Permalink : http://hdl.handle.net/2115/91156

JaLCDOI : 10.14943/jfhhs.19.1

Kant argues that human beings, who are both rational and sensible, are bound to have emotions and inclinations that are in conflict with moral law. Thus, in Kantian ethics, we must assume a dualism of reason and emotion; they must maintain an ordered governance structure. As Kant states, reason must always ‘hold the reins of government in its own hands.’ Kantʼs theory of virtue may then seem to assume that emotions should always be slaves that need to be subordinated. This, however, raises questions: are we required to always limit the workings of our emotions so that we are not influenced by them, and are we required to have control over them as if they are slaves? The answer is partly no. This is because, Kant also emphasizes that emotion can serve as a means for promoting the performance of duty based on reason. For example, in Kantʼs Doctrine of Virtue, cultivating emotions is necessary as a means of fulfilling duties, and one of these emotions is sympathy (Teilnehmung). Therefore, it is not only necessary to restrict the function of emotions in one aspect and to slavishly suppress and control them so that they do not interfere with reason as much as possible, but it is also necessary to cultivate them so they are compatible with reason to make them useful for the proper functioning of emotions that are to be used as means of reason. In this paper, I aim to clarify the role of emotions in Kantian ethics by interpreting the inner freedom that Kantʼs virtuous agents must have, with reason as their master, as a pluralistic and flexible way of controlling emotion. I argue that reason as the master must respond to emotions with two attitudes—suppression and cultivation—and that virtue finds a well-maintained balance between them.