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Reconsidering Kant's Second Antinomy

Sumihiko KUMANO

A house is a house because it is *one* house, and it would be no longer *a* house if one house were destroyed and made to a lot of wood. In this sense, therefore, "*unum convenitur cum ente*". On the other hand, if some ones are not the "One in itself," they must be "Many" at the same time. The problem unfolds with several paradoxes (*e.g.,* Zeno's paradox of "infinite division"). Kant was challenging this problem of ancient times in the second antinomy of *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Kant's considering on the problem is nothing but the consideration related to one of the most important points in Kant's theoretical philosophy, *i.e*., the question concerning the absolute unity of the transcendental apperception: "ich denke" (*cogito*).

Does Russell's Theory of Descriptions Have Some Ontological Implications?

Yasushi NOMURA

Bertrand Russell developed the theory of denoting concepts (TDC) in his *Principles of Mathematics* (PoM, 1903) and then the theory of descriptions (TD) in his famous paper "On Denoting" (OD, 1905). According to a "standard" interpretation, since TDC is thought to imply a possibilistic ontology and TD an actualistic ontology, Russell is seen to convert from possibilistic to actualistic ontologies by superseding TDC by TD. However, according to a "new" reading that is offered against the standard reading, there is no ontological shift during PoM to OD, because not only TD but also TDC can

be seen to imply an actualistic ontology.

In this paper I shall show that both readings are incorrect by pointing out the following two reasons. (1) Both TDC and TD have no ontological implications at all (therefore the standard interpretations are incorrect). However, (2) there is certainly an ontological shift from possibilistic to actualistic ontologies that is theoretically independent of, but accompanies with, or precedes, the overt theoretical shift from TDC to TD (therefore the new readings are incorrect as well).

'Geometrical Eyes' and Sense Data: *The Blue Book*, 63–64

Hajime NAKAGAWA

Wittgenstein uses the term 'geometrical eyes' in *The Blue Book*. It has been taken to be connected with the eye as the metaphor of the ego in the *Tractatus*. Nagai pointed out that Wittgenstein's argument was inconsistent with their interpretation. And he concluded that Wittgenstein was confused. We shall, however, show that the standard interpretation is not correct and Wittgenstein's argument is consistent. Geometrical eyes as objects are in vain, although the grammar of the word 'geometrical eyes' does well. Comparing the expression 'visual sense datum' to the word 'geometrical eye', Wittgenstein tries to uncover such philosophical fantasies as sense data.

Can Naturalistic Epistemology Regard So-Called Scientific Knowledge as Proper Knowledge?

Takashi ASO

Traditional formulation of knowledge is "justified true belief". Epistemology concerns about knowledge. W. V. Quine proposed naturalistic epistemology in 1969. This brought about a new dimension in epistemology. The two key points of naturalistic epistemology are that you should give up the first philosophy and that you can use empirical knowledge in investigating epistemological problems. Goldman's reliabilism plays the key role in this new tradition of naturalistic epistemology. According to Goldman, knowledge can be formulated as "true belief generated by a reliable process". In this article I will discuss the possibility whether this Goldman's formulation can be expanded to so-called scientific knowledge.

Why am I a Naïve Realist?

Takuya NIIKAWA

This essay aims to present my fundamental motivation to defend naïve realism. In Section 1, I set out the background to this attempt. Section 2 describes my way into naïve realism, focusing on my belief that the world in which I live is presented in my perceptual consciousness and my desire that other people who I meet and intract with in this world are conscious beings as I am. In Section 3, I present three challenges to naïve realism: they indicate that it is unreasonable to stick with naïve realism without strong reason for it. Section 4 concludes that the above desire—the craving for

conscious peers—motivates me to defend naïve realism and thus my reason for defending naïve realism is existential.

An Interpretative Study of "Inverse Correlation" in Nishida's Philosophy

Naizhen HOU

This paper attempts to provide an interpretation of Nishida's concept of "Inverse Correlation (Gyaku Taiō)", which pertains to the relationship between the absolute and the self in Nishida's later philosophy. To achieve this goal, the first step is to follow Nishida's discussion of the problem of the self in order to show the importance of "Gyaku Taiō" in Nishida's philosophy (particularly as it pertains to his theory of religion). Second, it focuses on the meaning of the word "Gyaku" and show the priority of the absolute in "Gyaku Taiō." Finally, the paper argues that, despite this apparent priority of the absolute in Nishida's notion of "Gyaku Taiō," it does not lead his philosophy into a form of pantheism constituted by the self-development or the hypostasis of a transcendental entity.