open access

https://doi.org/10.14943/ouyourin.16.46

https://hdl.handle.net/2115/95759

超義務と道徳的葛藤の関係についてのさらなる考察 : コメンタリー「道徳的理由のあいだの葛藤という観点から超義務を考える」へのリプライ

日本語

2025-06-30

北海道大学大学院文学研究院応用倫理・応用哲学研究教育センター

応用倫理

16

46-58

In this article, we respond to Shintaro Tamate’s commentary on the discussion by Keisuke Urano and Shu Ishida. Tamate points out that their taxonomy may not exhaust the entire spectrum of “desirable yet non-obligatory” actions, suggesting the need for another class of supererogation?i.e., conflictive supererogation. Roughly put, an action is conflictivesupererogatory when it is desirable in itself and yet non-mandatory, all things considered, in light of other moral considerations. It is caused by a conflict between two (or more) moral reasons, each of which alone is not decisive. True, this sort of moral conflict might comprise a part of the domain of “desirable yet non-obligatory” actions. However, even setting aside potential disputes on whether the situation described by Tamate should be genuinely outside the scope of heroic or benevolent supererogation, we are sceptical of seeing it as a novel class of supererogation. First, such a tripartite classification of supererogation would face a taxonomical inconsistency when, for instance, we should choose between two small benevolences. Second, and more importantly, moral conflict is a quite general normative experience, not unique to supererogation; we are familiar with cases in which moral conflicts complicate the call of obligations, such as moral dilemmas. Having these observations in mind, we finally submit a revised picture: supererogation?whether heroic or benevolent?and moral conflicts are two distinct normative phenomena that can often render a desirable action non-obligatory, independently complicating our normative experiences and moral choices.

紀要論文

Version of Record

1883-0110