open access

https://hdl.handle.net/2115/89026

Distributive justice and social conflict in an AK model

英語

social contract

2023-04

0-28

JEL Classification numbers: O41, O43, E25, P16, Z13

We introduce distributive justice into a standard macroeconomic model with agent heterogeneity in terms of capital endowments. The labour share is the primitive in the distributive justice game. We provide a clear definition of distributive social conflict. This conflict is resolved by two positive and three normative methods. The two positive ones are ‘average voter’ in the probalistic voting model and Nash bargaining, encapsulating electoral politics and socio-political bargaining; two normative (justice) criteria are the Utilitarian and the Rawlsian. We also propose a novel criterion of ‘justice as minimal social friction’. The labour share in turn affects growth in the ‘AK’ production economy. Thus, in socio-economic equilibrium, growth and the labour share are jointly determined. Greater impatience, status comparisons, wealth inequality or a decline in productivity exacerbate social conflict. Status comparisons and wealth inequality raise the labour share under all positive and normative criteria. At least if the capital-rich individuals’ overall socio-political strength is higher than that of workers, both positive methods imply a smaller labour share and more inequality than do all our three criteria of distributive justice.

学術雑誌論文

Author's Original