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Partial Tax Coordination in a Repeated Game Setting
| Title: | Partial Tax Coordination in a Repeated Game Setting |
| Authors: | Itaya, Jun-ichi Browse this author →KAKEN DB | | Okamura, Makoto Browse this author | | Yamaguchi, Chikara Browse this author |
| Keywords: | Partial tax coordination | | Repeated game | | Tax competition |
| Issue Date: | 19-Oct-2008 |
| Publisher: | Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University |
| Journal Title: | Discussion Paper, Series A |
| Volume: | 201 |
| Start Page: | 1 |
| End Page: | 28 |
| Abstract: | This paper addresses the problem of partial tax coordination among regional or national sovereign governments in a repeated game setting. We show that partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the number of regions in a coalition subgroup is smaller and the number of existing regions in the entire economy is larger. We also show that under linear utility, partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the preference for a local public good is stronger. The main driving force for these results is the response of the intensity of tax competition. The increased (decreased) intensity of tax competition makes partial tax coordination more (less) sustainable. |
| Type: | bulletin (article) |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2115/34777 |
| Appears in Collections: | Discussion paper > Series A
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Submitter: 板谷 淳一
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