Permalink : http://hdl.handle.net/2115/47861

The main question of this paper is whether any modal properties are ascribed to an object or not. According to David Lewis's counterpart theory, the answer is yes and no. It is yes only if we provide appropriate contexts where counterpart relationships hold between possible objects. This sort of counterpart relations is mind-dependent since its establishment depends on what people pay attention to etc.. It allowed that any objects have any modal properties in this case. On the other hand, the answer is no only if counterpart relations are determined by Lewis's theory of natural properties. This sort of counterpart relations is mind-independent since they are fixed by virtue of objective resemblance between objects, that is, one role of natural properties. I show that there are these two types of counterpart relations in Lewisian metaphysics. Moreover, I point out that the range of mind-independent counterpart relations corresponds to that of possibly nomological possibilities. In the result, any modal properties are not ascribed to possible objects in the case of mind-independent counterpart relationships involved natural properties.