also brought knowledge of themselves to the Matsumae. This was in the form of not merely their actual bodily presence in the region, but in the information and maps that they carried with them, the value of which was immediately recognized. Acquisition of such information probably occurred as part of an exchange, although our understanding of exactly what material changed hands during this period is extremely limited.⁶⁴ In engaging in such exchanges, though, the Russians were little different from the Dutch, who “rarely balked at answering geographically orientated questions and sought to manage their relations with the Japanese through the gifting of maps”. While it has been argued that this was because the latter were “Long accustomed to treating maps as commodities and responsible for much of the world’s geography being known in the form of maps and atlases published in the Netherlands”,⁶⁵ the concept of geographical knowledge serving as a medium of exchange was hardly unique to them. This is because, of course, that such representations serve as a form of power, and the provision of such “geographical gifts” by the Dutch is itself a reflection of the weakness of their position in Japan over much of the period.⁶⁶

While the Matsumae sought to keep the arrival of the Russians in Matsumae a secret, it is clear that rumours regarding their presence were beginning to circulate through the rest of the country, in a manner that would come to link Nagasaki with events in Ezo. This began with the experiences of one individual, Hirazawa Kyokuzan, who had journeyed to Nagasaki in 1774 as a member of a daimyo’s entourage. Spending about a year in the city, he heard details regarding “Hanbengoro’s” warning and became concerned at the prospects for a Russian invasion. This he later set down in a text that is known today as the *Keiho Gūhitsu*, in which he set out his fears that were sparked by learning of Benyowsky’s mission. As he noted early on in the work, his information about the world at large was derived from two interpreters. One of these,

⁶⁴ Which maps were exchanged on this occasion is unknown, but the Russians were apparently instructed to seek out maps of Japan. On Japanese acquisitions, see below.

⁶⁵ Roberts, “Re-Orientating the transformation of knowledge”, p. 29.

⁶⁶ “Geographical gifts” draws upon Bravo . “Ethnographic Navigation and the Geographical Gift”, we shall return to this concept in the next chapter. The weakness of the Dutch position is clear from Adam Clulow’s work on early relations between *The Company and the Shogun*.

Matsuura Genkō, informed Hirazawa about the visit of “Hanbengoro”, although he is not mentioned by name in the text. This visit confirmed Hirazawa in his fear of Russian, whom he learned from his interlocutors was a vast country stretching “15000 ri from east to west, and 8000 from north to south”.⁶⁷ Hirazawa himself was subsequently employed by the Shimazu, and journeyed to the Amami Islands to investigate “Henbengoro’s” landing there, before in 1778 accepting an invitation from the Matsumae to visit Ezo.⁶⁸ Hirazawa’s work was influential on future author’s accounts of this arrival of Benyowsky, including that of Kondō Jūzō.⁶⁹

The connections drawn by Hirazawa between the warnings regarding the Russians that had surfaced in Nagasaki and increasing contact with the Russians in the north, came to be displayed in another text written in response to this growing awareness of Russia’s approach which was that by Kudo Heisuke. A Sendai physician primarily resident in Edo, Kudo had a wide circle of acquaintances, including the foreign (*rangaku*) scholars Maeno Ryotaku and Yoshio Kosaku, and was a well-known individual at the time, although this text is all the remains of his supposedly voluminous writings.⁷⁰ Concerned by rumours circulating regarding the approach of these ‘Red Ezo’ to the north, and their connection with those known as the Russians, of whom very little was known, Kudo wrote two tracts in response. These two texts came to be bound together as books that have come to be known as the *Aka-ezo fusetsu ko*.⁷¹ The second text in these books, entitled “Personal thoughts on Kamchatka and Russia”, provided the history of Russia’s southward advance down the Kuril islands by placing it within the wider context of Russian history. This was the one that Kudo wrote first, probably in 1781. This was following the arrival of the *rangaku* scholar Yoshio Kosaku, who had been living in Nagasaki, in Edo the previous year. Kudo presumably requested more information on Russia from Kosaku, who seems to have provided Kudo with the partial translations of two texts. One of these was the *Oude en nieuwe staat van 't Russische of Moskovische keizerryk*, published in 1744,⁷² while

⁶⁷ Book 5 of the *Keiho Gūhitsu*.

⁶⁸ Keene *The Japanese Discovery of Europe*, pp. 31-37 & Lensen *The Russian Push toward Japan*, pp. 71-89.

⁶⁹ See Chapter 8.

⁷⁰ Gramlich-Oka notes that already “In his early thirties he drew disciples from all over Japan to his medical school *Bankōdō* 晚功堂. See *Mukashibanashi*, p. 45.

⁷¹ Report on the Land of the Red barbarians.

⁷² *History and current state of Russia or the Empire of Muscovy*, originally published earlier that year in German, as *Beschreibung von Russland*. Johannes Broedelet (Johan Bruder) is credited on the title page, and he did initially write the books, which were However, after his death, they were revised and completed by Joannes Reitz, who is normally credited as the author in Japan. Kosaku’s copy, labelled as *Rosia / Mosukuwa Teikoku Kokon Kokkashi*, is in the National Diet Library (although only the second half is extent), where it provided the basis for Maeno Ryotaku’s *Roshia Daitōryakki: Teikiken*.

the second was the 1769 Dutch translation of Hübner's *Geographie* that we have noted above.⁷³

However, these were clearly not the only sources available to him. The end of what became the second part of Kudo's text provides details of those Russians, including Shabalin himself, and the Russianized indigenous inhabitants of the northern Kuril Islands who had come into contact with Matsumae officials and basho merchants in Ezo, describing their appearance and clothing.⁷⁴ Clearly, Kudo was also receiving information that was originating in Ezo itself. This text therefore sought to compare the information being received regarding these Russians being acquired from sources separately available in Nagasaki and Matsumae. Kudo's own close study into the matter was at least partially to clarify the identities of the parties involved. Much of the text is taken up with establishing the location of Kamchatka, and the role of the Russians in ruling it. This is the significance of Iwasaki Naoko's argument that the text should properly be known as the *Kamusasuka Fūsetsu Kō*, after the Dutch pronunciation for Kamchatka.⁷⁵ The general understanding of the text as about the 'Red-barbarians' and the identification of these with the Russians actually works to conceal Kudo's aims within it.⁷⁶

Distinguishing Heisuke's text from that of Hirazawa is that he does not merely sound the alarm regarding the approach of Russia, but draws out the analogy between the process of Russian colonization and how Japan should deal with Ezo. The importance of the identity of these Aka-Ezo is that Kudo was making an argument for Japanese policy in Ezo by analogy with that conducted by the Russians towards them. In Kudo's hands,⁷⁷ the term refers to the natives of the Kamchatka peninsula, who were clearly differentiated from the Russians now ruling over them. The importance he ascribed to outlining this geographical correspondence between the

⁷³ Their arrival is indicative of an increase in the quantity and volume of information arriving in Nagasaki, where "it has been estimated that VOC personnel traded more than 10,000 Europeans volumes during the Edo period, more than half through private trade", see Jianhui *East Asian Information Network*, pp. 63-65.

⁷⁴ Akitsuki *Chishima Rettō wo meguru*, p. 79.

⁷⁵ As Iwasaki argues, part of the reason why this ultimately occurred may have been that the complicated sequence of unfamiliar characters with which 'Kamusasuka' (Kamchatka) was written came to be read as *Aka-Ezo*, for a number of the surviving manuscripts position the two phrases together on the cover, see Iwasaki "Akaezofūsetsukō Saikō", p. 82.

⁷⁶ The slippage is entirely understandable given the tradition of referring to the Dutch using variants of 'Aka Ezo', also based upon Chinese usage, see for example Kawamura *Kinsei Nihon no Sekaizō*, p. 113.

⁷⁷ Akitsuki argues that the name itself derives from the description by Ainu under Russian control of the Russians as 'Red Neighbors', in reference to their scarlet clothing, and this being translated into Japanese as 'Red Ezo'. This may well be the case, but as used by Heisuke the notion of 'Red Ezo' is clearly distinguishable from that of Muscovy or Russia. Akitsuki, *Chishima Rettō wo meguru*.

traders and envoys from the ‘Oroshia’ being reported by the Matsumae and those places like ‘Muscovy’ and ‘Rus’ that were known within Japan is clear from the way that in his second text, which appeared first in the manuscript, he returned to this theme. The early part of the text is therefore also taken up with the establishing the identity and location of places like Kamchatka, Russia and Muscovy and how they related to one another spatially. This strategy of attempting to make information from various sources commensurable does of course characterize texts on Ezo,⁷⁸ but significant in Kudo’s text is how this ‘Orosia’, believed to border ‘Oranda’, has come to annex all the land of Kamsasuka in ‘oku’ (anterior) Ezo.⁷⁹

Heisuke sought to represent this geography on a pair of maps that accompanied two versions of this proposal, which ultimately ended with Matsudaira Sadanobu and Kondō Jūzō. These have, again, been recently recovered by Iwasaki.⁸⁰ On these maps, it is possible to see Kudo wrestling with the problem of making the information he wishes to convey comprehensible. One of them is of the world, focused on the extent of the Russian empire, while the other is a map of the Ezo region. The world map picks out the extent of Russia along the top of the chart, emphasizing that Russia was a powerful country owing to its ever-expanding world trade and its success at sending convicted criminals to open the country.⁸¹ Its authority had spread over the lands of the ‘Red Ezo’ of Kamchatka around the Shōtoku era,⁸² and since that time, it had been moving down the ‘thousand islands’ between ‘Kamusasuka’ and Ezo, undertaking a policy of colonization through spreading “human seeds” onto barren islands.⁸³ The red line encircling and emphasizing the extent of Russia makes clear that its authority had now spread over a number of these islands, including those of ‘Rakko’ and ‘Etorofu’, although not to ‘Kunashiri’.⁸⁴

⁷⁸ See for instance Arai Hakuseki’s *Ezo-shi*, in which he establishes the correspondence between the Dutch ‘Kurunland’ and the Japanese adoption of the indigenous *Kurumise* as the same, and relates the names of islands represented there with Matteo Ricci’s map of the world, in *Ezo-shi*, p. 52.

⁷⁹ Iwasaki “Kamusasuka Fūsetsu Kō”, p. 126 (2). Oku Ezo is difficult to translate, the meaning is something like distant or interior, but that latter sounds strange when referring to a space that incorporated maritime regions

⁸⁰ In her “Jūhasseiki kōki ni okeru Hokuhen-ninshiki no tenkai”, which reproduces the maps in the Matsudaira version, held at Tenri University. Mention of the maps had been made in Satō *Yōgakushi no kenkyū*. Takagi *Kinsei Nihon no Hoppōzu Kenkyū*, p. 90, reproduces the Ezo map from the Kondō version, now at the Tokyo University Historiographical Institute. There is sufficient difference between the two versions to make the conclusions here provisional.

⁸¹ Akaezo fūsetsu kō, *ShinHokkaidōshi*, p. 290.

⁸² 1711-1716, this is a little later than generally claimed. See “Kamusasuka Fūsetsu Kō”, p. 126 (2).

⁸³ Akaezo fūsetsu kō, *ShinHokkaidōshi*, p. 290.

⁸⁴ The map is pl. 22 of *Taichi no Shōzō*.

In addition to this world map, Kudō also reproduced a map of Ezo, which sought to indicate Japanese knowledge of the region. The representation of the main island of Ezo is distinctive, being presumably copied from an existing map. As was common, the area nearest Honshu was filled with a succession of toponyms around the coast, whose density peters out dramatically the further away from Matsumae they are. As with Matsumae Hironaga's map with which we began this chapter, though, it is around this main island of Ezo that the differences to the traditional picture of Ezo become apparent, with a chain of islands now stretching out to the 'Oroshia' lands of Kamchatka, while the island of Karafuto is now attached to the continent. That this representation is based upon information circling at the time is indicated by the fact that the *Matsumae-shi*'s map also appears to represent Karafuto as a peninsula.⁸⁵ Heisuke was seeking to represent the latest geographical information on these maps, which was crucial to his argument for the necessity of responding to this reality of Russian advance. This was supplemented two years later by Heisuke's recommendation that the Japanese colonize Ezo, to not only to stop the Russians, but also in imitation of them. Heisuke argued that a policy of colonizing Ezo would allow Japan to reap the benefits of the island's rich resources. While he was cautious about Russia's intentions, and noted that "We do not know what Benyowsky had in mind when he sailed around Japan surveying our coastline, but we must not ignore the fact that he did so. A detailed inquiry should be made into what happened",⁸⁶ he was open to trading with the Russians in order to learn from them, and particularly its policy of 'benevolence' through which it had won over the natives of Kamchatka, as well as shipwrecked Japanese sailors.⁸⁷ While Heisuke recommended that trade be established to allow for the Russians to be studied more closely,⁸⁸ though, he also reported rumours of a secret trade between the Matsumae and the Russians as already occurring.

In writing his text, Heisuke had sought to bring a number of geographic sources into line with one another, in order to develop is argument for the success of Russian colonialism and the importance of a Japanese response. He had sought to underline this argument through an appeal to the histories and maps of both Russia and Ezo. However, on the map, Heisuke

⁸⁵ Although there is some discrepancy in the surviving images, they appear to all suggest Karafuto's peninsula status.

⁸⁶ Keene *The Japanese Discovery of Europe*, p. 38.

⁸⁷ Through *buiku*, the word which he also used to refer to Russia's policy of Christian proselytization. Akaezo fūsetsu kō, *ShinHokkaidoshi*, p. 290.

⁸⁸ See in particular Akaezo fūsetsu kō, *ShinHokkaidoshi*, p. 285.

proved unable to achieve the same. While the representation of the islands running between 'Aka-Ezo' and the main island of Ezo has been drawn as an abbreviated chain on the Ezo map, emphasizing the closeness of the Russian presence, on the world map they are pictured as a scatter of islands far more familiar from previous Japanese renditions of the region. As such, while much of the text is concerned with the necessity of making information commensurable, this could only be achieved within the text itself. The sheer diversity of visual representations mediated against the possibility of producing one image able to define the territory. While this revised conception of Ezo as a space of potential geopolitical competition emerged on Heisuke's world map, therefore, that which he adopted for Ezo itself remained within a cartographic tradition that sought to abstract the space of Ezo as relating primarily to Japan. While representing a shortage of information regarding Oku-Ezo, this was a tradition which funnelled understanding of Ezo through the Matsumae, as trade routes crossing the region had been. As such, then, it remained problematic to represent the nature of this new threat to the Ezo effectively on the map, in the absence of reliable geographical information about the region.

Repositioning Ezo in Japan's world

Despite allegedly being the author of more than a hundred works, this is the only one of Heisuke's text that survives.⁸⁹ Perhaps unsurprisingly, given its sensitive nature, this one was never printed, but obviously circulated widely in manuscript,⁹⁰ including to the highest levels of government.⁹¹ From the surviving copies, it appears that those versions with the map on were particularly valuable, and possibly used by Heisuke to attempt to influence influential individuals. One man certainly influenced was a fellow scholar of the Sendai domain, an individual by the name of Hayashi Shihei. Shihei's *Sangoku Tsūran Zusetsu* is a famous text, although the extent of its actual influence at the time is more difficult to discern.⁹² It is often

⁸⁹ Ōtomo Kisaku notes Heisuke's output of more than one hundred medical books, of which regrettably none but one withstood time. Ōtomo *Hokumon sōsho*, pp. 17-19.

⁹⁰ Kornicki "Manuscript Not Print".

⁹¹ See Chapter 8.

⁹² Much of its notoriety arises from the later fate of Shihei himself, who in printing his subsequent *Kaikoku Heidan* fell foul of the state's desire for certain topics not to be discussed in the public domain. The printing blocks for *Kaikoku Heidan* were destroyed, and Hayashi himself placed under house arrest in 1791. If anything, this would seem likely to have increased the cachet of his works.

taken as representative of the growing alarm with which the Russian presence was being viewed within the country, forming one part of what has been termed a “Boom in Northern Literature”.⁹³ This is certainly the case, and the looming threat of foreigner’s to Japan’s shores was something which had engaged for a number of number of years. Here, however, the focus will be on the maps produced by Shihei, and what they indicate regarding understandings of Ezo’s place in the world.

A couple of years prior to the circulation of *Sangoku Tsūran Zusetsu*, Hayashi had published another map that also sought to provide a representation of Japan that focused upon its border areas. This was the *Nihon Onkin Gaikoku no Zenzu* (*Complete Map of Foreign Countries Near and Far from Japan*), which focused on the same ‘three countries’ that Shihei referenced in his later work, those of Ezo, Ryūkyū and Chōsen.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, the difference in the representation adopted is marked in comparison with his later map. This early chart is characterized by the adoption of existing maps for these three ‘borderlands’ currently existing in Japan. That of Ezo, for instance, is clearly a version of a map drawn on the basis of those submitted by the Matsumae in the Shōhō and Genroku projects, which represented Ezo primarily as its main island, with a much smaller island of Karafuto to its north and a scattering of *Kurumise* islands to the East. However, what is noticeable in the context of Shihei’s later map is the continuing abstraction of this northern borderland from its surroundings, emphasized on this map in particular through the use of color. Shipping lanes are pictured as running from the Ryukyus to the continent, indicating that the latter’s role as an overseas trade entrepot was both well-known and recognized. By contrast, the area running between Korea and Ezo is only depicted very roughly, with routes limited to that running to Pusan, and a number of lanes circling Ezo itself. The absence of geographical information regarding the area of the world between meant the wider context within which Chōsen and Ezo in particular were situated remains undefined. While transforming the traditional map of Japan by representing these spaces in their entirety, rather than severing them and using them to

⁹³ See Wada’s Introduction to *Keiho Gūhitsu*.

⁹⁴ Recently work has mostly understood the reference to ‘three countries’ literally, as referring to Ryukyu, Korea, Ezo, which appears the intuitive explanation, see Yonemoto *Mapping Early Modern Japan*. However, Takakura notes how the notion also refers to the Buddhist world view associated with the lands of Tenjiku (India), Kara (China), and Japan itself, and used as a shorthand to represent the world as a whole, Takakura *Hokkaido Kochizu Shūsei*, pl. 14, p. 33, 35. Shihei’s title therefore cleverly plays on this ambiguity, given the title can be rendered to approximate Outline of three countries routes or Outline of the world’s routes [to Japan].

“enframe” the map of Japan proper, these borderlands were still abstracted from their surroundings and only constituted in relation to Japan itself.

The impact of Heisuke’s work is visible in the transformation of Shihei’s map of Japan, which has clearly occurred between the drafting of this map and those that would accompany his *Sangoku Tsūran Zusetsu*. In his introduction, Shihei doesn’t mention Heisuke’s work, instead referencing the works of Arai Hakuseki and Sakakura Genjirō and his conversations with a Matsumae guard. Nevertheless, that Shihei made use of Heisuke’s work seems clear, and not just for what appears to be Heisuke’s influence on the Hayashi’s text. The fact is that the representation for Ezo adopted by the two men is virtually identical. So too is the way in which Karafuto, which had largely been represented as an island prior to this, but now begins to be considered as part of the continent. Within a few years, indeed, this is considered as geographic orthodoxy among the political and intellectual circles within which Shihei and Heisuke operated. In 1792, Matsudaira Sadanobu, Tanuma’s replacement as effective head of the government, was recording that “Karafuto’s borders adjoin Manchuria, Santan and Tartary. The idea that Karafuto is a separate island is mistaken, in truth it’s not”. Three years later the Edo scholar and polymath Honda Toshiaki reflected the continuing confusion when he noted that, “The extent of Karafuto is unclear, but it’s obviously an island of considerable extent. It may be bigger than any in our lands, but does it connect to Manchuria?”.⁹⁵ This confusion was being driven by the increasing attention and volume of foreign material arriving in Japan, where neither those maps collected in the *Nieuwe Atlas*, for example,⁹⁶ nor the Russian material being made available to the Matsumae,⁹⁷ showed any indication of an island of Karafuto.

Nevertheless, while the shape of Ezo on his map was the same, Shihei’s geography of the place was somewhat different, with his list of toponyms hewing far closer to that provided by Arai Hakuseki. That is, Shihei sought to place the history of these borderland spaces into a geographic context, one in which they had come to be defined by the However, what Shihei succeeded in doing in this latter text was to attempt to place each of Japan’s borderlands within its geopolitical context. This is emphasized in his work through the use of color, which served to separate off Japan from each of its frontier regions. This bounding and marking of

⁹⁵ Fujita Kinsei *kōki seijishi to taigai kankei*.

⁹⁶ Delisle’s *Atlas Nouveau*, the Dutch translation of which had arrived in Nagasaki.

