open access

https://hdl.handle.net/2115/95158

Narrative self-constitution as embodied practice

英語

Merleau-Ponty

2023-11-25

Taylor & Francis

Philosophical Psychology

38(4)

1731-1755

Narrative views of the self argue that we constitute our self in self-narratives. Embodied views hold that our self is shaped through embodied experiences. In that case, what is the relation between embodiment and narrativity in the process of self-constitution? The question demands a clear definition of embodiment, but existing studies remains unclear on this point (section 2). We offer a correction to this situation by drawing on Merleau-Ponty's analysis of the body that highlights its habituality. On this account, the body has an inherent tendency to cultivate an organization of habits through its history of engagement with the world (section 3). Next, we explore its role in narrative self-constitution by distinguishing between two aspects of the narrative self, the narrated I and the narrating I (section 4). We argue on phenomenological grounds that self-narratives are informed by bodily perspectives in both respects. Furthermore, a focus on the habituality of the body allows for a better explanation of self-constitution than those based on implicit self-narratives (section 5). For these phenomenological and theoretical reasons, we conclude that narrative self-constitution is an embodied and embedded practice (section 6).

学術雑誌論文

Accepted Manuscript

This is an original manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology on 25 Nov 2023, available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2286281

0951-5089