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Hokkaido University Collection of Scholarly and Academic Papers >
Graduate School of Humanities and Human Sciences / Faculty of Humanities and Human Sciences >
Peer-reviewed Journal Articles, etc >
Punishing free riders : direct and indirect promotion of cooperation
| Title: | Punishing free riders : direct and indirect promotion of cooperation |
| Other Titles: | Direct and indirect effect of punishment |
| Authors: | Shinada, Mizuho Browse this author | | Yamagishi, Toshio Browse this author →KAKEN DB |
| Keywords: | Cooperation | | Punishment | | Expectation | | Conditional cooperation | | Prisoner's dilemma |
| Issue Date: | Sep-2007 |
| Publisher: | Elsevier |
| Journal Title: | Evolution and Human Behavior |
| Volume: | 28 |
| Issue: | 5 |
| Start Page: | 330 |
| End Page: | 339 |
| Publisher DOI: | 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.04.001 |
| Abstract: | Human cooperation in a large group of genetically unrelated people is an evolutionary puzzle. Despite its costly nature, cooperative behaviour is commonly found in all human societies, a fact that has interested researchers from a wide range of disciplines including biology, economics, and psychology to name a few. Many behavioural experiments have demonstrated that cooperation within a group can be sustained when free riders are punished. We argue that punishment has both a direct and an indirect effect in promoting cooperation. The direct effect of punishment alters the consequences of cooperation and defection in such a way as to make a rational person prefer cooperation. The indirect effect of punishment promotes cooperation among conditional cooperators by providing the condition necessary for their cooperation -- i.e., the expectation that other members will also cooperate. Here we present data from two one-shot, n-person Prisoner's Dilemma games, demonstrating that the indirect effect of punishment complements the direct effect to increase cooperation in the game. Further, we show that the direct and indirect effects are robust across two forms of punishment technology; either when the punishment is voluntarily provided by game players themselves or when it is exogenously provided by the experimenter. |
| Relation: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/10905138 |
| Type: | article (author version) |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2115/33772 |
| Appears in Collections: | 文学院・文学研究院 (Graduate School of Humanities and Human Sciences / Faculty of Humanities and Human Sciences) > 雑誌発表論文等 (Peer-reviewed Journal Articles, etc)
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Submitter: 山岸 俊男
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