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Asymmetric Tax Competition in a Repeated Game Setting

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タイトル: Asymmetric Tax Competition in a Repeated Game Setting
著者: Itaya, Jun-ichi 著作を一覧する
Okamura, Makoto 著作を一覧する
Yamaguchi, Chikara 著作を一覧する
キーワード: Tax competition
Asymmetric regions
Repeated game
Tax coordination
発行日: 2006年12月11日
出版者: Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University
誌名: Discussion Paper, Series A
巻: 176
開始ページ: 1
終了ページ: 28
抄録: The purpose of this paper is to reveal how fiscal policy cooperation can result from repeated interactions in an asymmetric model of capital tax competition. We investigate how regional differences in the per capita capital endowments and/or production technologies affects the willingness of each region to cooperate in achieving tax coordination in a multi-period framework. It is shown not only that there may exist cases where tax coordination is facilitated as regional asymmetries increase but also that the larger the asymmetry in terms of the net capital-exporting positions among regions, the easier is the cooperation to sustain tax coordination. (JEL classification: H73, H77)
資料タイプ: bulletin
出現コレクション:Series A

提供者: 板谷 淳一


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