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Hokkaido University Collection of Scholarly and Academic Papers >
Graduate School of Economics and Business / Faculty of Economics and Business >
Peer-reviewed Journal Articles, etc >
Unemployment Policies in an Economy with Adverse Selection
| Title: | Unemployment Policies in an Economy with Adverse Selection |
| Authors: | Kudoh, Noritaka Browse this author →KAKEN DB |
| Keywords: | adverse selection | | sorting | | involuntary unemployment | | unemployment insurance |
| Issue Date: | 5-Apr-2007 |
| Publisher: | Blackwell Publishing |
| Journal Title: | Bulletin of Economic Research |
| Volume: | 59 |
| Issue: | 2 |
| Start Page: | 179 |
| End Page: | 196 |
| Publisher DOI: | 10.1111/j.0307-3378.2007.00253.x |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the effects of unemployment policies in a simple static general equilibrium model with adverse selection in the labor market. Firms offer a contract that induces the selfselection of workers. In equilibrium, all unskilled workers are screened out and some skilled workers are rationed out. It is shown that the provision of unemployment insurance (UI) raises involuntary unemployment by encouraging adverse selection, while unemployment assistance (UA)–or subsidy to unemployment–reduces involuntary unemployment. A simple efficiency wage model is also presented to show that either of the two policies reduces employment by taxing effort and subsidizing shirking. The key is whether the social role of unemployment is a sorting device or a worker discipline device. |
| Rights: | The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com |
| Type: | article (author version) |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2115/38126 |
| Appears in Collections: | 経済学院・経済学研究院 (Graduate School of Economics and Business / Faculty of Economics and Business) > 雑誌発表論文等 (Peer-reviewed Journal Articles, etc)
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Submitter: 工藤 教孝
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