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Asymmetric Tax Competition in a Repeated Game Setting

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Title: Asymmetric Tax Competition in a Repeated Game Setting
Authors: Itaya, Jun-ichi1 Browse this author →KAKEN DB
Okamura, Makoto Browse this author
Yamaguchi, Chikara Browse this author
Authors(alt): 板谷, 淳一1
Keywords: Tax competition
Asymmetric regions
Repeated game
Tax coordination
Issue Date: 11-Dec-2006
Publisher: Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University
Journal Title: Discussion Paper, Series A
Volume: 176
Start Page: 1
End Page: 28
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to reveal how fiscal policy cooperation can result from repeated interactions in an asymmetric model of capital tax competition. We investigate how regional differences in the per capita capital endowments and/or production technologies affects the willingness of each region to cooperate in achieving tax coordination in a multi-period framework. It is shown not only that there may exist cases where tax coordination is facilitated as regional asymmetries increase but also that the larger the asymmetry in terms of the net capital-exporting positions among regions, the easier is the cooperation to sustain tax coordination. (JEL classification: H73, H77)
Type: bulletin (article)
Appears in Collections:Discussion paper > Series A

Submitter: 板谷 淳一

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