『論考』における意義と意味の区別
中川, 大
Permalink : http://hdl.handle.net/2115/75564
Abstract
Ludwig Wittgenstein distinguished Sinn from Bedeutung. In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Sinn was assigned to a sentence while Bedeutung was to a name. This distinction was similar to the one by Heinrich Rickert. On the other hand, Gottlob Frege took every expression to be a name, and he assigned both Sinn and Bedeutung to any expression. Did Wittgenstein reject Frege's theory in the Neo-Kantian way? No. Frege criticized the Neo-Kantian theory of values through his distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung, and Wittgenstein advanced Frege's way much more. Nevertheless Wittgenstein's distinction also allied with the realism of Russell and Moore, who disbelieved Frege's theory.
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