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https://hdl.handle.net/2115/89041

Question 21 : Is being the primary object of our intellect? [unity of being], in Questions on the De Anima by Duns Scotus

日本語

2023-03-29

Research Faculty of Media and Communication, Hokkaido University

Media and Communication Studies

76

53-69

This paper is a translation of B. Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera Philosophica V, Quaestiones super secundum et tertium De Anima, Quaestio 21: Utrum ens sit obiectum primum intellectus nostri. This question is in line with the theory of intellect in Aristotleʼs De Anima, Book 3, chapters 3-8. However, Aristotle does not designate the object of the intellect in De Anima as, for example, he designates color as the object of vision. The interpretation of the object of the intellect as ʠbeingʡ(ens) is derived from Avicenna. Scotus does not refer to the text of De Anima, Book 3 at all. Rather, Scotus frequently refers to the Aristotleʼs Metaphysics and Avicennaʼs Metaphysics. This is understandable, since being is the subject matter of metaphysics. This question can be regarded as abridged version of his main work, Ordinatio, Book 1, distinction 3, part1, quaestions 1-3 (Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera Omnia, studio et cura Commissionis Scotisticae, Civitas Vaticana, III, 1954), which is known as the source of theʠunivocity of beingʡThe outline of this question can be inferred from theʠtable of contentsʡabove. Namely, being is (1) the primary object of intellect according to potentiality with respect to the one, true, and good, (2) univocally predicated of God and creatures, and (3) univocally predicated of substance and accidents. In all three of these ways, being is the primary object of human intellect.

紀要論文

Version of Record

1882-5303

AA12286697