open access

https://hdl.handle.net/2115/66270

The promotion of cooperation by the poor in dynamic chicken games

英語

Social evolution

2017-02-24

Nature Publishing Group

Scientific Reports

7

43377

The evolution of cooperative behavior is one of the most important issues in game theory. Previous studies have shown that cooperation can evolve only under highly limited conditions, and various modifications have been introduced to games to explain the evolution of cooperation. Recently, a utility function basic to game theory was shown to be dependent on current wealth as a conditional (state) variable in a dynamic version of utility theory. Here, we introduce this dynamic utility function to several games. Under certain conditions, poor players exhibit cooperative behavior in two types of chicken games (the hawk-dove game and the snowdrift game) but not in the prisoner's dilemma game and the stag hunt game. This result indicates that cooperation can be exhibited by the poor in some chicken games. Thus, the evolution of cooperation may not be as limited as has been suggested in previous studies.

学術雑誌論文

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Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

2045-2322