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The promotion of cooperation by the poor in dynamic chicken games


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タイトル: The promotion of cooperation by the poor in dynamic chicken games
著者: Ito, Hiromu 著作を一覧する
Katsumata, Yuki 著作を一覧する
Hasegawa, Eisuke 著作を一覧する
Yoshimura, Jin 著作を一覧する
キーワード: Applied mathematics
Evolutionary ecology
Evolutionary theory
Population genetics
Social evolution
発行日: 2017年 2月24日
出版者: Nature Publishing Group
誌名: Scientific Reports
巻: 7
開始ページ: 43377
出版社 DOI: 10.1038/srep43377
抄録: The evolution of cooperative behavior is one of the most important issues in game theory. Previous studies have shown that cooperation can evolve only under highly limited conditions, and various modifications have been introduced to games to explain the evolution of cooperation. Recently, a utility function basic to game theory was shown to be dependent on current wealth as a conditional (state) variable in a dynamic version of utility theory. Here, we introduce this dynamic utility function to several games. Under certain conditions, poor players exhibit cooperative behavior in two types of chicken games (the hawk-dove game and the snowdrift game) but not in the prisoner's dilemma game and the stag hunt game. This result indicates that cooperation can be exhibited by the poor in some chicken games. Thus, the evolution of cooperation may not be as limited as has been suggested in previous studies.
資料タイプ: article
出現コレクション:雑誌発表論文等 (Peer-reviewed Journal Articles, etc)

提供者: 長谷川 英祐


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