What Is True Halving in the Payoff Matrix of Game Theory?

Ito, Hiromu; Katsumata, Yuki; Yoshimura, Jin; Hasegawa, Eisuke

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159670


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What Is True Halving in the Payoff Matrix of Game Theory?

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Title:	What Is True Halving in the Payoff Matrix of Game Theory?
Authors:	Ito, Hiromu Browse this author
	Katsumata, Yuki Browse this author
	Yoshimura, Jin Browse this author
	Hasegawa, Eisuke Browse this author →KAKEN DB
Issue Date:	3-Aug-2016
Publisher:	Public Library of Science
Journal Title:	PLOS ONE
Volume:	11
Issue:	8
Start Page:	e0159670
Publisher DOI:	10.1371/journal.pone.0159670
PMID:	27487194
Abstract:	In game theory, there are two social interpretations of rewards (payoffs) for decision-making strategies: (1) the interpretation based on the utility criterion derived from expected utility theory and (2) the interpretation based on the quantitative criterion (amount of gain) derived from validity in the empirical context. A dynamic decision theory has recently been developed in which dynamic utility is a conditional (state) variable that is a function of the current wealth of a decision maker. We applied dynamic utility to the equal division in dove-dove contests in the hawk-dove game. Our results indicate that under the utility criterion, the half-share of utility becomes proportional to a player's current wealth. Our results are consistent with studies of the sense of fairness in animals, which indicate that the quantitative criterion has greater validity than the utility criterion. We also find that traditional analyses of repeated games must be reevaluated.
Rights:	https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Type:	article
URI:	http://hdl.handle.net/2115/66436
Appears in Collections:	農学院・農学研究院 (Graduate School of Agriculture / Faculty of Agriculture) > 雑誌発表論文等 (Peer-reviewed Journal Articles, etc)

Submitter: 長谷川英祐

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