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Tax Rate Harmonization, Renegotiation and Asymmetric Tax Competition for Profits with Repeated Interaction

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タイトル: Tax Rate Harmonization, Renegotiation and Asymmetric Tax Competition for Profits with Repeated Interaction
著者: Eggert, Wolfgang 著作を一覧する
Itaya, Jun-ichi 著作を一覧する
キーワード: corporate taxation
tax coordination
multinational firms
発行日: 2009年10月13日
出版者: Graduate School of Economics & Business Administration, Hokkaido University
誌名: Discussion Paper, Series A
巻: 214
開始ページ: 1
終了ページ: 30
抄録: This paper analyzes a model of corporate tax competition with repeated interaction and with the strategic use of profit shifting within multinationals. We show that international tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the degree of asymmetry in terms of productivity differences between countries is smaller, or if concealment costs of profit shifting are larger when the tax authorities adopt grim-trigger strategies. Allowing for renegotiation in the tax harmonization process generally requires more patient tax authorities to support tax harmonization as a subgame perfect equilibrium. We find somewhat paradoxical situations where higher costs of profit shifting make international tax arrangements less sustainable under weakly-renegotiation-proof strategies.
資料タイプ: bulletin (article)
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2115/39483
出現コレクション:Series A

提供者: 板谷 淳一

 

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