⁹⁷ See the beginning of Chapter 8.

space with color allows for the delimitation of what is internal to the state and what is beyond it, and consequently this construction of the world as divided into state territory is not merely reflected on the map, but in important ways constructed by this representation.⁹⁸ The colour separation on these maps suggests that Hayashi saw the northern limits of Japan as stopping at the edge of the Wajinchi. Yet these areas were not merely outside of Japan, for he criticized Nagakubo Sekisui for not showing the full borders of the country in his maps,⁹⁹ thus implying that the notion of border he sought was in line with that of a buffer between Japan and the outside world, one indeed, in accord with the Matsumae's traditional role.

It is important to note this division is in the context of the argument that Hayashi is making; the necessity of the Bakufu advancing into this territory.¹⁰⁰ As he notes, "The country of Ezo has no one who could be called king, no one who could be called Daimyo...No one can be called lord of Ezo",¹⁰¹ and therefore that Bakufu needs to advance into the area to forestall the Russians. This assertion that 'Ezo country' lacks a 'lord' is not one the Matsumae would have shared, having been confirmed as 'Lord of Ezo Isle' as early as 1590. This view, though, of the *ezo* as a territorially distinct area inhabited by a different people has become standard, as can be seen in the work of Furukawa Koshokan, who heavily criticized Hayashi¹⁰² and ridiculed his concern regarding the Russian threat. Despite emphasizing the military preparedness of the Matsumae to defend the Ezochi, however, he noted that "At present the territory called *ezo* is certainly not under the Matsumae's control, and the island has no lord".¹⁰³ Koshokan too ends up dividing his territory by color between areas of residence of 'Wajin' and 'Ezo', and in doing so, appears to represent a division between commentators on the nature of the correct response to this Russia threat.

Like Shihei, subsequent authors largely understood this threat along the terms laid down by Kudo. For instance, after reading Heisuke's proposal Aizawa Seishisei wrote in 1801, "When the Russian barbarians took over Siberia, it was a vast wasteland with few inhabitants. That is

⁹⁸ Biggs. "Putting the State on the Map".

⁹⁹ See Toby "Kinseiki no 'Nihonzu' to 'Nihon' no Kyōkai," p.95

¹⁰⁰ For example, recently in Kikuchi Ezo-ga-chishima to Hoppō Sekai., p. 79.

¹⁰¹ 「蝦夷國に王と云者もなく、大名と云者もなし...然るときは誰蝦夷國の主と云事もなし」

¹⁰² On his map, quoted Takagi Kinsei Nihon no Hoppōzu Kenkyū, p. 27

¹⁰³ 「今世にいゝ蝦夷の地は必ず松前候の支配あるにもあらず、島の主もなし」. Furukawa's map accompanied his record of the 1788 Shogunal expedition to Matsumae, *Tōyū Zakki* 東遊雜記 (Record of a Journey to the East).

why they settled many people there and turned the area into a prosperous territory. One of the keys to their success in this undertaking was the large numbers of prisoners they dispatched to Siberia as settlers." He went on to argue that, "In order to acquire all of Ezo, [the Russians] first wanted to employ trade as a pretext for surveying conditions there and determining whether an immediate takeover was possible. That was there motive for wanting to establish trade relations with the bakufu, and this is why they minutely survey the geography of our Divine Realm."¹⁰⁴ That is, the connection between territorial desires and geographical knowledge was well established. The result was to relativize the territory of the Ezochi, through which it re-emerged as a political space open to contestation both in the territory itself, and at locations far removed from its borders.

¹⁰⁴ *Chishima ibun*, translation by Bob Wakabayashi, 1986, p. 79, 83. That Heisuke's text was widely known is clear from the number of author's who draw upon it. These include the works on Russia of Katsuragawa Hoshū (*Roshia-ki* (1793), *Hyōmin goran no ki* (1793), and *Hokusa bunryaku* (1794)) and Ôtsuki Gentaku (*Kankai ibun* (1810)). Honda Toshiaki writes almost identically what Heisuke stated about *Oroshiya* in *Ezo shûi* (Ezo Miscellany, 1789). Further, Honda Toshiaki draws on Heisuke's proposal in *Seiki monogatari* 1798 and *Keisei hisaku* 1798. Miura Baien cites from the work in his *Kisanroku* 帰山錄. Ôtomo Hokumon *sôsho*, p. 15, 47-48.

8. BORDERING EZO

Recognition of the appearance and threat of Russia resulted in a reconceptualization of Ezo's geography. This had resulted from not just an awareness of the proximity of Russia to Ezo, but also an understanding of Ezo as existing within a global space, one where the "the waters flowing under Nihonbashi in Edo and the waters in the rivers of China and Holland are one stream without any barrier".¹ This new awareness of global connections, and the relation of these connections to Ezo, saw a renewed attention to the question of borders in the region.² As earlier chapters have shown, the border that had mattered for the Matsumae was that between the area under their direct administration and Ezo, which worked to justify the structure of their own local administration. The Matsumae had consequently never shown much interest in the outer limits of this Ezo space. Yet this space now appeared to be under threat, accentuating the absence of knowledge felt by both the Matsumae and the central government. This absence of knowledge worked to make the segmented frontier strategy of the Tokugawa redundant, for the "ontological insecurity" engendered by the Russian approach meant that management of this frontier could no longer be outsourced by the Tokugawa. The result was the state's direct involvement in the bordering of this Ezo space, one which occurred not only in distant Edo, but through the circulation and administration imposed in this disputed territory itself. It was this process of materializing the state's maps on the ground that created the conditions for a re-articulation of Japan's Ezo in the world.

The involvement of the central state also strengthened the connections between Nagasaki and Ezo, as shown in the person of Kondō Jūzō. Following Kondō's career, this chapter will conclude by highlighting how his effort to discern the borders of Ezo through making geographic knowledge from a vast number of sources commensurable worked to reposition Japan's Ezo on the global map. The next chapter will then detail how two subsequent investigations would look to fix this new geography in place.

¹ Hayashi Shihei, *Kaikoku heidan*.

² As was also shown by Shizuki Tadao, who was quoted in the Introduction to Part 2.

From frontier policy to frontier policy

Much recent Japanese scholarship has pushed back the crucial moment of European encounter from the arrival of Perry in the 1850s to an earlier period in which there developed an increasing awareness of European, and most particularly Russian, imperial expansion, which has been dated to the end of the eighteenth century. This is in many respects a revival of an earlier tradition of scholarship that focused on the importance of Japan's defence of its northern frontiers,³ but one which now seeks to situate this 'transformation' within the context of Japan's position within the Early Modern East Asian system.⁴ This trend emphasizes the last two decades of the eighteenth century as being transformational in terms of Japan's Foreign Policy.⁵ While an earlier period of foreign engagement at the outset of Tokugawa rule had sought to situate them within an East Asian diplomatic order,⁶ it was only during this time that earlier ad hoc developments in Japan's arrangements for dealing with foreign countries came to be brought together as a system for foreign relations. Associated particularly with the person of Matsudaira Sadanobu, relations with overseas countries came to be reinterpreted as subject to the 'ancestral laws' of the Tokugawa, which justified the Tokugawa's refusal of Russian requests for trade.⁷

In considering this revisionist interpretation as a whole, such a perspective appears to have much in common with Matthew Mosca's recent reformulation of the eighteenth and nineteenth century worldview of the Qing as moving from "frontier policy to foreign policy". The former refers to the perception of the empire as consisting of a collection of discrete frontier areas, to which regionally-specific strategies were appropriate in order to flexibly govern these diverse borderlands. By the Opium War, this had transformed into a "single hierarchy of interests framed in reference to a unified outside world".⁸ This change was not only driven by external threats, but a change in the empire's information order, which was

³ "In a speech in 1916, Count Okuma, then premier of Japan, gave credit to Rezanov for opening Japan, saying that it had been the Russians and not Perry who opened the ports", Harrison *Japan's Northern Frontier*, p. 23 n. 37.

⁴ See for instance, Chapter 3 above.

⁵ See on this Iwasaki "Sekai-ninshiki no Tenkan" in particular.

⁶ See particularly Arano "The Formation of a Japanocentric World Order"; Toby "Reopening the Question of Sakoku".

⁷ Fujita, *Kinsei kōki seijishi to taigai kansei*.

⁸ Mosca *From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy*, p. 3.

increasingly contributed to and dominated by private scholars. The end of Qing expansion in 1750 saw the emergence of an increasingly entrenched and sclerotic bureaucracy with a vested interest in maintaining peaceful borderlands,⁹ for “to acknowledge a problem meant proposing a solution and becoming responsible for its implementation.”¹⁰ By contrast, private scholars were men on the margins of the imperial system who were not constrained by self-interest, indeed the reverse, from memorializing on the necessity of responding to threats to the Qing. Their belief in the need to do so was fostered by the increasing circulation of maps and written sources that served to gradually shift ideologically-entrenched worldviews. The previous chapter has indicated the effectiveness of this increased circulation of material in enabling individuals to reformulate their worldview, and is a process that clearly resulted in a new awareness of the space of the world and how it potentially related to Japanese territory.

As the same time, however, Mosca’s transformation takes place entirely at the level of an intellectual transformation, which is held to have transformed the worldviews held by those high in the Qing administration. While this may be so, it seems at least worth asking what impression this newly-globalized sense of space had in the frontier zones themselves. Did this transform such bordering and mapping processes as were occurring in these regions, and in what ways, is the question that this chapter will seek to begin to take the first steps to resolving.

That there was a connection between this new knowledge of Russia and the manner in which the world was conceived has been amply shown, but it also had an effect back in Matsumae. Poor old Matsumae Hironaga, already left bemused on the map, was also tasked with explaining how the Matsumae were to justify his domains involvement in what was clearly a foreign trade. This led to him putting forward the ingenious explanation that the Russian goods which arrived in Matsumae from the north were identical with Dutch goods, “naturally enough, when we consider that the kingdom of Muscovy lies to the east of Holland”, and were therefore permissible imports.¹¹ While an amusing enough tale, it is also significant for indicating the disorientation that this geographical transformation in the Ezochi was inducing. It was in an effort to resolve this confusion, ultimately, that the Tokugawa government resolved to send their own investigation to Ezo in order to assess what was occurring in its

⁹ Perdue, *China Marches West*, pp. 547-51.

¹⁰ Mosca *From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy*, p. 13.

¹¹ *Matsumae-shi*, p. 103.

increasingly ill-defined northern frontier. This decision was at least partially driven by the speculation among the “salons” of early modern Japan,¹² and more specifically, through the influence Heisuke’s text upon those circles.

In 1784, Kudo Heisuke’s *Kamusasuka Fūsetsu Kō* came into the possession of the *Kanjō bugyō* (finance officer), Matsumoto Hidemochi, who submitted it to the head of the government, Tanuma Okitsugu, the following year together with a request to develop Ezo. The text was well-received by Tanuma, at least partly because it fell within the tradition of government of the time. Although Heisuke presented Russia’s strategy of sending criminals out as colonists as central to its ability to conquer vast tracts of the world, this was not a strategy without domestic analogies. Several years before, Okitsugu had ordered the homeless around Edo to be shipped off to work in the silver mines on Sado Island.¹³ Ideas of ‘opening the country’, meanwhile, had been central to the development of new areas for agriculture on Honshu, while the export of farming to Ezo had already been proposed.¹⁴ That there was perceived to be something of a natural synergy between the two strands of developmental thought, the removal of non-desirables and their deployment on behalf of the state, is clear from the order subsequently issued by Matsumoto, on Tanuma’s behalf, to Danzaemon, the head of the Kanto Eta.¹⁵ This Russian strategy of transforming an uncultivated and barbarian land into a productive part of the state through the agency of the forced colonization was one that resonated in Japan as a threat, in part because it accorded with trends within their own political system.

The combination of Heisuke’s text and Matsumoto’s urgings had the desired effect, with the dispatch of what became known as the Tenmei expedition to explore the Ezo region in the second month of the same year, 1785. Arriving in Matsumae a month later, the five senior and five junior officials that made up the expedition were joined by Matsumae officials, translators and doctors, and divided into two parties. The eastern one headed along the southern coast of Ezo to investigate trading posts out in the east, and crossed over to Kunashiri, while in the West, members of the expedition crossed over to Karafuto. One member, Sadō Genrokurō, left

¹² Nakamura, *Kenkado no salon*; Ikegami *Bonds of civility*.

¹³ Botsman, “Punishment and Power in the Tokugawa Period”, p. 22.

¹⁴ As seen in Chapter 6. Heisuke also proposed developing new gold mines on Ezo, again slotting within existing developmental paradigms.

¹⁵ For more on Danzaemon’s role and relations with the state, see Howell *Geographies of Identity in Nineteenth Century Japan*.

this party and circumnavigated round the northern part of Ezo's main island, meeting up with the eastern party in Akkeshi. This was the first record of a circumnavigation of the island by a Japanese since 1636. As maps of the Matsumae have shown, the geography of outer Ezo had remained a mystery until this period.

Due to the lateness of the year, however, both the eastern and western parties failed in their efforts to discern and examine the boundaries of the Ezo region. Consequently, the next year saw a further effort to establish these borders in both the east of Ezo and the interior of Karafuto. A party consisting of Yamaguchi Tetsujirō, Aojima Shunzō and Mogami Tokunai crossed over to Etorofu, where they met with three Russians who had been abandoned on Urup following a disagreement with their countrymen. Almost starving, they had been rescued by Ainu from the settlement of and brought back there. One of these in particular, an Izuriov, was clearly well-learned and a valuable source of information on geography and surveying.¹⁶ The men allegedly repeatedly asked for Japanese help in being repatriated through Nagasaki, although they ultimately headed north from Urup in an Ainu vessel. Mogami also crossed over to Urup, almost certainly the first Japanese to do so. On Karafuto, meanwhile, Ōishi Ippei had succeeded in proceeding as far north as Kushunnai, and received information on the continent from both Ainu inhabitants and traders crossing from Santan on the geography of the region.¹⁷ Near the village of Nayoro, the locals sought to explain this geography through drawing simple maps on the sand, which they would do again a year later at Kushunnai in providing information to the expedition of Laperouse.¹⁸

As the originator of the expedition, Okitsugu, was removed from power in the twelfth month of 1786, the apparent aim behind the launching of the expedition, the agricultural settlement of Ezo, was not pursued. However, its results were available as the *Ezochi Ikken* and the *Ezo Shūi*, which provided a wealth of information on the region to those in Edo. As well as offering textual descriptions of the routes taken by survey teams and the region's geography, the mission also produced its own map of the region. This significantly transformed the image of the region, squashing the main island of Ezo into the shape of a "hatching beetle larvae"¹⁹ and

¹⁶ Akitsuki *Nihon Hoppen Tanken*, p. 150.

¹⁷ Takagi Kinsei *Nihon no Hoppōzu Kenkyū*, p. 103.

¹⁸ Akitsuki *Nihon Hoppen Tanken*, p. 151. The nature of the maps is not recorded, although we do possess some native maps from later expeditions, see Unno *Chizu ni miru Nihon*, p. 180-181. On Laperouse, see below.

¹⁹ "Shima no katachi ha yago no masa ni tonpo ni kasen suru ni niitari" is the description offered in the actual text of the *Ezochi Shūi*. Terui *Tenmei Ezo Tanken Shimatsuki*, p. 329.

seeking to incorporate the entire island chain of the Kurils on Ezo's map. This sought to represent the relation between the main island of Ezo and that of Kamchatka in a manner which retained its central focus on Ezo as a region, one which sprawled beyond the traditional focus on the island the southern tip of which the Matsumae occupied. Attached to the text of the *Ezo Shūi*, the map incorporated blocks of text drawn from that manuscript, and thus serve to provide an outline of not just the region's geography, but the expedition itself. The representation of the Kurils out to Kamchatka is thought based on Iziuriov's information, and the map as a whole is significant for offering a vision of Ezo that retains its position at the mouth of the Okhotsk Sea, but brings its terrestrial shape into something like alignment with reality.

The interest in the subject of Ezo is shown by the fact that within two years, the representation on this map of Ezo had appeared on a world map of Nagakubo Sekisui, while another two years later saw Sekisui bring out a map of Ezo that reproduced the bottom-left section of the above chart as a stand-alone map (*Figure 20*).²⁰ However, while this expedition did serve to map out the Ezochi, it was also, in some respects, operating within a pre-determined environment. This is visible in the work of Mogami Tokunai, who noted that while all the Kuril Islands "were within our country", the Russians had by now so thoroughly gained control of the Upper Kuril's that the island's would not obey Japan anymore, and that if nothing was done then more Russians would "come to occupy Japan's islands year by year".²¹ He was influenced by the same arguments as were being put forward in Hubner's text, concluding in the *EzoSōshi* that while in Eastern Ezo the islands under Matsumae rule had been inhabited by Ezo under Japanese influence, and thus were within the borders of Japan. However, with the coming of these Aka-Ezo in recent years, they have taken over 21 islands and although they belonged to our country, have been nurturing the population, introducing religion, extracting resources and sending them home, bringing these 21 islands under their tax system.

By 1790, maps of the region had come to incorporate the Russian discoveries of Bering and others, leading to a situation in which political positions found reflection upon the shading used on the map. Perhaps the most interesting map was that by the returning Russian castaway, Kodayu, who was returned by Adam Laxman when the latter arrived and wintered in

²⁰ Unno "Cartography in Japan", p. 446.

²¹ Mogami Tokunai's "Beppon Akaezo Fūsetsu Kō", quoted in Koller "Tenmei nenkan no Bakufu ni yoru Chishima tanken", p. 15.

Nemuro in 1792 in order to request an opening of trade relations between Russia and Japan. The map produced by Kodayu offers the illusion of a stark contrast between the territorial fixity represented by the Matsumae's administration, as well as its rule over Ezochi, as well as the openness of the rest of space, defined not through fixed blocks of territory, in the case of Siberia, but rather the tracks of movement over the surface. Nevertheless, given the continuing prevalence of movement within the Ezochi itself, such an image appears to represent more of an aspirational claim for the fixity of Japanese control than a true reflection of the situation in the region (*Figure 20*). The actual borders of the Ezo that mattered continued to be played out within Ezo territory itself.

Charting Ezo

While Hübner's *Geography* had appeared to grant definition to Ezo, associating it with the Japanese name for a people resident on the four islands north of Japan, it did not entirely resolve the question of the region's geography. This was partly because these Russian maps failed to account for the surveys conducted by Vries, with the various reports of this voyage being widely circulated in the literature. Consequently, the question of Jeso, and particularly its relation to the coast of Tartary, continued to be an area considered in need of exploration. In the latter half of the eighteenth century, the voyages of Cook encouraged the belief that the entirety of the world could be brought within the orbit of human comprehension. Cook himself never ventured into the northwest Pacific, but following his death, his Captains were ultimately granted permission to "return to England, by whatever route he should think best for the farther improvement of geography". While it was agreed that "to navigate the sea between Japan and Asia...would...afford the largest field for discovery", this was ultimately rejected due to the condition of the ships, which would instead "run along the Kuriles, and examine more particularly the islands that lie nearest the northern coast of Japan, which are represented as of a considerable size, and independent of the Russian and Japanese governments". However, the definition provided for the Asian coast on this chart, the 1785 'General Chart of Cooks Voyages' by Henry Roberts, was the result of an exchange of material that had occurred during the course of Cook's third voyage. According to the introduction to the account of this voyage, the representation of the coast of Asia was on the basis of "a

Russian MS chart”²² which had been acquired by the expedition from an Ismayloff during a three-week stay on “Oonalashka” (Unalaska in the Aleutians) in 1778.²³ The image produced on the basis of this Russian MS chart was to define the land at the outset of subsequent voyages.

Even before this new image of the world had been digested, however, and the demands of scientific rivalry and inter-imperial competition necessitated the dispatch of a different voyage. This one was the French mission of Comte de Lapérouse, who was a great admirer of Cook and modelled his own expedition on the latter. In his instructions, Lapérouse was told that “He is to coast along and examine all the Kurile Islands, the north-east the east, and the south of Japan ... He is to pass the Strait of Tessooy, and visit the lands known by the name of Yesso, and that which the Dutch call Staten Lan, and the Russians the Isle of Nadezda, of which we have no certain information. He will now finish his survey of the Kurile Islands....”.²⁴ The perceived need for knowledge about this Ezo region was not, therefore being felt only in Japan, but became caught up within that period of European history associated with the voyages of discover.

