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Partial Harmonization of Corporate Taxes in an Asymmetric Repeated Game Setting

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Title: Partial Harmonization of Corporate Taxes in an Asymmetric Repeated Game Setting
Authors: Itaya, Jun-ichi1 Browse this author →KAKEN DB
Okamura, Makoto2 Browse this author
Yamaguchi, Chikara3 Browse this author
Authors(alt): 板谷, 淳一1
岡村, 誠2
山口, 力3
Keywords: Tax coordination
Asymmetric countries
Repeated game
Tax competition
Issue Date: Nov-2010
Publisher: Graduate School of Economics & Business Administration, Hokkaido University
Journal Title: Discussion Paper, Series A
Volume: 229
Start Page: 1
End Page: 35
Abstract: This paper investigates the conditions under which partial harmonization for capital taxation is sustained in a repeated interactions model of tax competition when there are three heterogenous countries with respect to their capital endowments. We show that regardless of the structure of the coalition (i.e., any group of countries), whether partial tax harmonization is sustainable or not crucially depends on the capital endowment of the median country relative to those of the large and small countries. The most noteworthy finding is that the closer the capital endowment of the median country to the average capital endowment of the large and small countries, the less likely is the tax harmonization including the median country to prevail and the more likely is the partial tax harmonization excluding the median country to prevail.
Type: bulletin (article)
Appears in Collections:Discussion paper > Series A

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