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ポーランドのEU加盟交渉 : 土地取引をめぐる交渉を中心にして

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Title: ポーランドのEU加盟交渉 : 土地取引をめぐる交渉を中心にして
Other Titles: Poland's EU Accession Negotiations : On Sales of Land to Foreigners
Authors: 山本, 啓太1 Browse this author
Authors(alt): Yamamoto, Keita1
Issue Date: 2004
Publisher: 北海道大学スラブ研究センター
Journal Title: スラヴ研究
Journal Title(alt): Slavic Studies
Volume: 51
Start Page: 133
End Page: 155
Abstract: Since 1990, Poland has gradually shifted the weight of its foreign policy orientation toward the West, and in 1998 actually began negotiations to join the EU (European Union). The most significant characteristic of Poland's EU accession negotiations is that the manner in which candidate countries harmonize their own laws to the EU's "acquis communautaire," the set of treaty obligations and legislation to which all member states must adhere, was discussed. In Poland 27% of the entire work force is engaged in the agriculture sector and one third of current Polish territory was German territory before World War Two. Therefore, sales of land to foreigners formed a part of the negotiations that caused controversy in Poland. The negotiations revolved around the "transitional arrangements," or how long a time limitation Poland should get on the sales of land. The coalition governments in Poland negotiated not only at the international negotiation table, but also with domestic forces. From the aforementioned reasons, the author of this article uses the "Two-level games" framework, which was outlined by Robert D. Putnam. According to Putnam, the international negotiation process is divided into Level 1 (negotiations at the international table) and Level 2 (negotiations with domestic forces). The author discusses the concepts of "ratification" and "Win-Set" suggested by Putnam, as well as the "preferences of domestic actors," and "the structure of domestic preferences" suggested by Helen V. Milner. Section 1 outlines how the preferences of domestic actors and the structure of domestic preferences influenced the negotiation process, and how ratification and Win-Set were influenced by the preferences of the domestic actors and the structure of domestic preferences. The focus of Section 2 is the background of the political parties' preferences. From 1997 to September 2001, the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) and the Freedom Union (UW) (the UW left the coalition in June 2000) had formed the coalition government, and since October 2001 the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), which had formed an electoral coalition with the Labour Union (UP), together with the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) had become the ruling party. The AWS and the UW have an origin in the Solidarność movement during the 1980s. However, both forces' preferences are different. Within the AWS, the Christian National Union (ZChN) agreed to the European integration on the condition that long limitation to the liberalization of the sales of land to foreigners is granted. On the other hand, the UW supported the European integration very actively, demanding the reduction of the transitional arrangements. The SLD has its origins in the Polish United Worker's Party (PZPR), which was a ruling party of the communist regime before 1989. The SLD has shown a preference to proceed with the European integration and they prefer shorter limitation on the sales of land. The SLD's constituency is made up from members of trade unions, and from the secular people. Moreover, the SLD has recognized the failure of the economic policy during the 1970s and 1980s. The SLD's constituency and these learning effects formed the above preferences. The PSL was named the United Peasant Party (ZSL), a satellite party of the PZPR before 1989, but changed its name to the PSL after merging with other parties. The PSL's constituency is mainly formed by farmers. With time the Polish society recognized the cost of integration to the EU, and the support to join the EU amongst the PSL constituency fell. Therefore, within the PSL there was skepticism towards European integration, while simultaneously recognizing the necessity for the integration. Therefore, the AWS and the PSL have shown similar preferences, and the SLD and the UW have shown similar preferences, regarding the European integration and the sales of land to foreigners. However, the coalition government was formed between the AWS and the UW in 1997, and the next one was formed between the SLD and the PSL in 2001. The paradoxical structure of the combination of the parties forming the coalition government greatly influenced the negotiations. In Chapter 3, the details of the negotiations are analyzed. During screening with the EU in December 1998, Agenda-setting was implemented, and in July 1999, discussions about the length of the transitional arrangements were carried out within the coalition government. The ZChN in the AWS demanded that the limitation must be 18 years. The reason was that they recognized that there is a fear inside the Polish society that foreigners would buy up the cheap land in Poland. The ZChN's proposition became the position of the Polish government, and it remained such until the next general election in the autumn of 2001. The domestic structure of the preference had an overwhelming influence on the decision. The EU side had preferred a shorter limitation on the sales of land than the 18 years, which prevented the realization of the Win-Set during the AWS-UW and the AWS government. After the general election in 2001, another coalition government was formed, composed of the SLD-UP and the PSL. There were three negotiation positions. Some of the opposition parties and some groups within the PSL were opposed to the initial position formed in November 2001 in which the limitation of sales of land was shortened to 12 years, as well as allowing EU farmers to buy agricultural land after 3 years of leasing the land. In the next position of December 2001, Poland demanded from the EU side that the duration of lease be 3 years or 7 years, depending on the region. This position was a result of PSL pressure on the government. Accepting the requirements of Poland in the second position, the EU showed a third position in January 2002. The EU demanded that the counting of the beginning of the lease of the agricultural land be earlier so that EU farmers could buy land in Poland earlier. The PSL was opposed to the EU's position, but after domestic discussions on the third position, the PSL finally accepted the position and the negotiations on the sales of land were closed. The Eurosceptics [Self-Defence (Samoobrona), the League of Polish Families (LPR), the Law and Justice (PiS)] opposed the entire negotiation process of the Polish government. The most important reason for the realization of the Win-Set is that the domestic structure of preferences in Poland had been changed as a result of the general election in 2001 and the preferences in Poland came close to those of the EU. The preferences of the SLD-UP had the greatest role in changing the domestic preferences. However, there was a force inside the PSL which opposed the compromise to the EU, therefore the coalition government had to amend the negotiation position and include the demands of the opposition within the PSL into the agreement with the EU. During the AWS-UW government, the negotiation position had been ratified at Level 2, but the negotiations with the EU had failed. There was no Win-Set. Later, Win-Set was realized because of the negotiations of the SLD-UP-PSL government, but the size of Win-Set at Level 2 had been reduced. The negotiations on the agricultural subsidies are not addressed in this article. Poland negotiated more agricultural subsidies than the EU had suggested. This has alleviated the fear of farmers in Poland and it has lead to the widening of the range of the ratification at Level 2, which resulted in the success of the whole negotiation process. This issue will be raised in the next article.
Type: bulletin (article)
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2115/39050
Appears in Collections:51

 

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