The latter half of the eighteenth century are frequently seen as having witnessed the triumph of a positive geography, and an end to such geographic arbitrariness. The voyages of discovery undertaken by the likes of Cook, Lapérouse and Broughton have served as both examples and metaphors of “science in action”. In Bruno Latour’s famous formulation this French expedition led by Lapérouse would land on Sakhalin and be told by the natives they encountered there that Sakhalin was, indeed, an island.²⁵ This information was able to be communicated to Lapérouse through drawings made both on the sand and on paper. Despite the subsequent loss of the expedition, Lapérouse had fortunately conveyed this information back to the expedition’s center of calculation at Paris through “immutable mobiles” carried by his interpreter across Russia. The incorporation of the information contained on these mobiles within contemporary scientific knowledge enabled subsequent expeditions to the region to travel with a more accurate picture of the territory to be encountered than that possessed by

²² Cook and King *A voyage to the Pacific ocean*, lxxxii.

²³ Kippis *The Life Of Captain James Cook*, p. 226. This was a Gerasim Gregorievich Izmailov, who many years earlier had been left on one of the Kuril Islands by the Hungarian adventurer Benyowsky, during the latter’s escape from Kamchatka. See Akitsuki *Nihon Hoppen Tanken*, p. 172.

²⁴ “Preliminary Instructions for Lapérouse”, in La Pérouse *The voyage of La Pérouse round the world*, lvii-lviii

²⁵ Latour *Science in Action*, p.216.

earlier explorers. The moment at which Sakhalin is shown to be insular is able to be communicated to Europe and thus able to be represented on all future maps made of the area (Figure 21).

Latour's account offers a brilliant exposition of the moment at which a specific piece of information was communicated, represented in immutable yet mobile form, returned to Europe and subsequently disseminated through a variety of channels as scientific knowledge, but overstates the centrality of this moment on the shores of de Langle Bay, in part because of the drama inherent in the manner in which two distinct modes of geographical consciousness come into contact on the beaches of Sakhalin itself. As the example of Cook's two maps above indicates, enlightened geography was not necessarily able to proceed through the simple accumulation of additional knowledge on the same map, and its acceptance and re(-)presentation continued to occur in arbitrary fashion. Latour's "center of calculation" is too totalizing a metaphor, standing outside the way the production of scientific and geographic knowledge was actually practiced. There was never one moment at which Sakhalin became an island in the manner implied by Latour's use of this encounter.

While Laperouse's encounters were limited to the indigenous populations of Sakhalin Island, missing as he did the Tenmei Expedition by a year, this would not be the case with the next explorer to grace the area. In October 1793, William Robert Broughton was granted command of HMS *Providence*, and instructed to proceed to the west coast of North America to re-join the expedition of George Vancouver. Broughton was in fact retracing his steps, having served as the commander of a brig, the *Chatham*, which had accompanied Vancouver's *Discovery* on the latter's voyage to the American northwest. Vancouver's mission had been twofold; to accurately chart the northwest coast of the continent while also overseeing the First Nootka Sound Convention that had been signed between Britain and Spain in 1790. Having arrived in early 1792, Vancouver's negotiations with his Spanish counterpart had stalled, and Broughton had been despatched back to Britain for further instructions at the end of that year.²⁶

Putting in at Rio de Janeiro, Tasmania, Tahiti, and Hawai'i, Broughton made it back to Nootka Sound by March 1796, and found that Vancouver had long since departed. Anticipating correctly that Vancouver would already have surveyed the south-eastern part of South America, Broughton instead resolved to turn his attention to the coast of Asia, the survey of

²⁶ Clayton "On the Colonial Genealogy of George Vancouver's Chart", p. 330-337.

which he believed to remain as yet “unfinished”. Noting how “[The Providence’s officers concurred] to survey the coast of Asia, commencing at the island of Sakhalin”, his “intention was also to complete the survey of the adjacent islands, viz. the Kuriles, and those of Jeso and Japan, left unfinished in Captain Cook’s last voyage”.²⁷

Broughton sailed into ‘Endermo Bay’ on 15 September of that year and remained there for two weeks, provisioning and repairing his ship, and seeking to open lines of communication with both the “natives” and Japanese²⁸. On 1 October he rounded Erimo-Misaki and headed towards the Kuril Islands, reaching them four days later and sailing among them until the 18, before heading south and then west in order to strike the east coast of Japan just north of Edo (modern Tokyo). Sailing through the Ryukyu Islands and wintering in Macao, he returned to the Ryukyus, where the Providence was wrecked on a reef near the Miyako Islands on 17 May 1797. Having fortunately acquired a 35-man tender while in Macao, he subsequently proceeded up the east coast of Japan in the smaller vessel and returned to the harbor at ‘Endermo’ on 12 August 1797. Once again provisioning and refitting here, the tender weighed anchor on the 21 and left the bay on the 23. After plying back and forth for several days, waiting for the wind, he passed through the “Straits of Sangaar”, separating the main island of Japan from that of ‘Insu’, on 29 August 1797, passing the Japanese town of Matsumae on the 30.

Under the, as we shall see, mistaken impression that he was the first European in these waters, Broughton charted the west coast of the main island of “Insu” before continuing north to the “extensive island north of Insoo” (Broughton 1804: 291) on 8 September. By September 11, Broughton was struggling to “reconcile the extent of this land with the island, North of Insoo in the Japanese chart”.²⁹ Three days later he was convinced that “the extent of this land was much greater than we could suppose the Japanese island to be, as laid down in their chart”.³⁰ On September 16, having been halted in a bay, Broughton confirmed to his satisfaction that there was no passage to the sea to the north, and began to run south down the opposite coast, exiting what his chart would subsequently term the “Gulf of Tartary” on 23 September of that month, and reaching the island of Tsushima, between Japan and Korea, on

²⁷ Broughton *A voyage of discovery to the North Pacific Ocean*, p. 65.

²⁸ Broughton *A voyage of discovery to the North Pacific Ocean*, p. 96.

²⁹ Broughton *A voyage of discovery to the North Pacific Ocean*, p. 295.

³⁰ Broughton *A voyage of discovery to the North Pacific Ocean*, p. 299.

12 October. After provisioning at the Korean port of Pusan and exploring the islands off the south-western coast of Korea, he returned to Macau via the Ryukyus and Taiwan on 27 November.

As this account of his voyage shows, Broughton's aim was to "finish" that which Cook had not, the charting of lands at the eastern end of Asia. According to the account of Broughton's voyage, what he had accomplished was a survey of not just the "eastern coast of Tartary", but also that "of Chica, Jesso or Insu", an island that was certainly "an object of curiosity to Europeans".³¹ This object was a semantically slippery one, for having resolved to survey "Jeso", Broughton subsequently found himself referring to the territory in question by an alternative designation. On his approach to "Volcano Bay", he had questioned three boats of fishermen, who indicated that "Matsmai" was located to the west and that they called "their own land *Insu*".³² In his account, Broughton correctly noted that this was the "famous land of Jeso", but as the quotations above indicate, in general continued to utilize this new moniker of *Insu/Insoo* in the remainder of his account, adding another possible designation to a list that included "Jesso, Matsumay, or Matmay, and Chica".³³ The following year Broughton felt he had received some clarification when he returned to Endermo and came to understand that this was the name of the island utilized by its inhabitants.

The linguistic mapping being practiced here by Broughton, through seeking to understand the geographical designations adopted by the various inhabitants of the region being 'discovered', was in accord with the drawing of "lines of commensurability" highlighted by Michel Bravo³⁴. This "ethnonavigation" was utilized in order to discern the geographical identity of a given territory. Nevertheless, such a process was depended upon an image of territory which could be subsequently rewritten in accordance with the "geographic gifts" granted in the course of these "orchestrated encounters" with native peoples. The development of such a map, and role of exchange within it, were essential to Broughton's ability to seek the 'discovery' of this 'ill-defined' stretch of Asian coastline.

This was reflected in the maps of the region with which Broughton himself travelled. Departing without knowledge of Laperouse's expedition, In the margins of his journal, he noted on

³¹ Broughton *A voyage of discovery to the North Pacific Ocean*, p. vii.

³² Broughton *A voyage of discovery to the North Pacific Ocean*, p. 89.

³³ Kruszenstern *Voyage round the world*, Vol. 2, p. 49.

³⁴ Bravo "Ethnographic Navigation and the Geographical Gift", pp. 217-226.

approaching the coast that “we had no account relating to these parts excepting Cooke’s 3d voyage & general chart, in which Matsmai is laid down as an island North of Japan, which we suppose this to be”.³⁵ As already noted, however, one of the primary motivations for Broughton’s fixation with this stretch of the “coast of Asia, from the latitude of 35° north to the latitude of 52° north” was that it had not been surveyed by Cook, and consequently remained “ill-defined”. The vision of these islands north of Japan which Broughton carried to Asia with him was one that had already been written through a process of cartographic exchange that had occurred in the extremes of the northern Pacific. This created an image of Japan’s north where the “Islands of Jeso” immediately above the main Japanese island gave way to the Kuril Islands stretching away towards Kamchatka (*Figure 22*).

Lacking knowledge of Le Perouse’s expedition when he departed, Broughton independently arrived at the conclusion that Sakhalin was in fact an extension of the Asian continent, and represented it as such on the map that he produced to accompany his account of the expedition.³⁶ Nevertheless, the preface to that account, presumably written by the editor, Broughton’s brother, with Broughton’s consent, accepted that Sakhalin was, as Lapérouse claimed, an island. The author hoped that “their separate surveys will mutually correct the errors relative to these two islands [meaning ‘Sagaleen’ and ‘Jesso’], which have been laid down with such little attention to accuracy in former maps of the world”.³⁷ Different geographical representations could be “inscribed” within the same text and what is therefore disseminated is not the “immutable” representation of territory argued for by Latour’s theory, but an abstracted image that is dependent upon a process of selection. Several years later, the published account of Captain Broughton’s voyage was drawn upon by Krusenstern in order to prove that “my ideas upon the junction of Sachalin with Tartary were perfectly well founded”,³⁸ while in the 1820’s, Paris and Europe’s foremost Orientalist, Julius Klaproth, was

³⁵ Gould 2011: xli

³⁶ In his application of Latour’s notions to the Japanese expedition of Mamiya Rinzō, Brett Walker asserts that Broughton was seeing Sakhalin a “second time” (Walker 2007: 294), but it seems unlikely that this was the case. Barry Gough concludes that “[d]etails of [la Perouse’s] geographic discoveries, which had been sent back to Paris in September 1787 from Petropavlovsk, were apparently not known to Broughton, though if they were (and it seems unlikely) Broughton gives no hints” (Gough “Introduction”: xxii).

³⁷ Broughton *A voyage of discovery to the North Pacific Ocean*, p. vii.

³⁸ Kruszenstern *Voyage round the world*, Vol. 2, p. 182

lambasting Arrowsmith's 1822 map of an insular Sakhalin as indicating its maker was "the most ignorant of those whose occupation is cartography".³⁹

As these emblematic voyages were themselves resulting in knowledge itself somewhat 'ill-defined', it is impossible to make a clear distinction between maps drawn on the basis of 'positive' as opposed to 'speculative' geographical knowledge. There is no dividing line whereby modes of representation suddenly became 'scientific' and 'accurate'. One reason for this, as the above highlights, was because of the varied individuals and institutions involved in attempting to bring these territories onto the map, the collective products of which could confuse, rather than stabilize, representations of parts of the globe. A second, however, is the assumption, obvious in Latour's account, ascribing the incorporation of geographic knowledge as only occurring at one "center", identified with here with Paris, and more generally Europe. Yet the presentation of the cartography of these voyages as "an empirical, objective and unproblematic science concerned only with the presentation of geographic information"⁴⁰ assumes its maps as resting on the claims to science made by its producers, rather than in the shifting sources of knowledge out of which that geographic information was formed.

Exchanging territory

Bravo's article was written as a response to Latour's *Science in Action*, and particularly on Latour's understanding of how facts are surveyed in the field before being accumulated and abstracted in the metropole, those "centers of calculation". As Bravo explains, the focus on the "cartographic trace" as a material resource ignores the importance of other modes of communication utilized in the field, "spoken, verbal utterances, a broken conversation, intermittent references to a vocabulary list, the imaginative use of body gestures".⁴¹ Latour's focus on the "gesture of the native mapmaker" obscures the broader regional political framework within which this gesture is granted meaning. For Bravo, such gestures can only be understood as "cross-cultural productions" of knowledge.⁴² Although the means through which Rinzō induced his reception of the "geographical gifts" of Sakhalin's inhabitants remain

³⁹ Stephen 1971: 35

⁴⁰ Edney notes this is what Harley calls the "illusion of cartographic mimesis" and Wood and Fels the "cartographic myth". Edney 1994: 101.

⁴¹ Bravo "Ethnographic Navigation and the Geographical Gift", p. 229.

⁴² Bravo "Ethnographic Navigation and the Geographical Gift", p. 231.

obscure, his insight into the different names granted to the same locations by different ethnic groups is a paradigmatic example of establishing the mutual positions of different ethnic and linguistic groups in order to develop a “statement of commensurability” between them.⁴³ The linguistic mapping being practiced here by Rinzō, through seeking to understand the geographical designations adopted by the various inhabitants of the region, accords with the drawing of ‘lines of commensurability’ that characterized the earlier expedition of Lapérouse.

On 25 September, at anchor in Endermo Harbour,⁴⁴ Broughton noted how “In the morning we were visited by a new party of Japanese, superior to the others in dress, and equally so in behaviour. We derived not only pleasure, but information also, from their society...They permitted me to copy a large chart of the islands to the North of Japan, and promised to bring me one of their own doing the next day”.⁴⁵ The *Providence*, a 420-ton sloop of 16 guns with a full complement of 115 men, had just sailed across the Pacific and up the coast of the main island of Japan with the specific aim of charting those “islands to the North of Japan” represented on the chart that Broughton was permitted to copy. What Broughton was embarked upon in the *Providence* was a voyage of discovery, one that promised to “open new sources of knowledge and trade” (Broughton 1804: iii). The area which Broughton was intent on ‘discovering’ was one widely considered to still be unsatisfactorily represented upon European charts. Broughton’s voyage was self-consciously conducted in the image of Cook, and the fact that the area around the Okhotsk Sea had remained uncharted by the latter in the course of his explorations added to the allure of the region for Broughton himself (on the wider background to British interest in Japan, see King 2010). Broughton’s voyage of discovery should be perceived as both following in well-worn tracks and entering uncharted waters.

Among the officials that Broughton encountered while moored in “Endermo Bay” during September 1796 was the Matsumae official Kato Kengo. The eldest son of a clan retainer born in 1762, Kato had entered the Shogunal Academy in 1785 and then served as a physician for the Matsumae in Ezo. He was already considered something of a diplomat, having been in the party that had met with Adam Laxman when the Russian envoy has sailed down the Kuril Island chain and wintered over in Nemuro four years earlier in 1792, requesting the opening of

⁴³ This would all apply even if Mamiya had proved entirely mistaken in his explanation, he would nevertheless have provided the “inscriptions” required for Takahashi’s map. This will be clarified below.

⁴⁴ Known today as Muroran in Hokkaido

⁴⁵ Broughton *A voyage of discovery to the North Pacific Ocean*, p. 100-1

Japan to trade. The “large chart of the islands to the north of Japan” to which Broughton refers is almost certainly a version of a map known as ‘Matsumae Chizu’. The map in question was one that Kato had first drawn in 1791, and of which numerous versions were made over subsequent years, with over 70 manuscript maps based on this design known to be in existence in Japan today. Kato had already handed a version of this map over to that Russian expedition, and now took advantage of his being sent to deal with the troublesome arrival of another group of foreigners to once again display his knowledge of the islands. He apparently made quite the impression on the visitors, as when Broughton was returning to Volcano Bay in a much smaller vessel in the summer of 1797, after having wrecked the *Providence* on a reef in the Ryukyus in May, word reached the Matsumae that the English had been asking whether “Kato was well?”, resulting in the clan once again despatching him to deal with these unwanted yet knowledgeable guests.⁴⁶

In seeking to definitively chart the lie of the land for the curiosity of the nascent geographers and astronomers of European capitals, Broughton ran into the presence of Japanese upon these islands, who were similarly exercised by questions of trade and discovery as they sought to clarify the geographical outline of this space north of Japan proper. The cartographic exchange that surrounded the meeting of two individuals, William Broughton and Kato Kengo, at this harbour of Endermo highlights how the “horizon of possibilities” represented on their maps had come to be developed. Broughton noted that, “I acquired from him a very compleat map of the Japanese islands, with strong injunctions not to acknowledge from whom I procured it; as they explained the parting with it would bring them into disgrace and punishment, were it known”.⁴⁷ The representation Kato offered of these islands to Japan’s north provided ample evidence of the recent surge of interest in this region. The name by which the map is known, as the ‘Matsumae map’, reflects the fact that Kato was an official of the clan, but also is indicative of the geographic lineage from which the map has emerged. The construction of the map shows the traditional priority of the Matsumae as having been control over a number of distinct points situated near the coast of this collection of amorphous islands, with the map listing the members of the clan to whom each village or *Ezo* settlement was assigned (*Figure 23*).

⁴⁶ *Tsuko Ichiran* 6, p. 365.

⁴⁷ Broughton *A voyage of discovery to the North Pacific Ocean*, p. 272.

The insertion of this amorphous space claimed by the Matsumae into more global networks is perfectly demonstrated within the leaves of the *Matsumae-shi* itself, where these two distinct representations of the Matsumae's own area of rule are followed, a few pages later, with a map of Bering's voyage.⁴⁸ The incorporation of such a map of the North Pacific, particularly when taken together with the amendment that Hironaga made to the traditional Matsumae map of their territory through the cognition of Russia, underscores how this represented space of Matsumae rule was now beginning to be positioned not only in relation to Japan, but to other states as well. This shift is representative of a distinct change in how the spatial extant of Matsumae rule came to find representation upon the map, especially when we consider the identity of the mapmaker. For the chart of Berings Expedition inserted into the *Matsumae-shi* has noted upon it that it had been copied from a map made by one Kato Kengo. The manner in which *Ezo* has found representation upon this chart of Bering's discoveries itself speaks to the process of cartographic bricolage that was infusing all of these maps, for the mode of representation adopted for the area of the *ezochi* on this map is one that combines distinctive elements from both Hironaga's maps of his clan's area of control and Kato's own 'Matsumae map'. While the North Pacific chart appears to show Ezo and Karafuto as two large islands, as adopted by Hironaga and in contrast to the majority of early maps of the region in which the main Ezo island was represented as far larger than a subservient Karafuto, the similarly outsize impressions created by the Kuril Islands closest to Ezo, of Kunashiri, Etorofu and the cluster of islets standing for Shikotan and the Habomais, is one that is visible on Kato's map. Distinct is that while the map of the Pacific includes the island beyond Etorofu, known in Japanese as Urup, among those represented in a distinctively oversized way, Kato's 1791 map does not include this island among those being accurately represented, with its representation of the *ezochi* essentially halting at the edge of Etorofu and petering out in the desultory representation of a number of islands beyond.

While similarly seeking to account for new geographic knowledge, therefore, these two maps of Kato, likely to have been drawn a few months apart, seek to abstract the space known as the *ezochi* in two distinct ways. That produced for the Matsumae in 1791 sought to provide an

⁴⁸ It's unclear whether the map was originally part of the text or was added later (*Funakoshi Sakoku Nihon ni kita 'Koki zu' no chirigaku shiteki kenkyu*), but seems that Kato drew this map of Bering tracks on the basis of discussions with Laxman at Nemuro, which would mean the map was drawn up at least a decade after the history was originally written. Note, though, that the representation of Ezo adopted on this map is far closer to the maps Hironaga appended earlier in the *Matsumaeshi* than to Kato's understanding shown on the *Matsumae-chizu*.

abstract image of the extent of land under the governance of the Matsumae, with very little reference to its surrounding geography, merely noting a small section of “Santan” to the west of the island of Karafuto, and simplified representations for the rest of the Kuril Islands out beyond Etorofu. By contrast, the other map sought to position a rapidly changing picture of the land of Yezo within the new context provided by the image of the Northern Pacific, one that was presumably made possible by Kato’s encounter with Adam Laxman and his officers in the winter of 1792. The fluid cross-currents of geographic knowledge found themselves represented on these maps as much as they did on the deck of the Providence in Endermo bay.

