北海道農業経済研究 = Hokkaido Jounal of Agricultural Economics;第4巻 第2号

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環境政策の制定と実施のタイミング問題 : 政府・企業の交渉におけるゲーム理論分析

修, 震杰;出村, 克彦

Permalink : http://hdl.handle.net/2115/62990

Abstract

In environmental policy debates, it is often argued that industries would be put in jeopardy by the immediate enforcement of severe policies, while postponing environmental policies would allow the domestic industries to introduce new technologies and products, that would effectively improve environmental quality. Timing the execution of environmental policy is examined in finite and infinite horizon, perfect information game. However, postponement of policy fails to pass the credibility criterion called "renegotiation-proof."

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