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Epistemic Libertarian Paternalism

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Title: Epistemic Libertarian Paternalism
Authors: Miyazono, Kengo Browse this author →KAKEN DB
Issue Date: 27-Apr-2023
18-Mar-2023
Publisher: Springer
Journal Title: Erkenntnis
Publisher DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00664-9
Abstract: Libertarian paternalism is a weak form of paternalism that recommends nudges rather than bans, restrictions, or other strong interventions. Nudges influence people's choice by modifying contextual factors (the choice architecture). This paper explores the possibility of an epistemic analogue of libertarian paternalism. What I call epistemic libertarian paternalism is a weak form of epistemic paternalism that recommends epistemic nudges rather than stronger paternalistic interventions. Epistemic nudges influence people's beliefs and judgments by modifying contextual factors (the epistemic choice architecture). The main aim of this paper is to defend epistemic libertarian paternalism from the irrationality problem, which I take to be the most urgent problem for epistemic libertarian paternalism; given how epistemic nudges work (i.e. they typically co-opt psychological biases), nudged beliefs are irrational. In response to the irrationality problem, I admit that nudged beliefs are often (not always, though) irrational, but insist that there are conditions in which epistemic nudging can be justifiable nonetheless. I will propose two conditions that are jointly sufficient for justifiable epistemic nudging: Veridicality Condition (which says that nudged beliefs are more likely to be true than non-nudged beliefs) and Not-More-Irrationality Condition (which says that nudged beliefs are not more likely to be irrational than non-nudged beliefs).
Type: article
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2115/89059
Appears in Collections:文学院・文学研究院 (Graduate School of Humanities and Human Sciences / Faculty of Humanities and Human Sciences) > 雑誌発表論文等 (Peer-reviewed Journal Articles, etc)

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