However, in contrast to what is highlighted by Bravo, such geographical gifts were not a one way process of cartographic transfer. Rather, this was in the manner of a formal exchange, one in which “Our Japanese friends joined us for dinner, and presented me with a chart of their own doing; in return I gave them Captain Cook’s general chart of the world, which gratified them extremely”.⁴⁹ Kato presenting Broughton with a “chart of the islands to the north of Japan” could be considered as a “geographical gift”, but in this case one that earned its own “geographical reward” in return, a copy of Cook’s chart of the world. This is in contrast with the “Chinese” that Lapérouse encountered on Sakhalin. There, the people with whom Laperouse is speaking “are not all that interested in maps and inscriptions” as they are only “intermediaries for their exchange” and “not considered important in themselves”.⁵⁰ For Kato, by contrast, the “inscription” is recognized as significant, to the point that it is made clear to Broughton that Kato runs the risk of punishment in granting a copy of this map of “the islands to Japan’s north” to the interlopers, and as indeed is suggested by the famous Siebold incident which occurred some three decades after the encounters between Kato and Broughton at Endermo Bay. Yet even more critical is that the importance of the inscription’s is mediated by the inscription itself, to the point that the knowledge contained on it is able to be exchanged for that upon another inscription. It is within this process of cartographic exchange that the “ill-defined” territory of this part of the world came to be successively rewritten until its appearance on the map appeared to become fixed.

Nevertheless, the fixity offered by this exchange of territorial representations always threatened to come undone, depending as it did upon the geographic knowledge of the other

⁴⁹ Broughton *A voyage of discovery to the North Pacific Ocean*, p. 101

⁵⁰ Latour *Science in Action*, p. 218.

side of the exchange. Eight years after Broughton's second appearance at Endermo, a Russian expedition led by Adam Johann von Krusenstern was unknowingly following in his footsteps up the west coast of the island of Yezo, stopping at Soya near to northern tip of that island. Asking a local Japanese officer about the island of Karafuto, he was informed it was just to the north, as "we distinctly perceived as soon as the weather began to clear up, separated from Jesso by a channel".⁵¹ The chart issued for Krusenstern by this voyage was a very modern one, based on the latest geographical knowledge and being produced in only 1802. As Krusenstern noted at the outset of his voyage, "what particularly distinguishes this chart is an island between Jesso and Sachalin, called Karafuto, or Schisa. The west coast of Jesso, as well as this island, were inserted on the authority of a Japanese chart ...".⁵² According to the chart issued to Krusenstern for his voyage, this island of Karafuto was a small indented island orientated from east to west that was located between the islands of "Matmai" and Sakhalin. While the shape of the island of Sakhalin followed that used on Lapérouse's map, the shape of Matmai was orientated from north-east to south-west, in the same manner as on the chart that Kato had gifted Broughton. In fact, the representation of both "Matmai" and this island of Karafuto that nestled between it and Sakhalin were taken directly from Kato's map, which Kato had shared with members of Laxman's expedition in 1792, and subsequently sent back to Moscow. By the time of Krusenstern's arrival, the territory of these islands north of Japan had long since been rewritten for the Japanese themselves, but Kato's work still defined the territory created for Krusenstern at the outset of his voyage.

Nevertheless, the vision of the world with which Krusenstern carried could still be made commensurable with that possessed by the Japanese. The same officer at Soya "mentioned to us another land to the north of Karafuto, which was also separated by a narrow passage from this island. This last he only knew by hearsay, for neither he nor his countrymen knew anything of the northern part of Karafuto, which the natives call Sandan... the southern part of this island [Karafuto] is very well known to the Japanese, since the government reckons it among their possessions and maintains an officer there as a guard, just as it does here".⁵³ This assumed knowledge of the territory fed back into the territorial claims able to be made, as "He mentioned the names of Kunaschir, Ischicotan, Sturup and Urup, as the four islands which lie

⁵¹ Krusenstern *Voyage round the world*, Vol. 2, p. 47.

⁵² Krusenstern *Voyage round the world*, Vol. 2, p. 28-29.

⁵³ Krusenstern *Voyage round the world*, Vol. 2, p. 47.

to the north-east of Jesso, and form part of the Japanese empire; and it is nearly the same names that these islands have been known since Spangenberg's time, without having yet been received into any foreign charts...”.⁵⁴ Indeed, this concern regarding territorial ignorance and territorial dispossession had already run together on Kruzenstern's ship, for while in Nagasaki, the interpreter Rezanov had noted how “The Japanese were particularly anxious to understand the relative geographical position of Kamchatka to Japan”,⁵⁵ showing that even in 1804, they remained anxious to “import substitute” their knowledge of territory. By bringing all these territorial representations into line, it was hoped to make the world commensurable on the map.

Commensurable territory

This interest in bring representations into line with one another was characteristic of not just a Europe in the throes of its scientific revolution, but also a Japan which was reinterpreting its place in the world. At some point in the late-seventeen hundreds, the man who would institute the state's education reform also sought to engage in this Ezo question. Koga's recommendation of this policy is remarkable in linking this to institutional reform by arguing for the enfeoffment of Japanese lords in this area, and both learning from and utilizing directly barbarians in these areas for military purposes.⁵⁶ This clear recommendation to engage foreign technologies and people in organizing for military defense as well as expansion of Japan is one striking element of the treatise that goes beyond other writers' ideas of forward defense through occupation of “unused” lands. The model at this time for Koga's expansive vision of empire appears to have been not so much the West but Qing China, indicative of how writers in Japan remained able to reinterpret how to reposition Japan in a myriad ways. Koga “borrows the ‘employing the barbarians to assault the barbarians’ phrase from the Han shu from a period in Chinese history often compared to the Qing in terms of the extent of expansionist activity. Indeed, contemporaneously, the Manchu Qing empire was “defending” China exactly through this kind of dynamic territorial expansion, bringing it into initially

⁵⁴ Krusenstern *Voyage round the world*, Vol. 2, p. 47-48.

⁵⁵ McOmie “With All Due Respect”.

⁵⁶ Koga *Kyokuron jiji fufi*, pp. 183–84.

victorious military conflict with Russia—the very same foreign threat that Koga was worried about.”⁵⁷

While the date when Koga wrote this text remains unclear, what is interesting is the man who go on to be head of the Shoheizaka Academy from 1796 expressing these views. While Shihei had ultimately succeeded in attracting the censure of Matsudaira Sadanobu for the publication of his work advocating for Maritime Defence, the writers of other memorials circulating in manuscript were allowed more freedom of expression. This is reflected in the similar emphasis as writers like Heisuke and Hayashi that Koga placed upon the importance of colonizing Ezo, although in contrast to the latter in particular, he emphasized the utility of the Chinese model.⁵⁸ Koga’s own appointment within the bureaucracy, indeed, indicates the relevance of his own arguments for “opening the channels of communication” and increase bottom-up input into the political system through the notion of “remonstration”. This would only be possible through the creation of a standardized field of practical knowledge to which all could contribute, which explains the support of Koga Seiri, together with Bitou Jishuu, Shibano Ritsuzan, and Rai Shunsui, for Neo-Confucian orthodoxy while independent scholars in Osaka in the 1770s and 1780s. Their call was ultimately answered through Matsudaira Sadanobu’s state regulation of Confucian scholarship through the Kansei Prohibition of Heterodoxy in 1790,⁵⁹ following which the *Yushimaseido* Academy⁶⁰ was transformed into an official bureaucratic arm of the Tokugawa, coming to be known later that decade as the Shoheizaka Academy.

Although the influence of the Chinese model was clear with the establishment of *Gakumon Ginmi* from 1792, a system of Chinese-style public examinations for shogunal officials and their sons. The examinations were established to provide a meritocratic means for talent to rise to the top of what remained a largely hereditary system.⁶¹ It therefore represented an internal

⁵⁷ Paramore “The Nationalization of Confucianism”, p. 47-49.

⁵⁸ By which he meant the shogunate should “employ the barbarians to assault the barbarians”. While an effective slogan, however, what exactly was meant through this invocation of the Confucian classics was never clarified. Paramore notes the phrase as appearing in the *Han shu* and the *Hou Han shu*, see Paramore “The Nationalization of Confucianism”, p. 47.

⁵⁹ Paramore “Confucianism versus feudalism”.

⁶⁰ The Yushimaseido was the Confucian Rites temple established in Edo

⁶¹ And should be understood within a wider context of bureaucratic meritocracy that was not dependent upon notions of ‘rationality’ associated with ‘enlightened’ European bureaucratic governance, see in particular Woodside *Lost Modernities*.

response to concerns regarding the increasingly sclerotic nature of the bureaucratic system, as well a desire to incorporate men of talent and strengthen the link between functional knowledge and the performance of practical administration.⁶² The introduction of examinations was therefore a response to the perceived problems that were facing Sadanobu during the period in which he was head of the government, and tends to be viewed positively by scholars of the period.⁶³

In the second of these, a young man named Kondo Juzo was examined. Third son of a minor Tokugawa official, Juzo appears to have been something of a prodigy, giving lectures on behalf of his teacher, the eclectic Confucian scholar and educationalist Yamamoto Hakusan, from the tender age of 13. In 1787, when 17 years old, he established his own school, the *Hakusan Gigaku*, which provided him with a base from which to memorialize the shogunate on educational reform.⁶⁴ Juzo was therefore very much a product of this period of educational reform, and would subsequently exemplify the connection between practical knowledge and administration. This was still in the future, however, when in the second month of 1794, following the removal of the system's architect, Matsudaira Sadanobu, a further *Gakumon Ginmi* was held.⁶⁵ Perhaps surprisingly in view of his earlier precocity, he only received a third-class award.⁶⁶ Ultimately more important than the degree, however, were the human connections which appear to have been made in the course of this examination process. Kondo had his degree conferred upon him by the *Wakadoshiyori* Hotta Masaatsu, while among his examiners were Ishikawa Tadafusa, who was the shogunal official despatched to receive Kodayu from Laxman and hand him the pass for entry into Nagasaki harbour, and Nakagawa Tadateru. The connections between each of these men were to subsequently be important in defining the place of Ezo in Japan, as well as the extent of Ezo.

Just one year later, Juzo accompanied Nakagawa Tadateru, the Nagasaki bugyo, as an attached official when the latter headed to Nagasaki in June. The post of attached official was one that had been created by Sadanobu towards the end of his period in formal office, in the sixth

⁶² Paramore "Confucianism versus feudalism", p. 87.

⁶³ Even negative portrayals of Sadanobu's *Kansei igaku no kin*, which interpret orthodoxy in terms of ideological control, tend to be more positive about the examinations, see for instance Tsuji "Politics in the Eighteenth Century", pp. 468–70.

⁶⁴ Umezawa "Kondō Jūzō Note 1".

⁶⁵ There were ultimately nineteen in total between 1792 and 1868.

⁶⁶ Although in the third class. The likes of Ota Nanpu and Tōyama Kagemichi received first-class recognition.

month of 1793, and was in accordance with his general desire to promote men of talent within a largely unreflexive shogunal bureaucracy.⁶⁷ Juzo arrived in Nagasaki at an unpropitious time, after Napoleon's conquest of the Netherlands in 1793 affected the arrival of Dutch ships to Dejima, which consequently impacted on the town's economy.⁶⁸ Nevertheless, the short time in Juzo spent in Nagasaki managed to reflect the various ways in which Japan's place in the world was being transformed. One of these was through the return of Japanese castaways to the city, which occurred twice in the three years Juzo was resident in the city, on both occasions being returned on Chinese merchant vessels. The first occasion was the return of nine men from Mutsu, who had drifted to Annam (modern Vietnam) and were returned via Macao, Canton and Shanghai in the eleventh month of 1795. The second was in the first month of 1797, and saw the return of three men from Matsumae who had washed up at Ibitatsu on the coast of Tartary, and had been returned via Beijing from Ningpo.⁶⁹ It seems that questioning this second group with regards to their journey home through Ningnuta (Ning'an today) and Jilin piqued Juzo's interest in the geography of the northeast, and he questioned the Chinese merchants resident in Nagasaki on this. Juzo certainly wrote up the report on the first of these, although the second group appeared just prior to his departure, and consequently he may only have heard about their journey. His later interest in the geography of the region is unquestioned, however.

This was an interest that had certainly been provoked by the previous year, as reports of the landing for Broughton on Ezo (see above) made their way to Nagasaki. Juzo responded by writing two texts, one on flags used at sea, while the second, entitled *Igirisu-kiryaku*, was the first history of Britain in Japanese. Kondo exchanged letters with the Owari Confucian scholar Hitomi Kiyu on this topic towards the end of 1796. Returning to Edo in the fifth month of the following year, in the tenth month Kondo memorialized the shogunate on the threat posed by Russia and Britain and the importance of fortifying the Ezochi. By the following month he had begun his colonization map of Ezo, which we examined in Chapter 6. In the twelfth month of

⁶⁷ Sadanobu's term as *Roju* had run from 1787, the same year in which Kondo established his school, to 1793. The perceived significance of the role is shown by the fact it was abolished in 1820 by Mizuno Tadaakira, who essentially opposed all of the reforms that had been enacted over the previous decades. It was under Mizuno, of course, that control of the Ezochi had been returned to the Matsumae, see Chapter 5. In terming the shogunal bureaucracy as generally "unreflexive", the aim is to recall Giddens' "reflexive monitoring" detailed in Chapter 2.

⁶⁸ "VOC representatives remained on Dejima even after the company was officially bankrupt and dissolved in 1800" Roberts "Re-orienting the Transformation of Knowledge", p. 30.

⁶⁹ Akitsuki *Nihon Hoppen Tanken*, p. 264.

that year, Kondo was transferred so as to once again come under Nakagawa's direct authority as an official attached to the Kanto office, which Nakagawa had been made governor of after his return from Nagasaki. This circulation of officials not only shows the connections between Nagasaki and Ezo that have been showcased throughout the chapter, but also indicates the circulation of individuals between these frontiers. Although appearing to be acting alone, Kondo was part of a coterie of officials pushing for a more active Ezo policy, and it is within this wider context that his activities related to Ezo should be understood.⁷⁰ That Kondo as a result of his Ezo visits would call for a forward policy of colonization and engagement is therefore no surprise when it is understood that the basic position of those with whom he was associated was precisely that.⁷¹ His memorialization on the necessity of this began prior to his first visit to Ezo in 1798, and continued until 1807.

With the arrival of the Russian Embassy to Nagasaki in 1804, Kondo decided to resolve the problem of the status of Karafuto through a comparative analysis of all the geographical materials available to him, publishing the results in his *Henyō Bunkai Zukō*. Kondo had been intrigued by the account of the castaway Ibitatsu, who had returned from Russia via China to Japan while he was in Nagasaki. Kondo realized that the names of places he was passing through referred to locations noted in Eastern Manchuria. Therefore, he began to search out Qing materials that related to Eastern Tartary, in order to try to ascertain the extent of Qing control in this area, and consequently for materials that related to the island of Sakhalin and the areas known in Japan as Ezo. Kondo had therefore been involved in the mapping of this region over a long period, as well as its governance, and the construction of the *Henyō Bunkai Zukō* reflects this.

In this text, Kondo both analysed the Japanese and Chinese materials relating to the region, but also engaged in a comparative analysis of the maps possessed by the Bakufu. He reproduced 22 of these within his work, with eight from European sources, three from maps drawn by natives on Sakhalin for the expeditions of Nakamura Koichiro and Takahashi Jidayu in 1801, and the remainder either Chinese or Japanese. On one level, therefore, Kondo was engaged in a comparative analysis of geographical materials produced about the areas

⁷⁰ Fujita Kinsei *kōki seijishi to taigai kankei*. As well as Nakagawa, these included in 1797 the *rojus* Toda Ujinori and Honda Tadakazu, and the finance officials Kuze Hirotami, Magaribuchi Kagetsugu, and Ishikawa Tadafusa. This group would later include Hotta Masaatsu.

⁷¹ Tanimoto *Kondō Jūzō to Kondō Tomizō*, p. 42.

between Ezo and Kamchatka, on one hand, and Ezo and Santan, on the other, in order to bring to light the geography of two areas that were little known. However, Kondo's text was not written as an academic exercise, detailing as it did the advances and methods of the Russians and justifying its existence as required to fill in the geography between the Chuppka Islands and the limits of Kamchatka in the East, and the Karafuto region and limits of Santan/Manchuria in the West. That is, it was written in response to a political situation with which he was well-acquainted, given his involvement with Bakufu rule of the Ezochi, and most particularly his role in the 'colonization' of Etorofu. The geography that he produced was intimately concerned with both securing this territory in the face of the Russian threat and his belief that the Bakufu should take over the entirety of the Ezo, as they already had in the East in 1802.

The representation of the territory of the Kuril Islands adopted here is based upon the maps that Kondo analysed. Kondo subsequently went on to consider the question of Sakhalin and Karafuto, noting that while most of the names on Sakhalin were in the language of Santan, they did not match the ones on Karafuto, therefore proving that the two were different islands. The results of his investigation were shown on the *Konjo Kōtei Bunkai no zu*,⁷² largely based on the map he ascribed to Mortier that was a version of D'Anville's 1752 map. The majority of the European sources were also based upon the Kangxi map, but Kondo remained unaware that the distinctive 'arrowhead' shape for Sakhalin was indicative of this. On the basis of D'Anville's representation of two peninsulas at the base of the continent at a latitude of 45°, Kondo identified these as being the Capes of Shiretoko and Notoro represented until then on Japanese maps as forming the southern end of the island of Karafuto, and thus concluded for this and other reasons that Karafuto must be connected to the continent. Kondo had produced this map through a process of selection, considering this the best representation of the area, and therefore not bothering to correct the representation of the main island of Ezo to be more in line with the far more faithful maps that he had recently been producing.

The establishment of the Hakodate bugyo had been on the basis of territory "traditionally under the Matsumae", and therefore part of Kondo's rationale was to indicate the extent of this territory in Western Ezo as well as in the East. In a map made on the basis of Kato Kengo's map of Bering's expedition, thought to have been made by Kondo before heading initially to

⁷² 「今所考定分界之図」

the Ezochi, the extent of territory marked as Japanese extends to the southern edge of Karafuto. The change in his own view of Karafuto is clear in the new map, in which he makes the claim to a far greater extent of Japanese possession. He did this by marking essentially the entirety of the island/peninsula on which Karafuto was marked as being Japanese territory, leaving only a small area positioned between this territory and the borders of Tartary. He separated this area from Tartary itself by marking a channel as running between Tartary proper and this northern appendage to Japanese Karafuto. Kondo's clear statement that Karafuto and Santan are joined should not be understood solely in terms of geography, for his map essentially leaves open the question of whether this territory is attached to the mainland or not. Rather, the origins of his statement are in the discussion of 1802, which revolved around the question of the Santan trade's feasibility, given the restrictions on overseas trade in the rest of Japan. The conclusion to this discussion was that although the Ainu were being considered Japanese as they had traditionally been under the authority of the Matsumae, and despite in the Kuril Islands there being a policy in place to restrict the Ainu from trading up the Kurils, on Karafuto it was argued that the trade by the Ainu there with the continent was not the same as if it was done by Japanese, even were the latter to be made Japanese themselves.

When Kondo speaks of Karafuto's connection with the continent, therefore, he is also referencing this fact, that while Karafuto was connected to Santan through trade, its territory was under the authority of Japan and thus clearly distinguished from that of Tartary, which was under the authority of the Qing. While there are a number of variations of Kondo's text, in this area they all appear to possess the same pattern, with the island of Karafuto predominantly represented as under Japanese control but separated from a geographically and politically distinct Santan, with a buffer left in between the two territories. Not only was Karafuto retained as Japanese, therefore, despite its links with the continent, but the question of the exact demarcation of its borders was left open, irrespective of the version of this text that was adopted. This text also reflects the advance in his knowledge visible since his variant of Takahashi and Nakamura's *Karafuto Kenbunzu* in 1801. On that map, Karafuto was marked as either separated from, or connected to the territory of Santan. In reproducing this map, Kondo showed his greater concern with regional geopolitics by indicating Karafuto as being across a channel from Santan, but actually connected to Russia. This likely reflected the greater concern with reports of Russians on the island at the time, but sometime during the course of preparing his text, Kondo came to have a greater respect for the Qing's territorial extent,

marking both the coast and Sakhalin in its colors and placing Russia to its north. In this he was reflecting the cartographic materials that he utilized to create his map of the region (*Figure 24*).

Nevertheless, Kondo's subsequent cartographic endeavours suggest that he himself was not convinced of the accuracy of his work. What appears to have been his next map, 1807's *Ezochizu*, restricted its coverage to the southern tip of Karafuto, focussing on those areas mapped by Takahashi and Nakamura rather than merely heard about from native informants. Rather than the more expansive vision of the Ezochi in a wider context, and a concern with knowing the geography that lay between Ezo and other countries, this returned to a restricted view of Ezo territory. In his earlier work, however, Kondō has sought to consider the space of Ezo in a manner which took into account all knowledge on the subject. It was this effort to make these territorial visions commensurable and bring them into line which would characterize the two men who followed him in his comparative endeavour.

