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Partial Tax Coordination in a Repeated Game Setting

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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:http://hdl.handle.net/2115/34777

Title: Partial Tax Coordination in a Repeated Game Setting
Authors: Itaya, Jun-ichi Browse this author
Okamura, Makoto Browse this author
Yamaguchi, Chikara Browse this author
Keywords: Partial tax coordination
Repeated game
Tax competition
Issue Date: 19-Oct-2008
Publisher: Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University
Journal Title: Discussion Paper, Series A
Volume: 201
Start Page: 1
End Page: 28
Abstract: This paper addresses the problem of partial tax coordination among regional or national sovereign governments in a repeated game setting. We show that partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the number of regions in a coalition subgroup is smaller and the number of existing regions in the entire economy is larger. We also show that under linear utility, partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the preference for a local public good is stronger. The main driving force for these results is the response of the intensity of tax competition. The increased (decreased) intensity of tax competition makes partial tax coordination more (less) sustainable.
Type: bulletin
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2115/34777
Appears in Collections:Series A

Submitter: 板谷 淳一

 

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