9. EZO WORLDWIDE

Chapter 9 follows the process by which this re-produced Ezo space came to be reinserted back into the world map. This occurred through the state's ability to bring together both global and local information and make it commensurable upon the same representation. Takahashi Kageyasu's mapping project hinged upon his interpretation of Northern Ezo, about which he published a text justifying his choice of representation. Through bringing together the latest western and Qing maps with empirical investigation on the ground and a new understanding of events in China a century earlier, Takahashi was able to provide a new, more accurate representation of the island that had been known in Japan as Karafuto, and thus came to fix Ezo's extent upon a map of the world. Through his exchange with, above all, Siebold, it was this vision of Japan's extent that would shape the world's understandings of Ezo as it incorporated Japan a half-century later, and thus authorize Japan in its subsequent determination to decisively incorporate as much of this land as possible within its own empire in the latter half of the nineteenth century. That incorporation continued to rely, however, upon an understanding of Ezo as having been part of Japan, a land whose extent was only finally determined in the course of this investigation.

While it remains common within Japan to understand the work of Takahashi and Ino Tadataka as indicating a modern concern with the location of Japan in a global, abstract space, in fact their surveys served to provide Japan with a series of institutional claims to territory. However, this was only possible through bringing together a whole series of practices of bordering and mapping that together served to newly reconstitute this Ezo space to Japan's north. This emphasizes the importance of maps and borders as territorial processes open to re-enactment in the constitution of territory at a variety of scales, stretching from the local to the global, and that the constitution of relational territory is not restricted in time, but the product of a territory's inevitable creation in its wider context.

Territorial imperatives

Kondo's work was well thought of, with Otsuki Gentaku adjudging that it had "clarified the boundaries of western and eastern Ezochi".¹ While Kondo had been active in the east for a number of years, though, and his representation of the border as being the island of Etorofu would prove a stable one down to 1875, this was not the case in the west. On one level, this was not in itself surprising, as Kondo never himself visited Karafuto. As we have seen, however, he had long been interested in the area's geography, reproducing the speculative maps of Takahashi Jidayu and Nakamura Kōichirō on his own Map of Ezo (Figure 25). As the *Henyō Bunkai Zukō* had made clear, the representation of Karafuto joined to the continent was based upon a map drawn by Kariyashin, an Ezo living in Santan on the continent, as Kondō reproduced the original map within his text. On his own map in the *Henyō Bunkai Zukō*, Kondo had once again followed this mode of representation. He had concluded that "with regards to how the interior of Karafuto relates to the borders of Manchuria and Santan, whether it is contiguous or a separate island, the Ezo and Santan peoples have various views, but I think that Karafuto is connected to Manchuria and Santan".²

The continuing attention being paid to Ezo is clear from the fact that in early 1807, it was decided that the government would also take over Western Ezo, in addition to the east.³ Kondo's contention that Karafuto was connected to the continent would have failed to alleviate continuing concerns regarding the border regions, where the government remained unsure regarding the scale of the Santan trade.⁴ Nevertheless, the taking of this decision was about to signal the beginning of a more thoroughgoing engagement with the island of Karafuto. In the third month of 1805, the disappointed Russian diplomatic mission led by Rezanov sailed out of Nagasaki harbour. On its way north, the mission had proceeded to survey the southern coast of Karafuto, before sailing up the east coast of the island and surveying Sakhalin from the north. With regards to the Japanese presence in Karafuto, the commander of the expedition, Admiral Kruzenstern, had noted in his diary that, "With regard

¹ Having submitted the text to Hotta Masaatsu, who in turn supplied it to Gentaku when the latter was ordered to compile the accounts of the Sendai castaways who had been returned with Rezanov's mission.

² *Henyō Bunkai Zukō*. Versions of the map accompanying this text do appear to separate from the continent, but it appears that there were produced at a later date and altered to reflect information known after Kondō wrote his text.

³ It had provisionally taken over the latter in 1799 and made this permanent in 1802.

⁴ Akitsuki Nichirō *kankei to Saharin-shima*, p. 42

to taking possession of Aniwa, this could be done without the smallest danger...The capture of Aniwa is therefore no perilous undertaking; and I am convinced that this conquest would not cost a single drop of blood...”.⁵

His words were to appear prophetic, as in the autumn of the following year, two members of that expedition, the lieutenants Khvostov and Davidov, were landing at Ifutomari and attacking the Japanese settlement of Kushunkotan, in an assault later claimed to have been unsanctioned by anyone. Having overwhelmed what resistance there was, they sacked the settlement, carrying off all valuable together with eight Ainu and one Japanese soldier.⁶ After wintering at Petropavlovsk, the raiders shifted their attention to the island of Etorofu, burning the settlement of Naibo and fortifications at Shana in the fourth month of 1807, before returning to Karafuto and firing the Japanese buildings in the settlement of Rutaka the following month. They then moved on to Rebun, Noshappu and Rishiri, capturing and sinking several vessels en route.⁷

While reaction to the first raids on Karafuto, which did not reach Edo until perhaps the fourth month of 1807, was fairly phlegmatic, that towards the raids on Etorofu was far more marked. It was following this that the Bakufu ordered the mobilization of the six northern domains for Ezo's defence, and dispatched the officials Hotta Masaatsu, Nakagawa Tadateru and Tooyama Kagemichi to Hakodate which they reached on the 26th day of the 7th month. The following day, the Matsumae were transferred to the Northern Kanto, and the state took over the entirety of what had formally been Matsumae and the lands of the Ezo. Accompanying the officials was Kondō Jūzō, on his fifth and final tour of the Ezo. Kondō was accompanied by the Kyoto Confucian scholar, Yamada Ren, who was a member of Hotta Masaatsu's household. Kondō and Yamada together inspected Eastern Ezo, and subsequently submitted the *Yomiroku*,⁸ which advocated for an end to Bakufu explorations and instead the establishment of 'hard borders' as a solution to the 'inevitable' Russian advance. The text was clear that the Kansei-era program towards this "country under the reins"⁹ should be reintroduced in order to

⁵ Krusenstern *Voyage round the world*, p. 67-8

⁶ Aston "The Russian Descents Upon Saghalien and Itorup", p. 79; this occurred on the 12th day of the 9th month of Bunka 3, or October 18, 1806.

⁷ Lensen *The Russian Push toward Japan*, pp. 31-2; on Russian and Soviet interpretations, see Stephan *Sakhalin*, pp. 76-7.

⁸ 予見録

⁹ *Kibi Zokkoku* 犬磨属国.

transform Ezo and its population into land and people of Japan,¹⁰ by “aiding the people and opening the country”. The way to realize this was by “watching the borders of Ezo”. While this was possible in the east, however, where the border existed between two islands and was, by this stage, fairly well-established, with Etorofu colored as Japanese on the map and its inhabitants having been, at least nominally, organized into villages and induced become identifiable as farmers, this was not the case in the west. There, questions regarding the lie of the land continued to dog efforts in the west, where the proclamation of direct rule necessitated another effort to establish the lie of the land on Karafuto.

Yamada returned to Edo in the 10th month of 1807, and was asked by Hotta Masaatsu to attempt to discern the geography of Ezo and its borders soon afterwards. Up until this period, such questions had tended to focus upon eastern Ezo. As the previous chapter noted, it was Kondō himself who had also renewed his attention to the west, due to his fears regarding the Qing. The map of western Ezo he produced likely reflected his fundamental belief in the need for the Japanese state to take over western Ezo, as well as its eastern end.¹¹ However, and despite Kondō’s conclusion, there continued to be confusion with regard to the status of Karafuto, much of which stemmed from a number of maps that arrived with Rezanov and through other sources. Yamada’s was an ongoing project over several different texts, and one key development was the greater volume of material made available to him, both through Rezanov’s visit and the government’s attempt to gather up all geographical sources and make them available to its officials.

In his work, Yamada sought to marry western representations of Sakhalin, based on the Kangxi atlas, with an image of another island that appeared to accord to the Japanese Karafuto, one which ultimately went back to D’Anville’s 1734 map of Northeast Asia. In 1721, the Russian envoy to China, Ismailov, had sent to the Tsar Peter I, as a present from the Manchu Emperor Kangxi, a map making clear the fact that ‘Saghalien’ was an island.¹² This atlas, and the subsequent maps of D’Anville that illustrated du Halde’s work, provided the basis for the distinctive arrow-head appearance of Sakhalin on the majority of western maps arriving in

¹⁰ *Futensotsudo no ōdo ōumin* 「普天卒土の王土王民」, incorporated into the lands of the *Tenka*.

¹¹ Yokoyama “Edoki ni okeru Hoppōkūkanninshiki to gaikokushiryō”, p. 195.

¹² Leon Bagrow, “Die Priorität der Entdeckung des Amur, des Tartarischen Golfs und der Insel Sachalin,” *Yamato, Zeitschrift der Deutsch-Japanischen Gesellschaft*, III (1931), p. 84, in Harrison, “Notes on the Discovery of Yezo”, p. 266, and see the material presented in Chapter 7.

Japan during the period. This was a work which he pursued through a number of editions, the first of which may have been the *Hoku-I zu*,¹³ which provided a comparison of 15 maps and sought to bring all the information together on one chart. This map resembles that produced on the basis of the Tenmei expeditions and used to illustrate the *Ezo Shūi*, which summarized portions of the text on a representation of the main island of Ezo, the Kurils and Karafuto. The *Hoku-I zu* map added a smaller, Sakhalin-shaped version of ‘Santan’ above that of the island of Karafuto, separating these islands into two.¹⁴ If this text was Yamada’s, his map would probably have been influenced by a meeting with a man named Baba Tamehachirō, or at least through seeing his maps. Baba was one of two members of the Astronomy Bureau who, together with Namura Takichiro, had been sent to Soya, just across the strait from Karafuto, arriving in March 1808. While there Baba would confirm Soya’s latitude and draw several maps, one of which, the *Karafuto Sagarin-zu*, looks essentially the same as that in the *Hoku-I zu*. As with the *Hoku-I zu* chart, this map lined up an island, this time labelled as Sagarin above and slightly to the west of where Karafuto was noted as being, with a clear channel separating the two islands.

In the first month of 1809, Yamada produced his first draft of his updated examination into Ezo’s geography, which was called at this stage the *Hokueizusetsu Shūranbikō*.¹⁵ In it, he offered a detailed comparison of 18 maps, and looked to distil his own accurate image of Ezo from them. The map which Yamada made to represent all of this information, the “Shussaku Ezo Zenchi Ryakuzu”, makes clear his method of working, which was to make commensurable as many features on the map as possible. This process of selection is visible in the toponyms he lists on the map, where on his own map he lists both “western” and “Russian” names for these geographical features. For example, the peninsula in south-eastern Karafuto is labelled as

¹³ 「北倭図」 (Maps of northern Japan).

¹⁴ This accords with Kruzenstern’s conversation with “an officer” at Soya, who “confirmed to us the existence of the island of Karafuto, which we distinctly perceived as soon as the weather began to clear up, separated from Jesso by a channel ... he mentioned to us another land to the north of Karafuto, which was also separated by a narrow passage from this island. This last he only knew by hearsay, for neither he nor his countrymen knew anything of the northern part of Karafuto, which the natives call Sandan. [...] The southern part of this island [Karafuto] is very well known to the Japanese, since the government reckons it among their possessions and maintains an officer there as a guard, just as it does here...”. See Kruzenstern, *Voyage round the world, Vol II*, p. 47.

¹⁵ 「北裔図説集覽備攷」, a name which references the 1684 Qing geographic text, the 「北裔備考」, see below.

The final version is generally noted as the *Ishū Hokueizusetsu Shūranbikō* 「彙輯北裔図説集覽備攷」.

“Cape Patience” on western maps and “Cape Auise” on Russian maps.¹⁶ By comparison with the other maps in Yamada’s text, it is possible to see that the former of these draws upon, amongst others, a map he labels as the “1785 Dutch map of Ezo”, which is Witsen’s *LantKaarte van ‘t Oost –Tartarie*,¹⁷ which largely follows the toponyms and shape of the land accorded by Vries’ survey. Yamada overlays this map with that of the Russian map brought by Rezanov, and notes the presence of both of these toponyms on his own map of Karafuto. In so doing, we see Yamada attempting to engage in the same sort of ethnographical navigation considered in the previous chapter. In this case, however, rather than mapping Ezo’s space by paying attention to trade flows and the movement of language, this navigation occurs solely through the surface of the map (Figure 26).

Significantly, Yamada’s work also incorporated a Qing version of a map of Sakhalin, which he reproduced in his text. This was a work displaying the 16 inner provinces and 9 borderlands of China, which had been in the possession of Kimura Kenkadō. Kenkadō was an Osaka merchant and dealer in curios who had an astonishingly wide range of contacts with whom he used to engage in study sessions. The map is almost certainly the same as one that Mogami Tokunai would copy in Kenkadō’s study in around 1800, a map which he subsequently supplied to Siebold in the mid-1820s.¹⁸ As he notes, though, this particular map resembled Western ones in quality, and that consequently thought it may have been made by Europeans in the Kangxi period.¹⁹ It was one of three Qing maps reproduced by Yamada in this 1898 work. However, none of these really found their way into the final map that he produced, which reflected Yamada’s fundamental belief in Chinese mapping being characterized by a lack of accuracy.

The text evidences the increase in new information that was now being made available at the higher reaches of the state administration. As compared to Kondō’s work, Yamada included in this piece at least 3 maps that were brought to Japan with Rezanov, and also a further one that had been exchanged by Broughton with Kato Kengo in 1797.²⁰ This latter was Aaron

¹⁶ Today this is Полуостров Терпения (Terpenia Peninsula), which is the Russian translation of Cape Patience.

¹⁷ Mentioned in Chapter 7, n. 27, see the “Map of Eastern Tartaria made by N. Witsen” at

<http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/retrofiles/witsen/images/5.jpg>

¹⁸ As Leca notes, “Maps were part of intellectual conversations” taking place in the small study-circles analysed by Eiko Ikegami, see “Fig.1: Mogami Tokunai, *Sagarentō no zu* (‘Map of Sakhalin’)” in Leca “A user-centred reinterpretation of the Siebold incident”, for Siebold’s version. As Arisaka notes, Ezo materials were one topic of their conversation, “Kimura Kenkadō to Chizu”, p. 405.

¹⁹ Akitsuki *Nihon Hoppen Tanken*, pp. 268-275. For more on this map, see below.

²⁰ As detailed in the previous chapter.

Arrowsmith's 1794 "A map of the world on a globular projection : exhibiting particularly the nautical researches of Captain James Cook, F.R.S. : with all the recent discoveries to the present time".²¹ Those brought by Rezanov included, most famously, Arrowsmith's 'A Chart of the World on Mercator's Projection of 1798'.²² The exchange was recorded in the personal diary kept by Hermann Ludwig von Lowenstern, the fourth officer under von Krusenstern on the lead ship *Nadezhda*, who noted that, "Friderici gave ... the tolk [translator] a world map from Arrowsmith" in exchange for "a roll of obscene Japanese paintings".²³ Once again, the roll of the interpreters in Nagasaki in the accumulation of geographical knowledge, through their knowledge of languages as well as their access to rather more lewd representations, was crucial in this exchange. Yamada's reproduction of this map in his text tracked the route of Rezanov's embassy as it approached Japan from Kamchatka. This was again the product of a Japanese determination to discover the world, which saw that that "the banyoshi stayed on board and asked minute questions again about geography, and wanted to obtain all possible information about the situation, extent and population of the Russian empire. They followed the Russian ship's route on a map and asked minutely about distances from place to place...".²⁴ This route found reflection upon Yamada's copy of Arrowsmith's 1798 chart, which picks out Rezanov's voyage from Kamchatka to Nagasaki in red, in addition to the tracks of the other navigators that were already on Arrowsmith's original map.²⁵

However, although he claims that his own map was the result of mutually correcting both of these maps for errors, Yamada was ultimately convinced by another chart brought by Rezanov, which added Russian discoveries in the Kurils to the 1734 map by D'Anville.²⁶ Yamada provided a series of criticisms of Arrowsmith's map, which have been summarized by Yokoyama

²¹ As available here: <https://www.digitalcommonwealth.org/search/commonwealth:js956m40g> . Again, note that the representation of the region changes significantly on later editions as Arrowsmith comes to incorporate La Perouse's work.

²² A version of this certainly arrived with Rezanov, see below for its significance.

²³ von Löwenstern *The First Russian Voyage Around the World*, p. 284.

²⁴ McOmie "With All Due Respect", p. 106.

²⁵ Yokoyama argues for the map of Arrowsmith used as having been brought on the *Maria Suzanna*, which had arrived in Nagasaki earlier that year, in August 1804. Yokoyama "Edoki ni okeru Hoppōkūkanninshiki to gaikokushiryō", p. 207. This seems to be unnecessarily complicated, as Yamada's text illustrates that it was perfectly possible for the Japanese to create copies of maps which they wanted, which could then be marked with the route of Rezanov's diary. As Yokoyama notes, Rezanov was later shown one of these maps.

²⁶ Matsumoto & Ryuzaki "Kinsei Sanriku no umi ni okeru Ryōiki to Kyōkai (2)". This was the "General map of the Russian Empire divided into forty-one provinces" Генеральная карта Российской Империи на сорок одну губернию разделенную. It was an update of the earlier 1792 map, created by Alexander Wilbrecht and published in 1800. It and the previous 1792 version are visible here: http://expositions.nlr.ru/eng/ex_map/Russia/general.php

Yoshinori as follows. Yamada pointed out that the shape of Hokkaido on Arrowsmith's map was based on old charts and that its representation of the Kurils was poor when compared to that on the "General map of the Russian Empire divided into forty-one provinces". Somewhat ironically, he also argued that the representation of bays and promontories on Karafuto was old-fashioned, and not the result of surveys.²⁷ Yamada also noted the shape of the Okhotsk shoreline was distorted. Finally, he argued that combining the two islands north of Ezo as one was unsound, based on Chinese ideas, and should be rejected.²⁸

The two things worth highlighting here are that, firstly, in contrast to even the work of Kondō, Yamada accorded absolute primacy to visual representation. Rather than concerning himself with questions of geographic information, his interest almost entirely boiled down to how the various representations of space could be made to fit together. The second is that he was conducting a comparative analysis of the accuracy of these maps on the basis of knowledge solely derived from other maps. His praise for the Russian map of Rezanov's was largely on the basis of its superior standard of surveying, although his means of judging this was solely through other maps, not any survey he himself conducted. While indicative of the advance in the Japanese understanding of the trappings of modern European maps, such as coordinates, Yamada was not really in a position to judge the accuracy of the map, but proceeded to do so on the basis of another series of representations.

The map he produced a year later, the *Chikyū Yochi Zenzu*, shows that Yamada did possess considerable skill as a mapmaker.²⁹ A strikingly modern looking chart, it nevertheless retains the vision of Ezo adopted by Yamada from the map of the Russian Empire that arrived with Rezanov. Indeed, having asserted the accuracy of Rezanov's in that sense, Yamada's selection of this map represented a conscious choice between two geographical visions being offered of the Ezo region, and of the island of Karafuto in particular. Nevertheless, while his reasoning was partially sound, Yamada's decision to stake his representation of Ezo on Wilbrecht's was little more than a punt. This was because he lacked a route from the maps 'back' to the world that they purported to represent. This is notable when compared with Yamada's competition. For Yamada's reason for criticizing Arrowsmith specifically, was because he must have known

²⁷ As we shall see below, this was ironic because the map did at least incorporate the surveys of Lapérouse, whereas Wilbrecht's map was entirely speculative.

²⁸ Yokoyama "Edoki ni okeru Hoppōkūkanninshiki to gaikokushiryō", pp. 205-206.

²⁹ See Yamada Zōsai, "Chikyūyoshizenzu" at the Database of Historical Maps in the Yokohama City University Collection http://www-user.yokohama-cu.ac.jp/~ycu-rare/pages/WCT_4.html?l=1&n=0

that another individual making a map for the government, the official astronomer, Takahashi Kageyasu, would adopt it as the basis for his chart.

Institutionalizing accuracy

On the fourth day of the twelfth month of 1807, the *Record of the Astronomical Institute* recorded that “the head of the Hayashi family has requested the creation and submission of a map drawing on the latest Western and other materials”.³⁰ For the subsequent decade, work continued on this map, until on the seventh day of the twelfth month of 1816, the copperplate prints of both the “Abbreviated maps of the world” and “Revised map of the world” were added to the Bakufu archives.³¹ The process through which these maps were developed is indicative of how mapping functioned as a political technology able to be capture the territory of Japan, and how Japan’s territory came to be defined through the relation of its territory with that elsewhere.

The emergence of direct state control over the Astronomical Institute³² was part of a larger process of reform at the end of the eighteenth century, largely associated with Matsudaira Sadanobu. What is collectively known as the Kansei Reforms sought to standardize and regulate the role of knowledge institutions able to be drawn upon by the I state, and establish direct bureaucratic control over formerly affiliated associations. Matsudaira first sought to exercise control over the family that controlled the Confucian Academy, initially through demanding that the head of the Academy, Hayashi Kinpō consult with assistants Matsudaira appointed.³³ Following Kinpō’s death without issue in 1793, Matsudaira had a relative, Matsudaira Norihira, adopted as heir, with the latter acting as leader of the Hayashi for the next fifty years under the name of Hayashi Jussai. Actual running of the Academy largely

³⁰ 「林大学頭申談、蛮書を以地図等仕立可申旨、於同所御同人被仰渡」 in the official *Tenmongata Daidaiki* 『天文方代々記』 (Record of the Official Astronomers).

³¹ These are the 万国畧図 and 新訂万国全図 respectively, further details below.

³² This is the *Tenmongata*, translated in a variety of ways by different scholars, see “Astronomical Institute”, *Paramore Japanese Confucianism*, p. 107; “Bureau of Astronomy”, *Mitani Escape from Impasse*, p. 30; etc.

³³ Shibano Ritsuzan and Okada Kanzan, appointed to the School in 1790. On traditional interpretations of the Kansei “Prohibition on Heterodoxy” see Backus “The Kansei Prohibition of Heterodoxy”. On Matsudaira usurping Hayashi’s authority through these appointments, see *Paramore Japanese Confucianism*, pp. 104-106.

devolved onto other appointees as it became an official arm of government as the Shoheizaka Academy.

In the early 1790s, Matsudaira had intervened in the dispute over calendar reform, which had been ongoing between the *Onmyō* Court office in Kyoto and the Institute, and ordered the use of Western techniques for a newly-revised calendar, in accordance with Shogun Yoshimune's earlier effort. However, when the state's hereditary astronomers proved unable to develop a more accurate calendar, Matsudaira turned to Asada Gōryū. Gōryū, a self-taught astronomer then teaching in Osaka, and generally credited as the first Japanese to have examined Kepler's laws in depth, was invited to Edo in order to revise the calendar. Gōryū refused on account of his age, instead recommending two of his pupils to Edo. These were Takahashi Yoshitoki and Hazama Shigetomi; the former was officially appointed to the Institute with the latter as his assistant.³⁴ The revision to the calendar was accomplished in 1798. The invitation extended Gōryū and appointment of Takahashi and Hazama showed the determination that existed within the government to incorporate knowledge and scholarship into government and, perhaps as important, direct and control it from Edo, a desire broader than the person of Sadanobu, who officially retired in 1793.

The Astronomical Institute had become involved in Ezo issues when one of its officials, Hotta Ninjō, was ordered to survey the coast between Edo and Hakodate, in order to facilitate the state's control of eastern Ezo from there. Granted his own vessel, the *Kamikazemaru*, and with numerous astronomical instruments instruments in tow, Hotta preceded to survey the coast from Hakodate to Akkeshi, submitting the results to the government on a map covered with compass roses and other markers of western accuracy.³⁵ The continued requirement for surveying there provided an opportunity for Takahashi Yoshitoki to further revise what he knew to be a faulty calendrical system through comparing actual distance with latitude measurements. In order to do so, he encouraged the surveying aspirations of one of his students, Inō Tadataka, who petitioned the government to sponsor his mission to survey Ezo.

³⁴ It has been suggested that Hazama was the brains of the operation, but while he was of commoner background, Takahashi was a minor samurai and thus more amenable to being raised to a position of prominence, see Goodman *Japan and the Dutch*. Frumer expresses their relationship thus: "Yoshitoki was always a man of theory and calculations, while Shigetomi was a master of measurement and observations", in Frumer *Clocks and Time in Edo Japan*, p. 118, n. 300.

³⁵ Which had been largely defunct in Japan for much of the previous period, following the disappearance of the Japanese *portolan* tradition. The map itself is at the Kyōdokan in Twano, Shimane Prefecture, and has been published in Takakura *Hokkaido Kochizū Shūsei*, pp. 57, 59.

Inō's famous project to map the entirety of Japan's coastline, then, had its own northern origins in Inō's 1800 mission to survey the southern coast of the main island of Ezo Chi, from Hakodate to Nemuro. This survey was justified as aiding in the establishment of communications between the newly-founded Hakodate bugyo and the 'front line' of the Russian threat at Etorofu. Due to their satisfaction in his work, Inō found himself utilized and promoted by the government, which resulted in the expansion of the scope of his project so that it stretched over the entire coastline. Already aged over 50, Inō devoted the remaining years of his life to producing this map.³⁶ This clearly indicates the links that could be perceived between the project of mapping the territory of the state and questions of the latter's security, as also shown in the presence of Baba and Namura at Soya later in the decade.

For Yoshitoki, however, such questions remained more abstract; in 1803 he secured a copy of De La Lande's *Traite de astronomie*, which he worked on the translation of until his death on New Year's Day in 1804.³⁷ A few years earlier however, in 1797, a young man had come to Edo and began his studies at the Shoheizaka Academy. This was Takahashi Kageyasu, Yoshitoki's eldest son. Kageyasu inherited his father's position at the Astronomical Institute in 1804, and was very much a product of this period of intellectual ferment that we have seen characterizes the late-eighteenth century in Japan. Having learnt Dutch from a young age, he subsequently became Japan's foremost Manchu scholar, a development closely connected with the expansion in the role of the Astronomical Institute. Upon initially taking the role, he continued to translate De La Lande's *Astronomie* with the help of Hazama, while also supervising the survey of Japan's coastline being conducted by Inō Tadataka. It was the arrival of Rezanov's expedition, however, that had initially signalled a dramatic expansion in the scope of his responsibilities. Takahashi acquired the Manchu versions of the diplomatic documents brought by Rezanov, compiled his own dictionary of the language and presented the government with a Japanese translation.³⁸ Takahashi's efforts here showed how the Institute was being caught up in the necessity of supplying technical translations and analysis of documents and maps that pertained to Japan's wider geopolitical situation, and Takahashi's awareness of the importance of this work would lead him to petition the Bakufu for the creation of a Translation

³⁶ Ōtani Tadataka Inō. See the map in Takakura *Hokkaido Kochizū Shūsei*. pp. 61, 63.

³⁷ Goodman *Japan and the Dutch*, p. 107.

³⁸ Okada "The Manchu Documents" on Takahashi learning Manchu in response to Rezanov's arrival, later use when Rikord brought letters pertaining to Golovnin in captivity.

Bureau. This materialized in the fifth month of 1811 with the creation of the *Bansho Wage Goyō*, or office to translate barbarian (Western) documents, which brought Ogita Gentaku under Takahashi's authority. He was subsequently appointed as *Shomotsu Bugyo*, senior Shogunal archivist, in 1813, and continued to supervise the translation of Western works relevant to Japan's situation while advocating for the repelling of foreign ships. Crucially this was to be justified in terms comprehensible to the foreigners themselves.³⁹

Before this, though, there was the small matter of the new map of the world desired by the state. As Takahashi would later recall:

"I was ordered to create a map. There are many maps printed in the West. It is necessary to compare these many maps in order to discover and create the most accurate representation. The most problematic area was our island of Karafuto".⁴⁰

As the previous two chapters suggest, the state's desire for a modern map of the world was filtered through a sense of territorial insecurity with regards to Japan's northern reaches, which functioned in two primary registers. The first was obviously the immediate Russian threat, shown in the in the assaults of Khvostov and Davidov at Etorofu and Karafuto in 1806 and 1807. The second, however, is also the perpetual indeterminacy with regards to its borders in the region. This indeterminacy was should not necessarily be understood as a shortage of geographic knowledge, for as we have seen, there as a rapidly expanding accumulation of material that detailed the geography of the world and Japan's place in it, an expansion that had been particularly marked in the thirty or so years prior to the Russian attacks. However, this accumulation of material was not yet able to be collated into a satisfactory whole. Tasked with drafting this revised map of the world for the Bakufu, Takahashi and his collaborators would run into many of the same issues that had bedevilled both Kondo and Yamada in their own efforts to provide a map of the territory to Japan's north.

³⁹ Mitani *Escape from Impasse*, pp. 33-35. This emphasizes how for Takahashi the notion of territory was very much a relational, it had to be made comprehensible in terms that foreigners could understand.

⁴⁰ 「茲ニ於テ西刻地理諸編諸図ヲ発下シ、且予亦他ノ所藏ノ諸図諸説數本ヲ購求シ、互ニ參校シ、其ノ尤モ正観的実ナルモノヲ取テ新訂ノ一図ヲ製ス。其中我属島カラフト島ノ図ニ至テ大ニ窮スルモノアリ」, Takahashi *Kita-I Kōshō*, p. 310

Fortunately, much of Takahashi's thought process is open to being reconstructed, as in addition to other materials, on at least two separate occasions he was moved to set down his "Thoughts on Northern Ezo", which have been preserved in two texts, the *Kita-I Kō* and *Kita-I Kōshō*.⁴¹ Examining these texts us allows us to reconstruct the basis upon which Takahashi sought to resolve the question of how exactly to represent the geography of the area surrounding the island of Karafuto, and thus how the territory of Japan related to that of its neighbors.

Collating the world

Takahashi completed his "Thoughts on Northern Ezo" in the eighth month of 1809, or almost two years after being ordered to construct a new map for the Shogunate. The choice of title reflects the fact that perhaps two months earlier, the government had officially renamed the island of Karafuto as 'Northern Ezo'.⁴² Given the Russian assaults, this was significant, confirming that the Bakufu had come to formally consider Karafuto as part of Ezo, and thus to be protected from outside incursions. The six northern domains were indeed mobilized and their troops despatched to defend these furthest reaches of Ezo, wintering on Karafuto at horrific cost. Yet even as it was proclaimed, the extent of this territory remained unclear on the map, necessitating Takahashi's attention to the problem of extent of this new 'Kita-Ezo'. As he noted:

"Although a nearby island under our control, we know little about the interior. Many printed maps place an island called 'Sagarin' there. However, each of the maps differs over these islands' size, location, and whether there are one or two islands...Over two years of study, one or two things have become clear. These are noted and proved below".⁴³

This question of 'Sagarin' had indeed come to be an object of confusion for mapmakers, in both Japan and elsewhere. Takahashi was not the first person to have tried to wrestle the competing representations of this area into line. For Kondō, although western maps provided a

⁴¹ The former terminates in mid-sentence and is clearly an unfinished version that was later amended into the latter document. While the latter circulates in a number of versions, the former exists solely as a single copy held by the Hakodate City Library. Both are reproduced in the *Hoppōshi Shiryō Shūsei*.

⁴² *Kita-Ezochi* 北蝦夷地.

⁴³ Takahashi *Kita-I Kōshō*, p. 310.

representation of “the island of Sagarin at the mouth of the Amur on western maps”, he was to argue that “For me, this is mistaken, Sagarin is a different island”. On his own map of the area, the conclusion to his geographical researches, he rendered the question of the island’s location irrelevant by positioning it away from the Amur’s mouth (*Figure 24*). Yamada, meanwhile, had concluded that efforts to represent this Sagarin as the same island as Karafuto should be rejected, as such ideas were both incorrect and based upon outmoded Chinese geographical ideas.

The contemporary ideas upon which Takahashi chose to base his world map were those of Arrowsmith’s Chart of the world on Mercator’s projection. Takahashi would compare this map with numerous others in order to endure the most accurate representation. For Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku, Takahashi relied upon the maps being submitted through Ino Tadataka’s survey of the Japanese coastline, the progress of which is able to be traced upon successive versions of the maps Takahashi submitted.⁴⁴ It is in relation to the area north of this, however, that Takahashi had felt it necessary to justify his approach, given the continuing uncertainty over its geography. Arrowsmith’s Chart was used here as the base map, while adjusting the representation in accordance with surveying undertaken closer to home. This was fully in accord with his belief that surveying of locations themselves was crucial for accuracy on the map, which was the justification for adopting Arrowsmith’s map in the first place. As Takahashi noted, Arrowsmith’s was “the most accurate map of all those that had sought to map the discoveries of the world onto it, and had not been improved”. This was not only justified on the basis of the maps appearance, but because of the nationality of the cartographer. As Takahashi points out, the “Anglians [British] are supreme among Europeans in maritime technology”, and the voyages noted on the map show that the representations given for the various coastlines have been resurveyed and adjusted.

In that the Arrowsmith map upon which Takahashi would base his own clearly incorporated the results of the voyage of La Perouse in its representation of Sakhalin, his emphasis on surveying was correct. Laperouse’s surveys of the Coast of Tartary and the lower half of the island of Sakhalin were carried back to the “center of calculation” at Paris by his Russian translator de Lesseps, who fortunately left the ship at Kamchatka.⁴⁵ Changing political

⁴⁴ Hoyanagi “Takahashi Kageyasu / Inō Tadataka hen ‘Nihon yochi zenzu’ kō”.

⁴⁵ Fortunate because the expedition was subsequently lost in the Pacific.

circumstances meant publication of the voyage was delayed until 1796, with an English edition appearing soon afterwards. The results of his voyage were rapidly displayed on the maps of Arrowsmith, including the 1798 reissue of his “1790 Map of the world on Mercator’s projection”.⁴⁶ Takahashi’s lauding of British maritime superiority again indicates that he did not fully understand the process of cartographic production in Europe, given his assumption that the island’s presence on a British map indicated that the survey had been conducted by the British themselves. Nevertheless, Takahashi’s understanding of how these facts were arrived at, through surveys undertaken at the locations themselves, was fundamentally correct. Most important to Takahashi in the context of his investigation of this northern geography was the representation “where what we call *Kita-ezo* is a solitary island noted as Sakhalin on this map”.⁴⁷

Takahashi’s belief that Arrowsmith’s map was the result of surveys, together with the fact that this was a representation not seen on any other maps emphasized to Takahashi that Sakhalin on this map had been charted on the basis of surveys conducted on the island itself. As both Kondō and Yamada had previously attempted, Takahashi was engaged in a process of making territory commensurable, by seeking to adjudicate between various representations of territory on the map and produce a more accurate representation of this Ezo space. However, crucial for his project was that he was able to call upon an empirical investigation conducted on Karafuto itself, providing Takahashi with the “direction back from the documents to the world they portray”. This was despite the fact that, of the three men we are examining, it was Takahashi who never went anywhere near the Ezochi itself. Nevertheless, he was able to draw upon surveying conducted in the field and transmitted back to Edo. This was not, however, through what Latour would term an ‘immutable mobile’, in which the representation or data provided is able to slot within a pre-existing framework in order to provide new information about the world. While this is frequently what is presented as occurring within narratives of exploration, including in this instance, it does not provide an accurate reflection of the way in which the world comes to be collated on the map. Far from being ‘immutable’, the information that was returned to Takahashi from the field had to be remoulded beyond recognition in

⁴⁶ On which version of Arrowsmith was used, see Funakoshi . Ninomiya Rikuo has recently suggested that a version of the and “1801 Asia map for James Rennel” may also have had an influence, but his argument is not particularly convincing, see Ninomiya *Takahashi Kageyasu to ‘Shintei Bankoku Zenzu’*.

⁴⁷ 「此図中ニハ独リ我北蝦夷ト云モノト「サガリーン」ヲ以テ一島トナセリ」, Takahashi *Kita-I Kōshō*, p.

order that it be able to made to work for Takahashi. However, it was this process of making information commensurable, of making data from the field and existing information conform with one another, that was unavailable to both Kondō and Yamada. Takahashi's ability to draw upon such information showed both how the question of Ezo's western borders had come to be perceived as a factor of political significance to the state, and that this border's relation to the island of Karafuto reflected the expansion of Japanese trade and other contacts there witnessed over the preceding twenty or so years.

This information was acquired as a result of the political significance of Karafuto, which allowed for the famous expedition of the Hakodate bugyo to be co-opted into supplying geographical information to Takahashi. The expedition to Karafuto seems to have planned anyway, but having been initially delayed in the aftermath of the first Russian assault on Karafuto, because the Hakodate Magistrate Habuto Masayasu considered it too dangerous, it was postponed until the following year because of the lateness of the season.⁴⁸ Habuto had initially hoped to send Mogami Tokunai and Takahashi Jidayu,⁴⁹ but as neither had returned from Edo to Hakodate, the task instead fell to two young employees of the bugyo, Matsuda Denjurō and Mamiya Rinzo. The *Kyūmei Kōki Kikō* has them ordered to seek out the geography of the interior, discover whether Karafuto is indeed an island or connected to Manchuria, as well as to indicate the benevolence of the government to the Ainu. However, by the time the two of them set out from Soya for Shiranushi on southern Karafuto on the 13th of the fourth month of 1808, they may have received additional materials and instructions from Baba and Namura while in Soya, on Takahashi's behalf. Matsuda, at least, had wintered in Soya, and therefore would have been present when the two men from the Astronomy Institute arrived in March.

The expedition of Matsuda and Mamiya is an iconic one in Japan, and has been extensively referenced in Western literature as well, so will not be dealt with in depth here.⁵⁰ After separating to explore the western (Matsuda) and eastern (Mamiya) coasts respectively, Mamiya found his way north blocked and was forced to cross the island to the west coast, where he met Matsuda again just below Cape Rakka. Matsuda had already observed what he

⁴⁸ Akabane "Takahashi Kageyasu no Shintei Bankoku Zenzu ni tsuite", pp. 87-8.

⁴⁹ *Kyumei Kouki Kikou*, p. 88.

⁵⁰ In Japan the story is widely-known from school textbooks and so on. The perspective taken here will be a little different to that usually adopted, as will be highlighted.

though was a channel running to the north of this, indicating that Karafuto was indeed an island separated from the mainland. Mamiya apparently demanded that Matsuda take him back to the spot, where he borrowed an Ainu boat to paddle out into the channel and 'confirm' the existence of a channel.⁵¹ The two of them then returned to Soya in the intercalary sixth month of that year, where Mamiya drew his first map of Karafuto and despatched it to Takahashi through Matsuda, who was sent to report on their expedition.

While Matsuda returned to Edo, arriving on the 19th day of the 10th month, Mamiya returned to Karafuto and headed to the north, before wintering at Tonnai on the west coast. From there, he sent a second report and further maps to Takahashi, before crossing over to the continent and travelling on to the Qing outpost at Deren the following year.⁵²

In the first report, which was sent to Edo with Matsuda Denjuro, arriving there in October of 1808, Mamiya notes how places on the coast of the island around the Amur River, which were inhabited or co-inhabited by Smerenkuru and often visited by Santan from the mainland, were in fact places shown on maps of Sagariin. This is clarified on two maps, the first of which he takes from a reproduction of a 'French map' of Sakhalin, which had been reproduced by both Kondo and Yamada, and indicates locations on the island, primarily on the coast facing the continent. Rinzō then offers his own map that shows his version Karafuto, with the locations indicated using the names with which they had hitherto been referred; these names are then listed with their Smerenkuru equivalents used in the first map (*Figure 27*).⁵³ In doing so, he shows that locations reported, although not visited, by the previous Japanese expedition of Takahashi and Nakamura in 1801, were the same as those shown on the Jesuit maps of Sakhalin. The locations noted on maps of Sakhalin were in fact the same ones that the Japanese had encountered on Karafuto, and consequently that the two islands were the same.

⁵¹ This story is endlessly repeated by almost everyone writing on the subject, but could not have happened as is generally portrayed. From Cape Rakka, it may have been just possible to have seen the continent, but seems unlikely that the channel between where the distance between the island and mainland are at their narrowest would be visible. Certainly, paddling out in a boat would have reduced Mamiya's horizon to about 5km, rather than the 50km or so required to make this visible. Despite what is also often written/regurgitated, such as Matsuura, "Takahashi Kageyasu 'Kita-I kōshō'", p. 30, there is no way they could have seen the mouth of the Amur from here, given it is 110km distant from where they stood.

⁵² Takahashi notes this second report in both versions of the *Kita-I*, so it had arrived before July.

⁵³ The original of the first report doesn't exist, and its map survives as a 1904 reproduction in the *Journal of Geography*.

It is unclear whether Rinzō's realization was entirely his own, or driven by instructions received from Takahashi that could have been communicated in either March or when Matsuda and he returned to Soya in June. While Takahashi may have suggested⁵⁴ that Rinzō try to find where the locations on the Jesuit maps were, it seems that it was Rinzō who realized the significance of them having different names. Certainly, Matsuda's report, also written in the intercalary sixth month, does not make the connection with different ethnic groups referring to the same places using different names, although he does on occasion note both of the names, with Tekka as the river near Noteto, for example.⁵⁵ A second series of reports produced in the 11th month of 1808, during Rinzō's stay at Tonnai following his solo return to Ezo that July, provided further details on the different names utilized by ethnic groups to refer to locations to the northern end of the island. In a series of reports submitted to these, which included those sent specifically to both Kageyasu and to Takahashi Sanbei as well as the government, Rinzō provided further details on the locations which he argued had been named differently in previous Japanese reports and on the Jesuit survey. It also included another pair of maps highlighting Rinzō's point.⁵⁶ In this second report, Rinzō goes further in incorporating of knowledge these locations on the "French map", ultimately drawn from the Jesuit survey, into his own representation of this space, as he now marks places at the northern end of the combined Karafuto/Sakhalin using the names related to that survey.

Takahashi compared the names used by Rinzō with those on the maps of the Qing and de Hondt in order to show this territorial overlap, noting that they "were almost identical, with minor differences".⁵⁷ The inscription of these names, which for Rinzō had demonstrated the fact that these locations on Karafuto's west coast were under the authority of the continent, confirmed to Takahashi that Sakhalin and Karafuto "are one island", and that he was correct to base his world map on that of Arrowsmith.⁵⁸ This has the important effect of shifting

⁵⁴ Not instructed, as the mission was under the aegis of the Matsumae bugyo rather than the Astronomy Institute

⁵⁵ Mamiya *Tōtatsu chihō kikō*, p. 197.

⁵⁶ This second map, held in the NDL, is perhaps not that which was submitted to Takahashi but a later version. In *Kita-I Kōshō*, p. 319, far left, Takahashi notes that Mamiya has erred in putting 'Buiroo' at the northern end of Kita-Ezo, when it should be located on the continent. However, in the report that accompanies the second map, Rinzō notes that 'Buiro' is located on Eastern Tartary, see Mamiya *Tōtatsu chihō kikō*, p.223. Either Mamiya made an error on the map he submitted to Takahashi, or Takahashi has just made a mistake here.

⁵⁷ 「地名大同小異ナリ」

⁵⁸ Matsuura Shigeru has recently argued that Takahashi used Mamiya's information to confirm that Sakhalin and Karafuto were the same, before then drawing on Arrowsmith because the latter's representation of one island on the map agreed with a conclusion which Takahashi had already reached. However, the evidence he offers for this is

narratives around Rinzō from being a journey of discovery to something else, the relation between the territory on the map and what was discovered out there in the field. This relation was initially shaped by Takahashi's utilization of Rinzō for the purpose of discovering the relation between the Japanese island of Karafuto and that of Sakhalin. The claim made for Rinzō, that he "confirmed as no explorer had before"⁵⁹ the insular nature of Karafuto, was a claim proved not at Cape Rakka, or two miles off its shore, but rather back in Edo, as Rinzō's reports filtered back to Takahashi there. As with many an explorer, the significance of what they discovered was dependent on interpretations at distant 'centers of calculation'. Contrary to what is generally understood, however, the evidence to show this stemmed from Rinzō's insight regarding the different place names used by different ethnic groups on the island, which showed that the reports of Japanese and Qing survey expeditions had been talking about the same places. This allows for Karafuto and Sakhalin to be understood as the same territory, but in relation to how one another had appeared on the map.

Mapping relations

In his second, revised, *Kita-I Kosho*, Takahashi takes this issue of naming the territory as the starting point for his discussion, by focusing on the name Karafuto. Takahashi concluded that the Japanese called the island Karafuto as a local corruption of 'Karahito' (Chinese person), because of the position of the island within the carry trade in Chinese goods from the continent to Japan. That is, it should be thought of as meaning something like "place foreigners come to barter".⁶⁰ This name was ascribed to the island by the Japanese and, as Rinzō reported, unknown to the islanders themselves. He specifically notes the recent change of name to Kita-Ezo as the source for the name of the investigation he is writing. Takahashi then discusses why this island is called Sakhalin by everyone else. He begins by using Qing sources collected by Kondo to indicate the location of the island, and notes that this was

at best inconclusive. See Matsuura, "Takahashi Kageyasu 'Kita-I kōshō'", p. 39. Given Takahashi's belief in the accuracy of the map because it had been surveyed in the field, it seems more plausible that the causation was the other way round.

⁵⁹ Walker reflects general historiography when he notes how "Mamiya boarded a small boat and paddled westward, some 2000 m or so, off the coast and into the strait. Once there, he carefully positioned the craft and gazed northward and confirmed, as no other explorer had, that Sakhalin was an island and not a peninsula". This was not, however, how it was shown that 'Sakhalin was an island'. See Walker

⁶⁰ 「外人来市国」

named Saharin in Manchu. He then reasons it is known by variations of Sagarin in the West as a result of this Manchu name. Takahashi then moves onto his first piece of cartographical evidence, which he terms “the Qianlong-era 16 Provinces 9 borderlands map”.⁶¹

As Takahashi notes, this map was remarkable when compared to other Chinese maps he had seen that represented the entirety of China’s territory because of its high standard.⁶² Takahashi thought that the lines of longitude and latitude and the high quality of surveys for each province and district showed that it could not have been made by the Chinese. On the map, at the mouth of the Amur was a large island, unnamed but with twelve place names. “Its location is the same as Saharin on Western maps, while its size and shape resemble our ‘Karafuto’.” This was a puzzle. The breakthrough, Takahashi states, was made one day in the eighth month of 1808, when while Takahashi was working on the translation of a Western map with his colleague, the Dutch translator Baba Sadayoshi, the latter connects this Qing map with ones in a Dutch text widely referred to in Japan as “Peter Honde”.⁶³

Baba Sajuro (Sadayoshi) was the adopted son of the Baba Tamehachiro who had been despatched to Soya earlier in 1808. Sajuro was something of a linguistic prodigy, who had already learnt Dutch and French from the Dutch factor Hendrik Doorf, and who would subsequently go on to study English with his successor Jan Cock Blomhoff, as well as Russian with the party of Vasily Golovnin. It was recognition of this talent that had led to him being seconded from Nagasaki to the Astronomy Institute in the fourth month of 1808.⁶⁴ Arriving in Edo in the fifth month, he began to work on translating the sections relating to Ezo in Nicolaas Witsen’s *Noord en Oost Tartarye*. It was in this connection that the insight reported above presumably occurred.

⁶¹ This was the Qing map owned by Kimura Kendo, which had come into the state’s possession when it acquired Kimura’s collection on his death. Yamada was using the map at around the same time. In a letter dated the 16th day of the 11th month sent by Hazama Shigetomi to his son Shigeyoshi, it was noted that the same “16 Provinces 9 borderlands map” was being borrowed by them from the Hayashi, see Arisaka “Kimura Kenkadō to Chizu”, p. 400.

⁶² He specifically references maps attached to the “World History” section of the 1733 大清会典 (Da-qing hui-dian), the 盛京通志 (Cheng-jing tong-zhi – found in two texts, 1779’s 諸橋漢和辞典 and 1684’s 北齋備考), and 1783’s 大清一統志 (Da-qing yi-tong-zhi). These were texts that had been used by both Kondō and Yamada in their geographies of Ezo.

⁶³ Takahashi *Kita-I Kōshō*, p. 312.

⁶⁴ On April 30, 1808, Doorf’s diary noted 「小通詞為八郎の息子で稽古通詞の佐十郎が明朝江戸へ向け出發すべく私のもとに別れを告げにきた」, see Katagiri “Oranda Tsūshi Baba Sajuro”, p. 81.

Although Baba submitted this translation, the *Tōhoku Dattan shokoku zushi Ezo zakki yakusetsu*,⁶⁵ just after Takahashi concluded *Kita-I Kōshō*, the two men were clearly working together, with Takahashi relying on Baba for his understanding of this explanation. As Baba himself relates in *Tōhoku Dattan*, on seeing how accurate the Qing map was, he was reminded of a text which had been brought to Japan in 1800, which had detailed how the French Jesuit Yarutoukusū (Jartoux) had been commissioned by the Qing Emperor to make a map, and surveyed to the northern reaches of Korea. Wondering if this map could be the one made by Jartoux, he had searched for other material containing the same map. In the Astronomy Institute's collection, he found that one work occasionally had the same map attached to it. This was a work in Dutch of 15 volumes 'edited' by 'Piitoruhonde' and published in 1750, the title of which Baba translated as *Kairiku Henreki Kiji Shūsetsu*, or a 'Collection of Voyages and Travels'. When Baba compared the map in this text to the Qianlong map, it was clear that the latitude, features and place names were in different scripts, but with identical pronunciations. Baba then understood that the Qianlong map had been made by Westerners and on reading the accompanying text was delighted to learn that it had been made by Jartoux.⁶⁶

This 'Collection of Voyages and Travels' was a Dutch text often known as the *Historische Beschryving der Reizen*, published by Pieter De Hondt from 1747 onwards.⁶⁷ The alternative name for the text, which provided the Japanese name above, the *Nieuwe en volkome Verzameling van de aller-waardigste en zeldsaamste Zee- en Landtogen*,⁶⁸ indicates that the work was ultimately based on an English book published in the previous decade, entitled the *A New General Collection of Voyages and Travels*.⁶⁹ This was compiled by one John Green, and published by Thomas Astley of London, in four volumes that appeared between 1745 and 1747. The identity of the compiler was significant, for this was the same John Green who a few years earlier had been employed to translate and illustrate du Halde's *A Description of the Empire of China and Chinese-Tartary*, which was published in two volumes by Edward Cave in

⁶⁵ 『東北韃靼諸国図誌野作雜記訳説』, *Tōhoku Dattan* hereafter.

⁶⁶ This is from Volume 6 of *Tōhoku Dattan*.

⁶⁷ Pieter de Hondt, appears to have been active between 1747-1767 approx. de Hondt published the first eleven volumes, with twelve onwards in this collection coming from Schouten of Amsterdam.

⁶⁸ <http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/3059915?selectedversion=NBD46476563>

⁶⁹ John Green (Thomas Astley publ.) *A New General Collection of Voyages and Travels: Consisting of the Most Esteemed Relations, Which Have Been Hitherto Published in Any Language; Comprehending Everything Remarkable in Its Kind, in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America*; it is a rendition of this title that Baba is attempting with *Kairiku Henreki Kiji Shusetsu*.

1738-41. This was the English translation of the *Description géographique, historique, chronologique, politique, et physique de l'empire de la Chine et de la Tartarie chinoise*, first published in 1735. In this work, du Halde had sought to collate and make available the immense volume of material collected by the Jesuits over the course of their long sojourn in the country, and it still forms one of the most comprehensive accounts of China ever produced.⁷⁰

To illustrate the work, du Halde had engaged the young cartographer Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon d'Anville to execute the maps, most of which, as de Halde's preface noted, were adaptations of Chinese originals originally produced for the emperor of China with the assistance of European missionaries.⁷¹ D'Anville's maps also formed the basis for those executed by a John Green for the English version of the *Description*. Something of the critical geographer, Green revised several longitudes and then redrew the maps; he also added an explanatory cartographic memoir to the book. When Green subsequently fell out with his publisher Edward Cave, he came to be employed by the latter's rival, Thomas Astley. It was under Astley that he began compiling the material that went into *Voyages and Travels*, reproducing and improving the maps that he had originally produced for the *Description*.⁷² *Voyages and Travels* only reached four volumes, as Green once again fell out with his publisher, but it proved influential enough to garner a French translation by Abbé Prévost, as *Histoire Générale des Voyages*. This ultimately ended up becoming a much larger collection, but the first seven volumes of it were made up of the translation of the four volumes of Astley's (Green's) *Voyages*.⁷³ It would be this French version that was subsequently translated

⁷⁰ Cams *The China Maps of Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon d'Anville*, p. 51.

⁷¹ These maps were the source of great interest in Europe, and had been immediately pirated in the Netherlands and published as *Nouvel atlas de la Chine, de la Tartarie chinoise et du Thibet* (The Hague, Henri Scheurleer, 1737). Cams *The China Maps of Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon d'Anville*.

⁷² As Mario Cams notes, d'Anville had similarly revised and attempted to improve on the original the Jesuits supplied him, a source of some consternation back in China. See Cams *The China Maps of Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon d'Anville*. On Green himself, see Crone "John Green", Crone "Further Notes on Bradock Mead" and <http://www.oshermaps.org/special-map-exhibits/percy-map/john-green>.

⁷³ With Volumes 8-15 compiled by Prevost himself, and with additional volumes subsequently added, 18 in the Paris and up to 25 in the den Haag version. The French version was first published by Didot in Paris in 1746, and subsequently by one 'Pierre de Hondt' of 'La haye', with volume one emerging from there in 1747.

<https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=njp.32101067947612;view=2up;seq=8>

into Dutch and published by the same Peter De Hondt between 1750-65, with versions of the maps Green included with the original being reproduced in the Dutch version.⁷⁴

Access and awareness to these materials provided a tremendous resource to the two scholars, and allowed for Takahashi to thus question the relationship between the renditions of Sakhalin on this text, the *Mankoku zuki*,⁷⁵ and the “Qianlong-era 16 Provinces 9 borderlands map” with which Takahashi began his investigation. Both Takahashi and Baba assumed the maps in the *Mankoku zuki* were versions of originals that the Jesuits had made in China, like that of the Qianlong map. This is why “we see that it is absolutely identical with no variation, with the only difference being that one is written in Chinese and the other barbarian letters”.⁷⁶ In order to “prove” this, Takahashi decided in the *Kita-I Kōshō* to provide copies of both of these maps appended to his text. although the abandoned *Kita-I Ko* had only appended the Qianlong map. That these two maps, one made for Chinese and the other for Europeans, were the same helped convinced Takahashi that it was “now beyond doubt that [the Chinese map] was also made by Westerners”.⁷⁷ Takahashi and Baba were provided with an explanation for why “in recent years, the maps printed in the West are all drawing their understanding of Manchuria and Kita-Ezo [here referring to Sagarin] from these two maps”.⁷⁸

This still left the problem, though, of why it was that this surveying of Sakhalin had neglected the south of the island, which resulted in maps of the region like these “even if they show one island, leaving off the southern end”.⁷⁹ The reason behind this was once again provided by Baba through his work translating Witsen. In his ‘Further thoughts’, Baba explained how the surveying for Kangxi Atlas had been conducted by the Jesuits, but that they hadn’t been to

⁷⁴ It is not exactly clear when this text first came to Japan, but is supposed to have been around the turn of the century, when as we have seen a far greater volume of material began to arrive. There were also noted as being 19- and 21-volume collections in Japan around this time, but both Baba and Takahashi note that what they were examining was a 15-volume edition. This they give as having been published in 1750, although that date probably indicated the publication of the volume they were utilizing, and likely indicates that the translation was originally conceived as being of Prévost’s initial fifteen volumes. The *Hoppōshi Shiryo Shūsei* notes it as having been the 19-volume edition.

⁷⁵ 「万国図記」

⁷⁶ 「コレ前図ト比較スルニ全ク同フシテ分毫ノ差ナク、但漢字ト蛮字トヲ異ニスルノミ」, Takahashi *Kita-I Kōshō*, p. 314.

⁷⁷ 「前図ハ愈々康熙帝の託ニ因テ西洋人ノテニ成ル」, Takahashi *Kita-I Kōshō*, p. 313

⁷⁸ 「近歳将来スル所ノ西洋製図モ皆満州及ビ北野作地ハ〔Kangxi, Hondt〕図ニ由ルモノナル」.

⁷⁹ 「唯第二図第三図〔Qing and de Hondt Maps〕ノ如キハ一島トナストイエドモ南方ヲ尽サズ」.

Sakhalin. The Manchu party that had been sent to survey the island ran out of food and did not explore below 51°, but was assured by the native's resident on the island that the island did not extend much to the south.⁸⁰ This explanation provided a reason why the mapping conducted by the Jesuits in China, which both Takahashi and Baba were otherwise claiming was far in advance of Chinese methods, had produced an image of the island at the mouth of the Amur which, they were increasingly convinced, had neglected to represent the lower half of the island. Indeed, as Baba noted, it was likely that the surveys by the Dutchmen Vries, which had reached as far as 49° North, were, like Japanese maps of Karafuto, representations of the southern half of what was in fact one island to the north of Soya.⁸¹

The European origins that Takahashi and Baba demonstrated for the Qing map, as well as those in de Hondt, served to prove "China trades in theories, while the West produces facts".⁸² Facts here meant surveying the 'accurate location of things in space', which would be able to be successfully achieved through the incorporation of such things a map able to indicate longitude and latitude correctly. The surveying necessary to achieve this could only be achieved through visiting the locations in question. This made the propensity of Europeans to explore locations around the globe and survey them an excellent source of factual knowledge. By contrast, "China and Ourselves do not sail to the four corners of the earth and investigate places, and our methods of surveying have not improved since ancient times".⁸³ The production of these facts through visiting locations also, as we have seen, served to explain the confusion over the exact status of Sakhalin, different representations of which resulted from their having been surveyed at different times. The importance placed on this process of factual production through the actual surveying of locations also came to be significant in the production of the maps Takahashi eventually submitted to the Bakufu in 1816. The manner in which these facts were represented shows how it was that the territory of *Kita-Ezo* and Japan came to be produced on both Takahashi's map and those that continued to be charted until the middle of the nineteenth century.

⁸⁰ This explained why all the maps of Sakhalin failed to show the island as extending to the south. As Baba went on to highlight, the voyages by Vries in the 1640s and mapping by the Japanese both represented land to the south of here, and that combining these two views would provide one island of Sakhalin.

⁸¹ *Tōhoku Dattan*

⁸² 「凡漢土ハ空理ヲ立、西洋ハ実理ヲ立ツ」.

⁸³ 「我 国及ビ漢土ノ人ハ四方航海ヲ事トセザレバ行テ実験スルコトナク、其測量ノ法古ヨリ詳ナラズ」.

Relating territory

Takahashi and Baba's understanding was clearly that these maps were the results of a specifically Western way of viewing the world, which for them was exemplified by Europe's ability to produce these maps accurately. Takahashi explicitly argued that these two maps were able to be relied upon because they were made by Europeans, as "the Chinese lacked the requisite surveying skills to produce such a map in the Kangxi era".⁸⁴ On the basis of the Western concern with drawing up 'accurate' maps, Takahashi would argue for "something fundamentally different between Chinese and Western scholarship".⁸⁵ The difference between maps derived from Chinese and Western sources indicated that the West was thousands of years in advance of China, having long studied the heavens, while the Chinese were wedded to a belief that the Heavens were round and the earth square. The key difference between the two was in the importance that was assigned to observation, which as is long established was one of the fundamental parameters through which '*rangaku*' was understood and celebrated during this period.⁸⁶

Nevertheless, modern surveying is characterized by its incorporation of error. The mapping conducted by Takahashi and Baba, through which they arrived at their understanding of Ezo's northern geography, was characterized by the same. While they were broadly correct in their understanding of the relation between the two maps, though, this did not mean that Baba and Takahashi entirely grasped the history of the production of these maps. Takahashi, quoting liberally from Gerbillion's account reproduced in *Voyages and Travels*, appears under the mistaken impression that the maps appearing in the *Mankoku zuki* had been produced by

⁸⁴ 「清康熙中未ダ測量術ヲ詳ニセズ」, as a consequence of the account read by Takahashi and Baba, Takahashi was of the correct view that the maps had actually be surveyed during Kangxi's reign, although the map itself was a product of Qianlong's era. This method of opposing European and Chinese mapmaking as Takahashi does here was long accepted as given in studies of the history of cartography, while recently coming to be questioned. More significant here is the way that Takahashi's claim makes use of the 'authority' of Western science in order to argue his own perspective. This could also be institutionally explained through the importance of calendrical reform, which proved the superiority of Western astronomy. It was this reform which justified the employment of first his father and by extension himself.

⁸⁵ 「漢土ト西洋学ノ異なる事如此シ」, Takahashi *Kita-I Kō*, p. 296

⁸⁶ Screech *The Lens Within the Heart*; Marcon *The Knowledge of Nature and the Nature of Knowledge*.

Gerbillion himself, or at least were based on ones he had charted.⁸⁷ Although Baba correctly noted that while Gerbillion had led the project, Jartroux and others had undertaken the actual mapping, he was also confused about how the maps had appeared in Europe: Takahashi followed Baba in noting D'Anville, cartographer for du Halde's *Description*, as a Manchu surveyor named *Anhirure*.⁸⁸ This error suggests neither of them were aware that the maps in the *Mankoku zuki* they were viewing were the results of a long chain of production in several countries, which eventually led to their appearance in Japan.

While the unstructured and largely concealed nature of this process of "drawing in the world" would suggest that while Latour's notion of a "center of calculation" is too totalizing,⁸⁹ the manner in which these "immutable mobiles" circulated and enabled the collection of the world appears broadly correct. If we follow the role of Rinzō's insight in the production of *Kita-Ezo* on the map, it indicates that Latour's focus on and emphasis of the ontological content of these "traces" is fundamentally correct. Ontological content means that the "traces or inscriptions have an existence, but no meaning until it is assigned or attributed to them".⁹⁰ As we have already discussed, meaning is granted through the deployment of these inscriptions within a given framework,⁹¹ the process of which defines the epistemological content held by the material object.

Their deployment by Rinzō was, if not at "right angles" to Takahashi, then at least distinctive from how the latter would make use of Rinzō's insight back in Edo.⁹² As noted above, Rinzō and Matsuda were despatched to learn more about the island in a context shaped by the Russian raids of 1806 and 1807, as well as a general indeterminacy in the geography of this area. The decision, partially on the basis of material brought back by Matsuda, to officially rename this as 'Kita-Ezo' in the summer of 1809 shows that a decision had been made to incorporate the island more fully into an expanded conception of Ezo being shaped by Bakufu

⁸⁷ Funakoshi *Sakoku Nihon ni kita 'Koki zu'*, p. 78. This explains the excessive attention to Gerbillion himself in the *Kita-I*.

⁸⁸ 'アンヒルレ', see Takahashi *Kita-I Kōshō*, p. 317.

⁸⁹ As is often pointed out, see Walker "Mamiya Rinzō and the Japanese exploration of Sakhalin Island".

⁹⁰ Bravo "Ethnographic Navigation and the Geographical Gift", p. 228.

⁹¹ Bravo's emphasis on "commensurability" also accords with the focus Yulia Frumer places on the "long conceptual process prior to the actual inscription ... rooted in a set of practices and communal conceptual development" in mapping this region. Frumer *Clocks and Time in Edo Japan*, p. 147, n. 360.

⁹² Bravo "Ethnographic Navigation and the Geographical Gift", p. 228

rule.⁹³ Rinzō's concern in showing the different names for these villages was thus primarily political. While the southern end of the island was administered by Japan, it was barbarians under the control of Eastern Tartary that inhabited its western coast and interior. It was as a consequence of this, Rinzō noted, that Westerner's had come to name the island Sakhalin, filtering Takahashi's subsequent note of the different geographical designations through a political lens.⁹⁴ Rinzō's lack of concern with geographical interests is suggested by his correspondence with Yamada. Questioned by the latter regarding the possibility that Karafuto and Sakhalin were two islands, Rinzō proved perfectly amenable to the suggestion, responding that this seems plausible.

For Takahashi, however, the significance of the insight into the names was what they confirmed regarding the geography of the region. Rinzō's report and maps were offered as proof that Karafuto and Sakhalin were the same island. It also confirmed that the Jesuit maps were surveys showing the northern end of the island the Japanese had until recently referred to as Karafuto, because of the match between the names reported by Rinzō. This allowed for them to be united on the map, as is clear from the maps provided by both Takahashi in the *Kita-I* and by Baba Sajuro in *Tōhoku Dattan* (Figure 28). As Takahashi says of his, “the northern portion is largely based on the Qing map, and the southern end primarily makes use of Rinzō's surveyed chart. The completed map resembles the representation of Sakhalin on the new British map.” Takahashi then sought to calibrate the representation that would eventually be utilized in the world map, through comparing the representations offered for the Kuril Islands and the coast of Asia on both Arrowsmith's map and that of Wilbrecht, which Yamada had adopted.⁹⁵ Again, this was a means of attempting to make the representation of territory offered on these maps commensurable with each other, distilling the truth of the terrestrial lie of the land from a variety of representations. Ultimately, however, the construction of the map on the basis of Arrowsmith was an epistemological gamble, the same which had been

⁹³ Azuma “Saharin-tō wo sasu koshō, p. 23

⁹⁴ In earlier reports, he stuck to the names with which earlier Japanese explorers had used to refer to locations on the island, see for example 'Nakko' in his first report, on reaching Rakka. p. 190. Mamiya's decision on his second map to represent these places at the northern end of Karafuto using names matching those drawn from the Jesuit survey therefore accords with the political aims of his reports, which was to emphasize the fact that they were under the foreign control. These political concerns of Mamiya were obviously shared by the Bakufu, who in response to these reports despatched Matsuda back to Karafuto in order to show “benevolence” to the population.

⁹⁵ The maps upon which Takahashi engages in this process have been analysed by Funakoshi Akio, see “Shintei Bankoku Zenzu”.

undertaken by Yamada. In Takahashi's case, however, the map which he produced eventually proved him right.

CONCLUSION – A World of Territories

“A concept becomes possible at a moment. It is made possible by a different arrangement of earlier ideas that have collapsed or exploded. A philosophical problem is created by the incoherencies between the earlier state and the later one. Concepts remember this, but we do not: we gnaw at problems eternally (or for the lifetime of the concept) because we do not understand that the source of the problem is the lack of coherence between the concept and that prior arrangement of ideas that made the concept possible.” (Hacking, 37)

When reflecting back on his efforts in Japan almost a decade earlier, Horace Capron, Civil War veteran, Commissioner for Agriculture in the United States, and subsequently special advisor to the Hokkaido Development Agency, found considerable cause for satisfaction. He had been “engaged by the Japanese Government” in the “examination of the natural resources and the climate” of Japan’s northern region of Hokkaido “with the view to its future development and settlement”. Hokkaido was “an encumbrance to the nation” when “first taken in hand” in 1871, whose “actual production did not pay for the cost of protecting and governing it”. However, under “this Commission [it has] been Geologically, Mineralogically, Trigonometrically and Hydrographically surveyed and mapped; its harbors and rivers sounded and buoyed, its coasts charts corrected, its mineral and other resources developed and extent and value ascertained, its climate thoroughly investigated.” As a result, Capron felt able to conclude that “It may truthfully be said that the work of this Department exclusively under American direction, has resulted in literally enlarging the boundaries of the Japanese Empire to the extent of the domain of this great Island of Yesso or Hokkaido”.¹

¹ Capron *Memoirs of Horace Capron*

In Capron's view, this incorporation of Hokkaido is the outcome of the mapping and marking of the land to enable its utilization. While the civilizational discourse of early modern Japan had focused on the necessity of introducing agriculture to Ezo, and the Ezo to agriculture, this was not perceived as sufficient by Capron. Mapping Hokkaido into modern Japan would also incorporate its fisheries, shipping, the surveying and exploitation of new forms of energy and new industries, all of which reflected a modern vision frequently far in advance of realities in the rest of the state. This was not limited to Japan, for in the United States, too, "Some of the first effective interventions that can be understood as expressions of national-scale governmentality occurred at the borders of the territory".² Capron's perspective embodies a nineteenth century enlightened belief in the possibility of improvement and the transforming potential of technology when properly applied, for the benefit of the territory itself, the state, and ultimately the human condition.

And yet, Capron's concern in his mapping was ultimately with the importance of calculation and enumeration. This was a vision of territory perfectly familiar to early modern Japan, where the notion of territory was also dependent upon "what comes with it". For the early modern state, this was primarily expressed in agricultural surplus, a view which consistently found expression in plans for civilizing Ezo. For the modern, inorganic economy,³ the relative importance of what came with the territory was altered, but the role of the map in providing both a claim to it and framework within which to understand it had not. Japan's boundaries had been enlarged because of its eagerness to engage in and institutionalize a particular form of mapping. The establishment of this Development Agency emphasizes how this period of 'high imperialism' was a self-consciously comparative project, which was capable of importing 'best practice' from elsewhere in the name of development. It was also, however, a means of bordering Hokkaido as decisively Japanese, by incorporating this formerly barbarian territory upon the modern map.

The form of mapping adopted appears to be one able "to think of territory as emptiable and fillable", which is easier "when a society possesses writing and especially a metrical geometry to represent space independently of events... the coordinate system of the modern map is ideally suited".⁴ Yet this claim to homogeneity was precisely that, one that was made solely

² Hannah Governmentality and the Mastery of Territory, p. 40.

³ Wrigley, *The Path to Sustained Growth*.

⁴ Sack *Human Territoriality*, p. 63.

upon the map's surface. In reality, while early modern calculations of agricultural potential had invoked the entirety of Ezo's space, the island remained "a nutshell, rich in the interior, I believe, but not known even to the Japanese outside".⁵ On the modern map, too, the triangulated representations of Hokkaido's space were ultimately focussed upon certain specific points of interest: workable coal, for instance, or transport routes. Indeed, this was how the nineteenth century state functioned, representing itself as the grand unified tapestry of the nation while being "a fabric full of holes...politically-fragmented; legally differentiated and encased in irregular, porous and sometimes undefined borders".⁶

The relational nature of territory is what accounts for the clear contradiction in Capron's account, between his having been posted to 'Japan's northern region of Hokkaido' and the boundaries of the Japanese Empire only "enlarging" to incorporate "this great Island" as a result of the Department's work. While Ezo was a territory recognized, reluctantly and partially, as Japanese, its recreation as Hokkaido necessitated a new map, one that would be appropriate for the nation's presence on the global stage. This new map not only positioned Hokkaido within the global grid provided by its location in space, but also noted its presence in time, as a space open to being developed a modernized by Japan. The previously uncivilized space of Ezo is being transformed into a frontier in the American sense, as the outer frontier of a developmental advance. Thus it was necessary for the territory to be remapped and rebound.

While particularly associated with certain periods in history, this is not a development unique to the modern era: for they are "*always* re-made every time they are engaged with; mapping is a process of constant re-territorialization. As such, maps are transitory and fleeting, being contingent, relational and context dependent. *Maps are practices* – they are always *mappings*; spatial practices enacted to solve relational problems".⁷ This has been traced through this study in relation to maps largely produced by the state. Maps solve various problems for the state, the need to re-present their authority, to reflexively monitor their territory, and to comprehend the area under their control. As John Agnew has commented, "there is much more to the geography of political power...than is captured by regarding the state territory as

⁵ Hodgson *A Residence at Nagasaki and Hakodate in 1859-1860*, p. 48.

⁶ Benton *A Search for Sovereignty*, p. 2.

⁷ Kitchin & Dodge "Rethinking maps", p. 337.

the singular unit of political account".⁸ And yet this is why such bordering and mapping processes are so important, as they create those conditions under which such singular units become comprehensible and mobilizable in the first place. Rather than a narrow focus on the state apparatus, however, the significance is how the state comes to be mapped and bordered by a variety of people across a wide span of space and time. It is the ability of the map to connect spaces to others, and for borders to tie together individual spaces, which enables the constitution of the world and the "fabric of meaning in which human beings interpret their experience and guide their actions".⁹

Kären Wigen has noted of the post-Meiji transformation elsewhere in Japan, "Shinano had a geo-body all along; it had just been defined in relation to its neighbors rather than a global grid".¹⁰ The same had happened to Ezo, which from being bordered and represented solely in relation to Japan, had come to be placed upon the world's map. Yet despite the dreams of Takahashi Kageyasu, who had sought to fix its location once and for all, this was not possible, as the meaning of the map was required to be claimed and asserted in every subsequent remapping. Ezo territory required constant re-assertion, through its claim in practices which continue to operate into the present. In April of this year, Office of Policy Planning and Coordination on Territory and Sovereignty released their new map representing the "shape of Japan", upon which the nation has once again come to be reinserted into its wider geopolitical surroundings (*Figure 29*). The representation of the space of the national body accords with that of previous images and yet on this map, those formerly Japanese territories of Karafuto and the Kuril Islands are whitened, blanked out upon the surface of the map. While the earlier image produced by this office represented Japan's territorial disputes as abstracted to Japan alone, now they come to be related to Japan's own possible claim to parts of this former Ezo space, one presumably being made as a protest the absence of movement upon the question of the Northern Territories.¹¹

Territory today is not, then, the assertion of some abstract space, but is rather constituted through the relations between territories. Such relations are made real through their influence on practices of mapping and bordering, which are underpinned, but not reducible to, ideas

⁸ Agnew *Globalization and Sovereignty*, p. 39

⁹ Geertz *The interpretation of cultures*, p. 145

¹⁰ Wigen *A Malleable Map*, p. 125.

¹¹ The map doesn't make clear what this whiteness means with regards to the territorial claims represented upon it.

about territory. “Territory is not simply an object: the outcome of actions conducted toward it or some previously supposedly neutral area. Territory is itself a process, made and remade, shaped and shaping, active and reactive”.¹² In order to understand how it functions, we need to comprehend its role in the constitution of the political scales within which such representations operate. Friedrich Kratochwil has pointed to how “the local and the global are not ‘located’ at different levels, but constantly being reconfigured by the links that connect a decision center with other actors and issue areas across the globe”.¹³ Yet while he suggests for the novelty of this arrangement, this study’s examination of the role of mapping and bordering practices rather suggests that “these historical precedents ‘fit’ the contemporary patterns” rather well. Contemporary concerns over territory are not novel, precisely because territory has never been defined through its modes of legitimization, but rather through how it is practiced. If we are to capture the universal nature of territory, we must “pass these universals through the grid” formed from the way it is bordered and mapped.¹⁴

¹² Elden *The Birth of Territory*, p. 17.


¹³ Kratochwil “Of Maps, Law, and Politics”, p. 24.

¹⁴ Foucault *The Birth of Biopolitics*, p. 3.

Figures

知っていますか

内閣
官房
Deliver Secretariat
領土・主権
対策企画
調整室



日本のカタチ

(「北方領土」、「竹島」、「尖閣諸島」は日本固有の領土です)

※平成 27 年 3 月

Figure 1 - "Do you know the shape of Japan?" Office of Policy Planning and Coordination on Territory and Sovereignty, March 2015. http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/ryodo_eq/img/data/poster201502.pdf



Figure 2 - Map of Japan on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan website, published April 4, 2014.
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/territory/index.html>




Figure 3 - Ishikawa Ryūsen, *Nihon Kaisan Chōrikuzu* 日本海山潮陸圖, 1694. Courtesy of the C. V. Starr East Asian Library, University of California




Figure 4 - "Shugaisho", Medieval Japanese Encyclopedia (c. 1656 reproduction). *I-chi* 夷地 (barbarian land) indicated in the far north of Mutsu Province (extreme right of the map).



Figure 5 - Map of Japan from the *Kaitō Shokokuki* 『海東諸国記』, 1471, indicating a 'Barbarian island' to the north of Honshu. As with the *Shugaisho* Encyclopedia map, a 'barbarian land' (夷地) is also marked on Honshu itself. Courtesy of the National Diet Library. See <http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info>



Figure 6 - Representation of Matsumae and Ezo on one of the Shōhō 'Maps of all Japan', assembled from the provincial maps ordered in the Shōhō era. 1669 reproduction. The road traced along the southern shore of Ezo matches the distances from Matsuma travelled by the 1633 Inspection Tour.




Figure 7 - *Ezo Matsumae no zu*, a map produced to illustrate the Shakushain conflict. Upon the main island of Ezo, there are only three political markings, those of Matsumae, Onibishi, and Shakushain. Note the rough border between the latter two, and the naturalization of the border between Matsumae and Ezo in the form of mountains. The Kuril Islands are reduced to a 'Rakko' Island, 60 days journey from Matsumae. Karafuto is inhabited by the 'half-human' Ezo. Courtesy of the Northern Studies Collection, Hokkaido University.



Figure 8 - Copy of the Genroku Kuniezu, showing the boundary between the lands of Matsumae and Ezo in the east, marked as just before Shiokubi-no-saki. The road now appears to run beyond the barrier to the Ainu settlement of Muraki.



Figure 9 – The *Tōsando Mutsu Matsumae Chishima oyobi Hōshū Kyoran no zu* 東山道陸奥松前千島及方州掌覽之圖, 1789. Gives information on the history of Matsumae, products to be sourced there, and the local dialect. Writes in Ainu in katakana. The space is defined by the trade routes heading deep into Ezo's interior.




Figure 10 - Representative of numerous nineteenth century maps of Ezo, in which this list of places around the edge of the map also ties the space together on it.



Figure 11 – Ezo-chizu at the Hakodate Library, presumably a rejected draft submission of the map made by the Matsumae for the Tenpo mapping project. The map records the return of the land to the Matsumae in 1821. Its distinctive representation of Ezo's shape is retained on the government's Tenpo map. Courtesy of Hakodate City Library.



Figure 12 - Tenpo *kuniezu* map, indicating the divide between Matsumae villages and Ezo settlements on the map. Note the absence of village productivity figures and distance markers on the roads. Courtesy of the National Diet Library.



Figure 13 - Ezo-no-zu from the *Wakan Sanzai Zue*, 1888 reprint version. Shiretoko has been detached as an island; see the three Ainu groupings nearby labelled as 'kuni', with the character for dog, 'inu', above them (thought to indicate Ainu). The map of Ezo still finds itself "enframed" by fantastical locations.



Figure 14 - Map of Japan from the *Wakan Sanzai Zue*, manuscript. Ezo is situated outside the frame of the map in the top-right. Courtesy of Waseda University Library.



Figure 15 - North-east portion of Nagakubo Sekisui's *Nihon Yochi Rotei Zenzu* 日本輿地路程全図, 1791, showing Japan as a dense network of road and maritime connections. Matsumae is represented at the top of the map but is not part of this networked vision of the Japanese archipelago. Courtesy of Waseda University Library.




Figure 16 - The imperial state's formal reorganization of space, shown on here on the *Hokkaido 12-ka Koku 86 Gun Meisaizu* (Detailed map of Hokkaido's 12 Provinces and 86 Districts), 1869. Courtesy of the Northern Studies Collection, Hokkaido University Library.



Figure 17 – Jean Baptiste Bourguignon D'Anville, *Carte Generale De La Tartarie Chinoise Dressee sur les Cartes Particulieres Faits Sur les Lieux Par les R.R. P.P. Jesuites... MDCCXXXII*. Adding the representation of Japan and Ezo to his maps China, the cape of the island to Ezo's north is consistent with Vries' survey.




Figure 18 – Representation of the islands north of Japan on the *Mappa Generalis Totius Imperii Russici*, Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg 1745. Courtesy of the David Rumsey Map Collection



Figure 19 – Jean Baptiste Bourguignon d'Anville, *Troisième partie de la carte d'Asie*, 1753. The enormously influential representation of Asia by d'Anville. The maps in the Description would themselves arrive in Japan via a circuitous route, as the Dutch translation published by Pieter de Hondt of *A New General Collection of Voyages and Travels*.




Figure 20 - Nagakubo Sekisui *Ezo Matsumaezu*, predominantly based on the results of Tenmei expedition.



Figure 21 - Lapérouse's voyage in the islands north of Japan, from the *Map of the World, or General chart of the known parts of the globe, illustrating the voyage of La Pérouse in 1785, 1786, 1787 & 1788*, G. G. & J. Robinson, Paternoster Row 1799. Courtesy of the John Carter Brown Library at Brown University.



Figure 22 - Representation of the islands north of Japan on Roberts' map of Cook's voyage, from *A general chart: exhibiting the discoveries made by Captn. James Cook in this and his two preceding voyages, with the tracks of the ships under his command*. By Lieut. Henry Roberts of his Majesty's Royal Navy. W. Palmer sculp. (London, G. Nicol and T. Cadell, 1785). Courtesy of the David Rumsey Map Collection.




Figure 23 - Representation of Karafuto, Jeso and the Kurils out to Etorofu, Kato Hisashi (Kengo) *Matsumae Chizu* (original c. 1791). Courtesy of the Northern Studies Collection, Hokkaido University.




Figure 24 –Kondō Jūzō, *Konjo Kōtei Bunkai no zu*. Courtesy of Sapporo City Library.




Figure 25 - Kondō Jūzū, *Ezo oyobi Karafuto no zu*, 1802. Courtesy of Hokkaido University Northern Studies Collection.



Figure 26 - Yamada Ren, his own representation of this territory from the *Ishū Hokueizusetsu Shūranbikō* 彙輯北裔
図說集覽備攷, Courtesy of the National Diet Library.




Figure 27 - First Report, Mamiya Rinzō to Takahashi Kageyasu.




Figure 28 - Takahashi's own map of the region in the *Kita-I Kōshō*

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Figure 29 - "Do you know the shape of Japan?" Office of Policy Planning and Coordination on Territory and Sovereignty, April 2017. <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/rvodo/img/data/poster201704.pdf>

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